turboprop trash

@RWrasse Spineless

🕰️ 7:25 a.m. in the Senate

@TimLilley5 @philnmarks @DJSnM @CommiNathan @NASA @SpaceX When you have smoke in the cockpit and can’t see anything let me know how that touch screen works out

@philnmarks @DJSnM @CommiNathan @NASA @SpaceX It’s cute that you think those push-buttons and toggles have anything behind them besides a PCB.

Just sayin’

@DJSnM @CommiNathan @NASA @SpaceX Yep knobs and switches

@CommiNathan @NASA @SpaceX Just saying, I know what one pilots prefer.

The Artemis Moon base project is legally dubious theverge.com/science/905406…

Attention Aviation Journalists (& anyone interested)! I have a primer for you on the SFO “parallel approaches” story. It has the potential to be a big story. I imagine the airlines, and maybe even the city, will fight the FAA’s decision. Big impact. So, here’s a bit of history & a perspective on simultaneous close visual approaches to runways 28L & 28R from a pilot perspective. Summary: these are *not* dangerous approaches. You can find someone who will tell you they are, but I’d bet 95% or more of pilots who’ve flown them will tell you it’s not dangerous. In fact, it’s a fun approach & a treat for passengers w/ the added benefit of increasing the airport’s arrival rate capacity. In essence, these approaches – the “FMS Bridge Visual 28R”, the “Quiet Bridge Visual 28L” & the “Tip Toe Visual 28R” (list not all inclusive) – are used in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) only. Pilots must be able to see a long way to do these approaches. When there are low clouds, fog, rain or something, these are not an option even offered. Visual approaches are not at all unusual at any airport. In many cases, the visual is the preferred method of approach. At SFO, we must be able to see a long way because we must be able to identify our “pairing traffic” & keep them in sight during the entire sequence. We know exactly where the other jet is at all times during this approach. I’ve included a sample of the approach to runway 28R, below. Somewhere around point “TRDOW”, approach control is pointing out your “pairing traffic”. They won’t allow you to get close, or continue the approach until you have them in sight. It can take a couple minutes to visually acquire them, but by “GAROW” or “JANYY” it’s very easy to spot them. If you still can’t spot them, approach won’t let you continue. Keep in mind that the example I included below is *only* for 28R. Runway 28L has a different approach & it’s not depicted here at all. There is space between the runways to begin with…but the 28R approach creates more space between aircraft by bringing you in at an angle…it does not line up with the runway until a very short final. The aircraft on 28L is also looking for you & must keep you in sight, as well. The problem with these approaches is that they used to set off a “TCAS RA”. I assume you know this term. A TCAS RA must be obeyed. So, we obeyed it & did a go around, even though we can see the other jet & know it’s not really a problem. Reports are filed & records kept. At one point, SFO was one of a few places that certain airlines were allowed to switch the TCAS to “TA Only” mode. The RAs were a nuisance rather than a real threat & everyone knew it, so we disabled the RAs. I don’t know of many other instances this was allowed. That may sound extreme, but (the majority of) pilots were happy to have a solution, even if it was only temporary as they tried to find a better fix. They did. They offset the approach track to 28R enough that a jet following it would be below the TCAS inhibition altitude before it got close enough to the other jet to set off an RA. It’s an elegant solution & works very well. Now, these approaches are famous for videos of jets landing simultaneously. That’s cool, but not how it works in practice most of the time. One jet usually ends up behind the other & at nearly the same speed. They are below the required distance for usual separation, but they are separated in trail. Even when it does end up with the jets landing together, it’s not dangerous. I’m speculating, but this decision seems to be someone looking at reports of TCAS RAs over several years, seeing a bunch at SFO & deciding we can’t do this anymore, not understanding that the RAs are not a real danger signal in this case. It’s a spreadsheet decision, not a wisdom decision. It doesn’t actually make anyone safer, but it looks like it does & that’s what matters. The disruptions this decision will cause? Not included on the spreadsheet. Hope that helps!

