Sina Azodi
57K posts
@Azodiac83
MES Program Director. Assistant Prof. @ElliottSchoolGW -Author of "Iran & the Bomb: United States, Iran &the Nuclear Question." PhD-Tweets&RT≠E | Personal Views
#Neutrality For the duration of the armed conflict in Iran, the export of war materiel to the nations involved cannot be authorised. With neutrality in mind, current permits and exports of other goods will be reviewed on a regular basis. news.admin.ch/en/newnsb/eLmL… @DefrWbf
روز ملی شدن صنعت نفت گرامی، و راه رهبر بیچون چرای آن مرحوم دکتر محمد مصدق پر رهرو.
“There may be NO good airstrike option.” Andrea Stricker says the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear facility may be too deep to destroy from the air. “That could force a special forces operation — going inside the complex to eliminate it once the regime is further degraded.”
#Iran War Update No. 20 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative): 🔹The Strait of Hormuz is being increasingly framed in Tehran as a tool of Iranian leverage rather than a temporary wartime tactic. Iranian officials are openly discussing a post-war regulatory regime, including transit fees and IRGC-controlled routing. At the same time, there are reports that a “safe corridor” system is already being implemented for selected countries through Iran’s territorial waters. 🔹Meanwhile, international efforts to counter this are taking shape. Six U.S. allies U.S. allies – the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands – have signaled readiness to support maritime security operations in the strait, pointing toward a gradual internationalization of the waterway’s security. However, the exact form of their involvement remains unclear. 🔹Iran’s approach to escalation remains centered on vertical escalation rather than horizontal (expanding target types/categories). When Israel struck South Pars, Iran responded by targeting major energy infrastructure across the Persian Gulf. Continued strikes on U.S. bases follow the same pattern, i.e., response to attacks on Iranian military infrastructure. The focus so far has been on escalating within existing categories of targets, increasing scale and impact, rather than opening entirely new domains. 🔹This logic was reinforced by Iran’s strike on the Haifa refinery despite U.S. messaging against further energy targeting, underlining Tehran’s emphasis on enforcing its own red lines rather than accepting those imposed by the adversaries. 🔹According to Iranian expert commentaries, Iran’s current approach rests on three key elements: unpredictability, a “madman strategy,” and making threats to the enemy more credible; the latter reflected in shortened gap between warning and action, aimed at “correcting past misperceptions” caused by restraint. 🔹Energy infrastructure remains at the center of the conflict. Damage to Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility has caused significant disruptions to global gas markets, with parts of the complex potentially requiring years to fully recover. 🔹At the same time, Iran continues to sustain its own exports. Oil shipments from Kharg Island remain ongoing at roughly 1.1 to 1.5 million barrels per day, while increased storage at Jask suggests preparation for prolonged disruption scenarios. 🔹The war is also driving new economic dynamics. Discussions in Washington about waivers for up to 140 million barrels of Iranian oil indicate mounting pressure to stabilize global energy markets, but Tehran signals it will continue prioritizing China as its main costumer. 🔹Militarily, the United States maintains that operations are progressing, with over 7,000 targets reportedly struck. However, Iranian assessments suggest U.S. operations are adapting under pressure, including greater reliance on stand-off strikes, regional bases, and long-range bomber missions from Europe. 🔹Israeli strikes continue to target Iran’s military-industrial base, including electronic industries in Shiraz, reflecting an ongoing effort to degrade Iran’s industrial ecosystem. 🔹At the same time, there are indications of Iranian tactical adaptation. Reports of an F-35 being hit, possibly through Surface-to-Air Missile ambush (SAMbush), have fueled discussion about improved survivability and evolving Iranian air defense tactics. 🔹Regionally, attacks on U.S. positions persist. Bases in Erbil and Bahrain have reportedly been targeted again by Iran and its Iraqi allies. 🔹Unconfirmed reports of rocket fire from Syrian territory toward the Golan Heights raise the possibility of another active front, although the scale and intent remain unclear. 🔹Tensions between Iran and the UAE have escalated sharply. Diplomatic relations are deteriorating, with visa suspensions, closures of Iranian institutions, and reports of embassy shutdowns signaling a significant breakdown in ties. 🔹Internal security pressures inside Iran remain high. Authorities continue arrests linked to “espionage” and insurgent activity, particularly in southeastern regions, reflecting ongoing concerns about internal destabilization alongside the ongoing war. 🔹Diplomatically, divisions within GCC persist. Oman continues to push for de-escalation, Qatar maintains a more balanced stance, while Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE are adopting increasingly confrontational positions toward Iran. 🔹China has maintained a cautious posture, emphasizing stability and energy security while avoiding alignment with either side. Beijing has so far refrained from calling directly on Iran to halt its attacks and instead, continues calling on all parties to end hostilities. 🔹Inside Iran, discussions about nuclear doctrine are re-emerging, including limited calls for weaponization or withdrawal from the NPT, although these remain on the margins for now. 🔹Overall, the war is increasingly being shaped by competing efforts to define the rules of escalation, with Iran attempting to formalize new realities on the ground – especially at the strait – while external responses remain fragmented and uncertain despite growing concern over maritime security.
