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If you know me, you’ve heard me talk about this story for months. @HeraRizwan reported from 3 states. We obsessed over every detail. Google's AI, designed for phones, is now rationing food to pregnant women. Read. Get angry. Share boomlive.in/decode/ai-faci… @pulitzercenter

India’s youth story is a paradox: abundance meets scarcity. With 367 million aged 15–29 - the world’s largest youth cohort - the stakes couldn’t be higher. But the transition from education to employment remains stubbornly broken. My story. bbc.com/news/articles/…

VIDEO | Canada: Journalist and author Pinki Virani, on passive euthanasia death, said, "Supreme Court has given patients the right to die with dignity." (Full video available on PTI Videos - ptivideos.com)

New evidence suggests India misestimated annual economic growth rate during the past two decades. Growth in boom years 2005-2011 may have been underestimated by ~1–1.5 percentage points, & growth from 2012-2023 overestimated by ~1.5-2 percentage points. piie.com/publications/w…

#thebottomline The Marginal Barrel Problem: How the West Asia War Broke the Global Oil System's Last Safety Valve The Assumption That Died at Ras Tanura For decades, the global oil market ran on a simple stabilizing belief: when supply tightened anywhere, the Gulf would open the taps. Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity acted as the system’s shock absorber. Within days, additional barrels could enter the market and calm prices no matter where the disruption began. Libya collapsed, Venezuela faltered, Russia faced sanctions — the Gulf could compensate. But that entire architecture rested on one critical condition: the disruption had to happen somewhere other than the Gulf itself. The West Asia war shattered that condition faster and more completely than most market models ever truly stress-tested. The marginal barrel problem has effectively flipped on its head. Instead of OPEC+ deliberately holding back supply to keep prices stable, the market is now dealing with involuntary outages inside the Gulf. Meanwhile, the producers who are often described as holding “swing capacity” — U.S. shale, Brazil, and Guyana — cannot respond instantly. They operate on much longer timelines. Shale typically requires four to six months from drilling to production, and deepwater projects like Brazil’s pre-salt fields or Guyana’s Stabroek block simply cannot be accelerated quickly enough to matter during an unfolding crisis. The result is a widening gap between the moment a disruption occurs and the moment new supply can realistically appear. That lag has never been larger. And right now, the market is more exposed than it has been in decades. The price Signal Nobody Wanted to See The price reaction has been immediate and unmistakable. Brent surged to $117.04 at the open on March 9. At the same time, WTI ended the previous week up 35%, marking the largest weekly gain in the history of the futures contract since its launch in 1983 — even surpassing the spike during the 1990 Gulf War. Market analysts are now modeling scenarios that would have seemed extreme only weeks ago. Kpler’s lead crude analyst has warned that Brent could reach $150 by the end of March if tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz does not resume at meaningful levels. Allianz warns of a tail-risk scenario pushing Brent above $130 due to infrastructure and shipping disruptions, while Goldman Sachs now views $100 as a price floor rather than a ceiling. What the market is pricing today is not simply a temporary supply shock followed by recovery. Instead, it is beginning to account for the possibility that the global energy system’s last operating assumption has been structurally damaged. Hormuz: Closed Without Being Physically Shut The most striking evidence of this shift can be seen in shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. On March 1, only four crude tankers passed through the strait. Since January, the daily average had been twenty-four vessels. That represents an 83% collapse in throughput, and it occurred without a single naval mine deployed or any physical blockade in place. At the moment, around 200 internationally trading crude and product tankers are stranded inside the Gulf, unable to find a viable path outward. The mechanism behind this shutdown is not military obstruction but insurance withdrawal. Insurers stepping back from the risk have effectively created the same commercial outcome as a physical blockade. Ships simply cannot move without coverage. Mizuho Bank estimates the continuing war premium at roughly $5–15 per barrel, even if escort convoys operate consistently. That premium reflects something deeper than the immediate disruption. It signals a permanent repricing of Hormuz — from a neutral commercial artery into a contested strategic waterway. Once markets make that adjustment, it does not simply reverse with a ceasefire. What Has Actually Been Struck — And Why It Matters The attacks themselves have not been random. They have been highly targeted at nodal points — facilities whose disruption spreads the fastest and furthest across the global energy network. Ras Tanura, the largest refinery and export hub operated by Saudi Aramco, has entered emergency shutdown. At peak capacity, the facility handles around 7% of global oil supply, making it one of the most critical pieces of infrastructure in the entire system. In Qatar, both Ras Laffan and Mesaieed Industrial City — together forming the most concentrated LNG export complex in the world — have halted production entirely. These facilities normally supply 81 million tonnes of LNG annually. The consequences were immediate. European gas futures jumped 30%, while LNG tanker freight rates surged 40% in a single trading session. Perhaps the most consequential strike targeted Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. Fujairah functions as the primary bypass route for Hormuz, the contingency outlet designed specifically for situations where the strait becomes unsafe. On March 3, that terminal was hit by drone strike. The redundancy the global oil system relied upon — the backup pathway meant to relieve pressure in exactly this scenario — disappeared at the very moment it was needed most. The Self-Amplifying Shock The deepest structural issue now unfolding was absent from nearly every pre-war model. Gulf producers are beginning to curtail production, not because demand has collapsed but because there is nowhere left to store the oil being pumped. Storage facilities fill up quickly under disrupted shipping conditions. When that happens, wells must shut down. That dynamic turns the supply shock into a self-reinforcing cycle. Even if no additional attacks occur, output still falls. Iraq, which relies entirely on Hormuz for exporting Basra crude, has no alternative route. Southern oil fields are already beginning to shut down. Kuwait has reduced production as well, citing risks to tanker passage. The ripple effects are already spreading through Asia’s industrial system. China’s Zhejiang Petrochemical has closed a 200,000-barrel-per-day refining unit. India’s MRPL refinery has halted crude processing. Japan, which sources 95% of its crude from Gulf states, has begun releasing oil from its strategic stockpiles. Across Singapore and Indonesia, declarations of force majeure are multiplying as supply contracts fail to be fulfilled. What began as strikes in the Gulf is now cascading outward into industrial slowdowns across Asia. This was never a purely theoretical risk in energy models — it is now unfolding as a live operational reality. Strategic petroleum reserves can soften the blow, but only for a limited time. Even at maximum coordinated release rates, the combined SPR coverage amounts to roughly thirty days against a shortfall measured in millions of barrels per day. After that thirty-day window, there is no established institutional mechanism ready to replace the missing supply. No major multilateral model currently published offers a transparent explanation of what happens when that gap appears. Donald Trump described rising oil prices as “a very small price to pay.” But with Brent already above $117 and moving toward $125 — the level where several banking models indicate demand destruction begins in emerging markets — the definition of “small” varies sharply depending on where you sit. In Beijing, Mumbai, Seoul, and Nairobi, the cost looks very different. #IranIsraelUSAWar #Oil