Jim Lobe

So let’s destroy NATO for Israel’s sake. That’s what it’s coming down to.

Two takeaways from Trump's speech: 1. That so many still pay attention to what he says, which has no link to reality or to what he might or might not do; 2. that he so cavalierly threatens war crimes (to bring Iran back to the stone age) on behalf of an unlawful & unjustified war

One of which is a nuclear reactor… striking Bushehr would have devastating consequences for Iran and the region. Not to mention it would be a clear violation of international law. Would the US actually hit Bushehr? Highly unlikely. But the threat is irresponsible.

Assuming it’s an Israeli attempt, which is an entirely reasonable assumption based on past 30 days, it would seem Bibi wants to sabotage negotiations. (Also an entirely reasonable conclusion based on past 30 years.)

If Israel defines “dual-use” items the way they have during the Gaza siege, they could bomb factories producing anything from sewing machines and hair brushes to laundry detergent and fertilizer.

First sanctions denied Iranians access to medicine and pharmaceuticals and now targeted bombing is denying them to produce their own. The war is increasingly waged on the people.

Kagan began moving away from his neoconservative origins during the Arab Spring over the question of whether the movement could tolerate Islamist movements in power, as in Egypt. He even criticized Israel on the question. lobelog.com/robert-kagan-n…

At first it looked like Iran was going to chase US out of the. Middle East -- now it looks like it'll chase it out of Europe as well.

I'm old enough to remember when the Hasbara Symphony Orchestra kept referring to Nawaf Salam, Lebanon's current prime minister, as the "Hizballah judge" at the International Court of Justice because of his positions on the Gaza Genocide case. Hysteria is a state of being.

Brilliant @nytimes essay by @BrookingsFP's @asliaydintasbas on Churchill, chokepoints & how to build an offramp from the creeping quagmire in the Strait of Hormuz that reinstates freedom of passage & recognizes security concerns of all the littoral states nytimes.com/2026/03/31/opi…

It will be a clear war crime if Trump follows through on his threats to attack civilian infrastructure in Iran. Pentagon commanders would have a duty to refuse to follow these illegal orders or themselves face the possibility of criminal prosecution. trib.al/oiIBtkH

It never occurs to Israel’s friends in Washington that Saudi Arabia may consider Israel a strategic rival in the region, much as it does Iran, and that Israeli hegemony is no less distasteful than Tehran’s, which is more likely to lead to some sort of balancing game.

Israel and the US are engaged in the deliberate murder of members of Iran's scientific class. No matter how much Israel wants to torture the law, these people are not lawful military targets. x.com/Martyrs_lover/…

1. Israel is complaining about the targeting of innocent civilians. 2. 73,188 Palestinians have been reported killed in the Gaza war, with estimates that roughly 80% of these deaths are civilians. An OHCHR study indicated 70% of those killed in residential buildings were women and children.

Bottom Line: We may be looking not at regime change, but at a change within the regimen one that could produce a significantly worse strategic reality than the one that existed prior to the war. A younger, more radical, and more vengeful leadership, potentially dominated by hardline elements within the IRGC and lacking meaningful internal constraints could emerge. This risks pushing Iran further along a trajectory more akin to Pakistan or even North Korea in terms of nuclear posture and strategic behavior. At the same time, if the war ends in the near term, the regime will face a severe economic crisis. However, this will likely be accompanied by a strong motivation to rebuild its capabilities and reassess its nuclear strategy, including the question of weaponization, particularly given its stockpile of roughly 440 kg enriched to 60%. In that sense, what may appear as a highly successful operational campaign could ultimately translate into a significant strategic failure, one that creates a more dangerous long-term reality for the region. #IranWar

Honored to see Slovenian PM Robert Golob share my piece in @RStatecraft on suspected Israeli interference operations in Slovenian elections. Grateful for the read! @KelleyBVlahos @LobeLog @tparsi

The Israeli airstrike targeting Tofigh Darou represents a direct attack on Iranian public health. Iran manufactures 90% of the drug doses it needs and mainly imports advanced therapies. This is possible because the country has a large pharmaceutical industry. Companies like Tofigh Darou produce ingredients and precursors which can then be used to make a wide range of drugs domestically. The only reason you would hit this target is to try to limit medicine production in Iran. To make matters worse, Tofigh Darou is a subsidiary of Owzan, which is majority owned by the Social Security Investment Company. In effect, Tofigh Darou is a company owned by Iran's largest pension fund.

