ทวีตที่ปักหมุด
How to counter Vatniks.
A thread that will expand in the future.
NATO expansion to the EAST / Ukrainian NATO membership claims.
a. The comparison between Russia and NATO does not hold. Russia is an autocracy/dictatorship, whereas NATO is an alliance of democratic countries that decides unanimously on new membership. Countries themselves choose to join.
In former Soviet states, the peace movement even played a leading role, because NATO membership was seen as a guarantee of peace.
NATO does not have its own army but relies on the contribution of the member states. (...)
NATO can only expand when a potential candidate is accepted with unanimity by the other NATO members.
They have fulfilled certain requirements. These include:
- functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;
- the fair treatment of minority populations;
- a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts;
- the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations;
- a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.
There is only one country today that invades its neighbor with military force and thus advances towards NATO/EU members: Russia
Every day, the threat to the EU grows.
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b. “Not one inch eastward”
The alleged promise by James Baker, the U.S. Secretary of State, to Gorbachev has no legal value whatsoever.
Oral agreements are not legally binding according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ): legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sic…
Moreover, Gorbachev himself has denied the claim (x.com/olddog100ua/st… ), and Baker acted without a NATO mandate. They were merely exploratory talks that ultimately led to the treaty on German reunification.
“The talks were about German reunification, not about NATO enlargement. When German reunification was laid down in the 4+2 Treaty (the two Germanys plus the Allies, including the Soviet Union), NATO was in fact not mentioned at all. Gorbachev had not secured any written guarantee. All that remained was an oral promise made during confidential talks. According to Gorbachev, that promise was not about NATO enlargement but about Germany. In a 2014 interview, he said it had always been about the stationing of NATO troops in the former GDR, nothing more and nothing less.”
vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2022…
9 February 1990: Promise by Baker.
31 May – 3 June 1990: Bush tells Gorbachev that the United States supports a “Europe whole and free” and cannot accept agreements limiting nations’ rights to choose alliances
1 June 1990: At a joint press event, Bush reiterates the principle of free choice for all European states, with no mention of limiting NATO enlargement. This is a public, on-record signal to the Soviet delegation.
= There was no official, recorded, legally binding limit on the number of NATO members who can democratically decide to join.
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c. The Budapest Memorandum provided security assurances for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Included by Russia and including specific commitments by Russia and others not to use force or economic coercion against Ukraine:
The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances comprises four substantially identical political agreements signed at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Budapest, Hungary, on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories relating to the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The four memoranda were originally signed by four nuclear powers: Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.[1] France and China gave individual assurances in separate documents
“The memoranda, signed in Patria Hall at the Budapest Congress Center with U.S. Ambassador Donald M. Blinken amongst others in attendance, prohibited Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, ‘except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’.”
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_…
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d. The situation in Ukraine did not arise from possible NATO membership but from the refusal to sign a trade agreement with the European Union: on 21 November 2013, protests broke out in response to President Viktor Yanukovych’s sudden decision not to sign the political association and free trade agreement with the European Union (EU), while in February of that year the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) had approved the EU deal by an overwhelming majority. Instead, Yanukovych leaned towards closer ties with Russia, which pressured Ukraine to reject the EU deal and to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
The president acted against the will of the people, even though he had previously fully committed himself to securing a trade agreement with the EU.
Ukraine had never initiated an application for NATO membership. Only after the start of the war, in 2022, did Ukraine begin this process.
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Some examples of Russian hypocrisy or its willingness to unlawfully control other sovereign democratic neighboring countries, in a timeline:
1994:
Signature on 21 October 1994 of the Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of the Russian Fourteenth Army out of Moldova.
osce.org/sites/default/…
1999:
We welcome the commitment by the Russian Federation to complete withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002.
osce.org/sites/default/…
In 2025, Russian military forces are still present in Moldova, so what value do Russian commitments have?
1999:
Putin says he doesn’t want to take Crimea and that such an idea is “absolutely stupid”
x.com/nexta_tv/statu…
2002:
Putin said he had no problem with Ukraine joining NATO—because, in his own words, Ukraine is a sovereign nation and can decide for its own.
x.com/United24media/…
Only after the Orange Revolution, when a pro-Western leader was elected, did Russia change its position regarding Ukraine becoming a member of NATO.
2004:
The Orange Revolution was a series of mass protests and acts of civil resistance in Ukraine from late November 2004 to January 2005, triggered by widespread reports of corruption and electoral fraud in the presidential run-off between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych. Centered in Kyiv but supported nationwide, the movement forced Ukraine’s Supreme Court to annul the original results and order a new vote on 26 December 2004, which was judged free and fair and resulted in a clear victory for Yushchenko with about 52% of the vote against Yanukovych’s 44%. Yushchenko was declared the official winner and with his inauguration on 23 January 2005 in Kyiv, the Orange Revolution ended.
Shortly after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which brought the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko to power, Russia abruptly halted gas supplies to the country. The The conflict started in March 2005 and ended in January 2006.
The Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko has announced, following the conflict over Russian gas supplies, an independent nuclear programme with the production of nuclear fuel. To reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies, Ukraine must expand its own gas production and reconsider its current coal policy.
