Kingslayer Capital

@viggy_krishnan @TidefallCapital they do have levers to offset BB sub decline such as mobile growing double digits, video sub losses stagnating, margin expansion, and COX synergies. Long winded way of saying EBITDA is not going to fall off a cliff, while FCF is massively inflecting higher

@viggy_krishnan @TidefallCapital The bet is FCF inflection happens quicker than BB sub declines. 2025 FCF was $5bn with $12bn capex that is stepping down to $8bn (+$4bn FCF). $9bn pro forma on a $20bn mkt cap with the company guiding positive EBITDA growth this year (not saying I believe that), but.....

Something is wrong with $CHTR here: $20b market cap is too low or $25b FCF (including SBC) over the next 4 years is too high. I have zero trust in Charter management, they've consistently disappointed.

@viggy_krishnan @TidefallCapital Returns will get competed down to cost of capital. When that happens, cable terminal values will get reassessed. Not saying that happens this year or next year, but cable's terminal market share is not zero. Would not want to short $CHTR here

@viggy_krishnan @TidefallCapital Build costs higher bc of inflation. Labor costs up. Fiber going in the ground today is the result of purchase decisions made 2-3 years ago. They obviously cherry picked the best markets to build first, with subsequent markets less attractive. Low ABS fiber yields has helped ROIs

@viggy_krishnan @TidefallCapital According to U.S. census data, 7th decile of density live in groups with ~1/3 as many homes per square mile as the 5th decile. So cost per home passed for fiber triples assuming constant build costs. That is not sustainable.

@viggy_krishnan @TidefallCapital COX BB ARPU dis-synergies will be offset by mobile and video attach rate synergies. Look at FWA consumer net add trends at $VZ and $TMUS. $T will follow suit. Carriers make 50x more rev/gig on mobile than they do on FWA. Fiber unit economics inherently get worse over time.

@BillAckman even though not 2&20 the fee structure at $HHH will have a similar impact

@ohcapideas COX is deleveraging and can pay down ~0.5x / year with FCF if needed (on normalized capex). Leverage also adds juice to upside. Lower ARPU, further along in scaling mobile, better video offering than $CMCSA. Probably make money on both here but I think $CHTR is more asymmetric

@KingslayerCap Levered to the tits

A few months ago I really did feel that $VSNT was too cheap. But it’s a lot less so now. Maybe Einhorn is right that there’s a lot more upside left, but at this point $CMCSA now seems cheaper.

@realroseceline I think in order to buy any restaurant stock you have to have a view on the impact to the market from ozempic. Fundamentally changing consumer behavior

The next question becomes what kind of multiple should a business like this trade at. In my opinion, a business with: • recurring royalty revenue • elite operating margins • strong unit economics • asset light expansion • double digit unit growth • shrinking share count • global whitespace deserves a premium valuation. This is not a traditional low margin restaurant operator. It is a highly scalable royalty model with recurring economics. Even assigning a relatively conservative 20x-25x earnings multiple would imply: • roughly $360/share at 20x earnings • roughly $450/share at 25x earnings Today the stock trades around roughly $125/share. That would imply approximately: • ~19% annual returns to $360 • ~24% annual returns to $450 And importantly, this also does not include dividends paid along the way which would further increase shareholder returns by roughly another ~1% annually. Now let’s add a margin of safety, even if: • AUVs are lower than expected • growth slows somewhat • margins compress modestly • the market assigns a lower multiple • store growth takes longer than expected I still think a more conservative outcome could reasonably produce roughly 11%-14% annual returns over the next 6-7 years. That is what makes the opportunity so interesting to me. The bull case does not require perfection. It simply requires continued execution of an already proven elite franchise model. Another thing I really like about this business is how simple and understandable it is. There is no AI disruption risk here where you constantly have to worry about whether the next $NVDA Blackwell chip or some new model completely changes the economics overnight. People will eat wings, franchisees will still open restaurants, and $WING will still collect royalties across the system. It is also a relatively easy business to forecast compared to many industries because the model is straightforward. More stores, higher AUVs, royalty streams, and operating leverage. There are obviously risks, but this is not some business where one technological shift suddenly destroys the entire thesis. Another important point is that the story likely does not simply stop at 7,000 stores. Management already talks about 10,000+ stores globally over time. Personally, I think even 10,000 stores may ultimately prove conservative over a long enough timeframe. There are over 13,000 KFC locations in China alone and $WING is still only beginning expanding internationally. Obviously reaching that scale would likely take a very long time, probably closer to 15 years or more. But that is actually part of what makes the opportunity interesting to me. This feels much more like the type of business you can potentially hold for a very long time while the royalty stream quietly compounds underneath the surface. In some ways it reminds me more of the See’s Candies mentality Buffett talks about. A simple business, easy to understand economics, strong unit economics, pricing power, recurring customer behavior, a very long runway. The type of business where you can potentially sit and let the economics compound for a decade or longer. 🌹 2/2