Hardline neoconservatives are getting increasingly nervous about Trump not doing Bibi’s bidding.

The Houthis: Situation Assessment Following Their Entry into the Conflict Since the #Houthis entered the campaign, it is clear that this is not a full-scale, all-out engagement utilizing their entire capabilities. Instead, they are focusing on limited, sporadic attacks against Israel using missiles, UAVs, and cruise missiles, while notably avoiding large-scale attacks on the straits or Saudi Arabia. This restraint is not incidental. The Houthis have much to lose. Their economic situation remains fragile, and there are likely incentives — particularly from Saudi Arabia — aimed at keeping them from fully joining the war. Moreover, despite their significant force buildup, it is reasonable to assess that parts of their strategic capabilities have been degraded following sustained operations involving Israel and the United States. It is also important to remember: the Houthis are not mere proxies. They maintain a degree of independence and do not automatically align with every Iranian directive. In many ways, they see themselves as an equal actor within the broader axis. That said, their deep ideological and operational commitment to the “axis”, not only Iran, but also Shiite militias in Iraq and Hezbollah - ultimately tipped the balance and pushed them to enter the conflict at this stage. Even now, the Houthis appear to be waiting for a further escalation before expanding their operational footprint, particularly toward high-impact targets such as Saudi Arabia, the Bab el-Mandeb strait, or even the UAE. In this sense, they serve as a critical component of Iran’s deterrence architecture. Should Israel — and especially the United States or its partners; escalate further against Iran, the Houthis are well-positioned to respond by widening the conflict. Therefore, even though their current involvement is relatively limited and focused on Israel, their entry already signals a significant escalation. If the conflict intensifies, their response will likely follow — with particular attention to the potential closure or disruption of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a move that could have profound implications for the global economy. #iran

An increasingly likely scenario for ground troops is that Trump will seek to take three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf claimed by the UAE - Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Both pro-Israeli voices in the US and prominent Emirati accounts have been pushing this idea publicly for the past 10 days. Several motivations and objectives may lie behind this potential move: 1. Abu Musa in particular is a strategic island, situated in the middle of the Straits. But it may no longer be critical given the manner in which Iran controls the Straits - via missiles. It would have been 20 years ago if the Straits had been blocked solely through mines. So controlling it will likely not be the silver bullet Trump is hoping for. 2. Is the idea to trade the control of these islands for the opening of the Straits? Assuming that such a trade is even possible, it would depend on the cost of not seizing the island, but keeping it. The US Navy has kept itself 3,000km away from Iran to avoid being hit by Iranian missiles. Abu Musa is only 70km from the Iranian shorelines - the Tunbs are even closer. Iran would rain down missiles and drones, likely killing a large number of US troops. As a result, Iran would likely not have to trade the island. The US would simply abandon it because keeping it is too costly. 3. However, going for the islands does carry some messaging and political benefits. The GCC states have been split by the war, with Oman and Qatar striking their separate deals with Iran. But the GCC has a unified position on the three islands in support of the UAE. Making the war about the islands may be motivated by an attempt to push Oman and Qatar in support of the US/Israeli war, but under the false rubric that it is now about "liberating" the islands. 4. This would then also add a new political messaging. Given the UAE's likely endorsement and participation in the attempt to take/retain the islands, this would be an attempt to reframe the war from one that an isolated America and Israel are fighting alone, to one in which there is a US-Israel-Arab alliance against Iran. However, while that political messaging and reframing may succeed, it does not translate into a recipe for actually winning the war. That problem will not only remain unresolved, but it will become even more challenging based on Point 2 above. In sum, it appears that an increasingly desperate Trump is lowering his ambition. Instead of winning the war, he hopes to expand the number of stakeholders. And by that, spread out the blame for this debacle.