GoPlus Security 🚦

Glad to see #GoPlusSecurity AI security capabilities #AgentGuard powering SMART Benchmark 🚀 SMART Benchmark is a standardized evaluation framework for AI trading agents, co-hosted by @ManicTrade and @SonicSVM, built on real trading scenarios and scored across 5 key dimensions to help users better assess agent trading decision-making. 🎯 Participate in the evaluation & win rewards 1️⃣ Leaderboard rewards •Test your AI Agent and get ranked: benchmark.manic.trade 🏆 Compete for the Top 100 share of a $2,000 prize pool 2️⃣ Engagement rewards • Follow @GoPlusSecurity and @ManicTrade • Tag 2 friends • Post your score screenshot under this tweet 🏆 Reward rules (25 winners total, $5U each) • Top 10 highest scores • Top 10 lowest scores • 5 randomly selected participants 📅 Deadline: April 30 (Rewards via X within 7 working days)

Congrats to @custos_labsxyz 👏 #Custos is officially live, addressing a long-standing structural friction onchain: between blind trust and liquidity-constrained locking, users have faced inefficient risk–reward trade-offs. Custos transforms locking into verifiable, programmable commitments, combined with structured prediction markets,making every onchain action a more efficient risk–reward decision.

#Anthropic just taught the AI security space another lesson 😂 Last month, #Claude Code failed to exclude source maps during packaging, directly exposing 510,000 lines of source code. This time, Bloomberg revealed that their top-tier cybersecurity model #Mythos — which they considered “too dangerous to release publicly” — was quietly accessed for two full weeks. Attackers leveraged leaked naming conventions from a small Discord group via Mercor, guessed endpoint addresses, and used legitimately obtained credentials from a third-party contractor.

📢AgentGuard Checkup is Live 🚀 #AgentGuard has been protecting your agent in the background — blocking dangerous commands and scanning suspicious skills. 👉But one question remains: How secure is your agent right now? #Checkup gives you the answer — a full security report in 30 seconds: • 6-dimension scoring: code, credentials, runtime, Web3, config, trust • Severity levels + actionable fixes for every risk • Visual HTML report with Tier rating • Built-in Web3 rules: wallet drain, unlimited approvals, and more Run a check. Know your score 👇 github.com/GoPlusSecurity…

3/3 In a transaction prior to the exploit, the attacker address 0xd763 received 1 SUI directly transferred from the admin account 0xe769. This transaction can serve as evidence that the admin account’s private key had already been compromised. Transaction details: suiscan.xyz/mainnet/tx/BHQ…

2/3 Attacker address: 0xd763599972ea5a8cfe53d182371ee010dc52ace7e39ccff7d8803ba7100fa46a Compromised admin account address: 0xe76970bbf9b038974f6086009799772db5190f249ce7d065a581b1ac0adaef75 Compromised volo-vault Package ID: 0x8d9b38f82fcfc70a869eac1f7cefa871e9f22360aab94224f6bf751c1b9d7a2b Exploit transactions: suiscan.xyz/mainnet/tx/AQw… suiscan.xyz/mainnet/tx/7pT…

1/3 ⚠️ Exploit Analysis: #VOLO Incident Breakdown On April 21, 2026, the liquid staking protocol @volo_sui had its vault contract on the #Sui network exploited, resulting in a loss of approximately $3.5M in crypto assets (WBTC, XAUm, and USDC). Root cause: The attacker is suspected to have leveraged social engineering and related fraud techniques to compromise the private key of the vault’s admin account, and directly drained assets from the vault.

📢GoPlus Launches AI Auditing Benchmark - Redefining the Boundaries of AI Smart Contract Auditing with Real-World Attack Data 🛡️ The GoPlus #AIAuditing #Benchmark is a dataset designed for AI-driven smart contract auditing. Grounded in real-world attack incidents, it curates and extracts vulnerable contract source code from exploited projects, enabling systematic evaluation of AI’s real-world performance in vulnerability detection, attack path analysis, contextual reasoning, and auditing stability. ✅ Core Focus: Whether AI auditing systems can identify vulnerabilities that lead to real financial loss in complex, real-world, context-rich code environments, and whether they can provide continuous auditing capability. ✅ Current Progress: Includes 22 real and representative smart contract attack incidents from May 2025 to April 2026, with ongoing updates. ✅ benchmark_complete: Preserves the full source tree of exploited contracts (business logic, dependencies, interfaces), suitable for evaluating performance across complex call flows, cross-module state, and full-context analysis. ✅ benchmark_simplified: Keeps only vulnerability-related functions and minimal dependencies, removing irrelevant logic for efficient detection, fast regression testing, and lower token usage and compute costs. 🔥 If you're building in AI auditing, explore and contribute: github.com/GoPlusSecurity… ❤️ Let’s build this into a representative public benchmark for AI auditing.

