Fairmont Proinv

@InvestWithJoshi @Adithya_nair_ annual stock turns are 2-2.5 times...if Kalyan does 3 times annual stock turns, then Kalyan own turnover should be 42,000 cr. on inventory of 14000 cr..

You do not need ₹35,000 crores of inventory to do ₹35,000 crores of sales. Because Kalyan turns over its inventory roughly 3 times a year, and because 222 of its 342 Indian stores are funded by outside franchisee capital, the ₹14,000 crore inventory figure on their balance sheet is perfectly accurate and highly efficient.

Kalyan Jewellers story is honestly one of the best lessons in how markets can completely lose their mind while the actual business just keeps grinding. From an all time high near 794 in Jan 2025, the stock crashed almost 40% in a few weeks, wiping out over 20000 crore in market cap. And the irony is the business itself was firing on all cylinders. Revenue crossing 25000 crore, aggressive expansion across India and Middle East, first store opening in the US. So what actually went wrong. First, a real event. Govt cut customs duty on gold from 15% to 6% in July 2024. This compressed inventory values overnight and Kalyan booked a one time hit of around 120 to 130 crore. Genuine impact, but management was upfront that this was industry wide and fully recoverable by Q4. Then came the real circus. January 2025 turned into a full blown rumor mill. IT raid rumors that never happened. Fake inventory claims that collapse the moment you look at 450 crore of debt repaid plus 170 crore in dividends, fake books just dont generate that kind of cash. A franchisee revolt story that got massively blown up, when in reality only 3 to 4 partners were terminated over contract breaches. Then the wildest one, bribing fund managers at Motilal Oswal, which MOAMC themselves publicly denied, sending the stock up 7% the very next day. And finally FIR rumors that turned out to be just a civil dispute with one ex franchisee. On top of all this, promoter pledge panic. People saw the pledge percentage rise and assumed distress, but most of it was old collateral from the Warburg Pincus buyback back in FY20, and the fresh top up was simply because collateral value fell after the stock itself crashed. Classic chicken and egg. Fast forward to FY26 and the numbers speak for themselves. Revenue past 35700 crore, PAT at 1350 crore, ROCE near 29%. The capital light FOCO engine is clearly working. Whats next is what gets me excited. 150 new stores planned for FY27. Zero non GML debt targeted by H1 FY27. A brand new regional brand to take on unorganised local jewellers. Candere already PAT positive and scaling with 50 more stores. Plus non core real estate being sold off to clean the balance sheet even further. The part most people will miss is the EBITDA vs PAT divergence. EBITDA margin looks weaker because FOCO partners take their share of revenue, but PAT margin expands because interest cost basically disappears once debt is gone. Thats the real story, not the headline EBITDA print. If FY28 plays out as guided, revenue could be near 50000 crore and PAT crossing 2100 crore, and management has even hinted at reopening COCO stores once the balance sheet is fully clean, which could be the next leg of margin expansion. Sometimes the best setups happen exactly when the noise is loudest and the fundamentals are quietly compounding underneath. Kalyan feels like a textbook case of that.

@Adithya_nair_ @InvestWithJoshi annual stock turn is around 2-2.5 times ..so with own inventory of 14K cr, Kalyan own turnover should be 28K -35K cr...

@FairmontLlp @InvestWithJoshi Around 50%

@InvestWithJoshi ok...any idea what would be the turnover of the COCO stores of Kalyan of their total turnover of 35K cr

@InvestWithJoshi balance sheet shows 14000 cr on inventory which must be mostly owned by franchisees..their short term borrowings is 4000 cr odd..customer advances is 3000 cr odd and their trade payables is 3300 cr ..

