Chtongai

@aime_mwizaa You run

If condom is not available what can someone use as protection? 🤔

The countdown continues only 4 days to go. Munhuwese kusero rake, ko musangano wakasimbira kumasero ka.

@LindaDadisoM @Tererai89 @DUwa_C Anogona kungotanha ka🤣🤣🤣

@Tererai89 @DUwa_C Drink water please! 🤣😂🤣

What do men actually want?

@DUwa_C Peace and tranquility

Ambassador Matemadanda was a hero. He fought and stood for what was right for the attainment of independence. A true gallant son of the soil.

CA3 showed that the second republic's commitment to transparent, consultative and responsive governance. The government and parliament actively listened to the views of citizens, legal experts and civic organizations to refine the bill into a progressive piece of legislation. CA3

Learning is the only thing that remains when everything else has been forgotten.

Apa pataurwa muono unosimudzira musangano ne nyika. Those with ears let them "ear", those with eyes let them "eye". Nokuti hatigoni kurega kutaura izvotakaona neizvotakanzwa. @Tererai89 @padare @VaMabhena263

@Tererai89 Ukuziva wani 27 chakachaya

@Ctongai_Chitepo Ndotononokerwa

Musangano wakasimbira kuma Cell. Munhu wese ku cello rake

The district is not inaccessible: Morgan Tsvangirai held a rally at Binga Rest Lodge in June 2013, confirming the district can be reached when the political calculus justifies the visit. On 19 March 2022, at a by-election rally at Siabuwa High School in Binga, President Mnangagwa was widely reported to have stated: “Since independence in 1980, we did not visit this area under President Mugabe.” The campaign record is not a commentary on the character of successive administrations. Among the structural factors that shaped it, the arithmetic of a direct popular vote stands out: Binga could not deliver a margin that justified the visit. The ZEC data produces one further finding that the current debate has not engaged. Binga’s registered electorate is 60.46% female, 6.51 percentage points above the national average of 53.96%. Harare Metropolitan sits at 50.78%. The community most structurally invisible to direct presidential campaign arithmetic is simultaneously a community where women constitute a registered voter supermajority. Under Clause 3, the MPs representing those women carry votes no aspirant can discount. Grindle’s comparative analysis of how political executives shape public resource allocation in developing states, the central argument of Jobs for the Boys (Harvard University Press, 2012), and Burgess et al.’s empirical demonstration that expenditure follows executive selection arithmetic establish that when the incentive structure changes, the allocation pattern follows. For Binga’s two MPs, the structural consequence is direct: a presidential aspirant who must court their votes has, for the first time, an institutional reason to engage the constituency’s infrastructure deficit, healthcare access, and development needs as a matter of executive priority rather than electoral afterthought. This argument operates on different terrain from the legal debate about Section 328 and the referendum requirement, but it connects to the same constitutional moment. The distinction between Section 95(2)(b), which governs how long a term lasts, and Section 91(2), which limits how long a person may serve, is the legal architecture within which CA3’s minority representation consequence becomes possible: the cycle changes, the two-term ceiling does not, and the parliamentary selection mechanism that results from that combination creates the incentive architecture this piece documents. The government’s citation of Botswana as a positive precedent requires direct engagement. Botswana has operated a parliamentary selection model since 1966, but the Botswana Democratic Party held an unbroken parliamentary majority from independence to 2024, meaning the president emerged automatically from the dominant party’s internal choice without any requirement to secure support beyond its own caucus. The Basarwa and San communities, roughly 3% of Botswana’s population and dispersed across the Kalahari, have been systematically excluded from political representation under this model, as the 2001 Kamanakao High Court ruling on the Wayeyi paramount chief’s exclusion from the House of Chiefs and the subsequent Balopi Commission process confirm. CA3’s absolute majority threshold creates a different structural condition from Botswana’s automatic majority mechanism. Lijphart’s framework, developed across Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press, 1999; 2nd ed. 2012) and his 1996 analysis in the American Political Science Review, explains why: territorially concentrated minorities can be protected through federal and territorial arrangements, but geographically dispersed minorities require consensus institutions. In Zimbabwe, the Tonga, Kalanga, Venda, Nambya, Shangani and Khoisan communities hold constitutional language recognition under the 2013 Constitution. But they have neither territorial autonomy nor proportional representation.

