Captain Singh, FICArb, 73K

55 years in tankers. Billions in wealth. Five ships through a war zone. George Prokopiou calls it calculated. The ITF calls it what it is: putting seafarers in the line of fire. AIS off. Crews on board. 100% bonus if they make it. 200% compensation if they don't. The reward: $500k/day. The risk: someone else's life.

@elonmusk @grok Set it also with your premium X support to speedily attend to issues reported. The performance of X support needs monitoring!

Try using @Grok for your taxes!

@MartiONtheHill Correct ✔️ But commodity demand destruction indicates that recession maybe around the corner .

@captsingh It's all a game to the money folk.

The boys on Wall Street don't care.

Singapore, the world's bunkering capital, is feeling the squeeze. MPA confirms: "Recent global developments" have tightened fuel supply. Bunker premiums for March delivery have surged to $25–$35/tonne—above the typical $10–$15 range . The numbers: • Singapore sold a record 56.77M tonnes of marine fuel in 2025 • Alternative fuels hit 1.95M tonnes (vs 1.35M in 2024) • New LNG bunker licenses just opened—timing is everything MPA insists: "Singapore remains fully capable of meeting demand." But traders say inventories are being carefully rationed . The Strait is closed. The fuel is tighter. Even the hub feels it. ⚓

x.com/sidhant/status… India's envoy to the IMO just drew a line in the water. Vikram Doraiswami: Targeting commercial shipping, endangering crews, and impeding safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is "unacceptable" . India's position is now on the record—at the highest UN maritime body. 23,000 Indian seafarers are trapped. 28 Indian ships are stranded. And New Delhi just told the world: this stops here. ⚓

📈 Amphibious buildup: 8,000 Marines heading to the Gulf. The Boxer ARG (2,500 Marines) just departed San Diego, joining the Tripoli ARG (2,200+) already racing across the Pacific . The force: • 2 amphibious assault ships (USS Boxer, USS Tripoli) • 4 amphibious transport docks • F-35s, Ospreys, landing craft, and helicopters The strategic question: Officially, this is for "maritime security" and "evacuations" . But defense analysts note the amphibious warfare capability points to potential objectives like seizing Iran's Kharg Island—the export hub handling 90% of Tehran's crude—or islands in the Strait itself . The math: • 50,000+ US troops already in region • +8,000 Marines with amphibious assault capability • 0 coalition partners willing to join Washington is building the capacity to land. Whether they will is another question. ⚓

@shanaka86 Very well described ✔️ The sad plight of foreign labour in Gulf countries!

The strait carries oil. It carries gas. It carries fertiliser. It also carries the salaries of nearly 40 million foreign workers whose families on the other side of the world eat from the remittance, not the farm. Migrant workers make up between 76 and 95 percent of the labour force in Gulf countries. In the UAE and Qatar, foreigners represent roughly 87 to 88 percent of the population. In Kuwait, 70 percent. The construction sites, the hotels, the refineries, the hospitals, the delivery fleets, and the domestic households of the Gulf are staffed almost entirely by people from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa who wire money home every month. Pakistan received $38.3 billion in remittances in FY2025. Over 54 percent, roughly $20.9 billion, came from the six GCC countries. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for $9.35 billion. The UAE contributed $7.83 billion. India received approximately $129 billion in 2024, the world’s largest recipient. The Philippines received $39.6 billion. Bangladesh recorded $30.3 billion. Nepal’s remittances were 26 percent of GDP. The Hormuz crisis is not just disrupting commodity flows. It is disrupting the human flow that funds survival in a dozen countries. A study by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics estimates that if the conflict persists, roughly 500,000 new workers may not be able to migrate to the Gulf in 2026, and a similar number of existing migrants could be forced to return home. Remittances to Pakistan could decline by $3 to $4 billion annually. That reduction alone would pressure the exchange rate, widen the current account deficit, and weaken the economic stability that was just beginning to solidify after years of crisis. The mechanism is direct. Gulf economies slow when oil exports are disrupted, construction projects are paused, and security concerns halt civilian activity. When the Gulf economy slows, the sectors that employ the most migrant workers, construction, services, retail, and hospitality, contract first. Workers are laid off or see hours reduced. Remittances fall. Their families in Lahore, Dhaka, Manila, Cairo, and Kathmandu receive less money. Those families buy less food. The food was already becoming more expensive because the fertiliser that grows it and the freight that ships it both transit the same strait that disrupted the salary. The remittance and the molecule travel the same corridor. Both are gated by the same 21 miles. When the strait closes, the oil stops, the gas stops, the fertiliser stops, and the monthly wire transfer that a construction worker in Dubai sends to his mother in Sylhet also stops. The mother does not track Brent crude or CBOT urea. She tracks whether the money arrived. This month it may not. During the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, roughly 1.5 million workers and dependents fled within two months. The International Labour Organization documented the passage of hundreds of thousands through Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The entire remittance system took years to reorganise. Nepal’s airport has already seen stranded travellers unable to reach Gulf jobs since February 28. Fifteen million people in the Gulf earn the money. One hundred million people in South and Southeast Asia depend on it arriving. The strait does not distinguish between a barrel of oil and a bank transfer. Both flow through the same geography. Both are gated by the same sealed orders. And both determine whether a family eats this month. open.substack.com/pub/shanakaans…

JUST IN: 🇺🇸🇮🇷 ABC confirms US F-35 fighter jet was hit by Iranian fire.