The developments of the past 24h may prove a turning point in this war: Israel and the US's escalation by striking the Qatari-Iranian Pars field, the strikes against Asaluyeh, Iran's massive retaliation against oil and gas installations in Saudi, Qatar and beyond, which shot up oil prices, the near downing of a F35 by Iran and Secretary Bessent's revelations that the US may unsanction Iranian oil on the waters to bring down oil prices. As I said already on the fourth day, the US has lost control of this war. It had a Plan A, but no Plan B. Plan A came crashing down after it became clear that the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei neither brought the implosion of the theocracy nor their surrender. As a result, the US is increasingly letting the Israelis drive the bus, by virtue of them having a plan, even though their plan does not serve US interests (the Israelis want to prolong the war to degrade Iran's entire industrial base, regardless of what happens to energy markets, Trump's presidency, and security in the region as a whole.) The Israeli strike against the Pars field, coordinated with the US, is particularly important because it violated a promise Trump made to Qatar back in September 2025 - Israel would no longer be allowed to strike Qatar. But that gas field is shared by both Iran and Qatar, hence it was an attack on Qatar as well as on Iran. With US coordination. This - and the impact on energy markets - may explain why Trump took to social media to blame Israel for the attack and publicly forbade them from striking further energy fields. But Bessent's comments about unsanctioning Iranian oil on the waters are the most important. Though it's primarily done to push down oil prices, it appears that we may have nevertheless entered sanctions relief territory out of necessity. I wrote several days ago that Tehran is very unlikely to end the war even if the US pulls out and declares victory. Iran has leverage for the first time in years and will seek to trade it in. It has publicly demanded a closing of US bases, reparations, and sanctions relief in order to stop shooting at Israel and open the Straits. The first may happen over time anyway, the second is highly unlikely, but the third - sanctions relief - may become more plausible as the cost of the war rises, and escalation strategies become increasingly suicidal for Trump. As I have explained, a return to the pre-war status quo is unacceptable to Tehran because it will not only be in a degraded state, but also in a continuously weakening state because its pathways to sanctions relief have been blown up. If Iran weakens further, it will only invite further American and Israeli aggression, Tehran believes, because it was the false perception of Iranian weakness that created the "window of opportunity" to attack Iran in the first place. Sanctions relief is, as a result, a necessity to ensure that the war doesn't restart. But here is where Iran may miscalculate. Trump may not yet have reached the point at which the cost of continuing the war is so high that he opts to offer sanctions exemptions to select countries to get Iran's agreement to open the straits and end the war. He will likely only reach that point once it's clear that his base is starting to turn against the war in a serious manner. At that point, Trump will face a time crunch. He will need a narrative in which he declares himself a victor - with his base believing it. Absent the ability to convince his base that he has won, the benefit of ending the war may not outweigh the cost of continuing it. And as soon as his base starts turning against the war, his ability to convince them of his victory starts to wane. Mindful of the fact that negotiating this end may take an estimated 7-10 days at best, which is different from the 24 hours or so it took to negotiate the unconditional ceasefire in June, Tehran may overplay its hand and only agree to enter these negotiations at a point at which the length of the negotiations may exceed the time Trump has left to convincingly declare victory and provide himself a face saving exit. Getting the timing of this right will be very difficult for both the US and Iran. Israel will do all it can to sabotage any such off-ramp, including by killing Iranian's negotiatiors. But it will become increasingly clear - if it hasn't already - to Trump that all his escalatory options only deepen the lose-lose situation he has put himself in. That's why Trump should never have listened to Netanyahu in the first place.
🇱🇧🇮🇱 A cellist playing in the rubble of southern Beirut while 900+ have been killed in 3 weeks of Israeli strikes. Reminds me of Titanic… music playing while everything sinks, just this time it’s real and way more painful.
The US and its allies are making a concerted effort to de-escalate the oil/gas war, having witnessed that Iran was willing -- and able -- to climb the escalation ladder very quickly. To be seen whether Tehran plays ball. Whatever the case, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.
Addendum_1: It is likely that a 'SAM trap' (air defense ambush) was set for this fighter jet & it was targeted from close range. We should employ these methods more often, as this itself will instill fear & panic.
