Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

@citrinowicz

Middle East, National Security and intelligence expert خبير لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وإيران Senior Fellow @inss_hebrew Nonresident Fellow @AtlanticCouncil

Katılım Mart 2020
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
Before Striking Iran: Defining Achievable and realistic Objectives Before considering a military strike against Iran, it is essential to be realistic about what such a campaign can actually accomplish. There is little doubt that Iran is not a peer competitor to the United States militarily. The U.S. retains overwhelming conventional superiority and operational dominance across domains. However, Iran should not be underestimated. As demonstrated in previous limited confrontations, particularly in missile warfare, Tehran possesses meaningful asymmetric capabilities — especially in its ballistic missile arsenal and regional proxy network. The core question, therefore, is not whether the United States can inflict damage. It is: What strategic objective is realistically achievable? 1. Regime Change Even senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that regime change would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. There is no unified, viable opposition inside Iran capable of stepping in and governing. Moreover, regime change would almost certainly require a prolonged campaign, potentially including ground forces — something the American public and policymakers have shown little appetite for after Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent a willingness to commit to a large-scale, long-term stabilization effort, regime change is not a credible objective. 2. Destabilizing the Regime to Trigger Internal Uprising A military campaign could weaken the regime and create internal pressure. However, Iran’s leadership — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — has no exit option. The regime’s survival is existential for its core leadership. History suggests they would respond to internal unrest with overwhelming force. For destabilization to translate into meaningful political change, a sustained and prolonged campaign would likely be required. Even then, the most probable outcome may not be democratic transition, but internal chaos — potentially pushing Iran toward civil conflict. That scenario carries significant regional and global risks. 3. Destroying Iran’s Nuclear Program A military strike could significantly damage nuclear facilities. Precision strikes may delay progress and degrade infrastructure. But strikes cannot eliminate scientific knowledge, human capital, or political will. Nor is it certain that all highly enriched material could be located and destroyed. At best, military action may delay the program. It is unlikely to eliminate it permanently. Iran would almost certainly attempt reconstruction — potentially with greater determination and fewer constraints. 4. Eliminating Iran’s Missile Capabilities A broad campaign could substantially degrade Iran’s missile inventory and production infrastructure. However, Iran’s missile program is domestically based and central to its defense doctrine. It is viewed as a pillar of deterrence against superior conventional forces. Even after heavy losses, Tehran would likely prioritize rebuilding these capabilities. The result may be temporary degradation rather than permanent removal. 5. Forcing Iran Back to Negotiations on Better Terms There is an assumption that military pressure could coerce Tehran into accepting a more favorable agreement. Yet past confrontations suggest that the Iranian leadership may choose endurance over capitulation. The regime may calculate that time increases political pressure on Washington to de-escalate, particularly if the conflict becomes prolonged or regionally destabilizing. Rather than producing immediate concessions, military action could harden Iran’s negotiating position — or eliminate diplomatic channels entirely. 6. Targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Some might argue that removing the Supreme Leader could fundamentally alter Iran’s trajectory. However, decapitation strikes often produce unpredictable outcomes. Iran’s political system is institutionalized, not purely personalist. Removing Khamenei could trigger retaliation from Iran and its regional proxies and potentially force the United States into a much broader conflict. It is also unclear whether such a move would moderate Iranian policy. It could just as easily radicalize it. The Strategic Bottom Line There is no question about U.S. military superiority in a direct confrontation. The real issue is strategic clarity. For the first time in decades, the possibility of direct U.S.–Iran military confrontation raises the prospect of open interstate war rather than proxy conflict. That demands disciplined thinking about ends, ways, and means. No available objective appears easily attainable. All carry significant second- and third-order effects. Many outcomes could be unpredictable — and not necessarily favorable to U.S. interests. Thus, before initiating military action, policymakers must clearly define what “success” looks like — and whether the likely costs, duration, escalation risks, and regional consequences align with America’s broader strategic priorities. Military capability is not the same as strategic advantage. #IranRevolution2026 #Iran
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
