Sal Goodarzi

🧵Gold or Bitcoin: Which Is a Better Piggy Bank? I don't care which one should replace the other, or become the global settlement layer (neither probably will but that's for another thread). But we should be able to answer a simple question: If an average person wants to store spare wealth and outrun inflation, which asset is better, and why? Not just in terms of return size, but also: How long do you need to hold? How badly does timing matter? What are your oddds of beating inflation? Here's a fair comparison.

Bitcoin vs. Foretides® Processing massive global datasets in real-time, Foretides® is a proprietary, forward-looking quantitative engine that maps liquidity shifts before they hit the screen.

May I remind everybody that the money printer won't go berzerk without a hefty crash first AND after Real Rates have gone negative? Don't belive me? Check GFC and COVID. Neither of the two pre-condtitions are met, yet. Or is this time different?

The S&P is on a 9 positive weekly close streak, but the underlying Dollar Volume has decoupled and is currently on a 3 negative weekly close streak.

The Bitcoin discourse has been captured by two competing industrial complexes. One sells the "buy at any price & hold forever" utopia; the other, the "sell & never buy again" dystopia. Both are extraction engines designed to monetize your participation. Wake Up.

Who’s been selling into BTC ETF buys? Since BTC first broke its previous ATH in Mar 2024, Whales (=addresses with >1k BTC) have been selling ~900k BTC. ETFs have been buying ~550k BTC. Net = -350k BTC! That’s supply overhang which is often overlooked when $1M per BTC targets are casually thrown around. Perhaps for the first time in history, institutions are late to the game and are being the exit liquidity.

Should we worry about the yen carry trade? The yen carry profitability score formula is simple: VolAdjustedCarry = (RealCarry + FX_YoY) / FXVol. RealCarry captures the yield advantage of being long US short-term rates versus Japan. FX_YoY captures whether USDJPY has helped or hurt the trade. FXVol penalises for yen volatility. Historically, the danger zone does not appear to be “below zero”. It seems to require a much deeper break, roughly below about -0.65 on this score. That makes sense mechanically. A mildly negative carry score can just mean the trade is unattractive. A deeply negative score means the funding currency is moving against you hard enough, and/or volatility is high enough, that leveraged positions may need to be cut. The 1999–2000 episode is interesting because the yen-carry profitability score was already deeply negative before the dot-com crash unfolded. This is not to say that the yen carry unwind caused the crash, but it does suggest it contributed to it. Japan had introduced zero interest rate policy in 1999, creating the modern yen funding setup, but the trade became vulnerable when the yen strengthened and carry-adjusted returns deteriorated. The timing on the chart makes this look less like a coincident panic and more like one of the early cracks in the risk-liquidity structure. The 2002–2005 stretch is different. The score was weak for a long time, but the market context matters. The dot-com damage had already happened, the S&P had already been through the main bear-market phase, and Japan had moved into quantitative easing from March 2001 to March 2006. So even though the carry signal was not especially healthy, there probably wasn't much yen carry on the books to unwind. In my reading for 2008, the carry signal deteriorated as the GFC was already beginning to bite. That fits the historical narrative: as risk aversion surged, investors reduced risky assets financed through carry trades, bought back yen, and the yen appreciation then worsened the liquidation loop. Yen kept appreciating in 2008, making yen-funded positions increasingly more painful. So 2008 looks less like the yen carry trade contributed to the crisis, and more like the crisis triggered the unwind, which then amplified the crisis. The 2010–2013 stretch again needs context. Japan was still in ultra-loose policy mode, and the BoJ later describes this period as another phase of comprehensive monetary easing with short-term rates near zero. But the yen also became a stress currency during the eurozone crisis and after the 2011 earthquake. The G7 even conducted coordinated intervention in March 2011 to weaken the yen after “excess volatility and disorderly movements” in FX markets. So that period shows yen carry pressure, but again after major global damage had already occurred. The 2016 episode is smaller, but real. The BoJ introduced negative rates in January 2016, which should theoretically have weakened the yen, yet the yen rallied sharply as global risk appetite faded, commodity stress hit, bank-profitability fears rose, and investors became less willing to use yen as a funding currency. CNBC described this directly as the yen carry trade “waning” despite negative rates. That is exactly the kind of setup this indicator is trying to catch: not just rates, but whether the market still wants to hold the carry trade after volatility and FX direction are included. So we've really only had two market-relevant episodes of yen carry unwind: in the build-up to the dot-com crash, and as GFC was unfolding. The key point today is that the current 2026 reading is nowhere near those historical danger zones. The score is not below -0.65; it is in fact well above zero. Yes, the yen carry trade may still face headline risk from BoJ policy, Fed cuts, or sudden yen strength, but the actual profitability signal is not currently showing an active unwind regime whatsoever.