Saudi officials: $180 oil if war disruptions continue. Internal WSJ sources: If the energy crisis persists beyond April, the kingdom projects crude could hit $180 . The paradox: • More revenue, yes—but Saudi dreads the side effects. • Demand destruction: consumers permanently change habits • Economic recession: slows global growth • Political liability: being seen to "profit from war" Riyadh's sweet spot is moderate prices, stable markets. $180 is not a windfall—it's a warning. ⚓

Iran's legal case, explained: UNCLOS 1958 → innocent passage only. Tehran can enforce safety, pollution, security rules. UNCLOS 1982 → transit passage. Iran signed but never ratified. US also non-party. Tehran argues: no ratification, no transit right. US counters: transit passage is customary law now. The Strait's legal status: contested. The reality: Iran has the physical checkpoints. The law follows power. ⚓

JUST IN: 🇮🇷🇮🇱 Iran launches new barrage of ballistic missiles toward Israel.

Nearly all permitted vessels detour through an IRGC-vetted corridor near Larak Island, submitting ownership and cargo details for approval . Tehran's criteria: anything without a US or Israeli nexus gets a look. The net is wide—but the channel is narrow. ⚓

• Iran-linked vessels: 24% of transits • Greece: 18% • China: 10% Oil is heading to Asia—principally China, receiving ~1M bpd, far below pre-war 5M bpd .

Who's running the Strait? The data is in. Since March 1, 105 vessels have crossed—down from ~2,000 in the same period last year . Kpler's numbers: 60 oil/gas tankers (3/4 leaving the Gulf), 35 sanctioned ships (17 under Iranian flag) . 47% of tankers are sanctioned .

@donaldgorbachev Very interesting point of view 👌 Beware the Ides of March.

The five-second epistemology of the ban. There’s not going to be a tax. There’s not going to be an export ban. The market is pricing something that isn’t coming. You can’t ban what you don’t have. The empire produces 13 million barrels a day of light sweet crude. The refineries were built for heavy sour. Ban the export and the light sweet piles up in Cushing with nowhere to go because the refineries can’t process it. The refineries still need 4.1 million barrels a day of Canadian heavy. Still need Saudi medium that isn’t coming because the Strait is closed. Still need Iraqi Basrah that trickles through Ceyhan at 460,000. Ban the export and you crash WTI and spike Brent and the diesel stays at $5 because the diesel comes from heavy sour the empire doesn’t produce and can’t conjure by banning the export of something else. The empire is already buying Russian oil. Already eased sanctions on Russian refined products. Already considering buying Iranian oil. The empire that started a war to secure energy is buying energy from the enemy and the enemy’s ally because the war destroyed the energy the war was supposed to secure. You don’t ban exports when you’re begging for imports. You don’t tax crude leaving the country when you’re easing sanctions on crude entering the country from Russia and considering it from Iran. The policy contradicts itself before it’s announced. Goldman says the ban would discourage drilling. Goldman is right for once. Crash WTI and the shale producers stop drilling. The shale that the empire calls energy independence shutting down because the empire crashed the price of its own crude to save the consumer from diesel the ban doesn’t fix. The cure worse than the disease. The cure that kills the patient. The cure that stops the drilling that produces the crude that the empire calls independence. The energy independence that was already an accounting fiction becoming a policy-induced fiction on top of the accounting fiction. What’s coming isn’t a ban. What’s coming isn’t a tax. What’s coming is rationing. Including in America. Dubai physical at $163-175. The Strait is closed. The Gulf is offline. The jackup rigs are idle. The decline curves are running. Ras Laffan offline for years. Yanbu hit. The supply isn’t coming back. Not with a ban. Not with a tax. Not with a policy. The supply comes back when the Strait opens and the Strait doesn’t open because Iran controls the Strait and the negotiator is dead and the new leader said not the right time for peace and the parliament is writing toll legislation and the IRGC has 90% in reserve and three waves hit Jerusalem tonight. The $18 spread between Brent and WTI isn’t pricing a ban. The $18 spread is pricing the death of the one price system. The petrodollar splitting in two. American oil and everyone else’s oil. The spread goes wider not because of a ban but because the Strait stays closed and the physical premium in the Gulf keeps climbing and the empire produces the wrong crude and the refineries need what isn’t coming. The spread is the thesis. The spread is the petrodollar obituary. No ban fixes it. No tax fixes it. Rationing fixes it. Day twenty. No ban. No tax. Rationing. The empire produces the wrong oil. The refineries need what isn’t coming. The Strait is closed. Dubai at $175. WTI at $94. The spread is the obituary. Some ban. Some empire.

Washington weighs a radical tool: taxing U.S. crude exports. With Brent at $114 and WTI at $96, the spread has blown out to an 11-year high of ~$18 . The administration is weighing a tariff—and possibly a full ban—to cool domestic prices. Officials insist "no plan" is under consideration—for now .

Domestic fuel prices are nearing $4/gallon. The public is feeling it. But pulling U.S. barrels off the global market tightens supply further and raises international prices—which feeds back into U.S. costs. The spread is the market's way of pricing that dilemma. ⚓

• U.S. exports ~4M bpd—roughly equal to Kuwait's entire output . • A tariff would widen the WTI-Brent gap, lowering domestic fuel costs. • But it would also tighten global supply, pushing international prices even higher . The spread is already pricing the risk.

The ban option is even more dramatic. A full export ban hasn't been seen since the 1970s. It would: • Crash WTI prices (bad for U.S. producers) • Spike Brent prices (bad for allies) • Ultimately "discourage drilling," per Goldman—worsening long-term supply . A cure worse than the disease.

@migtronix Situation for seafarers is getting worse by the day in conflict zones ⚓️