Operational Success, Strategic Failure in Iran This is not a matter of opinion. It is a matter of facts. 1. Iran today is weaker than it was before the conflict, but it is also more radical. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has further consolidated its influence over decision-making, eroding what little internal balance once existed within the regime. Iran was never moderate under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but there were previously competing centers of power. That dynamic has largely disappeared, leaving a more ideologically rigid system in place. 2. To be sure, the United States and Israel have inflicted significant damage on Iran’s military capabilities. Their operational and intelligence superiority is unquestioned. But battlefield success does not automatically translate into strategic victory. Iran has demonstrated, time and again, an ability to rebuild. Nowhere is this more consequential than in the nuclear domain. With roughly 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, Tehran retains a latent capability that cannot simply be bombed away or seized. Counting destroyed targets is not the same as achieving a durable strategic outcome. 3. The regional picture further complicates the narrative of success. Key Gulf actors, such as Oman and Qatar, have pushed for de-escalation and, in some cases, openly criticized Israel’s role in the conflict. Qatar continues to maintain functional ties with Iran. Even among U.S. partners that normalized relations with Israel, such as the UAE and Bahrain, public unease is evident. Saudi Arabia, is unlikely to advance normalization under current conditions surrounding the Palestinian issue. The idea of a cohesive regional alignment against Iran remains overstated. 4. More fundamentally, the campaign’s implicit objective was not merely to degrade capabilities, but to alter the strategic landscape, ultimately by creating conditions for regime change. That outcome has not materialized. Instead, hardline leadership remains in place, now facing incentives to reassess its nuclear posture. A regime that feels both threatened and vindicated may be more,not less, inclined to pursue a nuclear weapon. 5. If the conflict ends under current conditions, Iran may emerge as the strategic winner despite suffering tactical losses. It can claim resilience in the face of sustained pressure from two of the world’s most capable militaries. Meanwhile, global competitors of the United States stand to benefit. Russia gains breathing room and geopolitical leverage, while China watches Washington become further entangled in the Middle East. 6. Even the situation in the Strait of Hormuz underscores the paradox. What was open at the outset of the conflict may now require diplomatic or military effort to reopen—turning a return to the status quo into a perceived achievement. 7. There would be no more positive development for the Middle East than the fall of the Iranian regime. That remains the strategic prize. But it is far from clear that the current campaign, as it stands, has advanced that outcome. If anything, there is a growing risk it has produced the opposite effect. 8. The more immediate question is how this ends. The administration faces a narrowing set of options, none of them particularly good. One path is a negotiated agreement. But under current conditions, such a deal is unlikely to be favorable. From Tehran’s perspective, the regime has withstood sustained military pressure and can claim a form of strategic resilience. That perception matters. It reduces any incentive to compromise on the core pillars of its security and ideology such as its missile program, its drone capabilities, and ultimately its nuclear posture. A deal reached under these circumstances risks formalizing, rather than rolling back, Iran’s long-term threat. The alternative is escalation: a broader military campaign, potentially including the seizure of strategic assets such as Kharg Island or contested Gulf or Hormuz straits. But such moves would not be decisive. Iran is not a state that can be coerced into collapse through limited territorial losses. Instead, escalation would likely prolong the conflict, expand its scope, and increase the risks of regional spillover—without guaranteeing a strategic breakthrough. In short, there is no good option as long as this regime in Tehran remains in place and at present, it is not going anywhere. 9. There is also a second-order effect that deserves attention in Washington. The U.S.-Israel alliance remains a cornerstone of Israel’s security and long-term future. That is not in question. But it is less clear that this campaign strengthens Israel’s standing in the United States. On the contrary, prolonged conflict, especially one that lacks a clear strategic end state, risks deepening political and public friction. If United States is being drawn into an open-ended Middle Eastern conflict without a clear payoff, the political cost for Israel could become significant. The bottom line is clear - this has been a remarkable operational performance, driven by close coordination between U.S. Central Command and Israel. But if it concludes without meaningful strategic change, it will be remembered as a strategic failure. The risk is not an Iran that is weakened and deterred, but one that adapts, emerging more determined, more radical, and potentially closer to a nuclear threshold, resembling Pakistan or North Korea rather than the "new" Venezuela for example #IranWar
David M Friedman@DavidM_Friedman

