Alex Cimpeanu

During Putin’s visit to Beijing, Chinese military orchestra played “Dance of the Little Swans”. On May 20, 2026, as part of the musical program at the official state banquet during the visit of the Russian delegation to China, the Chinese military orchestra performed this piece from Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake. In the post-Soviet space, “Dance of the Little Swans” is known as the unofficial soundtrack to the collapse of the USSR - it was repeatedly aired on Soviet television during the 1991 August coup and the final days of the Soviet Union. 📹: illustrative footage of the performance

Moscow oil refinery under a drone attack. Reportedly, this is the largest drone attack on Moscow region since the beginning of the war. For now, I guess?

Putin has been summoned to China. (Short summary of this long-read in first comment, if you're pressed for time) Putin is heading to Beijing, which is positioning itself as the center of power. Formally, they will discuss “strategic partnership,” stability, and multipolarity. In reality, it’s about coordinating the authoritarian bloc that is gradually building an alternative system of power, trade, and security outside of American control. It is telling that the visits of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Putin effectively frame Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing. This looks like a demonstrative signal to Washington: China is negotiating with the United States while simultaneously coordinating positions with Moscow and Tehran. Beijing is behaving like the center of its own geopolitical system. These talks will take place under conditions of a new asymmetry. Russia has lost its position as a relatively autonomous geopolitical pole and is sinking ever deeper into dependence on China. The Kremlin needs the Chinese market, technology, financial channels, components, logistics, and diplomatic cover. In return, China gets cheap resources, a politically and economically dependent Russia, and a permanent war in Europe that exhausts both Russia and the West while distracting the United States from the Indo-Pacific region. One of the main outcomes of the negotiations could be further progress on Power of Siberia 2. For Moscow, this is a matter of economic survival after losing the European gas market. For China, it is a possible element in preparing for a major confrontation with the United States. Beijing wants to reduce its dependence on sea routes that could be blocked in the event of a crisis around Taiwan. Russian pipeline gas gives China a land-based energy insurance policy. However, all the key terms - price, volumes, timelines, control - will be decided by China. At the same time, the parties will likely deepen financial and technological integration: settlements in yuan, sanctions evasion, dual-use supplies, and logistical and insurance schemes outside the Western system. This is no longer just about adapting to sanctions, but about gradually building an alternative economic infrastructure that is less dependent on the dollar and American control over global finance. In the broader architecture of this coalition, the roles are distributed quite clearly. Russia exhausts Europe through a protracted war and constant escalation. Iran destabilizes the Middle East, creates risks for the Strait of Hormuz, and supplies China with cheap sanctioned oil. North Korea maintains tension in Asia, providing Russia with ammunition, missiles, and personnel in exchange for money, technology, and combat experience. China, while formally remaining a “stabilizer,” gains strategic space for its own strengthening.

This is real...