
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
5.9K posts

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Middle East, National Security and intelligence expert خبير لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وإيران Senior Fellow @inss_hebrew Nonresident Fellow @AtlanticCouncil


I don’t buy any of this — a lot of think tank doublespeak that ignores some basic realities: 1. Iran is dramatically weaker now in every single relevant category of threat. 2. The US and Israel have destroyed large quantities of weapons and launchers, along with defense infrastructure and factories, research facilities and human capital. 3. The war has united the US and Israel with moderate Arab nations against radical Islamists, strengthening an important ongoing alliance. 4. With the internet down and the streets filled with armed thugs, regime change may not be imminent but it is likely inevitable. Comparing this to the facts and circumstances prior to 28 February, there is no doubt that the free world is better off now. Only a military “academic” could see things so differently.



הדובר הצבאי של החות'ים בתימן יחיא סריע מודיע כי בהמשך להודעה שלהם על התערבותם הצבאית הישירה כדי לסייע לאיראן ולחזיתות ההתנגדות בלבנון, בעיראק ובזירה הפלסטינית ולאור ההסלמה הצבאית והפגיעה בתשתיות וביצוע פשעים ומעשי טבח נגד אחיהם בלבנון, באיראן, בעיראק ובזירה הפלסטינית, כלשונו, החות'ים בעזרת האל ביצעו את הפעולה הצבאית הראשונה שלהם - שיגור של טילים בליסטיים לעבר יעדים צבאיים רגישים בדרום ישראל ("פלסטין הכבושה"). בהודעה אמר כי הפעולות שלהם יימשכו עד שיושגו המטרות המוצהרות וכפי שהוגדרו בהודעה הקודמת.


After Khamenei’s elimination there is no credible U.S. threat that will force Iran’s leadership to abandon its core strategy. Tehran doesn’t seek endless war, but it does use controlled escalation to reshape the regional balance of power. From its perspective, dismantling its missile or nuclear programs isn’t a concession, it’s an existential risk. So it’s willing to escalate rather than comply. Bottom line, as long as this regime is in power, its strategic objectives won’t change. Pressure can shape tactics, not goals. If the objective is real change in Iran’s behavior, deterrence alone won’t get you there. #IranWar





כניסת החות'ים למערכה לא הייתה שאלה של אם, אלא של מתי. בסופו של דבר, כרכיב מרכזי בראייתם וכחלק מציר ההתנגדות הנאבק בישראל ובארצות הברית, לא היה ניתן לבלום את הצטרפותם באמצעות איומים או תמריצים כלכליים. עם זאת, המשמעות המרכזית של כניסתם אינה הירי לעבר ישראל, מבלי להמעיט בחשיבותו, אלא ביכולתם לאיים על מיצרי באב אל-מנדב ועל נמל ינבו. יכולת זו מקשה על מאמצי סעודיה ומדינות המפרץ לעקוף את מיצרי הורמוז, ובכך מעצימה את הפגיעוּת של נתיבי האנרגיה האזוריים והגלובליים. אחד ההישגים המשמעותיים של איראן במערכה הנוכחית, בניגוד לסבבים קודמים, הוא היכולת להרחיב אותה לכדי מערכה אזורית מלאה—הכוללת את חזבאללה, המיליציות השיעיות בעיראק וכעת גם את החות'ים. התפתחות זו לא רק מקלה על איראן מבחינה צבאית, אלא גם מסבכת מאוד את האפשרות לסיים את המערכה, שכן סביר שאיראן תדרוש שכל הסדר הפסקת אש יחול על כלל הזירות במקביל. מכאן עולה כי למרות סימני שחיקה, ציר ההתנגדות רחוק מקריסה. להפך, רמת המחויבות וההתלכדות סביב איראן מדגישה את עמידותו. בהתאם לכך, כל דרישה מאיראן במסגרת משא ומתן לחדול מתמיכה בשותפיה האזוריים צפויה להיתקל בקשיים משמעותיים. פתיחתה של חזית נוספת רק מעמיקה את מורכבות המערכה ומגדילה את הסיכונים הגלומים בה.

Trump went to war on false or unproven claims: Iran was not within weeks of acquiring enough fissile material to make a nuke; did not babe an ICBM reaching US; was not about to attack US. This wasn’t fog of war; it was willfully contrived.

Told @politico that I have no doubt in my mind that eventually the Houthis will enter and they will do two things — first, block the Bab el Mandeb strait, and second, try to prevent the Saudis from having tankers in [its] Yanbu port taking oil. If negotiations stall or fail, shutting the Bab el Mandeb strait will be one of Iran’s most powerful political levers, which could draw the Houthis into the war If things escalate and Trump attacks energy facilities, the Iranians will be in a very hard situation. closure of the Bab el Mandeb strait might represent the next level of economic pain from the conflict. The Iranian regime is not as desperate for a deal as Trump appears to believe. In recent weeks, the Iranian regime has learned how much global power it can exert by closing Hormuz and causing worldwide economic pressure. If Trump escalates by attacking Iran’s Kharg Island, where 90 percent of Iran’s oil is exported, or by attacking regional energy infrastructure, Bab el Mandeb would become an important way for the regime to flex its power. We are not in a situation where the Iranians are capitulating as Trump is also desperate for negotiation. The other day, he blinked first. politico.com/news/2026/03/2…