I don’t buy any of this — a lot of think tank doublespeak that ignores some basic realities: 1. Iran is dramatically weaker now in every single relevant category of threat. 2. The US and Israel have destroyed large quantities of weapons and launchers, along with defense infrastructure and factories, research facilities and human capital. 3. The war has united the US and Israel with moderate Arab nations against radical Islamists, strengthening an important ongoing alliance. 4. With the internet down and the streets filled with armed thugs, regime change may not be imminent but it is likely inevitable. Comparing this to the facts and circumstances prior to 28 February, there is no doubt that the free world is better off now. Only a military “academic” could see things so differently.

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@igalmosko @kaisos1987 הם כבר עושים זאת אבל כי יש מגבלות משקל וגודל למיכליות שעוברות בתעלת סואץ וזה גם לא פותר את הצורך להעביר נפט לשווקים במזרח אסיה דרך באב אלמנדב. במקביל האיראנים כבר תקפו בנמל ינבו ששוקם אבל היכולת הוכחה, וזה עוד לפני שהחות'ים עלולים לפגוע בנמל זה.
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Yigal Mosko
Yigal Mosko@igalmosko·
@citrinowicz @kaisos1987 נמל ינבו הסעודי בערך 1500 ק"מ מצפון לבאב אל מנדב. מה הבעיה של הסעודים להוציא נפט משם לתעלת סואץ?
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
כניסת החות'ים למערכה לא הייתה שאלה של אם, אלא של מתי. בסופו של דבר, כרכיב מרכזי בראייתם וכחלק מציר ההתנגדות הנאבק בישראל ובארצות הברית, לא היה ניתן לבלום את הצטרפותם באמצעות איומים או תמריצים כלכליים. עם זאת, המשמעות המרכזית של כניסתם אינה הירי לעבר ישראל, מבלי להמעיט בחשיבותו, אלא ביכולתם לאיים על מיצרי באב אל-מנדב ועל נמל ינבו. יכולת זו מקשה על מאמצי סעודיה ומדינות המפרץ לעקוף את מיצרי הורמוז, ובכך מעצימה את הפגיעוּת של נתיבי האנרגיה האזוריים והגלובליים. אחד ההישגים המשמעותיים של איראן במערכה הנוכחית, בניגוד לסבבים קודמים, הוא היכולת להרחיב אותה לכדי מערכה אזורית מלאה—הכוללת את חזבאללה, המיליציות השיעיות בעיראק וכעת גם את החות'ים. התפתחות זו לא רק מקלה על איראן מבחינה צבאית, אלא גם מסבכת מאוד את האפשרות לסיים את המערכה, שכן סביר שאיראן תדרוש שכל הסדר הפסקת אש יחול על כלל הזירות במקביל. מכאן עולה כי למרות סימני שחיקה, ציר ההתנגדות רחוק מקריסה. להפך, רמת המחויבות וההתלכדות סביב איראן מדגישה את עמידותו. בהתאם לכך, כל דרישה מאיראן במסגרת משא ומתן לחדול מתמיכה בשותפיה האזוריים צפויה להיתקל בקשיים משמעותיים. פתיחתה של חזית נוספת רק מעמיקה את מורכבות המערכה ומגדילה את הסיכונים הגלומים בה.
roi kais • روعي كايس • רועי קייס@kaisos1987

הדובר הצבאי של החות'ים בתימן יחיא סריע מודיע כי בהמשך להודעה שלהם על התערבותם הצבאית הישירה כדי לסייע לאיראן ולחזיתות ההתנגדות בלבנון, בעיראק ובזירה הפלסטינית ולאור ההסלמה הצבאית והפגיעה בתשתיות וביצוע פשעים ומעשי טבח נגד אחיהם בלבנון, באיראן, בעיראק ובזירה הפלסטינית, כלשונו, החות'ים בעזרת האל ביצעו את הפעולה הצבאית הראשונה שלהם - שיגור של טילים בליסטיים לעבר יעדים צבאיים רגישים בדרום ישראל ("פלסטין הכבושה"). בהודעה אמר כי הפעולות שלהם יימשכו עד שיושגו המטרות המוצהרות וכפי שהוגדרו בהודעה הקודמת.