$WING One business I’ve admired for a long time is $WING. In my opinion, it has one of the best franchise models in the entire stock market. Not because it sells chicken, but because the economics underneath the business are so unusually powerful. Most restaurants become harder to operate as they scale. More labor, complexity, operational headaches. $WING is different because franchisees absorb the complexity while corporate simply collects a percentage of sales across a larger and larger system. That is what makes the margins so elite. The interesting thing is the market still mentally categorizes $WING as “a chicken restaurant.” I increasingly think that misses the bigger picture entirely. This business behaves much more like a recurring royalty platform disguised as a restaurant chain. The restaurant is simply the vehicle. The real business is the royalty stream attached to it. Today $WING has 3,056 stores. If they reach 7,000 stores over the next 6-7 years, that implies roughly 14%-15% annual unit growth. They have already been growing at elevated rates while still maintaining strong franchisee economics and positive same store sales for many years. A lot of restaurant concepts can grow fast temporarily. Very few can grow quickly while franchisees continue making excellent returns. That is usually the difference between a fad and a true long term franchise compounder. I’m trying to stay relatively conservative so I I assume in 6-7 years: • 5,000 domestic stores • 2,000 international stores • Domestic AUVs around $2.5m • International AUVs around $1.5m • Domestic blended royalty rates around 5.8% • International blended royalty rates around 4.8% Under those assumptions, total systemwide sales would be roughly $15.5b globally. This is where the beauty of the franchise model really starts showing up. $WING does not keep the full $15.5b because franchisees keep most of the restaurant economics. $WING simply collects a royalty on sales generated throughout the system. Royalty revenue would be roughly $870-900m annually. After adding franchise fees, technology fees, company owned stores, and ancillary revenues, total revenue could approach roughly $1b. The really important part is the operating margins. Most restaurant businesses structurally operate with mediocre margins because they directly absorb labor costs, food inflation, occupancy costs, and restaurant operating complexity. $WING is different because franchisees absorb most of those headaches while corporate mainly participates in the royalty stream. That is why I think the long term operating margin structure here is extremely unusual. If you strip out advertising revenue, which is mostly pass through revenue with little economic value, and also adjust for company owned stores, the underlying franchise royalty business already operates at 53% operating margins today. That is almost unheard of not only in restaurants, but in almost all businesses! If total revenue approaches roughly $1b and operating margins eventually reach around 55%, operating income would be roughly $500-$600m annually. That is software like profitability inside what the market still mentally categorizes as “a restaurant stock.” The really crazy part is that every new restaurant increases corporate earnings far faster than corporate complexity. Under these assumptions, net income could be roughly $400-$450m annually. There are currently around 27m shares outstanding and assuming roughly 2% annual share count reductions, shares outstanding will decline to roughly 24m over 6-7 years. That would imply potential earnings power approaching roughly $18/share within 6-7 years. 1/2👇

@Greg_Speicher It's a very cheap stock

Been running numbers on Charter. Even with pessimistic assumptions, the math you get to with free cash flow and buybacks is so absurd you keep wondering what you're missing. Mr. Market, either I'm missing something big time, or you're on one hell of a bender. $CHTR

@yummyCenturyEgg These guys have obviously cherry picked the best markets to build into first. ROI worked in 2015. How long does it work? Build costs going up (inflation), rates going up (financing), markets getting worse (cost per passing going up) Would love to hear an answer

@KingslayerCap Bro are we living in 2015?

$CHTR $T $CABO Based on my informal survey, about 50% of my street has already switched over to $T fiber over the last two weeks. I even saw a truck on Sunday. It's a small sample size and target rich, since $T only installed fiber on the streets that have some people already requesting fiber. But once the word of mouth gets going, more streets will likely get installed. I might need to adjust my fiber adoption curve...imagine cable losing half of their customers within two weeks of fiber coming online...things are changing fast.

@anishmoonka Picasso's work when he was young was incredible. When his friend committed suicide. Raw and emotional. The older (and richer) he got, the less he had to express in his art

Picasso drew four self-portraits in a single week in summer 1972, when he was 90, then never drew himself again. The two "ugly" bottom portraits in this image are from that week. Nine months later he was dead, painting up until 3am the morning he died. His friend Pierre Daix visited Picasso's studio while he was working on the green-and-pink one (called Self-Portrait Facing Death). Picasso held the paper up against his own face to show Daix that the terrified expression was just an act. Three months later Daix came back. The lines had grown harsher, and the fear no longer looked like a performance. "He did not blink," Daix wrote. "I had the sudden impression that he was staring his own death in the face, like a good Spaniard." Picasso is the most-traded artist on the planet. In 2025 alone, 3,729 of his works sold at auction. Five of his paintings have crossed $100 million each, more than any other artist who has ever lived. Women of Algiers, from 1955, went for $179 million in 2015. A self-portrait he painted at 19, called Yo, Picasso, sold for $48 million in 1989. In today's money, that's roughly $125 million for one painting of his own face. The "a kid could draw this" reaction has it backwards. Picasso was a skilled oil painter at age 8. By 13 he was already better than his own father, an art teacher in Spain who reportedly handed over his brushes and quit painting for good. The detailed top-left drawing, made when he was 18, is what Picasso could do without trying. He said it himself: when he was young he could draw like Raphael, but it took him a lifetime to learn to draw like a child. Three things explain the high prices on the late "ugly" work. Forging it is hard. Those loose, scribbly lines are the proof it's actually a Picasso, much harder to fake than realistic painting. Supply is also choked. Most of the great early Picassos are locked inside museums like MoMA in New York and the Pompidou in Paris. Private buyers fight over what's left. And the 1972 self-portraits especially are a real-time documentary: a 90-year-old watching himself age toward death across that single week, without flinching. Collectors pay for that as much as for the paint on the paper.

