Christopher Moltisanti

@konkretmobil @thepolandnews_ Ona ma 13 lat ty chory pojebie

@thepolandnews_ Ale musi być teraz grzmocona w obie dziury 😭😭

Policja w Lublinie prowadzi poszukiwania 13-letniej Amelii Pastwy. Dziewczyna zaginęła w poniedziałek, 19 maja — około godziny 20:00 wyszła z domu przy ul. Lubomelskiej i od tego czasu nie skontaktowała się z rodziną. W chwili zaginięcia miała na sobie czarną bluzkę z długim rękawem, krótkie dżinsowe spodenki, białe buty marki Nike oraz białe skarpetki. Osoby posiadające informacje o miejscu jej pobytu proszone są o pilny kontakt z Komisariatem Policji I w Lublinie pod numerem 47 811 24 00 lub pod numerem alarmowym 112.

My boss congratulated me on maintaining a 100% SLA resolution rate this quarter. He doesn't know my secret. Whenever a user submits a ticket that looks remotely complicated, I trigger a custom macro. It immediately closes the ticket and sends them an automated reply with a 47-step troubleshooting guide. The guide requires them to reboot their router, clear their DNS cache, and manually edit their registry keys. It ends by saying if the issue persists, they need to submit a new ticket with a video recording of the error. Nobody ever submits a second ticket.. My metrics are flawless. I now spend my afternoons learning how to juggle.

@gawrontomaczo @JBM_MEGA @visegrad24 Zwróciłem uwagę na zjawisko którego nie ma we Wrocku - w Wawie mnóstwo studentek w hidżabach z Indonezji i ogólnie jeżeli chodzi o multikulti to bardziej mieszanka. We Wrocku 90% ukry reszta mieszanka hindusów z murzynami, no i oczywiscie azja srodkowa. Arabów prawie nie widać

@AKostankevich @JBM_MEGA @visegrad24 Ostatnio byłem w sierpniu to nie było tak źle, ale oni strasznie rzucają się w oczy przez co zwraca się na nich uwagę i wydaje się że jest ich dużo. No i stolyca więc dużo turystów i studentów

500 000+ non-EU immigrants applied for temporary residence in Poland in 2025 🇺🇦 Ukrainians - 288 000 🇧🇾 Belarusians - 45 000 🇨🇴 Colombians - 22 000 🇬🇪 Georgians - 20 000 🇮🇳 Indians - 18 000 🇲🇩 Moldovans - 8000 🇹🇷 Turks - 8000 🇵🇭 Filipinos - 8000

@gawrontomaczo @JBM_MEGA @visegrad24 W Default City sporo kolorowych niestety, nawet kilku somalijczyków widziałem na rowerze. Niestety Wawa najgorsze miasto w PL pod tym względem aczkolwiek w porównaniu z Berlinem czy broń boże Paryżem i tak jest w chuj białe (tych ciapatych z murzynami może 2-3%)

@JBM_MEGA @visegrad24 Co ty pierdolisz ?

@nieukropol19337 @Antykomunista_ Jak można być cwelekacapem w 2026?

@Antykomunista_ Masz problem że nie jestem hipokrytą jak ty banderofilu?

A jak giną cywile na Ukrainie, to pysk ma ruska szmata zamknięty.

@PtrCzakZukowski Co za dzban xD

At least he's equally hateful to everyone 😅

@JBM_MEGA @visegrad24 W centrum warszaffki tak macie?