Presidential Selection and Zimbabwe’s Minority Communities By Tafadzwa Wakatama On 16 February 2026, the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment No. 3) H.B.I. Bill 2026, CA3, was gazetted for a 90-day public consultation period constitutionally required before parliamentary consideration. Among its 21 amendments, the Bill proposes replacing the direct popular election of the President with selection by a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament. The government’s stated precedents are Botswana and South Africa. Among the concerns the opposition has placed before the public consultation process is the claim that parliamentary selection diminishes the voice of minority communities. In this post, I examine that claim using the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, ZEC, polling station record for 2018, and find that it does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Executive selection systems tend to produce their distributive consequences not through the intentions of candidates but through the rational calculus that governs where political attention, campaign investment, and eventually public resources flow. Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria and Padro i Miquel demonstrated this with road expenditure data across six decades of Kenyan electoral history: districts whose populations aligned with the sitting president received roughly three times the road investment of those that did not (American Economic Review, 105(6), 2015). Van de Walle’s survey of 87 African multiparty elections identifies the same logic as the defining characteristic of African presidentialism: resources follow the arithmetic that produced the executive, and that arithmetic determines which communities receive attention and which do not (Journal of Modern African Studies, 2003). Clause 3 of CA3 changes that arithmetic. Under a direct popular vote, the rational calculus of a presidential candidate concentrates attention where registered voter populations are large enough to determine the national outcome. Under Clause 3, a presidential aspirant must secure an absolute majority across both Houses. The vote of every MP carries equal weight regardless of the population of the constituency they represent. Binga district’s 69,723 voters are represented by two MPs, Binga North with 33,716 registered voters and Binga South with 36,007. Under Clause 3, each carries one vote equal in weight to the MP from Harare South, whose single constituency holds 76,425 registered voters. The community that was invisible as a district in a national popular contest holds two votes in a selection process where every vote carries equal weight. The structural incentive this produces is not that any single minority community MP becomes uniquely decisive. It is that an aspirant seeking an absolute majority cannot afford to concentrate attention narrowly. The threshold requires breadth, and that breadth is the mechanism through which historically bypassed communities enter the presidential calculus for the first time. ZEC’s 2018 polling station data establishes what the current mechanism has produced. Binga district, the geographic heartland of the Tonga community, one of Zimbabwe’s 16 constitutionally recognised language groups and a population displaced from the Zambezi River plains by the construction of Kariba Dam in the late 1950s, held 69,723 registered voters in 2018. The national electorate stood at 5,695,706. That is 1.22% of the vote in an election decided by a margin of 313,027. At maximum mobilisation, Binga’s entire registered electorate could contribute 22% of that winning margin: meaningful in a judicial recount, insufficient to determine a national popular outcome. The rational campaign calculus produced by that arithmetic is confirmed by the itinerary record. Across four consecutive presidential election cycles, 2002, 2008, 2013, and 2018, no ZANU-PF presidential candidate held a primary star rally in Binga. In each cycle, the Matabeleland North event was held in Lupane.

#SUNDAYREFLECTION: Facts, law, and history stand independent of—and are in no way determined by—any individual’s political affiliation or attachment to a party or personality. To imagine otherwise, to believe that political affiliation alone makes one factually, legally, or historically correct, is the very definition of self-indulgent folly. This is why a cardinal methodological canon of political science is that theory follows practice. Only dilettantes suppose the opposite, that practice must follow theory. Those who claim to occupy the “right side of history” or to stand “with the people” solely by virtue of their political affiliation are delusional. History admits of no right side, no wrong side, and no single side. It comprises multiple sides, all embodied in and expressed through society’s always inclusive self-interpretation!

Critics have been pushing the referendum agenda. You cannot demand a referendum when the law clearly shows the requirements for one. Asking for a referendum on CA3 is just unconstitutional to even think about it.

The "effect" has to be of "an amendment to a term-limit provision"; not of ANY amendment. There are many provisions in the Constitution of Zimbabwe that deal with (or provide for) time but they're not all "term limit provisions". Once you use an indiscriminate "effect basis" without being clear about the premise or cause of that effect, you end up with a bambazonke interpretation, which by definition would be unworkable and untenable in terms of its practical application. The ConCourt resolved this in the landmark Mupungu case, when it rejected a precisely similar argument that the "effect" of raising the retirement age of judges of the apex courts from 70 to 75 years amounted to triggering the "non-benefit" rule in section 328(7). The ConCourt held that an age limit is not a term limit. That logic or legal reasoning employed by the ConCourt regarding an age limit, applies to a term length (such as in sections 95(2)(b) and 143(1). Various versions of term-lengths or institutional durations of the elective public offices of the President, Parliament and Local Government have been in the Constitution of Zimbabwe since 1980; and they have never been treated as term limits; because they're not. All constitutions have term lengths for elective public offices; but not all have term limits. President Mugabe stayed in office for 37 years under term-lengths with no term limits. In North America Franklin D. Roosevelt served four terms as President of the United States. Elected in 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944, he remains the only U.S. president in history to be elected to more than two terms. Before Roosevelt's presidency, there was no legal or constitutional term limit a US president could serve until the 22nd Amendment was passed in 1951. Prior to that, US presidents had only four-year term lengths which were open to unlimited tenure or re-election. Similarly, in Zimbabwe, the various term length provisions in place since 1980 did not suddenly become term limit provisions by the introduction of section 91(2) in 2013 under the new Constitution; the true and only term limit provision governing a term limit provision for an elective public office in Zimbabwe. Notably, there's still no term limit provision in the Constitution for Members of Parliament or Local Authority Councillors. Only the President is subject to a term limit provision; and only under section 91(2) and nowhere else in or under the Constitution

@zanupf_patriots My condolences to the Matemadanda family and the nation, we lost a great Comrade.

Dear Comrades,‼️ It is with deep sadness that we learn of the passing of cde Victor Matemadanda last night. Dr. Matemadanda served Zimbabwe and his party ZANU PF with distinction. We extend our sincere condolences to his family, friends, colleagues, and the nation at large. MHDSRIP.

Calls for a referendum are futile, CA3 did not activate the requirements for a referendum. CA3 huchi

@peterndoro Mr Ndoro take your own advice. "Please read better." You dont just scream referendum for the sake of it, if a bill does not trigger the requirements for a referendum why ask for it. CA3 did not activate said requirements thus no need for a referendum...

Please read the constitution. Parliament cannot simply pass a bill to override the Constitution. Some provisions are so important that they are protected and require a national referendum before they can be changed. Please read better.

CA3 is truly a historic progressive legislative bill ever made in Zimbabwe. From the public consultations to the parliamentary debate it showed a bill that is truly supported by the majority. CA3 zvinhu.

@SablesRugbyZW Eish why put double 00.

Not the result we wanted, but every challenge is a lesson. A tough outing for the team, but one that will make us stronger, sharper, and more determined. We take the learnings, regroup, and move forward together. 🇿🇼🏉