Esteban Cruz

La economía crece pero el Ponzi se pincha. redmmt.es/la-economia-cr… Por @noeseldeficit

On May 8, we welcome William H. Janeway as speaker for our Levy Anniversary Conference. Once labelled a “theorist-practitioner of financial economics” by Minsky himself, Janeway is a critical voice exploring capitalism in the Innovation Economy Register: connect.bard.edu/register/levya…

Si leéis que reducir el déficit público es bueno per se, echadle un ojo a esto y reflexionad. Hace falta ver el cuadro completo tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…

Si vemos la imagen completa dada por los balances sectoriales, ¿podemos hablar de que este es un dato positivo? ¿Acaso son "insostenibles" las cuentas públicas realmente? ¿Qué ocurre con la insostenibilidad de las cuentas privadas derivada de la posición del balance del SP?

El Pais, ese diario que posturea como progre pero te vende la agenda económica neoliberal.

📉 Speculation or Fundamentals? European Natural Gas Price Swings Post 2020 Our new working paper by @LevyEcon analyzes the dramatic swings in European natural gas prices during 2020-2024 and the energy crisis. Check it out here: levyinstitute.org/publications/s…

Hayek no es un pensador independiente, sino un cuadro orgánico del capital financiero. La creación de la Sociedad Mont Pelerin (1947) y el impulso del Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) en Londres no fueron actos de caridad académica. 1/9

Aquí tienen a dos "técnicos" hablando de economía. Comparen su discurso con el de otro "técnico" llamado Don @carlos_cuerpo. Saquen sus propias conclusiones. @Ivn_unalcoyano @aver_estudiao @RafelCarretero youtube.com/live/aIypIDWQA…

James Galbraith has been with the Institute since 1995. As we celebrate Levy’s 40th Anniversary and welcome him as a speaker at our anniversary conference, we now take a moment to reflect on Galbraith’s contributions, distinct impact on fed budget policy and continuing legacy. 🧵

The April Issue of @ReviewofPE is now out! Featuring contributions from symposia in honour of Luigi Pasinetti and the annual STOREP conference. @Lprochon @KappesSylvio tandfonline.com/toc/crpe20/cur…

Ha-Joon Chang compares mainstream economics to Catholicism in the Middle Ages. “Economics today resembles Catholic theology in medieval Europe: a rigid doctrine guarded by a modern priesthood who claim to possess the sole truth. Dissenters are shunned.”

¡YA ESTÁ AQUÍ! «La Guerra Civil española noventa años después» En el episodio n.º 97 de TODO COMENZÓ AYER, el podcast divulgativo de la @_AEHE , volvemos con un programa monográfico debatiendo con Ricardo Robledo, @lourenzofp Prieto, Eduardo González Calleja y @angelvinashist.

It’s official: I am now Co-Editor of Challenge, alongside @KappesSylvio , with @Lprochon as Editor-in-Chief. A journal with 65 years of publishing heterodox and post-Keynesian thought: #journal-metrics" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">tandfonline.com/journals/mcha2…

Full programme of the Poznan PK summer school coming this week. @ekon_heterodox

The April issue of @ReviewofPE is now out. It features a sympo in honour of Pasinetti, as well as a mini sympo from the 2024 STOREP meetings. @MariaCbgoes @KappesSylvio tandfonline.com/toc/crpe20/cur…

The backlash I’ve seen against this paper in the last few days is, frankly, strange. Some economists and social scientists seem disgruntled because the paper does not establish causality from structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to economic devastation across the Global South. The paper does not claim to do this, nor is it pitched as a research article. It reviews evidence. Perhaps the most striking weakness of the criticism this paper has received is the criticism's failure to grapple with the many studies the paper *does* cite that support the claim that SAPs contributed to economic decline in many countries around the world. Even the World Bank and the IMF have openly admitted that SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s caused harm in developing countries. What this backlash reveals, above all, is an enduring unwillingness to reckon with — and properly study — the historical record of harm caused by the Washington Consensus across the Global South.