@visegrad24 Its fake just go to streets indians bengalis on every fcking corner, they are lying about numbers

@KittenShovel @ultrakurwa @visegrad24 Bro stuck in 2007

@ultrakurwa @visegrad24 To take the jobs you people leave when moving to Germany and other Western countries…

Can Tusk shorten the approval time for migrants applying in Poland? Polish Constitutional and Administrative Law Analysis: The "Silent Consent" Residence Permit Proposal. What the Draft Actually Proposes Before analysing the legal questions, it is important to be precise about what the Ministry of Interior (MSWiA) has actually drafted, because it is narrower than some reporting suggests. The draft amends the Act on Foreigners of 12 December 2013 (Dz.U. 2013 poz. 1650, as amended) — the primary statute governing residence in Poland. The proposal introduces milcząca zgoda (administrative silence / deemed consent) for temporary residence permit applications at the first-instance voivodship level only. Key limitations built into the draft itself: -Applies only to nationals of "the most developed third countries" with "satisfactory security situations" — not all foreigners -Does not apply if the applicant appears in the Schengen Information System (SIS) or on Poland's list of undesirable foreigners. -Does not apply if voivodship officials identify threats to security or public order -Does not apply to appeal proceedings before the Head of the Office for Foreigners -Requires a confirmed receipt stamp from the voivodship office to start the 60-day clock Polish migration law expert Michał Wysłocki noted publicly that in practice fewer than 1% of applicants would benefit, because the confirmation receipt that starts the 60-day clock often requires a personal visit to the office — and appointments in many voivodships are booked months in advance. I. The Legislative Hurdles It Must Clear The draft is currently a government proposal (projekt rządowy). To become law it must pass: 1. Council of Ministers (Rada Ministrów) Must be approved by the full cabinet. Poland's coalition includes the Polish People's Party (PSL) and Poland 2050, whose members have expressed scepticism about liberalising immigration rules. Coalition discipline is not guaranteed on this issue. 2. Sejm — First Reading The bill is referred to committee (likely the Administration and Internal Affairs Committee). Committee members can propose amendments, delay hearings, or recommend rejection. 3. Sejm — Second and Third Readings Requires a simple majority. The governing coalition holds a majority, but immigration is one of the issues where coalition unity is most fragile. PSL in particular has rural constituents who are sceptical of immigration liberalisation. 4. Senate (Senat) Under Article 121 of the Polish Constitution, the Senate has 30 days to pass, amend, or reject the bill. The Senate is currently controlled by the governing coalition, but senators can act independently. A Senate rejection sends the bill back to the Sejm, which requires an absolute majority to override — a higher bar than the initial passage. 5. Presidential signature Under Article 122 of the Polish Constitution, the President has 21 days to sign, veto, or refer to the Constitutional Tribunal. II. Can the President Veto It? Yes — and this is the most likely blocking mechanism. President Karol Nawrocki, who took office in May 2025, is an independent candidate backed by the Law and Justice party (PiS). He is ideologically opposed to the Tusk government's immigration policies. The Sejm may reject the President's veto by a majority of 3/5 of qualified votes in the presence of half of the statutory number of members of parliament. The governing coalition does not hold a 3/5 majority in the Sejm — it holds approximately 54% of seats. This means a presidential veto would almost certainly be sustained, effectively killing the bill. Nawrocki has two veto options: Option A — Political veto under Article 122(5) The President returns the bill to the Sejm with reasons why he considers it inappropriate. The Sejm would need 3/5 of votes to override — a threshold the coalition cannot reach. Option B — Constitutional referral under Article 122(3) Before signing, the President may refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal for an adjudication upon its conformity to the Constitution. If the Tribunal finds it unconstitutional, the President cannot refuse to sign it. But a referral buys significant time and could result in the bill being struck down entirely. Conversely, if in the opinion of the Tribunal the statute conforms to the Constitution, the President cannot refuse to sign it. Given the current political alignment, Option A (the straightforward veto) is the most effective blocking tool and requires no constitutional argument — only political will. III. Constitutional Tensions — The Strongest Legal Arguments Against Article 5 of the Polish Constitution — State Security Obligation Article 5 states: "The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment..." The constitutional obligation to ensure the security of citizens creates a potential conflict with any system that grants residence rights automatically without affirmative state decision-making. The counter-argument for challengers: automatic deemed consent after 60 days transfers the decision from the state to the calendar, removing the affirmative sovereign act of granting residence. A challenge could argue this violates the state's constitutionally mandated security function. Article 52(5) of the Polish Constitution — Conditions for Entry and Sojourn Article 52(5) states: "The principles, on which Polish citizens may be obliged to leave the country shall be specified by statute. Conditions for the entry