Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib@afalkhatib
Since October 7, three distinct narratives have taken hold among pro-Hamas activists, journalists, researchers, academics, social justice hustlers, and a group of “pro-Palestine” slacktivists. The first was a narrative of awe and praise for Hamas’s “resistance” and the tactical surprise of the attack, framed as a triumph despite Israeli restrictions and blockade. It leaned heavily on invoking the 1948 Nakba and repeating the cliché that “this didn’t start on October 7,” an attempt to recast the massacre as a response to decades of displacement rather than a deliberate operation driven by Hamas’s own narrow goals, which have little to do with the Palestinian national interest. A common way to excuse Hamas was to repeat the sanctimonious and politically hollow slogan “we cannot” or “it’s not our job to tell Palestinians how to resist,” as if anything done in the name of Palestinian resistance is automatically virtuous and above criticism.
As the euphoria faded and Gaza descended into devastation and mass suffering, a second narrative emerged claiming Israel was committing genocide regardless of Hamas. In this framing, the war was detached from October 7, the hostages, Hamas’s decision to launch the attack, and the group’s conduct. The earlier glorification of “resistance” shifted to a singular focus on Palestinian victimhood under Israeli bombardment, with little willingness to consider actions and reactions, choices and consequences. Hamas received a free pass. There was no pressure to accept a ceasefire at any cost, no criticism of its decision-making, and no demands to release the hostages taken on October 7.
Now that the war has largely paused and the ceasefire is holding, but the transitional process is frozen, and the Palestinian cause has seen no political, legal, military, or economic progress despite a surge in global “pro-Palestine” sentiments, a third narrative is forming. More commentators and activists now simply say “Israel created Hamas” to justify genocide and occupation in Gaza and the West Bank. This argument is usually delivered dismissively, placing primary blame on Israel for what Hamas has become. It is not offered as a condemnation of Hamas but as a way to minimize its agency and responsibility and, in familiar fashion within the “pro-Palestine” discourse, to shift accountability elsewhere.
These three narratives have served as avoidance mechanisms that block any serious critique of Hamas and its impact on Palestinian life. Instead of confronting what Hamas is and does, the pattern is predictable: celebrate it when it appears to be winning, blame Israel when it is losing, and oversimplify its origins to erase its responsibility for Gaza’s tragedy and for broader Palestinian failures.
This is one of the core reasons I wrote Hamas and Its Two Million Hostages. The goal is to strip away the façade and show that agency, accountability, and responsibility, even within a profound power imbalance with Israel, are not only possible but essential for any genuine pro-Palestine advocacy. Today’s “pro-Palestine” discourse is largely incapable of this work. Even many moderates and pro-peace voices avoid the necessary, uncomfortable task of examining Hamas and its destructive consequences for Palestinian society and politics, convinced that the focus must remain solely on Israel.
