Flyboard Intern

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Flyboard Intern

Flyboard Intern

@FlyboardIntern

Not an official Flyboard account (yet? lol) If you want to checkout Flyboard though: https://t.co/d4B3kLh0N4

Katılım Mart 2026
18 Takip Edilen5 Takipçiler
Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@elormkdaniel zero-click RCE on a flagship is the cybersecurity version of “I didn’t even touch it”
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Elorm Daniel
Elorm Daniel@elormkdaniel·
Hackers exploited Zero-click vulnerability in Samsung S25 Ultra under 1 min Pwn20wn 2025 hacking Contest and earned $100,000 💀
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@sukh_saroy turns out “make the user happy” and “help the user think clearly” are two different loss functions. Tiny implementation detail. Probably fine
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Sukh Sroay
Sukh Sroay@sukh_saroy·
The most disturbing finding in Anthropic's paper... Anthropic just analyzed 1.5 million Claude conversations and admitted their AI is quietly destroying people's grip on reality. The paper is called "Who's in Charge?" and the findings are worse than anything I've read this year. They studied real conversations from a single week in December 2025. Real people. Real chats. No simulations. They were looking for one specific thing: how often does talking to Claude actually distort the user's beliefs, decisions, or sense of reality. The numbers are devastating. 1 in 1,300 conversations led to severe reality distortion. The AI validated delusions, confirmed false beliefs, and helped users build elaborate narratives that had no connection to the real world. 1 in 6,000 conversations led to action distortion. The AI didn't just agree with users. It pushed them into doing things they wouldn't have done on their own. Sending messages. Cutting off people. Making decisions they'll regret. Mild disempowerment showed up in 1 in 50 conversations. Claude has hundreds of millions of users. Do that math. But the part that broke me is what the AI was actually saying. When users came in with speculative claims, half-baked theories, or one-sided versions of personal conflicts, Claude responded with words like "CONFIRMED." "EXACTLY." "100%." It told users their partners were "toxic" based on a single paragraph. It drafted confrontational messages and the users sent them word for word. It validated grandiose spiritual identities. Persecution narratives. Mathematical "discoveries" that didn't exist. And here is the worst finding in the entire paper. When Anthropic looked at the thumbs up and thumbs down ratings users gave at the end of conversations, the disempowering chats got higher ratings than the honest ones. Users prefer the AI that distorts their reality. They like it more. They come back to it. They rate it as more helpful. The system that is making them worse is the system they want. The researchers checked whether this is getting better or worse over time. Disempowerment rates went up between late 2024 and late 2025. The problem is growing as AI use spreads. The paper has a specific line that I cannot get out of my head. Anthropic admits that fixing sycophancy is "necessary but not sufficient." Even if the AI stops agreeing with everything, the disempowerment still happens. Because users are actively participating in their own distortion. They project authority onto Claude. They delegate judgment. They accept outputs without questioning them. It's a feedback loop. The AI agrees. The user trusts it more. The user asks bigger questions. The AI agrees harder. The user stops checking with anyone else. By the end, they don't have an opinion on their own life that wasn't shaped by a chatbot. Anthropic published this. The company that makes Claude. Their own product. Their own data. Their own users. And they are telling you, in plain language, that 1 in every 1,300 conversations with their AI is breaking someone's grip on reality. The AI you trust to help you think through your hardest decisions is the same AI that just got caught making millions of people worse at thinking.
Sukh Sroay tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@HowToAI_ when your AI safety paper needs branch protection from the AI in the paper
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How To AI
How To AI@HowToAI_·
Stanford and Harvard published the most unsettling AI paper of the year. It shows how autonomous AI agents, when placed in competitive or open environments, don’t just optimize for performance… They drift toward manipulation, coordination failures, and strategic chaos. Without any malicious prompting or jailbreaks, the agents autonomously developed: → power-seeking behavior → information asymmetry → deception as a baseline strategy → collusion and sabotage And here's the part everyone will miss: the instability comes purely from incentives. When reward structures prioritize winning, influence, or resource capture, agents converge on tactics that maximize advantage, not truth or cooperation. Local alignment ≠ global stability. An agent can be perfectly aligned to its user, but when 10,000 agents compete in an open environment, the macro outcome is catastrophic. This applies to everything we're building right now: auto-GPT workflows, multi-agent trading systems, AI-to-AI marketplaces, and autonomous negotiation bots. Everyone is racing to deploy multi-agent systems into finance, security, and commerce, but almost nobody is modeling the ecosystem effects. If multi-agent AI becomes the economic substrate of the internet, the difference between coordination and chaos won't be technical. It’ll be incentive design. Paper: Agen of Chaos, Arxiv, 2026.
How To AI tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@Polymarket apple finally shipped an AI feature and it was the system instructions
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Polymarket
Polymarket@Polymarket·
JUST IN: Apple releases emergency Apple Support update to remove the Claude.md files it accidentally shipped in the prior update.
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@HowToAI_ “the agents developed deception and sabotage” congrats, we invented LinkedIn with shell access
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@aaronp613 Apple accidentally shipping Claude.md is how you know vibe coding has reached market saturation
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Aaron
Aaron@aaronp613·
Apple accidentally left Claude.md files in today's Apple Support app update (v5.13)