@MCCCANM And now the FAA is reacting to the PsyOp x.com/mcccanm/status…

The airplanes are not less safe. This is the “Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon”. It’s a “frequency illusion”…you noticed something, it becomes prominent in your mind, then you start noticing similar things where you hadn’t before. The *actual* frequency of these events has not changed at all, but you begin to think it’s suddenly happening a lot more. “Trend Reporting” by the media exacerbates this…like jumping on a bandwagon. These events do happen around the world. Not often – flying is very safe – but you normally don’t hear about them because only very specialized media covers them & you likely don’t even know that media exists. Social media is kind of a wildcard in that now you can notice things from all over the world, and actually search them out. It’s a bottomless rabbit hole. We go through this nearly every time there is some mishap in aviation that gets the public’s attention. One iteration of this phenomenon is that it can be airline specific; something happens at Delta, say, and now every incident at Delta is reported, while similar incidents are happening at American & Southwest, but you don’t hear about those. As some of us say, “every airline gets their turn in the spotlight”. Eventually the public either loses interest, we go a long period with nothing to report or the reports start focusing on trivial things & the public realizes the illusion. Some people know all this & use it for revenue anyway. It’s not healthy to stoke unreasonable concern in the public, but it can be profitable, and you can always say “I’m just asking questions”.

@LauraAE4HF @thenewarea51 I’d like to fly wherever you’ve been flying because this has not been my experience

@thenewarea51 I have been a pilot flying all over the world for 46 yrs. I actually remember when TCAS came out. An RA is an emergency with specific memorized procedures. I can count on one hand the number of RA’s I have experienced. Even TA’s are rare.

This is a “Big nothing burger” to quote Van Jones. The Blackhawk in this instance was playing by the rules. They not only descended to remain clear of the Class Charlie shelf but did so by at least 450’ which I’m assuming because they wanted to be sure that they were not going to cause havoc for the arrivals into SNA. Listening to the tapes via @theATCapp situational awareness prevailed, this was VMC conditions, KNIFE25 was not obligated to be on freq with SOCAL APPR, the United pilots had them in sight, the TCAS gave them a RA as it should. I’m not sure what prompted SNA Twr to make that remark to 589 as they rolled out, “This shouldn’t have happened”. I think it’s because everyone is on edge post the DCA accident. And maybe the SNA controller has a beef with SOCAL, who knows! The other day I was cleared to cross a Class C airport with MEDEVAC status by the tower. A Envoy ERJ was on a long visual final. I had the airplane insight, had them on my TCAS, tower confirmed with me that I had them insight. I was doing a 150 knots and much closer to the airport than the ERJ which was doing around 130 knots. The panic of this ERJ pilot was something else, you could tell she had no situational awareness, kept asking the controller where I was, was I a safe distance away, etc… etc. The controller politely asked if I’d climb another 500’ for the crossing most likely to put these ERJ pilots at ease which I happily obliged to. But I was thinking in my head as I started my climb, I’m going to bleed airspeed to climb and our separation is going to get closer now because these ERJ pilots sound like they don’t really have a clue as to what’s happening. Props to the tower controller for recognizing the situation and trying to put the ERJ pilot’s minds at ease. It was one of those moments where the controller and I were on the same page trying to hand hold the inexperienced pilots consuming the airspace.

@thestinkeye @ColonelTowner I’ve gotten a higher roll rate from a beech 99😂

@ColonelTowner The only thing that happened in that video is Goose keyed the mic, and said, "Did you hear something, Mav? Sounded like a firecracker."

I just hear Goose screaming at Maverick. You?

@MCCCANM Unless it’s the last leg of a four day lol.