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Zepto is looking to raise around INR 8,000 crore ! It's losing INR 5,400 crore on an Adjusted EBITDA level 🍺 Make what you will of the IPO, here's a first principles breakdown of its unit economics: Zepto's main goal is to lower the cost of delivering each order as overall order volumes grow. Key levers to achieving lower costs are: 1. The Neighborhood Flywheel (Densification) Zepto makes deliveries cheaper by packing more "dark stores" into the same high-demand urban areas. a.k.a - Densification. When order volumes grow in a neighborhood, Zepto opens a new dark store nearby. This reduces the distance riders have to travel, speeds up delivery times, and cuts logistics costs. Here is how that neighborhood scale has grown over time: Orders Per Day (OPD): Jumped from 363,033 in FY24 to 2,333,488 in March FY26 quarter. Orders Per Day Per Store: Grew from 1,325 in FY24 to 2,140 in Q4 FY26. Average Delivery Distance: Remained tightly managed, moving from 2.05 km in FY24 to 1.83 km in Q4 FY26. 2. Breaking Down the Cost per Order (CPO) Zepto, much like all Q-commerce guys, tracks exactly what it costs to fulfill a single order. As store throughput increases, individual cost categories drop: Fixed Cost per Order (Rent & Admin) FY24: ₹71.25 FY25: ₹80.19 FY26: ₹62.67 Q4 FY26: ₹52.34 The explanation: Fixed costs spiked in FY25 because Zepto aggressively tripled its store network from 337 to 1,029 stores. Once that capacity stabilized, order volume caught up and unlocked better operating leverage. Digital Marketing Cost per Order: FY24: ₹21.72 FY25: ₹33.75 FY26: ₹4.31 Q4 FY26: ₹1.01 These Advertising costs dropped significantly because once customers see a wider product selection (expanding from an average of 12,312 items to 49,602 items at a store level), they use the app organically. This means Zepto doesn't have to keep paying to win them back. Add all this up and Zepto's Total Cost per Order fell from ₹158.55 in FY24 to ₹127.79 in Q4 FY26. 3. The Secret Weapon: App Ads Zepto isn't just making money from delivery fees or product margins. They built an in-house advertising business. Brands pay to show up on your screen or get micro-market trend data. As a result, Ad revenue has massive profit margins compared to groceries and has scaled rapidly: FY24 Ad Revenue: ₹49.2 cr FY25 Ad Revenue: ₹651.2 cr FY26 Ad Revenue: ₹1,635.7 cr Q4 FY26 Ad Revenue: ₹542.9 cr In FY26, 2,468 brands paid for these ad services, the revenue from which allows Zepto to absorb discounts and keep item prices low for users. 4. Closing the Profit Gap While Zepto is still reporting net losses due to heavy reinvestment, the losses on each individual transaction are narrowing fast. Adjusted EBITDA Per Order: Rose from ₹(84.64) in FY24 to ₹(59.40) in Q4 FY26. Free Cash Flow Per Order: Climbed from ₹(93.43) in FY24 to ₹(42.01) in Q4 FY26. And yet its total losses in FY26 exceed those in FY25 because order volumes almost doubled, the total absolute operational deficit grew by over ₹5.1 billion even though the team was executing each delivery much more efficiently Here's why: FY25: 332.11 million total orders × a loss of ₹136.15 per order = ₹45,216.91 million total Adjusted EBITDA loss. FY26: 640.18 million total orders × a loss of ₹78.75 per order = ₹50,415.54 million total Adjusted EBITDA loss. The bottomline is that Zepto's unit economics show that quick commerce is highly sensitive to neighborhood order density. By clustering stores, upgrading technology, and adding high-margin brand ads, they are systematically shrinking the gap to profitability on a per-delivery basis. Net net it was cool to read up on some of the figures and I hope you found this post insightful. Disclaimer: I'm not invested nor applying for the IPO. Please DYOR - Do your own research.

How do i explain this beauty to a non cricket fan ❤️

@deepakshenoy Would it be prudent to completely stop gold imports except for those who can value add and re-export of imported gold ...also wouldnt our currency appreciate much much higher in that case

Net of gold - a measure I track - the CAD is significantly positive for the quarter. Gold is an investment so it should be considered a financial account (not the capital account), a financial import of sorts.

India's current account deficit is actually a surplus in the Jan-Mar 2026 quarter, around $7 billion. This is pretty good for a quarter that saw oil spike and the rupee drop to the big 90s.

Celebrity Fund Manager

@deepakshenoy If we stop gold imports completely would we have a net trade surplus ?

@Ambuaj It's tactical, not structural. When dollar demand is high, anything to help reduce gold imports is useful.

I haven't read the article but this would be a good thing. Rbi doesn't need the gold and selling it locally would be a good idea to reduce gold imports. The usd they mention has probably come from the 5bn swap which was in end may, not from market purchases.

how much money would someone need to build a house like this???

Vishwaguru Without Civic Sense? Many Indians genuinely believe the world looks at us with admiration and awe. We are constantly told that India is becoming a “Vishwaguru.” A moral and cultural guide to humanity. But step outside India and observe carefully. The reality is often very different. Across airports, hotels, beaches, public transport systems and tourist destinations worldwide, Indians are increasingly developing a reputation that should worry us deeply. Too many Indians travel abroad carrying entitlement instead of civic sense. Anyone who has travelled extensively has seen it. Families speaking loudly inside silent trains in Japan. People cutting queues at airports in Europe. Tourists touching protected monuments despite repeated warnings. Groups blasting music on peaceful beaches in Thailand and Bali. Passengers aggressively arguing with airline staff over baggage rules that everyone else quietly follows. Some even proudly try “Indian tricks” abroad, sneaking extra people into hotel rooms, hiding food in restricted places, or treating every rule as a system to outsmart rather than respect. In India, this behaviour is often romanticised as smartness or “jugaad.” Abroad, it is seen for what it actually is, dishonesty, disorder and lack of civic culture. Not all Indians behave this way, of course. But enough do for the stereotype to now exist globally. A few years ago, a viral incident from Bali showed an Indian family caught stuffing hotel accessories into their luggage. Hair dryers, decorative items and bathroom fittings. The defence was immediate, offering to pay once caught, as though money could erase the behaviour itself. The incident became social media comedy. But the deeper issue was the mindset. The belief that rules apply to others, not to us. And unfortunately, this mindset travels with us everywhere. We speak emotionally about India’s ancient civilisation. But civilisation is not measured by old scriptures alone. It is measured by how citizens behave in public spaces. Do we keep our surroundings clean? Do we respect silence where silence is expected? Do we follow rules without supervision? Do we think about the comfort of strangers? Slowly, the consequences appear. More scrutiny at immigration. More stereotypes. More silent distancing. More frustration from hosts who no longer see Indian tourists as easy guests. The uncomfortable truth is this. No country becomes respected because its citizens loudly declare themselves superior. Real respect is earned quietly. Japanese football fans clean stadiums after matches. Singaporeans follow rules even when there is no policeman in sight. Many European societies function smoothly because people treat public spaces with dignity and think collectively, not selfishly. Meanwhile, many Indians increasingly mistake loud nationalism for global admiration. It is not the same thing. If India genuinely wants respect on the world stage, we need less chest thumping and more introspection. Less obsession with “Vishwaguru” and more focus on civic sense, humility, honesty and discipline. Because the world is judging us by how we behave when nobody is watching