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
Four weeks into the war, the emerging picture is deeply problematic. The conflict appears to have produced a more radicalized Iranian regime, still in possession of significant stockpiles of 60% enriched uranium, while retaining the ability to exert influence over critical global economic chokepoints, and maintain a steady pace of projectile launches. This has come in exchange for a partial degradation of Iran’s forcd buildup primarily in the conventional domain. Even in this respect, however, the achievements remain limited and, more importantly, It is clear that Iran will rebuild its capabilities, and even if it takes longer than expected, it will ultimately succeed in doing so. The absence of a clearly defined exit strategy has led to a gradual slide into a war of attrition, one that is imposing mounting costs on the economy, military readiness, and, critically, the civilian home front all over the ME and beyond. At the outset of the conflict, the current trajectory suggests a far more ambiguous outcome. At best, the results are mixed; at worst, they point to a troubling gap between operational success and strategic effectiveness. While the end state of the campaign remains uncertain, the current trajectory suggests that accumulated operational gains are not translating into strategic success, and may, in fact, be leading to strategic failure. #IranIsraelWar
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweetledi
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
“Crying Wolf” on the Iran Issue A. While the ultimate outcome of this conflict remains uncertain, one trend is already becoming clearer: the likelihood of a sustained, large-scale U.S. military re-engagement in the Gulf is diminishing. This reflects the growing costs borne by the United States, the broader impact on the global economy, and potential shifts in domestic political priorities in Washington. B. For Israel, there is a real risk that this campaign, particularly if the Iranian regime endures will prove to be a double-edged sword, potentially undermining both the legitimacy and feasibility of future military action against Iran. C. If the conflict ends with the regime intact, Iran will almost certainly seek to rebuild its conventional capabilities and may, at a minimum, reassess the benefits of advancing toward a nuclear weapons capability. D. This raises a critical question: what will be the future capacity for coordinated U.S.-Israeli action in a renewed confrontation? At present, while Iran’s conventional military buildup constitutes a serious challenge, it does not amount to an existential threat. Moreover, there is no clear indication that Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold even under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and in the aftermath of the 12 days war. E. It is therefore possible that this joint campaign has come too early. Should Iran, under future leadership, decide to accelerate its nuclear weapons, it may prove significantly more difficult to mobilize U.S. support for another military effort aimed at preventing nuclearization. #IranWar
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
“Crying Wolf” on the Iran Issue A. While the ultimate outcome of this conflict remains uncertain, one trend is already becoming clearer: the likelihood of a sustained, large-scale U.S. military re-engagement in the Gulf is diminishing. This reflects the growing costs borne by the United States, the broader impact on the global economy, and potential shifts in domestic political priorities in Washington. B. For Israel, there is a real risk that this campaign, particularly if the Iranian regime endures will prove to be a double-edged sword, potentially undermining both the legitimacy and feasibility of future military action against Iran. C. If the conflict ends with the regime intact, Iran will almost certainly seek to rebuild its conventional capabilities and may, at a minimum, reassess the benefits of advancing toward a nuclear weapons capability. D. This raises a critical question: what will be the future capacity for coordinated U.S.-Israeli action in a renewed confrontation? At present, while Iran’s conventional military buildup constitutes a serious challenge, it does not amount to an existential threat. Moreover, there is no clear indication that Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold even under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and in the aftermath of the 12 days war. E. It is therefore possible that this joint campaign has come too early. Should Iran, under future leadership, decide to accelerate its nuclear weapons, it may prove significantly more difficult to mobilize U.S. support for another military effort aimed at preventing nuclearization. #iran
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
Rold @FT that Iran may lack the capacity for massive salvos, but its current approach appears to be a strategy designed to endure rather than overwhelm. This reflects long-term planning: Iran appears to be deliberately rationing its missile and drone use, recognising the conflict is likely to be prolonged. At the current tempo, it probably has enough missiles for several more weeks. Rather than relying on large-scale barrages, it is sustaining pressure through smaller but continuous attacks — limited missile strikes on Israel, waves of drones and frequent short-range missile launches towards Gulf states.  Even a small number of strikes could hit critical energy and infrastructure targets. This poses a particular challenge for Gulf countries and gives Tehran disproportionate leverage. @charles_clover ft.com/content/6a3944…
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
Told @FoxNews that there is a need separate between the IRGC and the regular army. The IRGC gets all of the budgets — better salaries, better equipment, better everything. The Iranian regime suffered blows, but still hold the ability and still have the capacity to launch missiles for weeks to come. They still have the capacity — speedboats, drones, surface-to-sea missiles — allowing them to block the Strait of Hormuz. There is definitely a setback … but Iran was never built on an air force Instead, Iran relies on missiles, drones and layered defenses. @EfratLachter foxnews.com/world/inside-i…
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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweetledi
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim@academic_la·
This analysis is correct. Despite being written off by so many analysts, the main lesson of the last month has been that Iran and its network of clients were written off far too soon. They remain a strong bulwark against Israeli-US ambitions. They will emerge from this war far stronger.
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz

