kingmo0x

@NewsWire_US $memes will continue

TRUMP TO ATTEND MEMECOIN CONFERENCE: POLITICO

@Kondux_KNDX Do you have plans to buyback at least half of dump?

Yesterday, the admin wallet for the Kondux Staking Treasury was targeted and drained. Approximately $98,000 in $KNDX tokens and ETH were stolen. We're sharing everything we know because our community deserves full transparency, and because what happened to us is happening to others right now. This is not a post we wanted to write. But it's one that is important for our community, our investors, and the broader crypto ecosystem. What Happened A Kondux admin wallet was compromised through a new class of phishing attack that exploits EIP-7702, a feature introduced in Ethereum's Pectra upgrade in May 2025, that temporarily handed control of the wallet to a malicious smart contract. We are still investigating how the off-chain authorization was obtained to complete the EIP-7702 exploit. No Kondux smart contracts were compromised. This was a sophisticated and highly targeted attack against an individual admin wallet. The attacker temporarily converted the admin wallet into an externally owned account (EOA) that could be converted into a proxy for a purpose-built drainer contract. The admin wallet they targeted had admin authority to the treasury, a contract built as the vault for the staking contract. With their ill-gotten delegate authority, the attacker withdrew roughly 3 eth directly from the account and roughly 96 million KNDX via withdrawal. The wallet has been secured. Since this was an EIP-7702 authorization exploit, we were able to remove the delegate wallet access and secure the wallet. No private keys were revealed during the exploit. We are not the only victims. While our users are safe from the exploit trickling into their wallets from our systems and smart contracts, we have found at least 3 other victims of this attack from the same hacker. Timeline Feb 25, 22:41 UTC — The attacker created a fresh executor wallet and deployed a purpose-built drainer contract. Total setup time: under 4 minutes. Feb 25, 22:45 UTC — First drain. The attacker submitted the signed authorization on-chain, converted the admin wallet into a proxy, and batch-executed operations: withdrawing 96.18M KNDX and 0.797 ETH. During this time, the community telegram was inundated with dozens of Russian spammers. TX Hash: 0xf9742ec13ef3f3b7a94f33517079fbfdf015c89e1fd12f54585dd0658d20d7bd Feb 25, 22:47 UTC — Second drain. An additional 2.266 ETH extracted. Total elapsed attack time: ~6 minutes. TX Hash: 0x40ca28afe55150c33916485aee1891fcb62dfb225387a4e3efb45fa5e6e9f66f Feb 26: The team revoked the malicious delegation via Flashbots Protect RPC and secured the wallet. The old authorization signature cannot be replayed. The Hacker Our investigation traced the attacker's receiving wallet to a serial phishing operation that has stolen an estimated $150,000+ in a single week across at least five confirmed victims. Every victim was a crypto project deployer or active DeFi participant. Every targeted wallet was dormant or low-activity at the time of attack. Other victims include: 1. A long-time DeFi user drained of ~$52,600 in QNT, USDT, and other tokens 0x55F27a0760979Edd208155917D42417F8CfAEdE6 The FLEABONE token deployer drained of 0.226 ETH - 0xe785e706048f75454e2c8963c1ce0809da67fded The Deboard project deployer drained of 0.066 ETH - 0xe23DAdad82873f3a72d41c68205beb0f0acD8A21 Kondux drained of ~$98,000 - 0x41BC231d1e2eB583C24cee022A6CBCE5168c9FD2 A fifth address reportedly lost 7.81 ETH (~$16,100) 0x257866ebFdd2e62A24eCb98E6B4429e97e6d4E5f Some of the funds are sitting in the address 0x615DeB963Af37783964edE2beC40e025A21A00f0 while the rest (43.92 eth) has been funneled using @RelayProtocol depository from hackers wallet 0xC330d08C988241331376E515a5F5F359DE050c0A The attacker funded their operation through a KuCoin exchange withdrawal, used intermediary wallets to obscure the trail, deployed identical infrastructure across multiple chains using CREATE2, and laundered stolen tokens through 1inch, 0x Protocol, KyberSwap, and cross-chain bridges to Polygon, Avalanche, Base, and BSC. EIP-7702 is new, powerful, and not widely understood by most users. You don't submit a transaction. You only sign a message. There's no gas fee, no on-chain footprint, and no MetaMask "confirm transaction" warning that would normally raise a red flag. The attacker stores the signature off-chain and executes whenever they choose. Your wallet becomes their wallet. Once the signed authorization is submitted on-chain, the attacker can execute any operation as you by withdrawing staked tokens, transferring funds, or interacting with contracts all from your address. Existing security habits don't protect you. The Kondux admin wallet had never connected to a third-party dApp besides OpenSea Studio. What This Means for Kondux The protocol is secure. No contracts were exploited. No user funds are at risk. The delegation has been revoked. The malicious authorization has been cleared, and nonce protection in EIP-7702 prevents the old signature from being reused. We want our community and investors to understand the precise nature of the threat and what it does and does not mean for the safety of the Kondux protocol. What We're Doing Now Immediate actions taken: The malicious delegation was revoked within hours. The admin wallet has been secured and migration to fresh infrastructure is underway. All on-chain evidence has been documented and preserved for law enforcement in the event that action can be taken. Ongoing investigation: We are working to identify the exact vector for how the signature was obtained despite the wallet's extremely limited exposure. The attacker's funding chain traces back to a @kucoincom hot wallet, which means potential KYC records exist. This information has been compiled for law enforcement referral. Community protection: We are publishing this full forensic analysis so that other projects can recognize and defend against EIP-7702 delegation attacks. If your wallet is dormant and you've deployed a crypto project, you may be a target. Final Word We built Kondux to last. This does not change the integrity of our protocol, the commitment of our team, or the strength of our community. We're sharing this publicly and in full detail but because the crypto ecosystem is only as strong as our willingness to be honest about what happened and help others avoid the same situation. If you or your project has been affected by a similar attack reach out. We're tracking this attacker's infrastructure and compiling evidence. - The Kondux Team

