The Good Lobby

The Commission just presented the most structurally ambitious reform of EU policy-making since the Better Regulation Agenda in 2002, and the most ideologically charged. Where previous reforms improved the BR toolkit as a governance instrument, this one repurposes it entirely, deploying it simultaneously: •to erode procedural safeguards (two-tiered IAs, formalised derogations, flexible consultation) •to systematically dismantle parts of the existing acquis (Deep Cleaning) •to centralise implementation and enforcement (what I’d call the federal turn) Combined with the anti-gold-plating drive and the formalised derogation powers, the Communication effectively creates an institutionalised channel through which external (including the US administration) deregulatory pressure can be translated into EU legislative action, with reduced procedural safeguards and limited independent oversight. Thread follows. Full Communication: commission.europa.eu/document/downl…

Today the EU Commission unveils how it plans to write laws going forward. After 10 omnibus packages passed without proper impact assessments or public consultation — justified by urgency and geopolitical shifts — the question is simple but consequential for 450 million citizens: Will the Commission codify democratic safeguards, or institutionalise their absence? The continued embrace of omnibus packages and "reality checks" as standard tools - as confirmed in "One Europe, One Market" suggests the 2025 approach is being entrenched, not corrected. As Commissioner @VDombrovskis releases the Better Regulation Communication today, join us on Thursday 30 April, 4.30–5.30 pm CEST to unpack what it means: 🎓 Claudio Radaelli — Professor of Comparative Public Policy, @EUI_EU and the most prolific and cited scholar in the field 🏛️ Elizabeth Golberg — former Director of Smart Regulation, @EU_Commission, who shaped the Better Regulation agenda from within the Secretariat General 🔍 Shari Hinds — Senior Policy Officer, @TI_EU, tracking democratic accountability in EU lawmaking ⚖️ Alberto Alemanno — Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law, HEC Paris and Founder @TheGoodLobby, who coordinated a submission by 50+ law professors on codifying Better Regulation as a constitutional requirement 📖 Background reading: lnkd.in/e_km9iVi 📝 REGISTER here: lnkd.in/eCEfmC92

Still no response from @EU_Commission on #FurFreeEurope. The deadline has passed. 1.5 million citizens are still waiting. The #EuropeanCitizensInitiative must be taken seriously. 👉 Time to act.

How paradoxical to see Americans rejecting data centres, while Europeans competing to attract them. This is part of Europe’s inferiority complex. Attracting hyperscaler infrastructure feels like securing a seat at the AI table. Yet this will backfire ft.com/content/ba4e8e…

No, you’re dismantling the EU not only its institutions No, you’re weakening our Union and capacity to project power and defend itself And no, you’re not completing the single market

Unable to reform at home, German Chancellor Merz is now blaming 'Brussels' for his shortcomings. He wants to dismantle EU policymaking and its institutions, by proposing (in a conservative draft strategy paper to be presented to Commission President von der Leyen in Berlin today): ▪ A new oversight body with a “fundamental veto right” over any new Commission legislation ▪ EU institutions ordered to adopt a “more restrictive interpretation of their powers” and cut staff (EU Dogeization) ▪ Member states’ budget contributions made conditional on deregulation progress (!) Three reasons to be concerned (at least!) Legally: the Commission’s monopoly on legislative initiative is guaranteed by Article 17(2) TEU. Anybody wielding a hard veto over that initiative is manifestly unconstitutional, and even a Treaty revision could not accommodate that revolutionary tweak without dismantling the whole construct underpinning the EU legal order. Empirically: there is no serious evidence that EU regulation is the primary driver of German economic underperformance. Germany’s contraction stems from energy costs spiked by the Iran war fallout, structural labor shortages, and two decades of domestic underinvestment. Deregulation fixes none of them. Politically, Merz is caught in a domestic bind, with SPD coalition partners blocking reform, a growth forecast just halved, and a debt brake legacy constraining fiscal space. Unable to deliver at home, shifting the blame Brussels comes as a short-term electoral fix. Yet what a genuine EU competitiveness agenda would require, from completing capital markets union, deepening the single market in services, to coordinated defense industrial investment, is conspicuously absent from all 27 demands. Von der Leyen had the better argument at Alden Biesen: gold-plating at national level does more damage to the single market than most EU legislation. She was right. She should hold that line today. Will she - while playing at home? Read @noyan_oliver 's piece in @POLITICOEurope politico.eu/article/german…

WOW: The US Ambassador just told Europe it needs more fossil fuels to join the AI economy. That’s a TRAP designed to deepen Europe’s energy dependence on the US, with demands to weaken EU methane standards as the price of entry. The real AI energy race is won by cheap, scalable, clean power not premium-priced imported LNG. Europe isn’t energy-poor but it’s been told to feel energy-poor so it buys American.