כניסת החות'ים למערכה לא הייתה שאלה של אם, אלא של מתי. בסופו של דבר, כרכיב מרכזי בראייתם וכחלק מציר ההתנגדות הנאבק בישראל ובארצות הברית, לא היה ניתן לבלום את הצטרפותם באמצעות איומים או תמריצים כלכליים. עם זאת, המשמעות המרכזית של כניסתם אינה הירי לעבר ישראל, מבלי להמעיט בחשיבותו, אלא ביכולתם לאיים על מיצרי באב אל-מנדב ועל נמל ינבו. יכולת זו מקשה על מאמצי סעודיה ומדינות המפרץ לעקוף את מיצרי הורמוז, ובכך מעצימה את הפגיעוּת של נתיבי האנרגיה האזוריים והגלובליים. אחד ההישגים המשמעותיים של איראן במערכה הנוכחית, בניגוד לסבבים קודמים, הוא היכולת להרחיב אותה לכדי מערכה אזורית מלאה—הכוללת את חזבאללה, המיליציות השיעיות בעיראק וכעת גם את החות'ים. התפתחות זו לא רק מקלה על איראן מבחינה צבאית, אלא גם מסבכת מאוד את האפשרות לסיים את המערכה, שכן סביר שאיראן תדרוש שכל הסדר הפסקת אש יחול על כלל הזירות במקביל. מכאן עולה כי למרות סימני שחיקה, ציר ההתנגדות רחוק מקריסה. להפך, רמת המחויבות וההתלכדות סביב איראן מדגישה את עמידותו. בהתאם לכך, כל דרישה מאיראן במסגרת משא ומתן לחדול מתמיכה בשותפיה האזוריים צפויה להיתקל בקשיים משמעותיים. פתיחתה של חזית נוספת רק מעמיקה את מורכבות המערכה ומגדילה את הסיכונים הגלומים בה.

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
This is not a war of necessity, but a war of choice—one initially premised on exploiting Iran’s perceived internal weakness following widespread domestic protests, with the aim of precipitating regime collapse. The fundamental problem emerged when the Iranian regime, contrary to expectations in both Israel and the United States, demonstrated resilience even after the opening shock, most notably the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In the absence of a clearly defined exit strategy from the outset, the campaign has grown increasingly complex. Under current conditions, it is difficult to identify a viable off-ramp that would allow policymakers to credibly claim “victory.” While the operational achievements are significant, they have yet to translate into strategic gains. This leaves decision-makers with a stark choice: either cut losses and pursue a negotiated arrangement with Iran, or expand the scope of the conflict. The latter course would likely exacerbate the broader negative consequences of the campaign, without guaranteeing a favorable strategic outcome—quite the opposite. What is emerging, therefore, is a deepening strategic entanglement—one that could further deteriorate when the Houthis move to fully disrupt traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. #IranWar
Aaron David Miller@aarondmiller2

Trump went to war on false or unproven claims: Iran was not within weeks of acquiring enough fissile material to make a nuke; did not babe an ICBM reaching US; was not about to attack US. This wasn’t fog of war; it was willfully contrived.