and sojourn in the territory of the Republic of Poland of non-citizens shall be specified by statute." This is significant. The Constitution specifically requires that conditions for foreign nationals' sojourn be determined by statute (ustawa). The argument available to challengers: a silent consent mechanism replaces a statutory determination of eligibility with an administrative time limit. The conditions for sojourn are no longer positively determined by law — they are negated by bureaucratic delay. This could be argued as an unconstitutional delegation of the sovereign immigration decision to administrative inaction. Article 2 of the Polish Constitution — Rule of Law (Państwo Prawne) Article 2 establishes Poland as a democratic state ruled by law. The Constitutional Tribunal has interpreted this to include the principle of legal certainty and the requirement that public authority acts be based on clear, positive legal foundations. A challenge could argue that granting residence rights through administrative silence — rather than through a positive administrative decision — violates the rule of law principle by creating legal status without a lawful determination. Article 32 — Equality Before the Law The draft applies only to nationals of "the most developed third countries." This creates a distinction between categories of foreigners based on their country of origin. While such distinctions are permitted in immigration law, the criteria must be clearly defined and proportionate. If the government fails to publish a precise list of qualifying countries, the provision could be challenged as creating arbitrary distinctions that violate Article 32's equal treatment guarantee. V. Administrative Law Tensions — Acts on Foreigners and the KPA The proposal amends the Act on Foreigners of 2013 and interacts with the Code of Administrative Procedure (Kodeks Postępowania Administracyjnego, KPA). Several tensions arise: KPA Article 35 — Timeframes for Administrative Decisions KPA already requires authorities to act within one month (two months for complex cases) and provides remedies for delay. The proposal does not resolve the underlying administrative capacity problem — it merely converts a delay into a deemed grant. Challengers could argue this circumvents the existing KPA remedy framework rather than fixing the actual administrative dysfunction. Act on Foreigners Article 108 — Grounds for Refusal The existing Act specifies positive grounds that must be examined before residence is granted: criminal history, security screening, valid purpose for stay, sufficient means. The silent consent mechanism by definition bypasses this examination. A challenge can argue this conflicts with Article 108's mandatory screening requirements, which are not waivable by administrative inaction. The Security Screening Gap The draft contains a SIS-check exception, but SIS covers only persons already flagged in the Schengen system. It does not cover persons who should be refused on other grounds under Polish law but have not yet been screened. Automatic deemed consent before a full screening is completed conflicts with the affirmative security obligations in the Act on Foreigners itself. V. EU Law Dimension — Both a Constraint and a Counter-Argument Poland is bound by EU immigration directives, including the Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU) and the Long-Term Residents Directive (2003/109/EC). EU law requires that residence permit procedures be conducted within a defined reasonable timeframe but does not require deemed consent mechanisms. The existence of EU-level timeframe requirements could cut both ways: For challengers: EU law sets maximum processing times but does not mandate automatic grants — Poland is going beyond what EU law requires, and could be argued to be substituting administrative failure for legal procedure. For the government: EU harmonisation principles could be cited to support the reform as consistent with improving administrative efficiency across the EU single area. VI. Political Blocking Paths — Beyond the Courts Even if the bill passes constitutional scrutiny, several political mechanisms can delay or prevent its enactment: 1. Coalition partner dissent (PSL) PSL's rural base is the constituency most sceptical of immigration liberalisation. PSL ministers could delay cabinet approval, demand significant amendments, or abstain in Sejm votes. 2. Senate amendments Even with coalition control of the Senate, individual senators can attach amendments that either gut the bill (making it effectively meaningless) or introduce conditions so restrictive that the Ministry withdraws it. 3. Presidential veto — the most effective tool As analysed above, President Nawrocki can veto the bill and the coalition cannot override the veto with a 3/5 majority. This is the single most decisive blocking mechanism available under Polish constitutional law. 4. Constitutional Tribunal referral Either the President (before signing, under Article 122) or a group of at least 50 MPs (after signing, under Article 191) can refer the law to the Constitutional Tribunal. Given the Tribunal's current composition, a challenge on Article 2 (rule of law) or Article 52(5) (conditions for sojourn by statute) grounds would receive a serious hearing. The presidential veto is the cleanest, fastest, and most certain blocking mechanism. It requires no court proceedings, no coalition management, and cannot be overridden by the current Sejm arithmetic. If President Nawrocki exercises it — which is consistent with his political profile and his relationship with the governing coalition — the bill dies without ever becoming law. As you can imagine he will be voted out before anything can even happen.

