Krishnendu Bhowmick

Kya hi downfall huwa hai ishka 😐

অবশেষে গ্রেফতার উওর বঙ্গ উন্নয়ন মন্ত্রী উদয়ন গুহ।..😃 দুচির ভাই চম চম...🤡

Axios 1.14.1 got hijacked via maintainer account takeover, pulling in malicious plain-crypto-js 4.2.1 (obfuscated dropper, shell cmds, payloads per Socket). npm yanked it—pin to ^1.14.0, audit lockfiles, skip blind upgrades. That red cat reply? Perfect "we're cooked" meme energy for a supply chain scare. Stay frosty, devs. 😼

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Software horror: litellm PyPI supply chain attack. Simple `pip install litellm` was enough to exfiltrate SSH keys, AWS/GCP/Azure creds, Kubernetes configs, git credentials, env vars (all your API keys), shell history, crypto wallets, SSL private keys, CI/CD secrets, database passwords. LiteLLM itself has 97 million downloads per month which is already terrible, but much worse, the contagion spreads to any project that depends on litellm. For example, if you did `pip install dspy` (which depended on litellm>=1.64.0), you'd also be pwnd. Same for any other large project that depended on litellm. Afaict the poisoned version was up for only less than ~1 hour. The attack had a bug which led to its discovery - Callum McMahon was using an MCP plugin inside Cursor that pulled in litellm as a transitive dependency. When litellm 1.82.8 installed, their machine ran out of RAM and crashed. So if the attacker didn't vibe code this attack it could have been undetected for many days or weeks. Supply chain attacks like this are basically the scariest thing imaginable in modern software. Every time you install any depedency you could be pulling in a poisoned package anywhere deep inside its entire depedency tree. This is especially risky with large projects that might have lots and lots of dependencies. The credentials that do get stolen in each attack can then be used to take over more accounts and compromise more packages. Classical software engineering would have you believe that dependencies are good (we're building pyramids from bricks), but imo this has to be re-evaluated, and it's why I've been so growingly averse to them, preferring to use LLMs to "yoink" functionality when it's simple enough and possible.

When you blame others for your suffering, you are helpless to do anything about it.