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
As anticipated, the Houthis have entered the conflict. However, the more consequential dimension of their involvement is not the projectile fire toward Israel, but rather their capacity to disrupt maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and, by extension, undermine Saudi Arabia’s ability to bypass the Strait of Hormuz via the East–West pipeline and the port of Yanbu. While Houthi strikes against Israel should not be dismissed, from Iran’s perspective, as part of a broader economic campaign against the United States, the central issue lies in their demonstrated ability to threaten critical energy transit routes at both maritime chokepoints. This raises a key question: whether the Houthis will escalate further by targeting Saudi infrastructure and shipping lanes more directly, or whether they will preserve this capability as an additional lever of pressure as the conflict evolves. With each passing day of the conflict, particularly in light of its expanding scope against Iran, the likelihood of this scenario materializing continues to grow. It is increasingly not a question of if, but when. #IranWar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz

Told @politico that I have no doubt in my mind that eventually the Houthis will enter and they will do two things — first, block the Bab el Mandeb strait, and second, try to prevent the Saudis from having tankers in [its] Yanbu port taking oil. If negotiations stall or fail, shutting the Bab el Mandeb strait will be one of Iran’s most powerful political levers, which could draw the Houthis into the war If things escalate and Trump attacks energy facilities, the Iranians will be in a very hard situation. closure of the Bab el Mandeb strait might represent the next level of economic pain from the conflict. The Iranian regime is not as desperate for a deal as Trump appears to believe. In recent weeks, the Iranian regime has learned how much global power it can exert by closing Hormuz and causing worldwide economic pressure. If Trump escalates by attacking Iran’s Kharg Island, where 90 percent of Iran’s oil is exported, or by attacking regional energy infrastructure, Bab el Mandeb would become an important way for the regime to flex its power. We are not in a situation where the Iranians are capitulating as Trump is also desperate for negotiation. The other day, he blinked first. politico.com/news/2026/03/2…

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
As argued from the outset, this war is likely, at a minimum, to prompt a reassessment of Iran’s nuclear strategy, with particular emphasis on the question of its potential military dimensions. Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could constitute a significant initial step in such a recalibration, signaling a shift in Iran’s strategic calculus and raising broader concerns regarding regional and global nonproliferation frameworks. In general, the internal checks and balances within Iran’s political system have been significantly disrupted in the course of this conflict, most notably by the elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This development represents a profound systemic shock, likely to destabilize existing power structures and compel a reassessment of Iran’s national security doctrine. #iran
Babak Vahdad@BabakVahdad

A well-placed Iranian figure-whose name I won’t disclose-reflects a view increasingly shared even among those who held more moderate positions before the war: “After today’s attacks by the Israeli regime on Iran’s economic infrastructure and nuclear facilities, there is no longer any justification for Iran to remain in the NPT, to continue cooperation with the IAEA, or to uphold the fatwa banning the development of nuclear weapons. It now appears that under the new leadership, the Islamic Republic may need to revisit and reassess all of these commitments.” #Iran #Iranwar

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
This agreement provides a forward-looking indication of emerging geopolitical dynamics. Iran is unlikely to relinquish its strategic hold over the Strait of Hormuz and will continue to leverage this position to advance both political and economic interests, particularly vis-à-vis countries with significant dependence on Gulf energy flows. Thailand is unlikely to be the last state to pursue bilateral arrangements with Iran in this context, suggesting the potential for a broader pattern of differentiated engagements that may gradually reshape regional energy and security architectures. #iran
Javier Blas@JavierBlas

Thailand has reached a deal with Iran to allow Thai tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. “An agreement has been reached to allow Thai oil tankers to transit safely through the Strait of Hormuz," Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said at a press conference, according to @AFP

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweetledi
Art Berman
Art Berman@aeberman12·
Lost in the noise: Iran doesn’t stand alone China & Russia are likely to expand their support for Iran, writes @citrinowicz China buys its oil Russia profits from the shock Hormuz becomes leverage—not just a weapon
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz

