Anthony Lutfallah

In June 1982, a Kataeb delegation talked PLO with Syria's Abdul Halim Khaddam. At the time, the Israelis were besieging the PLO in Beirut, and the Palestinians needed a place to go. That place could not be Syria, as far as Khaddam was concerned, because "In Syrian eyes, the presence of these fighters could encourage Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni opposition, and lead to pressures and interference by other Arab counties. Khaddam's proposed alternative was that the Palestinians should be disarmed and remain in Lebanon." What is especially cynical about Khaddam's response is this: he did not want anyone intervening in Syria because of the Palestinians. But it was perfectly acceptable for Syria to obtain an American-Israeli green light to enter Lebanon in 1976 to tame the very same Palestinians whom Khaddam didn't want in Syria. And when push came to shove in 1982, the Syrians would not lift a finger to help the PLO against the Israelis. Assad engaged his air force in the battle only when his own forces were in trouble. When the PLO's number two, Abu Iyad, was asked at a press conference on June 9, 1982, to assess Syria's assistance to the PLO during the war, his terse response spoke volumes: "no comment." Will the Lebanese ever learn that, when they involve themselves in these kinds of regional dynamics, they are merely setting themselves up to be used and abused by stronger players? Neutrality in this kind of environment is not isolationism; it's survival.