

Decurity
343 posts

@DecurityHQ
DeFi Security | Tier-1 Security Audit Firm | Top-2 in @Paradigm and @OpenZeppelin CTF | Public audits: https://t.co/CqYGRNibvj








Meet our Bug Machine @dan_fronts - 20 paid reports in under 2 months 🔥 @dan_fronts joined HackenProof in February and didn't wait to warm up: he delivered 20 validated, paid reports. Thank you for your work - this is only the beginning. The community sees you. Keep going!


New on the Quicknode blog: @DecurityHQ's CTO on how Streams let them rebuild Defimon from polling to push, cut block latency from 2s to under 0.5s, and scale exploit detection across 8 chains with one engineer running the pipeline. blog.quicknode.com/real-time-defi…


Introducing Project Glasswing: an urgent initiative to help secure the world’s most critical software. It’s powered by our newest frontier model, Claude Mythos Preview, which can find software vulnerabilities better than all but the most skilled humans. anthropic.com/glasswing

DeFi exploits don't wait. Neither does @DefimonAlerts, built by @DecurityHQ. 8 chains. Sub-second alerts. $48K/year in infra costs gone. Powered by Quicknode Streams. Full story: quicknode.com/case-studies/d…

⛑ $512K rescued by Defimon after infinite approvals were granted to @squidrouter multicall The SquidMulticall contract's run() function allows anyone to execute arbitrary external calls with no access control. A wallet 0xacc0 mistakenly approved the multicall contract instead of the router contract and did it across multiple chains. It didn't take a long time before first attack - a MEV-bot called run() with a crafted Call struct that executed transferFrom() on the WETH contract, transferring just 1 WETH from a victim. In fact the victim user had around $800K approved to the mulitcall contract on various chains. After we detected the first attack our whitehat bot identified the vulnerable cross-chain approvals and managed to rescue around $512K. We contacted the person via Blockscan chat and returned all the rescued funds. We learnt that it was an operational mistake: "we were supposed to only approve to the Squid router address". Although some funds were lost, 0xacc0 was happy that the majority of the funds was rescued! First attack: bscscan.com/tx/0x81d0c429e… Victim: bscscan.com/address/0xaCc0… SquidMulticall: bscscan.com/address/0xaD6C… Rescued funds consolidation address: debank.com/profile/0xF50D…