A well-placed Iranian figure-whose name I won’t disclose-reflects a view increasingly shared even among those who held more moderate positions before the war: “After today’s attacks by the Israeli regime on Iran’s economic infrastructure and nuclear facilities, there is no longer any justification for Iran to remain in the NPT, to continue cooperation with the IAEA, or to uphold the fatwa banning the development of nuclear weapons. It now appears that under the new leadership, the Islamic Republic may need to revisit and reassess all of these commitments.” #Iran #Iranwar

Thailand has reached a deal with Iran to allow Thai tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. “An agreement has been reached to allow Thai oil tankers to transit safely through the Strait of Hormuz," Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said at a press conference, according to @AFP

This assumption may be valid, but it tells us very little about the future of the Iranian regime after the current conflict. A. We simply don’t know how this campaign will end. If it concludes with an agreement that removes or eases sanctions, the regime will almost certainly emerge stronger. this is Israel’s primary concern. B. If sanctions remain and given the dominant role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a different scenario is more likely, meaning a more authoritarian, poorer regime that prioritizes military buildup above all else. At the same time, not sure that large-scale public unrest will significantly challenge the system, particularly given the IRGC’s strengthened position and its ability to capitalize on perceived success in the conflict. C. history matters. After the Iran-Iraq War, the regime was strengthened, at least in the short term. D. We should also not underestimate the willingness of China and Russia to expand their support for Iran, nor Iran’s ability to leverage strategic assets like the Strait of Hormuz to extract economic and political concessions, potentially undermining the sanctions regime. Bottom line is that the regime may emerge weakened in some respects, but also more radical, more confident in its own resilience, and more focused than ever on building its military power. The condition of the population will likely deteriorate further, but that alone does not necessarily lead to regime change. In fact, it may have the opposite effect. In any case, it is worth waiting until the conflict concludes before drawing firm conclusions.

🚨וויטקוף בכנס כלכלי במיאמי: "יש לנו הארכה של הדדליין. אנחנו רואים בזה דבר חיובי מאוד. אנחנו מנהלים משא ומתן עם האיראנים. ייתכן שיש לנו הגדרה שונה למשא ומתן מזו שלהם. אבל אנחנו מדברים איתם. הצענו (להיפגש). אנחנו חושבים שיהיו פגישות השבוע. אנחנו בהחלט מקווים לכך. ספינות עוברות (במצר הורמוז) וזה סימן טוב. הנשיא רוצה הסכם שלום. אבל בלי לחץ לא מביאים אף אחד לשולחן. אנחנו מוכנים לפתור את זה באמצעים דיפלומטיים. אין העשרה. לא תהיה צפון קוריאה שנייה במזרח התיכון. יש לנו תוכנית בת 15 סעיפים על השולחן. אנחנו מצפים לתגובה מהאיראנים. זה יכול לפתור הכול."

The strike on Arak, more than anything, highlights the fundamental complexity and limitations of the current campaign. When targeted decapitations depend on highly precise intelligence, and when U.S. constraints effectively rule out attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, the range of viable targets becomes extremely limited. What remains are deeply buried facilities, often tens of meters underground, and nuclear-related sites whose operational significance is questionable. Arak itself is a good example: even prior to the nuclear agreement, it did not pose an immediate threat given Iran’s alternative plutonium pathways, and certainly not in its modified state after the deal. Faced with these constraints, Israel has expanded its targeting to include metal and industrial facilities, actions that may escalate the campaign, delivering decisive strategic gains, especially in light of the likely Iranian response. Paradoxically, this strike may indicate that the campaign is approaching exhaustion. Without moving to a new phase, such as targeting energy infrastructure or considering a ground component we may be nearing the point of diminishing returns, where each additional action yields less strategic value. At the same time, the unresolved issue of the roughly 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% underscores a more fundamental reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to Iran’s nuclear challenge. #IranWar

The strike on Arak, more than anything, highlights the fundamental complexity and limitations of the current campaign. When targeted decapitations depend on highly precise intelligence, and when U.S. constraints effectively rule out attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, the range of viable targets becomes extremely limited. What remains are deeply buried facilities, often tens of meters underground, and nuclear-related sites whose operational significance is questionable. Arak itself is a good example: even prior to the nuclear agreement, it did not pose an immediate threat given Iran’s alternative plutonium pathways, and certainly not in its modified state after the deal. Faced with these constraints, Israel has expanded its targeting to include metal and industrial facilities, actions that may escalate the campaign, delivering decisive strategic gains, especially in light of the likely Iranian response. Paradoxically, this strike may indicate that the campaign is approaching exhaustion. Without moving to a new phase, such as targeting energy infrastructure or considering a ground component we may be nearing the point of diminishing returns, where each additional action yields less strategic value. At the same time, the unresolved issue of the roughly 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% underscores a more fundamental reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to Iran’s nuclear challenge. #IranWar

Right. So, ok to do this, I suppose. But, the wolf closest to the sled is the HEU issue and we're still waiting on that.