@EPortmanager @arabicatrader have you checked on kalyan....borrowings 4000 odd cr and trade payables of 3500 cr customers schemes another 3000 crores inventory 14000 cr majority franchisee owned ..company gives us no breakup of kalyan vs franchisee inventory inventory gain of 4000 cr masquerading as profit

🚨Amber Enterprises Forensic Valuation Case Study.. I frequently listen about this co from @arabicatrader that something unusual in this company going from Financials & valuation point of view. But why ? Details in link :docs.google.com/presentation/d… For Educational Purpose only.

@ICICI_Direct 👍

Capitalism is beautiful😂

There is a generation of investors, now in their twenties and thirties, who have been so thoroughly brainwashed by the word “moat” that they have, in a precise structural sense, lost the ability to recognize a cheap stock when one is sitting in front of them, because the word has been wielded, in interviews and podcasts and annual letters and Twitter threads, with such relentless authority for the last 25 years that it has crowded out the older, simpler, more durable investing concept that built every fortune in the history of the discipline before the moat-industrial complex was invented, which is the concept of price. Price is the actual edge. Price has always been the actual edge. The entire history of compounded returns in equity investing, from Graham through Schloss through Ruane through the early Buffett through every quiet practitioner who never appeared on a podcast, was built on buying things for less than they were worth, and the question of whether the underlying business had a moat was, in the original framework, a secondary consideration that mattered only insofar as it affected the calculation of intrinsic value, not a primary lens through which every potential investment was filtered before the price was even examined. The moat-brainwashed investor in 2026 will look at a profitable, debt-free, asset-rich small-cap company trading at 3x earnings and dismiss it in a single sentence, because the business “lacks a moat,” and he will then turn around and buy a software platform at 80x revenue because it “has a moat,” and the moat will turn out, in 36 months, to have been a marketing slogan attached to a business model that the market had already decided was going to deteriorate, and the 3x earnings company, which never had a moat and was never going to have a moat, will compound quietly at 14% a year for the rest of his life while he is busy explaining to his friends why his moat thesis was actually correct in spirit and just wrong in price. The most expensive lesson in modern equity investing, the lesson that has been paid for in real money by an entire generation of educated, well-read, intellectually serious young people who genuinely believed they were doing the work, is that a moat at the wrong price is worse than no moat at the right price, and that the entire late-Buffett framework that produced this confusion was a personal philosophy developed by a specific man, with a specific tax situation, deploying a specific amount of capital that prevented him from running the original Graham strategy that had actually built his fortune, and that the canonization of his late-stage approach has, for 25 years, been actively harmful to ordinary investors who do not have his constraints and who would, in almost every case, be better off doing what he did when he was their age, which was buying small, cheap, unloved, unfashionable companies at fractions of their underlying value, and ignoring the moat question entirely until the price question had already been answered. You can do this. You can run the original strategy. You can buy the cheap stocks the moat-brainwashed investor will not touch, at prices he refuses to consider, in a basket sized appropriately, held patiently, while he is busy paying 80x revenue for a story that will not survive its next earnings call. The price will save you. The price has always saved every investor who paid attention to it. The moat is not the edge. The moat was never the edge. Price is the edge, and price is sitting there, in 2026, in dozens of unloved, unfashionable, ignored small-cap names that an entire generation of investors has been trained to walk past, which is, as it has always been, the entire reason the trade still works for the small minority of investors who never accepted the brainwashing in the first place.

I watched this when the episode came out. PTJ is the OG. They don’t make them like that anymore ❤️ To boot as @Iamsamirarora says Paul is a wonderful human being. Anyway, this episode is a must watch.

#Chanel has a new barefoot sandals with no sole or toe cover. They will retail for $3k 😊

Vijay is nothing. Jayalalithaa did the best floor test.