

Emil Verner
1.7K posts

@EmilVerner
Professor at @MITSloan working on finance, macroeconomics, international economics, economic history, and other fun stuff




Hélène Rey, Professor of Economics at @LBS, is appointed as Economic Adviser and Head of the Monetary and Economic Department, replacing Hyun Song Shin, from 1 September 2026 bit.ly/4skt7zc



I have a solution

Industrial policies (IPs) are rarely connected to global imbalances. Yet, IPs are a key feature of many surplus countries. This new paper tackles three questions: Can IPs shape global imbalances? What are the spillovers to deficit countries? What policy responses are available?




Every journal editor should read this: causalinf.substack.com/p/claude-code-…




In all of the discussion of AI, r, and the Citrini post, I have not seen mention of Ricardo Caballero's recent paper on AI, r, and valuations. Some quick thoughts: Ricardo's model captures the second force @ojblanchard1 mentions, namely lower r from wealth concentration. Higher wealth concentration among the wealthy who have a higher propensity to save (as in work by @ludwigstraub, @AtifRMian, @profsufi) leads to a lower required return. Here is the mechanism: Optimism about AI => higher valuations (Tobin's q) => higher investment => higher capital => higher capitalist wealth => lower required return (nonhomothetic preferences over wealth) => high valuations (q) justified A key assumption is that AI capital is "labor-like" and so does not have diminishing returns over some range of capital. Another interesting feature: during the AI deployment, wages and worker consumption stagnate, and the labor share is lower (workers don't own claims to AI). What about a recession? The model doesn't have sticky prices/demand-determined output. But it does highlight the simple point that a recession is more likely if the AI boom crashes (drop in q). If there is no crash and the optimistic AI boom is realized, then (*speculating here*) it depends on whether the rise in investment and consumption of capitalists offsets the stagnant worker wages. But investment demand would likely be strong given the high valuations, which will push against a shortfall of demand. Also, my sense is that a recession would be relative to the rising potential output (a "growth recession"), not the counterfactual without AI. Again, this latter part is speculation... Here's a link to Ricardo's interesting paper: nber.org/papers/w34722

🚨Big day for @Macro_Musings🚨 After 10 years of audio only, the podcast is now going full video and we kick things off with Raghuram Rajan. You can subscribe to the YouTube channel here: @MacroMusingsDavidBeckworth" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">youtube.com/@MacroMusingsD…
Of course, you can still do the audio version via your favorite podcast app.


On AI and r* (inspired by the Citrini discussion). Standard effect: If AI leads to higher growth, likely to increase r* (higher investment, lower saving). Non standard effect: If AI leads to more inequality (enormous rents for the owners of AI, unemployment or low wages for those displaced), then likely decrease r* (saving rate of the rich much higher than saving rate of the poor). Which way does r* go?


On AI and r* (inspired by the Citrini discussion). Standard effect: If AI leads to higher growth, likely to increase r* (higher investment, lower saving). Non standard effect: If AI leads to more inequality (enormous rents for the owners of AI, unemployment or low wages for those displaced), then likely decrease r* (saving rate of the rich much higher than saving rate of the poor). Which way does r* go?

