Idiocracy

BREAKING: The Federal Reserve is asking major US banks for details about their exposure to private credit following a surge in redemptions from the funds and a rise in troubled loans in the industry, per Bloomberg

Just IN:— Despite requests, Israeli journalists & media teams have been barred from entering Pakistan to cover the US-Iran talks in Islamabad.

우리는 이스라엘 외교부가 대통령께서 특정사안에 대한 의견이 아닌 보편적 인권에 대한 신념을 표명한 글의 의도를 잘못 이해하고 이를 반박한 것에 대해 유감스럽게 생각합니다. 우리 정부는 이스라엘이 지적한 테러를 포함, 모든 형태의 폭력과 반인권적 행태를 단호히 반대하며, 국제인도법과 인권은 예외없이 준수되어야 한다는 입장을 일관되게 견지하여 왔습니다. 아울러 홀로코스트로 인해 이스라엘이 겪은 형언할 수 없는 고통에 대해 늘 마음을 함께 하고 있으며, 다시 한번 홀로코스트 피해자에 대한 깊은 애도를 표명합니다. We regret that the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs misunderstood the intent of the President's remarks—which were an expression of his convictions regarding universal human rights rather than an opinion on any specific issue—and subsequently countered them. The Government of the Republic of Korea remains steadfast in its opposition to all forms of violence and anti-humanitarian acts, including the acts of terrorism pointed out by Israel. We have consistently maintained the position that international humanitarian law and human rights must be upheld without exception. Furthermore, we continue to empathize deeply with the unspeakable suffering endured by Israel due to the Holocaust, and we once again express our profound condolences to the victims of the Holocaust.

We said if Hormuz stayed close until mid-April, global supply chains were mathematically certain to begin collapsing, including in the US. Right on cue, on April 10👇 Things will rapidly get much worse from here if Hormuz stays closed “What’s the trade?” = Stockpile essentials

“I fire 50-60 bullets every day, I've stopped counting kills. I have no idea how many I've killed, a lot. Children." This is at an aid drop-off location And every fucking day people defend this. from the average idiot on here to the most powerful politicians in the world.

🇺🇸BREAKING | U.S. officials told the Wall Street Journal that additional attack aircraft (presumably A-10 Thunderbolt IIs) have recently landed in the Middle East, within the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. 🪖 In the coming days, up to 2,000 soldiers from the Army's elite 82nd Airborne Division, as well as thousands of sailors and Marines, are expected to arrive. 🔹 The strike carrier group of the USS George H.W. Bush and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (from the USS BOXER assault landing ship) are again heading toward the region; their arrival will likely take more than a week. See the latest updates with us: @visionergeo

Reminder that under Obama's Iran Deal the Iranians shipped 98 percent of their enriched uranium out of the country - without a pointless and devastating war.

The war that FDD steered the U.S. into with Iran has now drained for years the critical munitions that the U.S. had been relying on for conventional deterrence in Asia while also demonstrating an inability to defend regional bases against the strike munitions of a power far weaker than China. If your goal was avoiding war in Asia the silver lining of this may now be that regional powers and Taiwan decide resisting China is futile and the U.S. is incapable of defending them and just make arrangements accordingly. The leadership of the Taiwanese KMT party is in Beijing today.

A whole convoy of empty oil tankers on the way to the US to fill up. It could have been Canada but we have land acknowledgments to do and carbon tax instead.

"The Times’s analysis shows that the damage was often caused by strikes in crowded neighborhoods" "In most instances examined by The Times, the intended target of a strike was not clear. In some cases, schools and health care facilities ... were directly hit."

About 70-75% of Singapore’s crude comes via the Strait of Hormuz. Keeping the fuel flowing requires a permanent detente with Iran.

