Devin

Substack : ashesofpompeii.substack.com/p/the-cult-of-…

When Trump was in Berlin for his first state visit with Angela Merkel he asked the secret of her great success. Merkel told him you have to have intelligent people around you. "How do you know if someone is intelligent?" asked Trump. "Let me demonstrate." She picked up the phone, called Wolfgang Schäuble and asked him a question, "Mr. Schäuble, he’s your father's son but not your brother. Who is it?" Without hesitation Schäuble answered, “Quite simply, it's me!" "You see," Merkel told Trump, "this is how I test a person’s intelligence." Thrilled, when Trump flew home he called Mike Pence and asked him the same question. ”He’s your father's son, but is not your brother. Who is it?" After much back and forth, Pence said, “I have no idea, but I’ll try to find out the answer by tomorrow!" Of course Pence couldn’t figure it out and decided to seek advice from former President Obama, so he called him and said, “Mr. Obama, it's your father's son, but is not your brother. Who is it?" Obama answered, “Easy, it's me!" Happy to have found the answer, Pence called Trump and said triumphantly, "I have the answer, it's Barack Obama!" Trump raged and shouted, "No, you jackass, it's Wolfgang Schäuble!"

One of the West’s least discussed anxieties about China isn’t just losing economic or military ground. It’s what a Chinese “win” would validate. Not only a state-capitalist hybrid system—or unapologetic authoritarianism— but a collectivist mindset that appears to deprioritize the individual. When U.S. politicians or business leaders say they don’t want to “live in a China-dominated world,” the deeper discomfort is actually the second implication. That a Chinese “win” could read as proof of superior organizational logic. It would suggest that a system which: – prioritizes coordination over individual autonomy, – accepts trade-offs between personal freedom and collective goals, – and tightly aligns capital, labor, and policy can outperform one built on decentralized decision-making and individual and corporate primacy. That cuts closer to the bone than geopolitics. Because it challenges three core Western assumptions (expanded in the first comment): 1. Individual empowerment leads to societal strength 2. Market fundamentalism outperforms state-shaped markets 3. Political rights determine societal satisfaction That’s the discomfort the West hasn’t fully processed— and why framing this as winner-take-all leads to the wrong response. The more effective move is selective adaptation: strengthen weak points without diluting core strengths. 1. Individual empowerment drives innovation and dynamism; cohesion and coordination are force multipliers at scale. 2. Markets are powerful allocators—but not across every timeframe or stakeholder; strategic shaping and public–private coordination matter in capital-intensive, long-cycle sectors. 3. Political rights underpin legitimacy—but are most stabilizing when paired with broadly shared economic gains; voice without material progress is brittle. That’s the real concern. Not “they beat us,” but “they may have built a model that works differently—and in some domains, more effectively.” Which is precisely why the winner-take-all framing is dangerous. It invites ideological defensiveness instead of analytical adaptation. The mistake isn’t adherence to Western values or belief in capitalism. The mistake is treating this as a zero-sum contest. Drop that lens and policy quality improves: More nuance. More hybrid thinking. More relative-risk analysis. Better balance across short-, medium-, and long-term goals. The Owl view🦉: Net result: a U.S. that’s not just more competitive— but more resilient, renewed, and stable. All of this still requires more pragmatism than the West is currently willing to exert.

We are told that security in the Middle East requires defeating Iran, security in East Asia requires defeating China, and security in Europe requires defeating Russia. We never discuss security in terms of how to learn to live together by harmonising interests and managing competition. This is by design. This is hegemonic peace, in which security depends on defeating rivals rather than managing a balance of power. Subsequently, security relies solely on deterrence rather than reassurance; diplomacy is dismissed as appeasement; peace agreements are temporary and deceptive; and war is peace. Our rivals do not have legitimate security concerns, as their policies are allegedly always motivated by aggressive, irrational, or expansionist behaviour. We have convinced ourselves that our liberal hegemony is a force for good, and that our opponents oppose our dominance because they reject our benign values of freedom. Discussing the security concerns of adversaries is believed to “legitimise” their policies, which is treasonous. The world is divided into good guys (liberal democracies) and bad guys (autocracies). We should not ask how defeating Russia, as the world's largest nuclear power, is a rational security strategy, or why our governments refuse to even speak with Moscow to discuss the European security architecture and end the war. Our governments have relabelled nuclear deterrence as nuclear blackmail to signal that there can be no more constraints. All empires can become irrational during decline. Leaders take greater risks to avoid decline, legitimacy crises at home must be distracted with enemies abroad, outdated strategies from a bygone era of strength are still embraced, and there is a tendency to double down on narratives of being indispensable, representing universal values, and dismissing all opposition as illegitimate and dangerous. Are we the fanatics?