This sounds controversial, but most US airlines already do these fuel savings programs in some form. They are not specifically monetized like this, but factor into profit sharing. Common means of minimizing fuel use include taxiing on only one engine, starting the other just in time to meet the warm up time requirements before takeoff. Or shutting one down after the cool down period while taxiing in to the gate. If there is going to be an extended delay, we’ll ask ground control for a place we can park & shut both engines down. The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) is a small turbine engine in the tail that burns a lot less fuel than the engines & provides both electric & pneumatic power for air conditioning & lights, etc. (it doesn’t provide any thrust). The bigger savings is often in how the flight is planned, though. The dispatchers run a program that optimizes the route for fuel burn, or time, depending on what you prioritize. This may entail flying at different altitudes to get out of the worst headwinds, or even flying a longer route; a famous story at my airline is of a crew flying from the East Coast to LAX. ATC offers them a route that’s direct to the destination, in theory shaving a bunch of time off the flight. They accept, but their route had been selected to avoid the heavy headwinds…and around PHX, they realize they don’t have the fuel now to make it to LAX, choosing to divert into PHX. Embarrassing! Now we have a rule that if ATC gives you a route that goes more than 100 miles off your planned route, or if you get stuck at an altitude more than 4,000’ off planned altitude, you must consult your dispatcher in flight. Another way fuel gets “wasted” is by pilots “bumping up” the planned fuel load at the gate. It’s not uncommon for a pilot to add an extra one or two thousand pounds of fuel “just in case”. That sounds reasonable & in some cases may be justified, but the dispatchers take this stuff into consideration. They also track an astounding number of metrics at an airline, one of which is how much fuel you land with. It’s not done in a punitive way, they just want to see how the flight plans are working out in the real world. They use this data to come up with a fuel load that’s realistic, but still offers a pretty robust safety margin that is above what the FAA requires (it would take too long to explain required fuel reserves, as it differs based on the weather & things like going to an island, etc.). In cases where pilots add fuel, it almost never gets used. But the heavier a jet is, the more fuel it must burn to fly…so something like 3% of the extra fuel is burned just to carry the extra fuel…if you load an extra 2,000 lbs of fuel, 60 lbs will be burned just to carry it….a little less than 10 gallons. That doesn’t sound like a lot, but imagine it happening 3,000 times a day…that’s 30,000 gallons of fuel a day that’s burned for nothing. At the current price of jet fuel, $7.32, that’s roughly $220,000 a day. Now, sometimes jet fuel is significantly more expensive at the destination than at the origin. If so, we’ll load up at the origin & “tanker” fuel to not need as much there. They’ve done the math. You can’t bring in all you need, but you can reduce how much you have to buy at the expensive place. Anyway, pilots are very aware of the fuel burn. I’d say the culture in the U.S. at major airlines is to save fuel wherever we can, and we’ve found a happy medium where it doesn’t present a safety issue. The less fuel we burn, the more profitable the airline is, which factors into our annual profit sharing checks. Hope that helps provide a little context! As always, I’m simplifying for a general audience here.

@dmbkparker @Ok53900269 They still work great and also teach what the software is doing

You need to know that in the year of our Lord 2026 these are still used to train pilots to calculate fuel consumption, wind drift, and ground speed.

@MCCCANM Good grief the reporting on this is atrocious! And can we ban the “pilots” who spout nonsense on TV?

Ok, the helicopter & the United flight. You’re hearing that the United jet got an “R.A.” on final approach. This is a “Resolution Advisory” from the “Traffic alert & Collision Avoidance System” (TCAS). TCAS is a small unit in the jet or helicopter that talks to other TCAS units in other flying machines. Sometimes little airplanes don’t have a TCAS, so the TCAS in that case just listens to that airplane’s transponder. When TCAS determines that the airplanes will get close, it issues a “Traffic Advisory” (TA). It announces “TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC” over the speaker & colors the visual depiction of the traffic on your screen so you can see who it’s concerned about, what altitude they are at & whether they are climbing or descending. With that information, you know specifically where to look outside to visually acquire the offender. It’s not too unusual to get a TA. You don’t have to do anything about it & usually the offender levels off a thousand feet above or below you…TCAS doesn’t know that’s the plan though, and it didn’t like the rate of closure, so it spoke up. Now, if things start getting even closer & TCAS thinks there will be a collision, it issues a Resolution Advisory (RA). TCAS has been planning for this possibility the whole time & coordinating with the other TCAS…they are chatting to each other specifically, even as both continue to talk to all the other little TCAS boxes in the area, too. TCAS can only tell you to climb or descend (it can’t tell you to turn), so they work together to figure out who will climb & who will descend to create separation the fastest…they will *not* issue the same instructions, like having both jets descend. Even if the other airplane doesn’t have a TCAS, TCAS can perform basically the same thing by listening to that airplane’s transponder…it’s just that the other little airplane without TCAS is probably still clueless that a potential collision is looming. Anyway, TCAS comes over the speaker & says “CLIMB, CLIMB” (or descend). It puts a target on your attitude indicator to raise the nose to. If it doesn’t like how you’re doing it, it says “INCREASE VERTICAL SPEED”. It will do this until it announces “CLEAR OF CONFLICT”, at which point you return to your ATC cleared altitude. You *must* obey TCAS. It overrides ATC instructions. There might be a circumstance where you wouldn’t obey it, but it better be bulletproof because you are going to have to explain yourself. Not obeying TCAS has caused at least one major accident. As soon as TCAS issues an RA, you tell ATC “Responding to TCAS RA” & they know you are busting their clearance. They’ll focus on making sure you don’t become a problem for someone else in the area. Eventually, the whole thing gets written up in reports & the incident is investigated for a loss of separation. In the DC crash, the TCAS never said a word, and that’s by design. Below a certain altitude, it inhibits itself, as it assumes you are landing…I think it’s around 1,200’, but don’t quote me on that. As you approach to land, there are a bunch of jets on the ground with their transponders turned on…TCAS can’t filter out who is doing what, and if it worked like it did when you were in the air, you’d never be able to land. So, that’s basically what happened here. Hope it helps!