🤔If you’ve used AI Agents, you already know they are becoming a new layer of productivity infrastructure, but the connection between “usage value” and creator revenue has long been broken. 👉 We need to pay attention to a key issue: how to truly align developers’ incentives with the long-term growth of AI Agents. @SafuSkill is fixing this structure by tokenizing each Skill and bringing it on-chain as a continuously distributed revenue protocol, where real usage directly translates into long-term, automated on-chain income.👇

🚨Vercel employees were targeted in an AI supply chain attack. Please ensure you verify the Sensitive flag on your environment variables to prevent the leakage of critical data. I. Attack Chain Analysis 1. Supply chain entry-point compromise: The attackers compromised a third-party AI tool, Context[.]ai, and used it as a stepping stone to execute a supply chain attack. 2. OAuth credential hijacking: Internal Vercel employees had previously authorized this AI tool via Google Workspace. The attackers exploited this trust relationship to steal associated OAuth access tokens. 3. MFA bypass and account takeover: Using the legitimately stolen OAuth tokens, the attackers bypassed enterprise Single Sign-On (SSO) and Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), successfully taking over the employees’ Google Workspace accounts. 4. Internal lateral movement: With valid internal identity access, the attackers rapidly moved laterally within Vercel’s internal infrastructure, reaching production environments and core business systems. 5.Execution of the attack: The attackers enumerated internal systems and systematically exfiltrated sensitive core data at scale. II. Remediation and Defense Guidelines 1. Credentials stored in environment variables not marked as Sensitive may already be exposed. Immediately rotate high-privilege credentials such as GitHub/NPM tokens, database passwords, and cloud access keys (AK/SK). 2. Conduct a full audit of project configurations and enforce enabling the Sensitive flag for all confidential environment variables. 3. Review recent Vercel logs for API call traces and IP activity, and revoke redundant or unused third-party integrations and authorizations. Incident report below 👇 vercel.com/kb/bulletin/ve…

⚠️ #KelpDAO Attack Details Update: Core issue: KelpDAO rsETH was configured with a 1-of-1 single DVN setup, which is a design flaw that violates #LayerZero’s multi-DVN redundancy model. Attack vector: The attacker gained access to the RPC nodes used by LayerZero DVN and compromised two of them. They then launched a DDoS attack against the remaining uncompromised RPC nodes, triggering a failover (RPC spoofing). As a result, LayerZero Labs DVN ultimately validated a completely non-existent malicious cross-chain message. Risk trend: LayerZero DVN infrastructure is increasingly becoming a target for nation-state level threat actors, especially the notorious Lazarus Group from North Korea.

🐮 910x profit in 2 days — is Elon Musk doing it again, or is this a main character moment? On April 17, well-known U.S. conservative commentator @glennbeck posted the final wish list of Liv Perrotto, a 15-year-old girl who passed away from cancer. One of her wishes was to use the Shiba Inu character she designed, ASTEROID, as the SpaceX mascot — and got a reply from @elonmusk saying he would respond soon. 8 minutes later, address 0x6801Bda730124FA7661a960b9261E9Bb01EF99af bought 1 #ETH worth of $ASTEROID. At 02:56 early this morning, #ElonMusk finally confirmed that #ASTEROID would be used as the SpaceX mascot. Following this, $ASTEROID surged rapidly, with its market cap breaking $100M. The 0x68…F99af wallet held for 2 days and achieved a 910x return, reaching $2.1M, and has already sold in batches to realize $300K in profit.

