Mathilde Velliet

Depuis 2025, l’administration Trump a (re)lancé une offensive vigoureuse contre la réglementation du numérique, aux États-Unis et en Europe. Un🧵sur cette campagne et ses conséquences, à l'occasion de la sortie de mon étude @IFRI_ à ce sujet aujourd'hui. ifri.org/fr/etudes/trum…

Great to speak with @PunchbowlNews' @Dareasmunhoz about the MATCH Act—one of several pieces of legislation due for markup by @HouseForeign on Wednesday—which would require companies to apply for a license to provide maintenance service to their lithography machines in China. I told Punchbowl about our recent research at @AEIfdp diving into the SME supply chain. Julia Torres and I estimate that, absent U.S. action, the hundreds of deep ultraviolet lithography machines imported by Chinese companies will be more than sufficient to manufacture huge numbers of cutting-edge AI chips in the years ahead. On the other hand: “If you take away the parts and prevent them from being serviced, then Huawei is going to be sitting on tens of billions of dollars of wasted investment—unable to make chips at a really critical moment in the trajectory of the global AI industry,” Ryan Fedasiuk, a fellow at @AEI, said. Grateful to @RepBaumgartner and @BrianMastFL for their leadership on this important issue. punchbowl.news/article/tech/m…

Make election interference great again, @JDVance.

Politico polling of six EU countries shows 36.5% on average now see the US as a threat vs 31% for China Most wary of China: France, Belgium and Poland. Most wary of the US: Spain, Italy, Belgium

The great irony is that, for many years, the United States had been pressing and leaning on China to establish a robust export control system — to help with securing dual-use material and preventing diversion to various actors in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Ultimately, many of those calls went unheeded as several Chinese and Hong Kong entities facilitated transshipment and Beijing insisted it lacked the resources to implement a trade control system like the United States. The past decade has totally inverted this dynamic as both sides, and particularly the United States, turned to export control and other national security tools to protect their supply chains. China began implementing its own bureaucratic machinery to keep pace with what it perceived as Washington’s overreach — implementing measures that in some cases extended well beyond the scope of initial U.S. restrictions. We saw this play out in October with the announced rare earth licensing regime; and for many years before that — with opaque national security investigations designed to suspend certain American companies’ operations in China, and economic coercion deployed against faraway political rivals like Lithuania. Today’s announcement brings us full circle: China has launched an ICTS-like investigation and review mechanism capable of singling out entities and even individual people deemed a threat to Chinese supply chains. It’s a capability Beijing will almost certainly weaponize against the United States and its partners in the weeks and months ahead — even as the U.S. begins dismantling some of the machinery of economic security (like the ICTS office, or the delayed 1260H list) it had spent so many years preparing. I wonder if we might even see its initial application in the run-up to the Trump-Xi Summit.

The great irony is that, for many years, the United States had been pressing and leaning on China to establish a robust export control system — to help with securing dual-use material and preventing diversion to various actors in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Ultimately, many of those calls went unheeded as several Chinese and Hong Kong entities facilitated transshipment and Beijing insisted it lacked the resources to implement a trade control system like the United States. The past decade has totally inverted this dynamic as both sides, and particularly the United States, turned to export control and other national security tools to protect their supply chains. China began implementing its own bureaucratic machinery to keep pace with what it perceived as Washington’s overreach — implementing measures that in some cases extended well beyond the scope of initial U.S. restrictions. We saw this play out in October with the announced rare earth licensing regime; and for many years before that — with opaque national security investigations designed to suspend certain American companies’ operations in China, and economic coercion deployed against faraway political rivals like Lithuania. Today’s announcement brings us full circle: China has launched an ICTS-like investigation and review mechanism capable of singling out entities and even individual people deemed a threat to Chinese supply chains. It’s a capability Beijing will almost certainly weaponize against the United States and its partners in the weeks and months ahead — even as the U.S. begins dismantling some of the machinery of economic security (like the ICTS office, or the delayed 1260H list) it had spent so many years preparing. I wonder if we might even see its initial application in the run-up to the Trump-Xi Summit.

@IFRI_ @emile_marzolf @MathieuPollet_ @ClotildeBomont @mdups @LaurenceNardon @Lucas_Medv @CorentinSellin @guillaumgrallet in case of interest :)

Depuis 2025, l’administration Trump a (re)lancé une offensive vigoureuse contre la réglementation du numérique, aux États-Unis et en Europe. Un🧵sur cette campagne et ses conséquences, à l'occasion de la sortie de mon étude @IFRI_ à ce sujet aujourd'hui. ifri.org/fr/etudes/trum…

Si la chronologie de ce différend transatlantique est vouée à s'allonger, j'espère que cette étude vous aidera à le décrypter ! 👉disponible sur ifri.org/fr/etudes/trum…

Comment l’Europe peut-elle faire face ? Quelques pistes en conclusion :

Jonathan Fulton @chinamedit not mincing words: "Since this war started I’ve seen a lot of pieces from think tankers in DC who try to explain why this has something to do with China, and frankly I usually just skip past them. They’re mostly garbage, and it’s become very clear that the war has more to do with a broken decision making process in an administration full of enabling careerist cowards and a president very much out of his depth. And a lot of these pieces are written by people hoping to hitch their wagons. So rather than reading hacks that haven’t actually studied anything about China, here is some commentary from China that should give you a sense of what Chinese analysts think about the war." chinamenanewsletter.substack.com/p/chinese-anal…

Al is the new Industrial Revolution—and like the first one, countries that industrialize will prosper, and those that don't will flounder. The U.S. is all-in. China is close behind. Europe has the talent, capital, and companies to be a real partner in this race. But the EU is regulating its way into irrelevance. The AI Act, DMA, DSA, and Data Act aren't safety frameworks—they're innovation killers. You can't win a race against China while strangling your own team. Europe needs to build, deregulate, and embrace abundant low-cost energy —now. Pax Silica is knitting together the trusted network the Al race requires. Europe belongs in that network. The question is whether Brussels will let it show up.

Cette nuit, Donald #Trump président des Etats-Unis, a lancé une attaque historiquement des plus virulentes contre la #CourSuprême, accusée d'être 1 organisation politique partisane, en remâchant ses accusations infondées sur l'élection de 2020. Révélateur du moment politique 1/🧵