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FLOW 项目发生重大风险事件，基于对用户资产安全的评估，火币 HTX 已第一时间暂停 FLOW 相关交易。 出事后，我们一直在与项目方深度沟通。但令人震惊的是，Flow 项目方目前的处理方案极其野蛮：他们计划通过单方面冻结、甚至“无差别销毁”包括各大交易所在内的钱包资产来弥补其技术漏洞。 这其中不仅包含黑客资金，更包含大量无辜用户的合法资产！区块链的去中心化精神不应成为项目方掩盖失职的遮羞布。 回溯历史相关案例，即便是在过去多起重大漏洞与黑客事件中，主流公链也极少通过直接剥夺无辜持仓者资产的方式来“回滚结果”。相反，行业更倾向于通过市场出清、补偿基金或社区治理机制来消化风险。   这一行为一旦被默认，将对所有中心化交易所的资产安全边界构成挑战——今天是 FLOW，明天可能是任何拥有协议层强权限的项目。 ▶︎起因与经过 根据目前已披露的信息，FLOW 网络在协议层出现严重安全漏洞，攻击者在未经授权的情况下铸造并流通了大量 FLOW 代币，直接破坏了原有的代币供给与资产完整性。事件发生后，市场已通过真实交易完成风险转移，价格与持仓结构随之发生变化。   然而，在后续处置过程中，FLOW 项目方并未通过与交易所、用户充分协商的方式来解决问题，而是选择启用其所谓的“隔离式恢复（Isolated Recovery）”方案，利用协议层权限，在不掌握私钥的情况下，对其认定的链上资产进行强制转移和冻结处理。   需要特别指出的是，被转移和限制的资产中，包含大量通过二级市场合法交易获得的用户持仓。这些用户并未参与漏洞行为，也未从非法铸币中获益，却在事后被一并纳入处置范围，其资产控制权被单方面剥夺。   这一做法，已经超出了单纯“漏洞修复”的范畴，触及了区块链体系中最核心的边界问题：项目方是否有权在事后追溯并处置无辜用户的合法资产？  ▶︎我们正在进行的处理方案 1、持续与 FLOW 项目方进行交涉。 我们已多次要求项目方就处置边界、资产认定标准以及后续方案进行明确说明，并敦促其正视正常用户与交易所托管资产的合法权益，避免通过单边技术手段扩大伤害范围。   2、基于最坏情形制定用户保护预案。 在不排除极端结果的前提下，我们已启动内部评估机制，并密切关注项目方动态，研究可能的风险与保护方案，以应对用户资产面临的潜在损失。 核心原则始终只有一个：最大限度保护用户的合法资产与权益。 ▶︎最后，重申一下我们的立场： 无论技术细节多复杂、修复理由多充分，都不应成为事后否定无辜用户资产合法性的理由。区块链的信任，建立在规则事前明确、事后不可随意更改的基础之上。   火币 HTX 将继续站在用户一侧，推动问题在透明、审慎、可被行业监督的框架下解决，并第一时间通过官方渠道同步后续进展。   这不仅关乎 FLOW，更关乎整个行业的底线。 htx.com/zh-cn/support/…

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