⚠️ Vulnerability Analysis: KelpDAO Attack Incident Breakdown On April 18 evening, the DeFi platform @KelpDAO was exploited, resulting in losses of up to $292 million, making it the largest DeFi security incident so far in 2026. I. Root Cause of the Attack The attacker forged cross-chain messages and maliciously extracted a large amount of $rsETH from KelpDAO’s LayerZero bridge. They then rapidly deployed the stolen assets into lending protocols such as Aave, Compound, Euler, and Fluid, using high leverage to borrow additional funds, which ultimately led to massive bad debt across multiple protocols. The attacker called the lzReceive function on LayerZero EndpointV2, injecting a carefully crafted malicious transaction into KelpDAO’s Ethereum cross-chain contract. After KelpDAO’s contract verification passed, 116,500 rsETH were released to the attacker’s designated address: etherscan.io/tx/0x1ae232da2… This transaction was approved by only one DVN (Decentralized Verifier Network) node, meaning a 1-of-1 DVN configuration, which is critically weak in security. In addition, the system failed to strictly verify the authenticity of the source-chain transaction. This is a classic single-point-of-failure risk in LayerZero OFT/OApp architecture. 👉 Recommendation: all projects using LayerZero should immediately check whether they use a secure DVN setup (≥2-of-N) and implement stricter cross-chain transaction validation. II. Attacker Addresses & Fund Flow Initial receiving address: 0x8B1b6c9A6DB1304000412dd21Ae6A70a82d60D3b Main aggregation wallet: 0x5d3919F12bCc35c26Eee5F8226A9bee90c257Ccc Secondary address: 0xCBb24A6B4DAfaAA1a759A2F413eA0eB6AE1455CC Linked with #TornadoCash, indicating professional laundering behavior. Other related addresses: 0xBb6A6006Eb71205e977eCeb19FCaD1C8d631C787 0x1F4C1c2e610f089D6914c4448E6F21Cb0db3adeF 0xeBA786C9517a4823A5cFD9c72e4E80BF8168129B 0x8d11AeAC74267DD5C56D371bf4AE1AFA174C2d49 (Note: activity also observed on L2 networks such as Arbitrum.) Because rsETH has limited secondary market liquidity, direct selling would cause severe slippage. The attacker instead used a more efficient strategy: 1. Collateralized lending: Deposited stolen rsETH into Aave V3, Compound V3, Euler, etc. as collateral. 2. Borrowed WETH: Took out highly liquid WETH loans against rsETH, with total debt exceeding $236 million. 3. Cross-chain laundering: Bridged borrowed WETH to Arbitrum in batches and laundered via Tornado Cash. 4. Final profit: The attacker ultimately obtained ~106,466 ETH (≈ $250 million) through collateral borrowing + asset liquidation. III. Impact on Lending Protocols (Aave, Compound, etc.) Because the attacker used synthetic/unstable rsETH with no real backing as collateral to borrow real WETH, these positions effectively became bad debt for lending protocols. ➜Aave Loss exposure: ~$177M – $196M Bad debt handling: first covered by the Safety Module / Umbrella system (Aave’s automated reserve pool). ▪️Umbrella currently holds ~$50M equivalent WETH ▪️If losses exceed reserves → LPs may suffer direct losses, potentially triggering liquidity outflows and deeper stress ➜Compound ▪️WETH, USDC, wstETH markets on multiple chains -suspended ▪️Liquidation functions remain active to prevent further contagion ➜Lido Finance Suspended new deposits for earnETH product ➜SparkLend rsETH-related markets frozen ➜Fluid -Suspended affected markets -Clarified no meaningful rsETH exposure on L2s; user funds remain safe ➜Euler Finance Confirmed ~$840K impacted borrow exposure ➜Silo Finance Issued statement and suspended related markets IV. Key Follow-up Areas ▪️ KelpDAO root cause analysis (RCA) and compensation plan have not yet been released ▪️ Whether Aave’s Umbrella module can fully absorb bad debt will determine LP loss risk ▪️ How other lending protocols handle remaining bad debt and user impact ▪️ Post-attack fund movement, potential freezing, and regulatory scrutiny ▪️ A significant portion of ETH remains spread across wallets and has not been fully laundered yet

6/ After the following steps, extract_lp was called to remove liquidity. During this process, the amount of funds withdrawn was significantly higher than the initial deposit. It is suspected that there may be a flaw in the price handling or calculation logic, which resulted in excess funds being extracted during liquidity removal.

5/ Pool Trading Setup nearblocks.io/zh-cn/txns/2Wf…

1/ ⚠️ Vulnerability Analysis: Rhea Finance Exploit On April 16, 2026, the multi-chain decentralized exchange and lending platform @rhea_finance was exploited on the REAR chain, resulting in losses exceeding $7.6M. Shortly after, the Teher CEO posted on X that approximately $3.29M in USDT linked to the attacker has been frozen. (For a detailed breakdown of the attack process, continue reading this 🧵)