Everyone’s scrambling to come up with a narrative as to why Bitcoin has been underperforming. Meanwhile, Foretides®: “Bitcoin is doing exactly what it’s supposed to do”.

The Synthetic Melt-Up: How Stock Replacement and Volatility Suppression Continues to Engineer This "Crack-Up Boom", and Why Legacy Macro Is Completely Broken TL;DR: The historic divergence between deteriorating macro indicators and a vertical stock market is not a symptom of retail euphoria, but a fundamental redesign of institutional risk architecture that explains why equities are ripping while traditional havens like Gold and Bitcoin stall. Faced with an inability to price terminal corporate value due to shifting trade policies and the AI revolution, asset managers have abandoned traditional spot equity and bypassed hard assets that lack highly liquid derivatives plumbing. Instead, they are executing a stock replacement strategy, parking an unprecedented $8.2 trillion into high-yielding Money Market Funds while risking only that generated interest on short-dated, high-delta call options. This structural shift has hollowed out the demand for traditional index puts, turning classic complacency metrics into phantom signals. However, this volatility-suppressed loop faces an unyielding timeline: when data-driven clarity returns via the rigid corporate earnings calendar in late July, extending into August for Nvidia, the wide distribution of potential future states will collapse, exposing options dealers to severe gap-down risk (if earnings disappoint) and triggering a violent, asymmetric volatility reset, as well as wealth destruction. * * * 1. The Broken Macro Mirror and Policy Alchemy Traditional macro analysts are struggling to reconcile a vertical S&P 500 with a landscape dominated by global trade frictions, changing international orders, and an accelerating fiscal debt spiral. This massive divergence often leads to the conclusion that the entire system is being directly manipulated from above. In reality, policy controllers are not orchestrating the geopolitical events themselves because the sheer amount of real-world entropy makes perfect orchestration impossible. Instead, the strategic manipulation occurs entirely within the policy responses and the structural options market plumbing. When a major macro shock occurs, it provides immediate political cover for the U.S. Treasury or the Federal Reserve to deploy targeted liquidity injections. By the time a disruptive trade policy or tariff is officially enacted, its specific parameters have already been systematically leaked and priced into the volatility landscape, producing a market reaction that completely evades a mechanical crash. 2. The Sovereign Plumbing and the Reserve Floor This coordinated defense between the Treasury and the Fed is the core reason why classic liquidity metrics failed to project the current rally. Legacy financial models predicted that historic fiscal deficit spending would choke the banking system by draining essential settlement reserves. To prevent this, the Treasury has deployed an aggressive, structural buyback program, actively purchasing older, less liquid, off-the-run long-duration bonds in the secondary market and funding those operations by issuing highly liquid short-term Treasury bills (which will only explode higher with stable coins). This operation successfully replaces dead-weight collateral with high-velocity instruments. Simultaneously, the Federal Reserve has adjusted its open-market framework to maintain an ample reserves regime by buying short-dated bills, keeping a firm floor under bank liquidity and keeping the institutional repo market fully insulated from sudden clearing spikes. 3. Trading the Path over the Destination While sovereign plumbing prevents a mechanical collapse, the actual driving force behind the equity melt-up is a structural migration of capital within the options market. Because institutional asset managers are facing massive structural uncertainties, traditional discounted cash flow modeling has suffered a terminal breakdown. When market participants cannot calculate a reliable terminal value a few years down the line, they lose the ability to trade the delta, which represents the directional destination of the asset. Faced with this fundamental blindness, institutional desks have pivoted entirely from investing to volatility management, adopting a stock replacement strategy to express their bullish exposure through defined-risk long call options rather than purchasing physical spot shares. Because a long call option caps an investor's maximum loss strictly to the premium paid, downside protection is automatically engineered into the trade from inception; hence the current extreme low values in Left Tail Index, or Put/Call ratio, for example. 4. Deconstructing the False Complacency This rapid transition to synthetic equity exposure perfectly explains the collapse of traditional risk metrics highlighted by many market observers. When analysts point to a plunging Put/Call ratio as a sign of blind, unhedged market euphoria, they could be missing the structural reality beneath the surface. The ratio is falling because of a severe starvation of the numerator alongside a massive explosion in the denominator. Institutional managers who use stock replacement do not own physical spot shares, meaning they have no mechanical requirement to buy downside put protection, while their relentless demand for synthetic long calls drives the denominator to record highs. The same mechanical distortion applies to more other indicators, too. Implied correlation is cratering because capital is likely heavily concentrated in single-name call options on a handful of mega-cap winners, decoupling individual stock variance from the broad index. Left-tail volatility is disappearing because deep out-of-the-money index puts are obsolete when the baseline downside risk is already capped by the call premium. 