@ReaderPhx @GlobalDiss What's the main motive then? :D

@AKostankevich @GlobalDiss You are ignoring the main motive.

🚨🇵🇱 Poland is turning into an IMMIGRATION STATE. Tusk government pushes “silent consent” rule: no answer in 60 days = automatic residency. Over 500,000 applications, and this could mean 150,000+ approvals per year. POLAND IS CHANGING FAST.

@JohnnySpinu @GlobalDiss Lots of people voted for him, check the lines to voting rooms and street protests. People voted for his coalition just to get rid of PiS. Sad not many of them voted for Konfa instead - could be better but now we see that even them are lobbied by business to import cheap workforce

@AKostankevich @GlobalDiss Doubt many voted for him =) that's the point. You can always change the result in the database after the elections and noone can really question it. Hence Poland is cooked like kalbasa

@JohnnySpinu @GlobalDiss I didn't vote for him by the way and despise him for his past but his gov seems to at least barely do something and try to clear the mess which was done by PiS gov which opened the floodgates.

@AKostankevich @GlobalDiss You "elected" Tusk. Seems the same everywhere else.

@ReaderPhx @GlobalDiss Everyone was allowed - jeez, have you heard about visa scandals? Visas sold to africans for bribes? Diploma mill scams allowed by the PiS government. Poland is a gateway to EU, not a fucking endpoint. Not a single brownie will willingly move here if they have an EU passport

@ReaderPhx @GlobalDiss I can see reading comprehension isn't your strong skill...How exactly the new project makes it easier to settle? Care to elaborate? EU citizens were able to move to Poland since 2004 without any permit. What does it mean "were not easily allowed"?

VAC coming soon

@ludrilla @GlobalDiss Most of the commenters here are also completely retarded. Nobody knew Poland has historically one of the easiest "get in" policies but they thought it's a hardcore mode for immigrants while anyone can come apply for TRC and be legal for unknown amount of time until decision given

@AKostankevich @GlobalDiss He‘s a Serbian inbred grifter, can‘t expect much

@mleko_2008 @GlobalDiss Why do you think over 40% of all residence applications got dismissed and left without consideration? Because folks got in, applied not to get deported from here and then immediately left further west. They never submitted any paperwork to prove and never responded to urzad

@mleko_2008 @GlobalDiss Because Poland already had one of the easiest and lax "get in" rules. Until recently Colombians came as tourists and got employed here, anyone could come, apply for TRC and legalise stay for an unknown period of time, hundreds of thousands of folks used PL as a transit point WEST

@mleko_2008 @GlobalDiss The actual issue with immigration in Poland are local janusz businessmen who import temporary seasonal workforce from latin america and middle asian taxi drivers + diploma mills (de-facto resolved a year ago but still too lax rules for foreigners).

@mleko_2008 @GlobalDiss PL is nothing more than a gateway into the EU for them. They come here bc it's much easier, then 90% of them leave once they can, many immediately move west (check student visa scandal). Only ones who settle are the ones who are married with locals or have DECENT job(gl w that).