In the dispute over the drastically increased purchase price of Russian gas for Ukraine, the Kremlin temporarily suspended at the beginning of the year (1 January 2006) all gas supplies destined for neighbouring countries.
oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-conte…
nieuwsblad.be/buitenland/joe…
Russia disliked the election results and initiated economic revenge. Its vision of Ukraine joining NATO also changed: Russia suddenly realized it was starting to lose its influence over Ukraine and could not let this happen.
10 FEB 2007:
Munich Conference. Attended by Putin.
The main topics of his speech were criticism of the unipolar world order and of the role of the OSCE, NATO's eastward expansion, disarmament and the Iranian nuclear program. President Vladimir Putin's speech was seen as Russia's message to the West that it would not accept a subordinate role in international affairs.
"First, the relationship between Russia and NATO must be clarified and further developed before Ukraine can join NATO, and not the other way around. Otherwise, NATO will be an enemy to Russia”
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Muni…
02-04 APR 2008
Bucharest NATO summit
Russian President Vladimir Putin was invited to the summit, and he arrived on the second day (3 April) to participate in bilateral NATO–Russia talks. He opposed the US plans to deploy missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, which was discussed at the summit. Russia also opposed Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership bids.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Buch…
Russia has no say over other sovereign, democratic countries. They may dislike it, but that's their problem.
And about the missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic:
One country has recently placed nukes (!) closer to the other: Russia. In 2023 in Belarus. Where was the outrage about that?
European Countries next to countries with Russian Nukes: 7 (8 if you include Sweden bordering Kaliningrad by Sea)
Russia next to European Countries with nukes: 0
And Russia want to have a say in the missile defense capability of European nations? Why should we allow this?
Kaliningrad -in between European countries- has nukes. Belarus has nukes since 2023.
Why is this not a threat to us? Where is our aggressive outrage?
Russia is the aggressor, but its information manipulation makes it sound otherwise.
Russia took all the aggressive steps over the last decade.
8 August 2008:
Russian-Georgian war. The Russian pretext started before, with Separatists... and infiltrating Russian soldiers... (Sounds familiar?)
"On 1 August 2008, the Russian-backed South Ossetian forces started shelling Georgian villages, with a sporadic response from Georgian peacekeepers in the area. Intensifying artillery attacks by the South Ossetian separatists broke a 1992 ceasefire agreement. To put an end to these attacks, Georgian army units were sent into the South Ossetian conflict zone on 7 August and took control of most of Tskhinvali, a separatist stronghold, within hours. Some Russian troops had illicitly crossed the Georgia–Russia border through the Roki Tunnel and advanced into the South Ossetian conflict zone by 7 August before the Georgian military response. Russia falsely accused Georgia of committing "genocide" and "aggression against South Ossetia"—and launched a full-scale land, air and sea invasion of Georgia, including its undisputed territory."
2008:
Putin: “Crimea is not disputed. The problems with the population (Tartars, Slavic Russians, etc) is a problem for Ukraine itself.”
x.com/adnashmyash/st…
x.com/PitBackle/stat…
2013:
Putin: “We will not send in troops (in Crimea)”
x.com/adnashmyash/st…
x.com/PitBackle/stat…
2014:
Putin: "The troops in Crimea are not 'Russian'"(soldiers) x.com/PitBackle/stat…
2014:
Armed men (Back then ’separatists’ but know we know these were Russian soldiers) seized Simferopol’s Parliament building in Ukraine’s Crimea region.
nytimes.com/video/world/eu…
2014:
The Crimean status referendum was a Russia-manipulated total scam: there was no choice.
a) The official result from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was a 97 percent vote for integration of the region into the Russian Federation, with an 83 percent voter turnout, and from Sevastopol there was also a 97 percent vote for integration with Russia, with an 89 percent voter turnout. In earlier opinion polls from 2009 and 2010, support for joining Russia ranged between 50% and 65%, depending on the exact wording of the question, and moreover, the Crimean Tatars were predominantly opposed to joining. A result of 97% is therefore simply not credible.
b) The March 16 referendum's available choices did not include keeping the status quo of Crimea and Sevastopol as they were at the moment the referendum was held. The choices were only “rejoin Russia as a federal subject” or “restore the 1992 Crimean constitution and Crimea's status as a part of Ukraine”. Both provided referendum choices would result in de facto separation from Ukraine, so the referendum choices were only “Against Ukraine”
c) Before, during and after the referendum was proclaimed, the Crimean peninsula saw Russian soldiers take over public buildings and Ukrainian military installations. Finally, armed Russian military personnel – at the time still officially referred to as “separatists” – were present at the polling stations, which from the very beginning seriously undermined the free exercise of the right to vote.
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2014:
Igor Girkin, an important Russian figure among the separatists in Donbas, working for the FSB, himself states that people were forced to vote for annexation at gunpoint.
x.com/cossackgundi/s…
2014:
Putin: "After the annexation of Crimea, Russia does not plan to further divide Ukraine."
x.com/adnashmyash/st…
2014: Putin: "Our soldiers were in Crimea."
x.com/PitBackle/stat…
In short:
2008: “Crimea is not disputed”
2013: “We will not send troops to Crimea”
Early 2014: “The troops are not Russian.”
Later 2014: “The troops were Russian.”
(Next will be Part 2: The Minsk agreements and the start of the massive illegal invasion in 2022.)
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