Holy hysteria Batman! This is pretty normal in this scenario. ACAS looks at where the plane will be 20 seconds in the future BASED ON THE CURRENT PATH OF THE AIRCRAFT. If the aircraft is descending or climbing into another aircraft ACAS doesn’t know if you are planning on leveling off and will trigger. This is addressed by 2 things. Controllers will alert pilots to traffic and you should slow down the rate of descent when within a thousand feet of your level off altitude. This may or may not work and occasionally a resolution advisory will still be triggered. Completely irresponsible reporting here!

🚨 “THIS IS NOT GOOD.” 🚨 PACKED UNITED PASSENGER JET SECONDS FROM CRASHING INTO BLACK HAWK HELICOPTER ON FINAL APPROACH That’s not a caption. That’s the air traffic controller… reacting in real time. A United flight carrying 168 people was seconds from landing at John Wayne Airport in Newport Beach, California... Then out of nowhere, a Black Hawk helicopter cuts directly across its path. • Just 525 feet apart vertically • Less than 0.3 miles separation • Top-level collision alert fires inside the cockpit Pilots immediately halt descent mid-air to avoid impact. This wasn’t cruising altitude. This was final approach over Southern California… where there’s almost no margin for error. A military helicopter… crossing directly in front of a commercial jet… in controlled airspace. And it’s all caught on video… and audio. And this comes after the LaGuardia incident, multiple recent near-misses involving helicopters… and a deadly mid-air collision last year. So how is this even happening… And at what point do we admit this isn’t random anymore… it’s a pattern?

@DankNDerpyGamer @dougdrvr @HustleBitch_ Under visual flight rules the minimum vertical separation is 500’

@dougdrvr @HustleBitch_ If I recall correctly, though, isn't there a FAA mandated minimum *vertical* clearance of 1,000 feet? That (2,000 - 1,500 foot) difference is only 500 feet. (Do you have a timestamp in the vid that tells you what altitude the aircraft was at? My dopey ass keeps missing it.)

@GivnerAriel @JoshDaws The algorithm is intentionally addictive though. That’s the problem

This is disgusting and I can’t wait for the appeals. The precedent set by YouTube being liable for screen-time addiction is kind of scary. Treating algorithms like a defective product opens the door to endless lawsuits over “addictive” tech. What’s next? Books, video games, junk food? What happened to personal responsibility?

@disclosetv This is an April Fool’s joke right?

JUST IN - Trump to appoint Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Ellison and Jensen Huang to the Science and Technology Advisory Board — WSJ

@Variety Please stop. Make something new

NEW 'LORD OF THE RINGS' MOVIE Stephen Colbert is co-writing "The Lord of the Rings: Shadow of the Past" (working title), which will go into production after "The Hunt for Gollum." The synopsis: "Fourteen years after the passing of Frodo - Sam, Merry, and Pippin set out to retrace the first steps of their adventure. Meanwhile, Sam’s daughter, Elanor, has discovered a long-buried secret and is determined to uncover why the War of the Ring was very nearly lost before it even began." Colbert is co-writing the script with his son, Peter McGee, and franchise veteran Philippa Boyens. variety.com/2026/film/news…

@je_ff_ff @MCCCANM That was one of my questions also. Based on what I saw the truck was on tower frequency when cleared to cross

@MCCCANM If jazz 646 is on tower frequency, shouldn’t they hear truck 1 being cleared to cross?