“But the curse of every ancient civilization was that its men in the end became unable to fight. Materialism, luxury, safety, even sometimes an almost modern sentimentality, weakened the fibre of each civilized race in turn; each became in the end a nation of pacifists, and then each was trodden under foot by some ruder people that had kept that virile fighting power the lack of which makes all other virtues useless and sometimes even harmful.” -Teddy Roosevelt

油画赏析：《主席卧室中的女人》 首先，这幅画的作者很深刻地领会了19世纪中期流行欧洲的拉菲尔前派创造真谛，强烈地表达了自己想要表达理念的欲望，仔细地研究了自然和表达这种自然的理念，抓住了伟大领袖毛主席日常生活中的一瞬间：毛主席有深夜工作的习惯，凌晨时分江青同志无意闯入毛主席的卧室， 正与毛主席在床第交欢的年轻女子来不及穿衣服，抓起衣服仓皇躲避，毛主席则泰然处之顺手拿起一本书，一本正经地装作正在读书做学问的样子，成功地掩饰了江青推门而入时看到的场景的尴尬与不安。同时，画家还继承了拉斐尔前派的创造风格，采用了学院派传统的对称构图法则，利用毛泽东床前的一盏灯营造了逆光的效果，整个画面形成了一个金黄色的暖色调。画家模仿了18世纪欧洲画家的手法，把一些故事情节用暗喻的手法巧妙地嵌入画内：如画面中江青面部转向说明此刻已经发现室内的另一个女人，身上穿的是当年自己设计颇有时代感的那条灰裙子，象征着神性爱与圣灵的红色窗帘，窗外庙宇的大屋顶建筑剪影暗示着中南海的楼台亭阁，微亮的天空寓意着又一个黎明，窗户玻璃上毛泽东侧面的镜像是《毛泽东选集》封面上的金属浮雕。画面的中心自然是毛主席以及背后那盏台灯，江青则处于台灯的背光区域，脸上仍残留着进屋时谄媚的笑容。最值得一说的还是画面前景中的裸体女人，梳着毛泽东时代未婚女子流行的发辫以及发辫末梢的红色的蝴蝶结，丰硕圆润的身体，劲健有力的四肢，奔跑时抬起的小腿和脚掌都是健康的美感元素，毛主席不喜欢小资女人的情调，最喜欢的就是这种接地气的“工农”款。这个女人究竟是谁？画家仅是画了她一个背影，也没在画面上注明，所以给观者留下了无限的想象空间，只是江青的突然闯入，惊扰了与主席的缠绵，慌乱之中本能地抓起衣服离开（其实主席在，女孩无需回避），增加了巴洛克主义的动感以及主配角之间互动的舞台戏剧效果。 主席一生有“数不清”的女朋友，井冈山时代和延安时代就不说了，解放后更是排队进中南海都要发放特别通行证。六十年代，空军司令刘亚楼还活着的时候就把陪毛主席跳舞的任务替空政歌舞团抢了下来，那时空政歌舞团还在东城区同福夹道，众多俊男靓女经常出没于此。到了舞会的晚上，几辆挂着甲A牌照的黑色大红旗悄悄开进胡同，几个打扮的入时的空政女演员坐进汽车，冒烟不知前去何方。那时的大红旗轿车只有三种人有资格坐：政治局委员、国务院副总理、大将军衔，一个朋友因为偶然机会坐了一次肖劲光的大红旗，从此成了他前半辈子最大的荣幸，逢人便吹。。当时比较出名的有三人，分别是陈惠敏，孟锦云和刘素媛。那时，北京圈内人士都知道，空政文工团可以通天，其实就是因为这三个女人（还有一个女人叫邵锦辉的）。这三个女人如何能够通天呢？我讲个事例便能说明一二：毛主席的女友刘素媛，文革后造反任空政文工团革命委员会主任（团长），虽然是个团长，而且还是造反上去的，而文革中的空军司令吴法宪不仅是空军的司令，更重要的还是政治局委员和军委办事组成员，即便这个级别也苦于跟不上主席的思路（老人家一日三变都是少的），经常找到刘主任，毕恭毕敬要求刘主任传达一下主席的昨晚的最新指示；毛主席的另一个女友孟锦云，也是通天的人物，一个小小的文工团女演员，结婚时前来道喜的陆海空三军高级官员的高级轿车把一条胡同挤了一个水泄不通。孟锦云结婚后，想生个孩子，还需要听听毛主席的意见，这关系，哈哈，太不寻常了！刘孟两位女士党性比较强，舞会中间在休息室和毛主席干了些什么从来不肯透露，但陈惠敏就不同了，大大咧咧，有啥说啥，曾经对孟锦云说，你说咱和毛主席这叫啥关系？说妃子没有名分，说妓女没有收入。后来陈惠敏去香港定居，到了自由世界更加放肆，向报界透露：毛主席很伟大，身体各个器官都很伟大。大到什么程度呢？按照陈惠敏的说法就是：后来接触其他男人也不少，但都失去了欲望和感觉，对结婚生子更是没了兴趣。 陈惠敏和孟锦云当时年轻，入伍时年龄都在11-15岁之间（陈惠敏自称在14岁那年即被毛主席破处），跳舞出身的小姑娘身材应该偏向单薄。然而画面上的裸体比较成熟，各部位发育完全，不太可能属于她们两个！而刘素媛1940年出生，入伍较早，从1958年开始就承担为毛主席伴舞的光荣任务，此时已婚，男女之间的事也算的上久经风雨，身体各部分都达到完全成熟的状态，所以最大可能就是刘素媛，当然也不完全排除邵锦辉或其他人。 这副画虽然堪称珍品，但也不是完美无瑕的。裸女慌乱中出走，夹在腋下的衣服应是绿色的65式军装和深蓝色的军裤（空军当时的军衣为上绿下蓝），而不应该是这种浪漫小资带有18世纪欧洲宫廷情调的白色长纱裙。当时文革期间，中国人基本色调为灰和蓝，一个女人穿此白色纱裙进入中南海几乎是不可能的，这不能不说是这副画的一个硬伤。另外，如果这副画能在几个小地方再强调一些，效果会更好一些，主题也会更加鲜明：例如，裸女的发辫应该散开一个，床上的床单被褥应该再凌乱一些，能让观众联想到刚才毛主席和她激烈战斗的场面。被子下应该露出一条鲜红颜色的女式内裤，既有含蓄，又为“仓皇”二字画龙点睛，起到一箭双雕的效果。 ---油画赏析：毛主席卧室里的裸体女人是谁？ @长岛风