5. The Money Market Paradox This framework elegantly, in my opinion, resolves the ultimate paradox of the current cycle, which is the simultaneous vertical climb of both equity indexes and Money Market Fund cash levels. FRED data shows that money market balances at an unprecedented $8.2 trillion, which might initially look like proof that investors are 'not' fleeing currency debasement. However, in a financialized sovereign debt spiral, the government actively pays investors to hoard cash by keeping short-term interest rates high. Institutional desks are 'optimization-renting' this environment, parking, say, 95% of their core principal safely in money market funds to clip a risk-free 5% yield, and deploying only the generated yield to purchase the high-delta call options fueling the stock market. This dynamic explains why equities continue to rip while traditional hard assets like Gold and Bitcoin have faced sharp tactical corrections from their respective peaks, with Gold pulling back to around $4.5k an ounce and Bitcoin trading around the $70k level. Crucially, the institutional stock replacement strategy cannot be replicated in alternative assets because Gold and Bitcoin lack the deeply liquid, institutional-grade options markets that equities possess. Without that hyper-liquid derivatives infrastructure, macro desks cannot efficiently execute the ninety-five to five cash and call split to safely harvest upside convexity. Consequently, holding non-yielding physical gold or spot Bitcoin introduces an immense opportunity cost when cash pays a guaranteed 5%. Furthermore, mega-cap corporations act as dynamic inflation hedges because their monopoly pricing power allows them to immediately adjust enterprise fees to match currency expansion, whereas hard assets must absorb raw, unhedged capital flows without the assistance of a deep equity dealer options network that mechanically buffers volatility by buying every market dip. 6. Mechanics of Wealth Destruction in a Vol Reset Because risk can never be fully deleted, only redistributed, this stock replacement regime sets up a highly concentrated profile of financial vulnerability for the moment the machine breaks. When the market eventually turns, the wealth destruction will be massive, falling heavily onto options dealers who face severe overnight gap risk. To hedge the calls they sell to institutions, dealers must dynamically purchase underlying spot shares. If an unexpected macro shock causes the market to gap down violently, dealers cannot unwind their massive spot inventory fast enough in an illiquid market (with no spot demand or put support), forcing them to absorb catastrophic execution losses. At the same time, institutional call buyers will watch their active options premiums vaporize to zero in a matter of days, erasing hundreds of billions of dollars in fund performance even though their core principal remains insulated in money market funds. The ultimate casualties will be the passive, legacy spot holders, including pension funds, retirement systems, and standard index-tracking exchange-traded funds. These entities are bound by strict mandates that force them to hold physical spot equity at all times, meaning they will absorb the full weight of the nominal dollar destruction when dealers dump spot shares to unwind their books. 7. The July Valuation Wall and the End of Ambiguity The structural volatility suppression engineered by this options loop requires a perpetual state of unresolved, high-variance anxiety to sustain its profitable feedback loop, meaning that the ultimate party crasher to this melt-up, somewhat ironically, could be data-driven 'clarity'. While global trade negotiations and geopolitical conflicts can be prolonged indefinitely by strategic political actors, the corporate capital cycle is bound by an unyielding calendar that forces public tech monopolies to report hard numbers every ninety days. This upcoming corporate reporting sequence represents the first major valuation wall where speculative capital expenditure must answer to realized return on invested capital. Alphabet kicks off the sequence on July 23, serving as the initial indicator of whether massive infrastructure outlays are actively eroding cloud margins. Microsoft and Meta follow on July 29, testing enterprise software monetization and digital ad margin durability. Apple and Amazon report on July 30, revealing consumer-side hardware upgrades and cloud infrastructure efficiency. Finally, Nvidia anchors the cycle on August 26, establishing whether physical architecture demand can maintain its historic structural premium. If these prints reveal a distinct plateauing of the artificial intelligence monetization curve, the terminal value calculations will suddenly hit a rigid mathematical ceiling. This sudden return of clarity will cause the wide distribution of potential future states to collapse, instantly dissolving the implied volatility skew, crushing the dealer gamma walls, and forcing a violent transition to a short-gamma liquidation regime. * * *

