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#Iran War Update No. 12 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative): 🔹Iranian sources expect that the war is entering a new and more volatile phase that could, on the one hand, involve internal unrest, and on the other hand, expanded regional fronts and greater pressure on global energy markets. 🔹Iranian security circles are warning that a phase involving foreign-instigated domestic instability or civil strife may be approaching. In response, authorities appear to be tightening internal security, adjusting Basij and security forces procedures, and mobilizing pro-government supporters to maintain control of public spaces. 🔹Pro-government gatherings were reported in several cities during the night. Iranian officials have openly encouraged supporters to occupy the streets in order to prevent opposition groups from shaping the domestic narrative during wartime. 🔹At the same time, state media claim new volunteers have come forward to join Basij operations after reports that some Basij members had been targeted and killed by Israeli drones in Tehran. The state media are in fact signaling that attacks on these forces are unlikely to intimidate the government’s core ideological support base. 🔹Iranian strategic discussions also suggest that the conflict is entering a more complex regional phase. Hezbollah’s escalation is seen in Tehran as a way to reduce pressure on Iran by forcing the United States and Israel to divide their military focus across multiple fronts. 🔹In response to Hezbollah’s large rocket attacks, Israel reportedly conducted a major wave of strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon. Iranian analysts believe this could force Israel either to shift resources toward Lebanon or risk widening the war further. 🔹Some Iranian analysts also argue that the Yemen front could soon become active, potentially adding another layer of pressure on the United States and Israel and further stretching their military resources across the region. 🔹At the same time, reports indicate that Israel may be considering establishing a base in Somaliland to counter the Houthis in Yemen. If implemented, such a move could expand the conflict toward the Horn of Africa and create new targets for Houthi operations. 🔹At the same time, there is growing concern in Iranian discussions about Syria potentially becoming another arena of escalation. Some analysts warn that Syrian government forces could become involved in the conflict against Hezbollah in coordination with Israel, which in turn could trigger retaliation by Iran or by Iraqi Shia militias against Syrian targets. 🔹The maritime dimension of the conflict continues to dominate global attention. G7 leaders have discussed the possibility of organizing a coordinated naval escort mission for commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in order to restore maritime traffic and stabilize energy markets. 🔹The economic impact of the war is also becoming more pronounced. The International Energy Agency announced the release of around 400 million barrels of oil from strategic reserves in an effort to stabilize global markets. 🔹Despite these measures, energy markets remain under pressure due to the near halt of shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the broader disruptions caused by the conflict. 🔹Donald Trump stated that oil prices are already beginning to fall but indicated that the United States is unlikely to end the war before achieving its objectives, suggesting that Washington may still lack a clear endgame for the war. 🔹Meanwhile, GCC political dynamics appear more complicated behind the scenes than public statements suggest. According to reports cited by Reuters, some Gulf leaders privately believe the United States entered the war hastily and dragged regional partners into the conflict without a clear long-term plan. 🔹Iranian analysts interpret these reports as evidence that Gulf states may be increasingly frustrated with Washington’s ability to guarantee their security despite massive investments in defense systems. 🔹From the Iranian perspective, geography will ultimately force Gulf states to maintain relations with Iran regardless of current tensions. Iranian observers argue that once the war ends, regional states may reassess aspects of their strategic alignment with the United States. 🔹Diplomatically, Iranian analysts appear to view the recent UN Security Council abstentions by Russia and China pragmatically. They note that both countries attempted mediation efforts but could not guarantee that Gulf states would deny their territory to U.S. operations, making abstention the expected outcome. 🔹At the same time, Iranian observers emphasize that Russia and China continue to support Iran through diplomatic backing and other forms of cooperation, even if they avoid openly confronting the United States in international institutions. 🔹Iranian strategic thinking increasingly assumes that the United States may escalate the war further. Scenarios discussed include attacks on Iran’s economic and energy infrastructure, limited ground deployments, and expanded targeting of security forces such as the Basij. 🔹Overall, day 12 suggests that the war is moving toward a broader contest over regional positioning, domestic resilience inside Iran, and the ability of each side to impose economic and political costs over time. At the same time, the geography of the conflict may be widening, with growing indications that additional theaters such as Syria and even the Horn of Africa could become involved as the war evolves.