#Iran’s Delegation in Islamabad: Signaling Strength Before Entering the Room 🔹After a full day of mixed signals, denials, and shifting conditions, the Iranian delegation finally arrived in Islamabad. The delay was part of a deliberate effort to shape the terms under which Iran is seen to be entering these talks. 🔹For most of the day, it remained genuinely unclear whether Tehran would participate at all. Early reports of the delegation’s arrival were officially denied, and Iranian messaging emphasized that without the inclusion of Lebanon in the ceasefire framework, there would be no negotiations. 🔹By the early evening, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf added another condition, publicly calling for the unfreezing of Iranian assets. This was less about sequencing demands and more about reinforcing a broader point that Iran is not approaching these talks from a position of urgency. 🔹These moves were clearly aimed at countering the narrative coming out of Washington that Iran was eager, if not desperate, to negotiate. Tehran’s objective was to reverse that framing before the talks even began. 🔹Even the timing of the arrival reinforced this posture. The U.S. delegation had already been in Islamabad for hours before Iran confirmed its participation. The optics were carefully managed to underline that Tehran is not the party seeking engagement at any cost. 🔹At the same time, the composition of the Iranian delegation offers important insight into how Tehran is approaching this round of negotiations. 🔹Ghalibaf’s role as head of the delegation is particularly notable. This is not a position typically held by a Speaker of Parliament. Under more conventional circumstances, one would expect the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to lead. 🔹His presence instead reflects something more structural about the current distribution of authority within the Iranian system, and how that is being projected externally. 🔹Beyond leadership, the delegation itself is highly structured, with distinct economic, military, political, and legal committees, each led by senior officials. This is not a small, exploratory team. 🔹The seniority of the delegations on both sides suggests that unlike previous negotiations, participants appear to have the authority to make decisions in real time, without constant referral back to their respective capitals. This could make the process more efficient and increase the likelihood of substantive outcomes. 🔹In this context, the appointment of JD Vance to lead the American delegation has been interpreted in different ways in Tehran. Some view him as relatively less hawkish compared to other figures in the administration, which could facilitate progress. Others see this as a test; both of his diplomatic capabilities and of whether perceived moderation will translate into actual flexibility. 🔹In contrast to earlier pre-war talks in Oman, which were limited in scope and personnel, the current setup points to preparations for a far more substantive and wide-ranging negotiating process. 🔹At the same time, Iran is entering these talks without relinquishing its most important sources of leverage. Maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted, and there is little indication from Iranian messaging that this pressure will be eased in the near term. On the contrary, officials have emphasized that the situation in the strait has fundamentally changed. 🔹This serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it is aimed at increasing pressure on the United States to restrain Israeli operations in Lebanon. On the other, it preserves a coercive bargaining tool that can be used during the negotiations. 🔹The ongoing discussion within the Iranian parliament about formalizing stricter control over the strait – despite the impracticality of some of the proposed measures – should be understood in this context. It is part of a broader signaling strategy rather than a literal policy blueprint. 🔹There are also early indications that this pressure may be having some effect. Media reports suggest that Trump has already urged Netanyahu to reconsider military operations in Lebanon in order to avoid jeopardizing the Islamabad talks. 🔹From Tehran’s perspective, this reinforces a key strategic point, that Lebanon is not a secondary issue, but an integral part of the same regional equation. 🔹Domestically, the Iranian leadership has also moved to stabilize the political environment ahead of the negotiations. 🔹A statement by Mojtaba Khamenei the day before played a central role in this regard. He emphasized that Iran does not seek war, but will not abandon its rights, while at the same time reaffirming the unity of Iran’s broader regional alliance structure. 🔹Importantly, he also called on supporters to remain mobilized, making clear that the ceasefire should not be interpreted as a reason for disengagement. This combination of reassurance and resolve appears to have reduced visible criticism from more hardline constituencies, at least for now. 🔹Alongside this, state institutions, particularly the judiciary, have signaled that public disagreement and internal divisions will not be tolerated. This has contributed to a more controlled and cohesive domestic atmosphere in the immediate lead-up to the talks. 🔹At the same time, Iran’s external messaging has remained firmly anchored in deterrence. A statement from the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters emphasized that the armed forces remain fully prepared and ready to respond if hostilities resume. 🔹Iranian armed forces have also continued to signal that Hezbollah remains part of a unified strategic framework, warning that further Israeli escalation could trigger a broader response. 🔹At the same time, Iranian analysis of developments in Lebanon reflects growing concern about parallel diplomatic tracks. 🔹Reports of contacts between the Lebanese government and Israel, facilitated by the United States, are being interpreted as an attempt to sideline Iran and limit its influence over any eventual arrangement. 🔹From this perspective, even if a ceasefire emerges in Lebanon, Tehran risks being excluded from shaping its terms or claiming political credit. 🔹In practical terms, the results of Iran’s pressure so far appear limited. There are indications of partial de-escalation, including a halt in strikes on Beirut, but no comprehensive ceasefire has been achieved. 🔹Israel, for its part, has shown little willingness to commit to arrangements that would significantly constrain its operational freedom. 🔹This brings the focus back to Islamabad itself. 🔹Iran has made clear that physical presence does not automatically translate into substantive engagement. Participation in negotiations remains conditional on whether its core demands are addressed. 🔹Another open question is whether the talks will be conducted directly or through intermediaries, as in previous rounds. The format will be an important indicator of how far both sides are willing to go. 🔹The central message is consistent throughout. Tehran is willing to engage diplomatically, but it is determined to do so on terms that reinforce, rather than undermine, its position.

EU boosts imports of Russian gas as Middle East crisis squeezes supplies-FT

what a difference a month makes, must be why they pay him the big bucks

@DilanMakoo Easier to exploit these people for own gain.

دو گروه از فرماندهان سپاه از حملات اسرائیل مصون ماندند، اول خرفت‌ترین آدم‌ها که در عرصه کار خودشان هیچ تحولی ایجاد نکردند. دوم فرماندهان با سابقه فساد مالی شدید در قرارگاه‌ها و هلدینگ‌های وابسته.

Iran is not Assad. Putin let Syria fall when saving it cost more than it was worth. Iran is a peer, not a client. It has its own revolutionary ideology, its own reach, and a proven ability to choke the global economy. It creates pressure on America in ways that benefit Russia.

The Fox clip below is an example of the Israeli influenced media echo chamber- President Trump’s policy for Iran has always been “No Nuclear Weapons”, not zero enrichment (see Truth post). The Israelis want zero enrichment b/c it is nearly impossible to enforce, is a non starter for Iran & requires regime change. No Nuclear weapons is obtainable & POTUS’s redline, zero enrichment is an Israeli/Neocon ploy to force conflict. x.com/allenanalysis/…

وفدان سعودي وصيني وصلا إسلام آباد 🇨🇳 🇸🇦

تیم مذاکره کننده #ایران هیاتی ۷۰ نفره است که حدود ۲۶ نفر آن عضو کمیته‌های فنی ‌و تخصصی هستند. تیم آمریکایی با حدود ۳۰۰ نفر به ریاست جی‌دی ونس و حضور افرادی چون ویتکاف و کوشنر هستند. تمرکز ایران، ‌گفتگوهای جدی و تخصصی در چارچوب طرح ۱۰ بندی. تمرکز آمریکا، نمایش سیاسی؟