Luke Baker

This is an utterly bonkers story. Gamblers trying to win a bet on Polymarket are vowing to kill me if I don't rewrite an Iran missile story | The Times of Israel timesofisrael.com/gamblers-tryin…

I was in a 2 hour briefing today on the Iran War. All the briefings are closed, because Trump can't defend this war in public. I obviously can't disclose classified info, but you deserve to know how incoherent and incomplete these war plans are. 1/ Here's what I can share:

1. Is Trump planning to "Venezuelize" Iran? This analysis deviates from the mainstream media portrayal of a fickle, senile, or Bibi-led president. It assumes Trump is evil but rational. A thread. 🧵

It appears that a Polymarket account called "Magamyman" made $515,000 in a single day betting on last night's U.S. strike on Iran, with the first trade placed 71 minutes before the news broke publicly. When this person bought in, the market had this at a 17% probability. They turned roughly $87,000 into over half a million dollars overnight. Reminder that Donald Trump Jr. sits on Polymarket's advisory board and his firm invested double-digit millions into the platform last year. The DOJ and CFTC both had active investigations into Polymarket that were dropped after Trump took office. Prediction markets cannot be a vehicle for profiting off advance knowledge of military action. We need answers, transparency, and oversight.

Small point, perhaps, but can't help feeling that this copy should be referring to Mountbatten Windsor throughout, not "Andrew". He's a regular citizen. If the law applies equally to all, refer to him like others under investigation ⁦@BBCBreaking⁩ bbc.co.uk/news/articles/…

From an old ⁦@PrivateEyeNews⁩

Plans to invade Greenland have just been cancelled after this

Trump Administration Pushes Out Key Officials Focused on China Tech Threat—Staffers worked for a Commerce Department office charged with protecting the U.S. from Chinese technological advances @heathersomervil @AmrithRamkumar wsj.com/politics/natio… wsj.com/politics/natio…

My journey from foreign correspondent to Uber driver in Trump's America I see my own fragility reflected in the people climbing into my back seat before dawn: widows, migrants, parents, workers stitching together lives on the margins. open.substack.com/pub/stevescher…

“I do not understand what you are doing on Greenland,” French President Emmanuel Macron says to Trump in an apparent text message.

At #Davos today, I introduced myself to someone, saying my name and adding that I was from Portland. "Oh that's great," they said enthusiastically. "I was just in Warsaw." 🫤🤦‍♂️ @PortlandComms #Poland

Well said

Thank God. The beginning of UK sense, and it will convince anyone who does it that Europe is a Good Thing and will lay the ground for rejoining the EU... magari UK to rejoin EU Erasmus student exchange scheme from 2027 thetimes.com/article/36abdc…