@aakashgupta Is the annuity adjusted for inflation?

The spreadsheet math on this is brutal. She left roughly $54 million on the table. Yet she probably just made the best financial decision of her life. $1M in an S&P 500 index fund at age 20 compounds to approximately $58M in inflation-adjusted terms by age 80. The historical real return is about 7% annually over 97 years of data. Her annuity pays $52,000 a year. Over 60 years that totals $3.1M. The gap is 18x. Every finance account in these replies will tell you she's wrong. The compounding math is clear. Take the lump sum, put it in VOO, don't touch it for 60 years. The Certified Financial Planner Board says roughly a third of lottery winners declare bankruptcy within five years. Illinois court records show 28% of winners who won $50K or more went bankrupt in the same window. The average winner spends 60% of their winnings on family and friends in the first two years. She's 20. Peak impulsivity, minimal financial literacy, and every person she's ever met just found out she has a million dollars in her checking account. The $1M doesn't go into a Vanguard account. It goes into the most socially pressured spending environment a human being can occupy. $1,000 a week is a permanent $52K salary, tax-free in Canada, that arrives whether she makes good decisions or catastrophic ones. Can't be drained by a partner. Can't be lost to a scam. Can't be "invested" in a cousin's restaurant. Shows up every Friday for the rest of her life. The spreadsheet says lump sum by 18x. The data on what actually happens to people who receive $1M at 20 says she just bought the most expensive insurance policy in lottery history, and it was worth every dollar she gave up.

@Mr_Derivatives Ozempic

$MCD new multi yr lows $DPZ new multi yr lows $WING new multi yr lows $SHAK new multi yr lows $CMG near new multi yr lows What’s going on in here in fast food land!?

@realroseceline $WING ?

I bought a new stock for my portfolio today. Only the second new position I have started this entire year. It is a $3.5b small cap non tech company that I have admired for many years, but I was never able to buy it because the valuation always felt too expensive. I think one of the hardest things in investing is accepting that a great business and a great investment are not always the same thing. Sometimes the business is incredible for years while the stock itself is a terrible investment simply because expectations and valuation became disconnected from reality. Ironically my first purchase this year was $NOW, which at the time was considered one of the worst buys imaginable on this platform and I got totally killed in here. People were acting like the business completely broke overnight. A few weeks later sentiment flipped and suddenly it became a loved companies again. The fascinating part is the actual business barely changed during that period. Mostly the stock price and the narrative changed. That is one of the biggest lessons over time. Social media sentiment moves much faster than business fundamentals. Investors often confuse volatility with change. A stock declining 25% does not automatically mean the business is suddenly 25% worse. Another thing I have learned is that patience in investing looks stupid until it suddenly looks disciplined. I only bought 2 new stocks this year because truly great opportunities are actually pretty rare. Most people trade constantly because activity feels productive, but some of the best returns I have ever had came from doing almost nothing for long stretches and then acting aggressively when price, expectations, and quality finally aligned. What interests me most is not next quarter or even next year. I care far more about what this business can potentially look like 5-10 years from now. Is the moat strengthening? Are the unit economics improving? Does management allocate capital intelligently? Those questions matter infinitely more to me than whether social media currently loves or hates the stock. I no longer really share my exact buys and sells publicly the way I used to. Not because I am trying to be secretive, but because I do not want people blindly copying me without fully understanding the risks, valuation, time horizon, etc. A stock that fits my portfolio, psychology, and long term expectations may be completely wrong for someone else. I think social media has created this idea that investing is about copying and cloning instead of thinking. But real investing is much deeper than that. Two people can buy the exact same stock and have completely different outcomes because one understands what they own and the other is simply following a narrative. 🌹

@JerryCap @pkg999 April 29, 2000-today. Try again.

@pkg999 Qqq vs brk since?

The shareholder was right

@blueprintsmb22 Really not that different tbh

Different situations. Obviously Ellison’s balance sheet played a role but there was way more transparency in the details of both the Paramount and Netflix offers as the Warner Media board had a fiduciary duty to choose the best offer with Paramount ultimately paying NFLX almost $3bn in a breakup fee after winning the bid to buy a company that was a willing seller x.com/ReesePolitics/…