This story is technically correct, but I think you need more context & it can mislead you as presented. I also don’t think this system – ASDEx (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) – would have prevented the accident & focus should be elsewhere. The controller tried to stop the truck almost immediately after clearing it. Having a transponder in the truck for ASDEx *may* have given the controller a second or two of additional warning, but that’s it. The controller knows where the truck is already, because the truck tells him when he called: “…request to cross 4 at Delta”. This tells the controller that the truck is on taxiway Delta, holding short of runway 4. The Transponder system just shows the truck on a digital map of the airfield. It does *not* prevent the truck from crossing the runway, does *not* prevent the controller from issuing clearance to cross & does *not* alert the truck there is traffic on final approach. It would *not* have warned the aircraft, either. It *might* have turned on the Takeoff Hold Lights (THL), a component of the Runway Status Lights (RSL) system which the pilots *might* have noticed…but there is no procedure for seeing that from the jet on final. As the name implies, the Takeoff Hold Lights are for takeoff. It might look unusual, but it would not force a go-around. If I even managed to notice them, which I doubt, I would have continued my landing. The transponder system *might* have gotten the controller’s attention a second or so earlier, but that’s not clear. I *don’t know* if it sounds an alarm when traffic crosses the “Hold Short” line before a runway…but if it did, I don’t think it would have been more than a second or two earlier than the controller realized the error & started trying to stop the truck. So, yes, investigators will look at this, and probably recommend all vehicles be equipped with transponders, but I don’t see this as being able to prevent the accident. The first mistake was issuing a clearance to cross. The second mistake was the truck not honoring the Runway Status Lights (RSL), which take precedence over a clearance to cross & are an automated system, independent from the tower. The third was not visually clearing for traffic before crossing. A transponder in the truck would not have prevented any of that & not provided any kind of warning to the truck, nor prevent the controller from issuing a clearance to cross in the first place. Transponders in vehicles are not required anywhere, to my knowledge (I could be wrong…maybe on certain vehicles in certain airports, but I don’t think so). They are nice to have, but not strictly necessary. I’m doing more speculating than I’d like to here, but people will speculate anyway & I’d like to at least try to guide it in a productive manner. The correct answer is that multiple variables were involved & only an investigation will tell us what happened. I trust the NTSB. But, if I was a journalist, I’d focus on the RSL. We have video of them being illuminated when the truck starts to cross, then turning off after the truck is on the runway (as it’s programmed to do). That system is designed to prevent almost exactly this type of scenario…it overrides the human factor & takes precedence over Tower’s instructions. Yes, even for emergency vehicles. Ok, I’m going to stop repeating myself. Just trying to provide useful context…hope it helps.