This assumption may be valid, but it tells us very little about the future of the Iranian regime after the current conflict. A. We simply don’t know how this campaign will end. If it concludes with an agreement that removes or eases sanctions, the regime will almost certainly emerge stronger. this is Israel’s primary concern. B. If sanctions remain and given the dominant role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a different scenario is more likely, meaning a more authoritarian, poorer regime that prioritizes military buildup above all else. At the same time, not sure that large-scale public unrest will significantly challenge the system, particularly given the IRGC’s strengthened position and its ability to capitalize on perceived success in the conflict. C. history matters. After the Iran-Iraq War, the regime was strengthened, at least in the short term. D. We should also not underestimate the willingness of China and Russia to expand their support for Iran, nor Iran’s ability to leverage strategic assets like the Strait of Hormuz to extract economic and political concessions, potentially undermining the sanctions regime. Bottom line is that the regime may emerge weakened in some respects, but also more radical, more confident in its own resilience, and more focused than ever on building its military power. The condition of the population will likely deteriorate further, but that alone does not necessarily lead to regime change. In fact, it may have the opposite effect. In any case, it is worth waiting until the conflict concludes before drawing firm conclusions.

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
חבל על הציפיות: א. האיראנים לא יקבלו את מתווה 15 הנקודות. ב. בפועל אין מו״מ. ארה״ב מעבירה מסרים דרך צד שלישי, וכך גם איראן שככל הנראה כבר דחתה את ההצעה באותו ערוץ. L ג. מעבר המכליות רק מדגיש נקודה אחת: איראן שולטת במיצרי הורמוז. מבחינת טהראן זו לא מחווה לממשל האמריקני, אלא איתות ברור, שום מכלית לא תעבור ללא אישורה שבשתיקה. ד. מבחינת ההנהגה האיראנית, עם לחץ או בלעדיו, התרחיש הגרוע ביותר אינו המשך הלחימה, במיוחד כאשר הם סבורים שיש להם יתרון—אלא ויתור על עמודי התווך של המשטר: תוכנית הטילים והגרעין. בסיכומו של דבר, התיאור הזה שב ממחיש את הפער הקיים בממשל האמריקני בהבנת ההיגיון האסטרטגי שמנחה את איראן ואת צעדיה.
Barak Ravid@BarakRavid

🚨וויטקוף בכנס כלכלי במיאמי: "יש לנו הארכה של הדדליין. אנחנו רואים בזה דבר חיובי מאוד. אנחנו מנהלים משא ומתן עם האיראנים. ייתכן שיש לנו הגדרה שונה למשא ומתן מזו שלהם. אבל אנחנו מדברים איתם. הצענו (להיפגש). אנחנו חושבים שיהיו פגישות השבוע. אנחנו בהחלט מקווים לכך. ספינות עוברות (במצר הורמוז) וזה סימן טוב. הנשיא רוצה הסכם שלום. אבל בלי לחץ לא מביאים אף אחד לשולחן. אנחנו מוכנים לפתור את זה באמצעים דיפלומטיים. אין העשרה. לא תהיה צפון קוריאה שנייה במזרח התיכון. יש לנו תוכנית בת 15 סעיפים על השולחן. אנחנו מצפים לתגובה מהאיראנים. זה יכול לפתור הכול."

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweetledi
Richard Nephew
Richard Nephew@RichardMNephew·
⬇️
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz

The strike on Arak, more than anything, highlights the fundamental complexity and limitations of the current campaign. When targeted decapitations depend on highly precise intelligence, and when U.S. constraints effectively rule out attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, the range of viable targets becomes extremely limited. What remains are deeply buried facilities, often tens of meters underground, and nuclear-related sites whose operational significance is questionable. Arak itself is a good example: even prior to the nuclear agreement, it did not pose an immediate threat given Iran’s alternative plutonium pathways, and certainly not in its modified state after the deal. Faced with these constraints, Israel has expanded its targeting to include metal and industrial facilities, actions that may escalate the campaign, delivering decisive strategic gains, especially in light of the likely Iranian response. Paradoxically, this strike may indicate that the campaign is approaching exhaustion. Without moving to a new phase, such as targeting energy infrastructure or considering a ground component we may be nearing the point of diminishing returns, where each additional action yields less strategic value. At the same time, the unresolved issue of the roughly 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% underscores a more fundamental reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to Iran’s nuclear challenge. #IranWar