Regarding this piece on the social impacts of structural adjustment (jasonhickel.org/s/e017221full.…)... it is quite strange that some people have criticized it by saying it does not implement original statistical assessment to establish causality. Strange, because this is very clearly *not* a research paper. Nor is it a systematic review paper. It is simply a short analysis paper, clearly labelled as such, which is intended to "discuss topical issues" as per BMJ guidelines.  It is obviously beyond the remit of such a piece to undertake original statistical assessment, and indeed the piece makes no claim to such an undertaking. Instead, it provides citations to examples of previously published research that has explored the impact of SAPs on various social outcomes, including studies that *do* undertake to assess causal effect.  In other words, it is incorrect to claim there is no evidence on the causal effects of SAPs. There is such evidence, and we cite key examples, including studies that account for endogeneity and selection biases. This literature deserves to be better known.  For instance, see: -On poverty: link.springer.com/article/10.105… -On poverty and inequality: degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/1… -On child and maternal health: link.springer.com/article/10.118… -On child health: academic.oup.com/ije/article/48… -On health system access and neonatal mortality: sciencedirect.com/science/articl… -And there are many others we were forced to cut for brevity And yes, the piece also cites political economy research that does not rely on statistical analysis, because these are also recognized as valuable contributions to the literature.  Along these lines, I encourage everyone to read Mike Davis' masterpiece "Planet of Slums", which includes a chapter on SAPs. As for the figures, none of them claim to demonstrate causality.  They are included purely as illustrations of broad trends in social indicators during the adjustment period - social indicators that are assessed by the studies we cite. Someone asked about using 1980 as the starting point for liberalization.  This is common convention: Chang, Pollin, Weisbrot, Baker, Rosnick and others use 1980 to generally distinguish between the developmentalist and neoliberal periods.   In Sub-Saharan Africa, for the majority of countries that were SAPed, comprising most of regional GDP, 1980 was the year immediately prior to first implementation.  Most of the rest first implemented in 1982 and 1983, and of course any assessment of effects should assess interventions on a country-specific basis. As for India's 1981 loan, the IMF insisted on adjustment conditions, the Indian government said they could not accept externally imposed conditions, so it was agreed they would implement "homegrown conditionality", with policies generally aligned with IMF preferences.  The policies affected food prices, which is why we see an increase in BNPL poverty. As for China, their agreement with the World Bank was signed in 1988 and implemented in 1990.  While healthcare and some other sectors began to be liberalized earlier, in the 1980s, the BNPL basket was not substantially affected until 1990. As for the question of national income, researchers have found liberalization had a negative impact on growth in non-manufacturing regions, which is evident in the case of LatAm and SSA, but this does not apply in regions with higher manufacturing. Regarding Kenya, we see an increase in infant mortality after 1986, and the same pattern in child mortality.  We note that some of this is attributable to HIV (and cite research showing that this pathway too is exacerbated by SAPs), but we also know from work by IRD and CERDI researchers that, in Kenya, HIV is responsible for a minor share of the change in the child mortality trend.  Even removing HIV, there is increasing child mortality after 1986 compared to the pre-SAP trend.  Several studies indicate that adjustment was associated with increased child deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, existing research provides valuable information on the social harms related to structural adjustment.  And this should not be surprising; after all, we know there were mass protests and riots across much of the South during the adjustment period. They were literally called "IMF riots".  People don't riot for no reason, they riot because they are desperate. The IMF and WB themselves recognized this, and relaxed some of their more extreme conditions. Why care about all this? Because every man who was impoverished by these policies is my brother, every mother who died needlessly during childbirth is my sister. Nothing will shake my conviction in that fact.

100.000 familias viven a merced de 13 grandes propietarios. Y no se refiere a la España de la edad feudal.

El facha de Schrödinger Una genialidad más de Vaya Semanita

Los autores de este artículo, dos de los científicos del comportamiento más influyentes del mundo, realizan una autocrítica sincera sobre el tema de los nudges (empujoncitos). Durante años creyeron que los pequeños “nudges” (empujones sutiles) podían resolver grandes problemas sociales y ambientales haciendo que las personas tomaran mejores decisiones individuales: comer más sano, ahorrar más, reducir su huella de carbono, vacunarse, etc. Hoy admiten que se equivocaron. Según ellos, el enfoque conductual ha caído en una trampa: al centrarse casi exclusivamente en modificar el comportamiento individual, ha desviado la atención de las verdaderas causas de los problemas, que son sistémicas (diseño de mercados, incentivos corporativos, políticas económicas, entornos laborales y comerciales). En lugar de cambiar los sistemas que empujan a la gente hacia decisiones perjudiciales, la ciencia del comportamiento ha terminado culpando sutilmente a los individuos por sus “malas elecciones”, ofreciendo soluciones superficiales que no resuelven los problemas de fondo. Chater y Loewenstein concluyen que ha llegado el momento de cambiar de dirección: la ciencia conductual debe dejar de obsesionarse con nudges individuales y empezar a presionar por cambios estructurales reales en las empresas, los mercados y las políticas públicas. Parchear el comportamiento de las personas ya no es suficiente.