#TomcatTails Number 64 #TomcatTuesday “That Time Someone ACTUALLY Had To ‘Go See the Man’” This story occurred onboard the USS Nimitz while I was in the VF-24 Renegades. Our (weak) Sister Squadron was the VF-211 Checkmates. Per tradition, we’d give each other maximum grief when able and also relished the times when our Sister Squadron got in a bit of trouble. This is one of those stories. “Tonto” and I were manning up for a day launch, parked next to a VF-211 jet (tactical callsign “Nickel”) as we were starting up behind the island.. My mission was some kind of AIC or ACM gig, the Nickel jet was launching on a maintenance check flight after some repairs had been made. As is revealed later, those repairs must have included some work on the comms system. “Fergie” was driving the Nickel jet with “Bart” in his back seat. My friend Bart is a reader of these Tails and he asked me to tell this story at one point. I hope he’ll offer some corrections and comments when he reads it. We get our jet running and start going through the normal post start procedures. Various checks that I can do while parked, while Tonto works on the navigation system getting our INS alignment. During the start-up phase all aircraft on the flight deck are up on Tower frequency. The Pilot has a radio switch on the right throttle where “up” is the radio frequency you’re on (“up and out” to remember) and “back” opens the ICS (Internal Communication System) so the Pilot and RIO can talk to each other. The RIO uses foot pedals, one for each (radio or ICS); I don’t remember which (not my job!). While getting ready to go flying, the Pilot and RIO are focused on what they’re doing and may not say much to each other except for a few comments here and there. Once everything is ready, then we may banter back and forth. So while we’re getting our post start checks done, we hear a few strange comms on Tower frequency but don’t think much about it and continue. After a bit, those strange comms become more frequent, and it’s pretty clear that it’s Pilot/RIO banter (but NOT us). Weird. And then I recognize it’s Bart. He’s one of the funnier dudes in the squadrons so always has something to say. He also has a great opera singing voice as validated on a number of occasions in various bars in various ports of the Pacific Ocean and in Key West. I can’t exactly recall all of what he was saying so hopefully Bart will fill in here. I recall a few burps over Tower frequency. Some things like random singing, funny comments, etc., etc. All going out Tower frequency. Which is being heard by: 1. All the aircraft starting up on the fight deck. 2. All the people in the Tower including the Air Boss. 3. All the people in CATCC (Carrier Air Traffic Control Center) below decks. 4. All the people in CVIC (Carrier Intelligence Center) 5. Probably somewhere in the Admiral’s Blue Tile area. 6. DEFINITELY in the Bridge where the Captain is. Me and Tonto are absolutely laughing our asses off in our cockpit. Bart’s a superior RIO so we know he’s NOT inadvertently keying the radio pedal. The maintenance on the jet must have crossed the wires somewhere so every time he keys the ICS pedal, it’s going out over the radio. And then Bart starts singing to Fergie: “♫ Fergie’s a butthole, Fergie’s a butthole, Fergie’s a butthole ♬” Both Tonto and I start convulsing with laughter and Bart notices us and stops talking. We’re looking at him laughing our asses off, and he's looking at us. He keys his ICS pedal and says “Corky, Tonto…..can you hear me??” I nod with mirth, and Tonto nods and showcases his huge smile (kinda like that one the Grinch had). We immediately see Bart start shouting at Fergie because obviously he can’t use the ICS anymore. They’re certainly down for the flight so they start to shut down as we have our chocks and chains removed and start taxiing out, still laughing our asses off. After we got back from the flight, we got the whole story. Now, in Naval Aviation there’s always the threat that if you screw up, you might have to “go see the man.” And that “man” is the Captain of the ship. In Top Gun, they go see CAG; he’s kind of “the man”, but the Captain is THE man. And if you have to “go see the man”, he’s NOT going to tell you what a good job you’re doing. You’re about to be verbally flame-sprayed. When we get back, we hear that Fergie and Bart had to go put on their khaki uniforms (we call those “the penalty suit”) and go see the man AND HAD TO BRING THEIR SKIPPER (also in Khakis). Not good. Not even remotely good. Like, on the whole “good/bad scale”? You just dumped 100 metric tons on the “bad” side. The Captain proceeds to rake them over the coals for unprofessional behavior, conduct unbecoming an Officer, lack of morals, etc., etc. Bart can fill this in better, but I think the Captain threatened to call their wives and parents and describe just how terrible their husbands/children were. And the funniest part to us JOs (Junior Officers) was that the Captain dismissed Bart and Fergie and the chewed on their Skipper for 20 more minutes. This is all naturally very funny to us in VF-24. Much teasing ensued. But we also counted ourselves VERY fortunate it didn’t happen to us. Lot’s of “routine banter” within our squadron wasn’t necessarily for prime time. Like that time we got a new system called Fast Tactical Imagery or FTI. This system enabled us to send back real-time pictures from the jet (like bomb damage assessment, weapons fusing, etc.). Each time you went flying, you’d make sure the system worked by having CVIC send us a photo from the base station in the Intel Shop. How many system checks did it take us to start sending centerfold pictures? None. We did it on the very first one, and every time thereafter. So there MAY have been banter about the photo received. Another was after our ship went Coed in 1995, we had a number of women working on the flight deck. One in particular we called “Melanie” and my RIO “Cheese” would always seek her out during our Television Camera System (TCS) pre-flight checks. The TCS was just that, a camera you could slew around and the image showed up in the cockpit displays, front and back. And we called her “Melanie”, but it was spelled “Melony”. ‘Nuff said. And that was the ONLY time in the Navy that I saw someone have to “go see the man.” Thanks goodness it was the Nickels!!!!

@thestinkeye There are many careers where this happens. Are you supposed to come out exactly the same as you went in?

There's nothing I can add to this, but if you want to understand what disabled veteran means, this is a good read.