You can’t electrify Europe on rhetoric alone, @vonderleyen! You dismantled the Green Deal’s regulatory architecture (CSRD, CSDDD, carbon reporting) that’d have allowed Europe to reduce its carbon dependence, by moving capital toward renewables and introducing supply chain rules that would have made decarbonisation a corporate obligation.

Russia is no longer represented in the EU Council, yet the US permanently embedded into its membership’s mindset #EUCO

The Baltics could be the target, Putin might be tempted, and our allies are currently in a tough spot - warns Landsbergis landsbergis.com/the-baltic-sta…

How is Europe responding to the energy crunch caused by the US war on Iran? Across the continent, national governments are frantically introducing tax breaks on diesel and petrol to shield consumers from rising prices. That costs billions in lost revenue, and most of that money flows to the wealthiest, who consume more energy than lower-income households. Worse, it kills the incentive to consume less or switch to electric vehicles, directly undermining Europe’s own electrification strategy, its best path to breaking free from energy dependency. There’s a better way and Europe has already used it. In 2022, the EU introduced a windfall profits tax on energy companies (under Article 122’s emergency powers clause). Member states raised billions. The same tool is available today. Oil companies are making record profits from this crisis. Tax those windfalls. Redistribute the gains to those most affected by rising energy costs. So why isn’t President von der Leyen proposing exactly that? It’s hard to imagine a more popular policy across Europe right now or a clearer opportunity to show that the EU works for its citizens, not for oil companies. To know more tune in @euscreams euscream.com/categories/equ…

EU govts reportedly ready to embrace enhanced cooperation to fast-track single market completion. A “two-speed Europe” is no longer taboo: Europeans can no longer afford the luxury of waiting for everyone to agree à la Merkel. For decades, enhanced cooperation was theoretically available but politically toxic: no govt wanted to be left behind or seen splitting the bloc. If this holds, it’s a quiet revolution. All eyes on #EUCO Cyprus this week #SingleMarket #EU #EnhancedCooperation politico.eu/article/eu-cra…

Let me get this straight: I CAN’T celebrate Orbán’s defeat. Not yet. Here’s why I remain cautious 🧵 1. Magyar is no outsider He’s a Fidesz insider, shaped by the same political culture, networks, and system that produced Orbán. He didn’t run against Orbánism. He ran against Orbán. This is a crucial distinction, most observers are glossing over in their relief. 2. Magyar’s politics aren’t that different On migration, national sovereignty, and illiberal reflexes, Magyar is closer to Orbán than his voters may realise. This may case some surprises within #EUCO 3. A 2/3 majority is a necessary yet insufficient condition to uncapture a captured state Orbán spent 16 years hollowing out courts, prosecutors, media, and public procurement. A parliamentary supermajority is a necessary yet not sufficient condition for restoration. Poland overturned its illiberal government in 2023. It is still fighting judge by judge, outlet by outlet. 4. This victory came too late, and that’s on European leaders EU rule of law conditionality worked. Freezing funds helped produce this result. But it came too timidly and too slowly, held hostage by national leaders unwilling to confront a fellow head of government. Years of backsliding were tolerated in the name of Council consensus. The lesson must be applied faster, to Slovakia, and beyond. 5. Orbán doesn’t disappear He retains a transnational network; CPAC, Patriots for Europe, Trump’s orbit, Kremlin-adjacent channels. Losing ‘Budapest’ doesn’t mean losing Brussels or Washington. He will regroup, reframe, and re-export his model. What if Orban hegemonic infrastructure outlasts the election? I hope to be proven wrong on each of these points #hungary #orban #magyar

RT @alemannoEU: BREAKING: Viktor Orban concedes. 16 years. Over. Hungary just proved that even captured democracies can vote their way out…

Hungary’s historic, record-turnout election proves the best possible sign of a lively democracy #hungary

What if Sánchez’s rapprochement to China isn’t diversification but a new dependency, and worse, one that splits Europe while China watches? Every member state running its own trade policy is exactly the fragmentation Beijing (plus Washington and Moscow) want. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

Orbanists under pressure

Why Hungary (and the EU) need a redemocratisation plan My take on the Hungarian elections was published across 20 media outlet, from El Pais to Libération albertoalemanno.substack.com/p/why-hungary-… Hungary