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweetledi
Babak Vahdad
Babak Vahdad@BabakVahdad·
This “Arak itself is a good example: even prior to the nuclear agreement, it did not pose an immediate threat given Iran’s alternative plutonium pathways, and certainly not in its modified state after the deal.” #Iran #Iranwar
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz

The strike on Arak, more than anything, highlights the fundamental complexity and limitations of the current campaign. When targeted decapitations depend on highly precise intelligence, and when U.S. constraints effectively rule out attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, the range of viable targets becomes extremely limited. What remains are deeply buried facilities, often tens of meters underground, and nuclear-related sites whose operational significance is questionable. Arak itself is a good example: even prior to the nuclear agreement, it did not pose an immediate threat given Iran’s alternative plutonium pathways, and certainly not in its modified state after the deal. Faced with these constraints, Israel has expanded its targeting to include metal and industrial facilities, actions that may escalate the campaign, delivering decisive strategic gains, especially in light of the likely Iranian response. Paradoxically, this strike may indicate that the campaign is approaching exhaustion. Without moving to a new phase, such as targeting energy infrastructure or considering a ground component we may be nearing the point of diminishing returns, where each additional action yields less strategic value. At the same time, the unresolved issue of the roughly 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% underscores a more fundamental reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to Iran’s nuclear challenge. #IranWar

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
The strike on Arak, more than anything, highlights the fundamental complexity and limitations of the current campaign. When targeted decapitations depend on highly precise intelligence, and when U.S. constraints effectively rule out attacks on civilian energy infrastructure, the range of viable targets becomes extremely limited. What remains are deeply buried facilities, often tens of meters underground, and nuclear-related sites whose operational significance is questionable. Arak itself is a good example: even prior to the nuclear agreement, it did not pose an immediate threat given Iran’s alternative plutonium pathways, and certainly not in its modified state after the deal. Faced with these constraints, Israel has expanded its targeting to include metal and industrial facilities, actions that may escalate the campaign, delivering decisive strategic gains, especially in light of the likely Iranian response. Paradoxically, this strike may indicate that the campaign is approaching exhaustion. Without moving to a new phase, such as targeting energy infrastructure or considering a ground component we may be nearing the point of diminishing returns, where each additional action yields less strategic value. At the same time, the unresolved issue of the roughly 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% underscores a more fundamental reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to Iran’s nuclear challenge. #IranWar
Richard Nephew@RichardMNephew

Right. So, ok to do this, I suppose. But, the wolf closest to the sled is the HEU issue and we're still waiting on that.

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Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش retweetledi
Alan Eyre
Alan Eyre@AlanEyre1·
Yes.
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz

This assumption may be valid, but it tells us very little about the future of the Iranian regime after the current conflict. A. We simply don’t know how this campaign will end. If it concludes with an agreement that removes or eases sanctions, the regime will almost certainly emerge stronger. this is Israel’s primary concern. B. If sanctions remain and given the dominant role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a different scenario is more likely, meaning a more authoritarian, poorer regime that prioritizes military buildup above all else. At the same time, not sure that large-scale public unrest will significantly challenge the system, particularly given the IRGC’s strengthened position and its ability to capitalize on perceived success in the conflict. C. history matters. After the Iran-Iraq War, the regime was strengthened, at least in the short term. D. We should also not underestimate the willingness of China and Russia to expand their support for Iran, nor Iran’s ability to leverage strategic assets like the Strait of Hormuz to extract economic and political concessions, potentially undermining the sanctions regime. Bottom line is that the regime may emerge weakened in some respects, but also more radical, more confident in its own resilience, and more focused than ever on building its military power. The condition of the population will likely deteriorate further, but that alone does not necessarily lead to regime change. In fact, it may have the opposite effect. In any case, it is worth waiting until the conflict concludes before drawing firm conclusions.

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