🔥任剑涛“单口相声”：中共是如何利用马克思理论煽动仇恨的！

🇪🇸 A young Spanish woman will be euthanized today, after a group of illegal migrants gang-raped her while she was in state care. In 2022, the teenager Noelia Castillo Ramos placed in a state institution amid family difficulties and placed in a state-run home together with North African migrant minors where she was raped by them. The trauma broke her. Months later, Noelia attempted suicide by jumping from the 5th floor. She survived, but the fall left her paraplegic. The rapists were never arrested and remain free. Instead of delivering justice or adequate long-term support, the authorities offered assisted suicide as the solution. Today, March 26, 2026, Noelia Castillo Ramos will be euthanized. The system that failed to protect her is now "solving the problem" by ending her life

The phrase is repeated so often it has hardened into certainty. The Dark Ages, we are told, began when the Roman Empire collapsed and Christianity smothered the light of classical civilization. Science vanished. Learning died. Europe stumbled blindly through a thousand years of superstition until the Renaissance finally rescued reason from the grip of priests. It is a tidy story. It is also wrong. When the Western Roman Empire collapsed in the fifth century, the disaster was not theological—it was civilizational. Cities emptied. Trade routes collapsed. Roads crumbled. Literacy declined. Political authority fractured into a patchwork of Germanic kingdoms that possessed neither the administrative machinery nor the cultural inheritance of Rome. The darkness that followed did not descend because monks burned books. It descended because the world that produced those books had collapsed. And yet, in the wreckage of that fallen order, something remarkable happened. In lonely valleys and along forested hillsides, small communities of Christian monks began doing something that no conquering army, no new king, and no collapsing city seemed interested in doing: they preserved the memory of the ancient world. Inside monastic scriptoria, by candlelight and patient discipline, monks copied manuscripts—line by line, page by page. They copied the Scriptures, of course. But they also copied Virgil, Cicero, Ovid, Livy, and countless other works of classical antiquity. Without those quiet labors, much of what we know about Greece and Rome might simply have vanished. The men doing this work were not secular humanists ahead of their time. They were Christians. They believed that truth, wherever it appeared, ultimately belonged to God. Preserving learning was not rebellion against faith. It was an act of devotion. Monasteries became islands of stability in a turbulent world. They cultivated fields, organized communities, and preserved literacy at a moment when most of Europe had forgotten how to read. Their libraries became reservoirs of memory while kingdoms rose and fell around them. Over time those small islands of learning began to connect. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries a new intellectual revival was underway. Cathedral schools evolved into institutions dedicated entirely to scholarship. These institutions would soon receive a new name—universities. The University of Bologna, Paris, and Oxford did not emerge in defiance of the Church. They were born inside it. Theology stood beside law, medicine, and philosophy as part of a unified search for truth. Scholars argued fiercely over Aristotle, debated logic, experimented with natural philosophy, and tried to reconcile reason with revelation. The medieval world was not anti-intellectual. It was intensely intellectual. Figures like Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and Roger Bacon wrestled with the newly rediscovered works of Aristotle and the expanding body of knowledge flowing from the Islamic world. They did not treat faith and reason as enemies. They believed both ultimately pointed toward the same reality. Even the foundations of what would later become modern science were quietly forming during these centuries. Medieval thinkers developed the idea that nature operated according to rational laws because it had been created by a rational God. If the universe was ordered rather than chaotic, then studying it was not impiety—it was a form of worship. The irony is striking. The very civilization accused of plunging Europe into darkness built the intellectual institutions that would eventually illuminate it. None of this means the medieval world was idyllic. It was violent, unequal, and often brutal. Wars were frequent. Plagues were devastating. Superstition and ignorance certainly existed. But these were not the unique failings of Christianity. They were the universal conditions of premodern life. #archaeohistories