According to Reuters, the United States has informed European NATO allies that it no longer intends to provide conventional assets for Europe’s defence after 2027. While this approach is not entirely new, the combination of a clear deadline and the new National Security Strategy raises the question of whether Washington has fully thought through the implications. As a thought experiment, I attempted to estimate what it would actually cost the United States to withdraw its conventional military assets from Europe. Naturally, there may be elements I am not aware of, and this is not intended to be exhaustive. However, the resulting figures are very likely on the low side of what the real costs would be. Below is the picture under three scenarios: an abrupt withdrawal, a rapid withdrawal, and a gradual phase-out. Summary: A full U.S. military withdrawal from Europe, including Army, Air Force, Navy presence, pre-positioned stocks and C2, and relocation of those capabilities back to U.S. or other theatres, would likely cost on the order of $70–140 billion in one-off and capital expenses. This would be spread over roughly 5–10 years in a planned scenario. An abrupt pullout, maybe technically possible in 1–3 years, would sharply raise short-term costs and political damage, while leaving major capability gaps and storage problems. Any such move would also increase long-term operational costs if the U.S. ever needed to project power back into Europe. Analysis: 1. What are we actually talking about removing? Very rough, but ballpark: Personnel in Europe (DoD only): 80–90,000 active-duty US troops in Europe (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines) plus several tens of thousands dependents and DoD civilians. Major Army formations: 2nd Cavalry Regiment, rotational Armoured Brigade Combat Teams, combat aviation brigades, artillery, air defence, logistics brigades, SOF elements. Air Force: Several fighter wings (Germany, UK, Italy), heavy airlift and ISR presence (Ramstein, Mildenhall, etc.), plus support units. Navy: 6th Fleet HQ, forward-deployed ships & subs, Rota (Spain) destroyers, logistics/support. C2 - strategic enablers: EUCOM HQ, AFRICOM HQ, AIRCOM & AOC support, CAOC integration, SIGINT/ISR sites, pre-positioned stocks (APS), depots, medical facilities, fuel farms, communication backbone, etc. So we’re not just talking “some brigades and jets” — it’s a whole theatre infrastructure. 2. Types of cost one would need to count Physical relocation costs Moving people, families, equipment, vehicles, aircraft, munitions. Shipping, strategic airlift, de-rigging pre-positioned stocks. New infrastructure & basing costs Building or expanding bases in the US (I think the military term is CONUS) or elsewhere to receive relocated units. Housing, schools, depots, ranges, HQs, hardened shelters, IT, comms. Contractual and political costs Base closure, environmental remediation, penalties, host-nation agreements. Possibly early termination of long-term deals, SOFA adjustments. (Sure, the US can probably just not care about this, but the political cost for not caring would be a generationl reputation damage in Europe) Operational opportunity costs Reduced forward presence means more time & money to come back if needed. Increased strategic lift requirement for any future operation in Europe and Middle East. 3. Rough money estimate (order-of-magnitude) A) Moving the stuff Hardware in theatre: Several armoured brigade equivalents: Say 1,000–1,500 heavy vehicles (tanks, IFVs, SPGs, MLRS, etc.). Thousands of other tactical vehicles, trailers, support assets. Dozens to low hundreds of aircraft (fighters, transports, helicopters, ISR platforms). Massive amounts of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, comms gear, medical stock, etc. Moving can be: Strategic airlift (C-17, charter) – extremely expensive per ton. Sealift (RO/RO ships, containers) – cheaper, but months of port/rail logistics. If you treat it like a large, multi-year retrograde and use lots of sealift direct transport bill might be on the order of: $10–20 billion (over several years) That includes unit moves, families, and large-scale movement of pre-positioned equipment. B) Building and expanding bases in new locations (US or even SE Asia) This is the big one. Consider: A single new or massively expanded Army base with housing for 15,000–20,000 people, training areas, depots, motor pools, HQ facilities, hospital capacity etc. can easily cost $5–10+ billion over a decade. Air bases with: Hardened shelters Upgraded runways and taxiways Ammo storage Fuel infrastructure Security, tech, and climate hardening can run to multiple billions each. C2 & HQ infrastructure (replacing EUCOM/AFRICOM footprints, relocating data centres, comms nodes etc.) is another multi-billion line. If you assume: The U.S. would need 3–5 major additional / expanded Army facilities, 2–3 major Air Force hubs, plus significant expansion at existing ports, depots, and training ranges, we are probably in the ballpark of: $50–100 billion in new or expanded infrastructure over, don't know, 10–15 years depending how gold-plated and dispersed you make it. C) Soft financial costs Base closure & remediation in Europe: Environmental cleanup, infrastructure handover, legal obligations sums up to many billions over time. Again, this is often politically obfuscated. Re-tooling pre-positioned stock concept: APS sites in Europe would need to be replaced with stateside or alternate-theatre storage (e.g. CONUS, Indo-Pacific). That’s more construction & logistics. Let’s conservatively throw another $10–20 billion over time for closure/cleanup/contractual and APS restructuring. D) Total order of magnitude Add the pieces: Transport: $10–20 bn New/expanded infrastructure: $50–100 bn Closure/cleanup/APS reshuffle: $10–20 bn This is very plausilby $70–140 billion one-off / capital + transition cost spread over a decade or so. That’s not counting: Higher recurring cost of projecting power back into Europe later, Extra spending on strategic lift, The cost to rebuild political credibility if the US ever wants to return becuase believe it, if Europe has to build up the same stuff and will become strategically capable and independent in say 10 years, why would Europe want the US back? E) Three scenarios (time) Scenario A – “Crash pullout and political rupture” Timeline: 1–3 years Politically motivated, rapid drawdown (like “bring them home now”). Priorities: personnel out fast, families first, then high-value kit, then what you can salvage. You use a lot of airlift and surge sealift. Bases are left “warm” or mothballed; minimal remediation at first. Feasible in a few years, but: Operational chaos Very high short-term logistics costs Enormous political damage in NATO Many assets stored in suboptimal conditions until proper bases are ready. Scenario B – “Planned strategic re-posturing” Timeline: 5–10 years You phase out presence gradually: First close some smaller sites. Consolidate remaining forces into fewer hubs. Meanwhile, build or expand bases in the U.S. (or possibly in the Indo-Pacific or dont know, "the Western Hemisphere"). Equipment moves in waves; some pre-positioned stocks get re-shored or scrapped/modernised. Remediation and host-nation negotiations happen in parallel. This is politically and logistically more realistic. 5–7 years is probably the minimum if Washington wants to avoid major disruption. Does it? 10 years gives time to align with budget cycles, procurement, and new doctrine. Scenario C Something like “Silent hollowing out” Timeline: 10-15 or more years Officially U.S. “remains” in Europe, but: Gradual troop reductions No new major units deployed Pre-positioned stocks quietly reduced C2 footprints slimmed down Cost is lower because things are not replaced and slowly shrinking. This is less “withdraw and relocate” and more “let it wither”, but it’s often how great powers reduce presence. F) Strategic implications for US (not political, thats a whole separate story) Pure force-planning says: relocating everything back to US or anywhere makes future operations in Europe much more expensive. More airlift, more tankers, more sealift, and more pre-planned surge plans just to get back to where you were. C2 that is physically remote (e.g. controlling a Baltic war from the U.S.) is slower, more fragile, and politically less credible. Downside for NATO's Eastern flank is obvious, but this might not be Americas priority problem for now: US relocation changes the risk calculus for Russia: a U.S. that has physically left Europe has to decide and mobilise to come back, which is exactly the window for opportunistic aggression. Finally, I did calculations for Europe to replace US conventional assets and strategic enablers. I cam up with a rough 300 billion number. So in total. It would cost the US about 2/3 to leave and lose control of European theatre what it would cost for Europe to replace the US assets and become strategically independent. Im not sure who loses more in this equation.

and there it is

Great interview -- Ethan Hawke: ‘It is tremendously difficult to stay married’ thetimes.com/article/81858e…

@StigAbell @TimesRadio BBC Directors-general Stig, not director-generals 🧐

PM #Modi meets UK PM #Starmer in Mumbai. 'CETA is a turning point in India-UK ties, paving the way for a forward-looking partnership,' says Indian Amb to the UK Vikram Doraiswami. Tells @Parikshitl both nations will deepen cooperation in tech, green energy, education & defence.

The note passed to Trump from his Secretary of State just now in the White House. Caught on camera, (shot mirrored so it’s clear what was written) “We need you to approve a Truth Social post soon so you can announce deal first”

Trump and Netanyahu have met dozens of times to discuss the future of Israel and the Palestinians. Here's Trump in 2017, when he said he was happy with either a one-state or two-state solution to the conflict... forward.com/news/363408/mu…