Bitcoin vs. Foretides® Processing massive global datasets in real-time, Foretides® is a proprietary, forward-looking quantitative engine that maps liquidity shifts before they hit the screen.

and remember...

Everyone’s scrambling to come up with a narrative as to why Bitcoin has been underperforming. Meanwhile, Foretides®: “Bitcoin is doing exactly what it’s supposed to do”.

$BTC 4-HOUR Bitcoin is building bullish divergence with oversold RSI on the 4-hour chart. Often a signal of the bottoming process beginning (can still go lower). Have a great day.

Bitcoin: Where Will I "Back Up the Truck"? Bitcoin remains below two key large-capital TWAPs: the ETF cost-basis and the Market Maker cost-basis. Importantly, price recently rallied back into those zones and got rejected, suggesting that the entities operating around those levels are not yet willing to absorb enough supply to push BTC decisively higher. That leaves the Network Realised Price the next major structural level to watch. Unlike market price, realised price reflects the average price at which coins last moved on-chain, making it a much more important measure of aggregate holder cost-basis. Historically, BTC bear market bottoms have tended to occur not merely at realised price, but roughly 30% below it, where forced selling, capitulation, and deep undervaluation relative to aggregate holder positioning tend to converge. If that historical relationship were to repeat again, it would imply a potential ultimate downside target near 38k. That is where I’d personally be backing up the truck. *Not financial advice.

Bitcoin: Where Will I "Back Up the Truck"? Bitcoin remains below two key large-capital TWAPs: the ETF cost-basis and the Market Maker cost-basis. Importantly, price recently rallied back into those zones and got rejected, suggesting that the entities operating around those levels are not yet willing to absorb enough supply to push BTC decisively higher. That leaves the Network Realised Price the next major structural level to watch. Unlike market price, realised price reflects the average price at which coins last moved on-chain, making it a much more important measure of aggregate holder cost-basis. Historically, BTC bear market bottoms have tended to occur not merely at realised price, but roughly 30% below it, where forced selling, capitulation, and deep undervaluation relative to aggregate holder positioning tend to converge. If that historical relationship were to repeat again, it would imply a potential ultimate downside target near 38k. That is where I’d personally be backing up the truck. *Not financial advice.