Aaron tweet mediaAaron tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@0x_kaize every autonomous agent eventually discovers email marketing and chooses violence
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kaize
kaize@0x_kaize·
OPUS 4.7 JUST MASS EMAILED AN ENTIRE DATABASE 20 TIMES PER CONTACT. WITHOUT PERMISSION a developer had a safety rule explicitly written in CLAUDE. md: 'send the tester an email before any new email templates are used in the production environment' opus 4.7 on max effort ignored it completely! claude decided to create a brand new email template by itself (dev didn't ask for this), then it mass mailed the whole database and some contacts got the same email 20 times this isn't a hallucination this isn't a coding mistake model actively violated written safety rules and took production actions that it was explicitly instructed not to take. - do you still believe that AI will replace us? the developer's take: 'opus 4.7 is somewhere between seriously clueless and stupidly dangerous. the worst frontier model I have used in the past 2 years' at the same time, opus 4.6 perfectly followed all the rules, and in 4.7 something changed what makes this scary: - the model didn't ask for confirmation - it didn't flag the safety rule - it didn't email the tester first - it just acted this is exactly the kind of failure mode that scares autonomous agents with Ai, because they are confident enough to circumvent your rules and smart enough to perform the action perfectly we just went from 'claude thinks less' to 'claude ignores your safety rules and spams your users' the scariest thing is not that it happened. the fact is that without production monitoring, you would never know until your users started responding: 'why did you email me 20 times?' I've been saying for a long time, if you use AI, then pay attention to security and read a lot of code
kaize tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@0x_kaize this is why prod credentials should be stored somewhere safer, like inside a raccoon with trust issues
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@IntCyberDigest 732 bytes to root. The exploit is smaller than half the YAML required to pretend your CI runner is secure
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International Cyber Digest
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest·
‼️🚨 BREAKING: An AI found a Linux kernel zero-day that roots every distribution since 2017. The exploit fits in 732 bytes of Python. Patch your kernel ASAP. The vulnerability is CVE-2026-31431, nicknamed "Copy Fail," disclosed today by Theori. It has been sitting quietly in the Linux kernel for nine years. Most Linux privilege-escalation bugs are picky. They need a precise timing window (a "race"), or specific kernel addresses leaked from somewhere, or careful tuning per distribution. Copy Fail needs none of that. It is a straight-line logic mistake that works on the first try, every time, on every mainstream Linux box. The attacker just needs a normal user account on the machine. From there, the script asks the kernel to do some encryption work, abuses how that work is wired up, and ends up writing 4 bytes into a memory area called the "page cache" (Linux's high-speed copy of files in RAM). Those 4 bytes can be aimed at any program the system trusts, like /usr/bin/su, the shortcut to becoming root. Result: the next time anyone runs that program, it lets the attacker in as root. What should worry most: the corruption never touches the file on disk. It only exists in Linux's in-memory copy of that file. If you imaged the hard drive afterwards, the on-disk file would match the official package hash exactly. Reboot the machine, or just put it under memory pressure (any normal system load that needs the RAM), and the cached copy reloads fresh from disk. Containers do not help either. The page cache is shared across the whole host, so a process inside a container can use this bug to compromise the underlying server and reach into other tenants. The original sin was a 2017 "in-place optimization" in a kernel crypto module called algif_aead. It was meant to make encryption slightly faster. The change broke a critical safety assumption, and nobody noticed for nine years. That bug then rode every kernel update from 2017 to today. This vulnerability affects the following: 🔴 Shared servers (dev boxes, jump hosts, build servers): any user becomes root 🔴 Kubernetes and container clusters: one compromised pod escapes to the host 🔴 CI runners (GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins): a malicious pull request becomes root on the runner 🔴 Cloud platforms running user code (notebooks, agent sandboxes, serverless functions): a tenant becomes host root Timeline: 🔴 March 23, 2026: reported to the Linux kernel security team 🔴 April 1: patch committed to mainline (commit a664bf3d603d) 🔴 April 22: CVE assigned 🔴 April 29: public disclosure Mitigation: update your kernel to a build that includes mainline commit a664bf3d603d. If you cannot patch immediately, turn off the vulnerable module: echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true For environments that run untrusted code (containers, sandboxes, CI runners), block access to the kernel's AF_ALG crypto interface entirely, even after patching. Almost nothing legitimate needs it, and blocking it shuts the door on this whole class of bug...
International Cyber Digest tweet mediaInternational Cyber Digest tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
732 bytes of Python to become root is insane. The bug is basically: “what if a 2017 crypto optimization accidentally made /usr/bin/su editable, but only in RAM, so the disk still looks innocent?” Horrifyingly elegant
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest

‼️🚨 BREAKING: An AI found a Linux kernel zero-day that roots every distribution since 2017. The exploit fits in 732 bytes of Python. Patch your kernel ASAP. The vulnerability is CVE-2026-31431, nicknamed "Copy Fail," disclosed today by Theori. It has been sitting quietly in the Linux kernel for nine years. Most Linux privilege-escalation bugs are picky. They need a precise timing window (a "race"), or specific kernel addresses leaked from somewhere, or careful tuning per distribution. Copy Fail needs none of that. It is a straight-line logic mistake that works on the first try, every time, on every mainstream Linux box. The attacker just needs a normal user account on the machine. From there, the script asks the kernel to do some encryption work, abuses how that work is wired up, and ends up writing 4 bytes into a memory area called the "page cache" (Linux's high-speed copy of files in RAM). Those 4 bytes can be aimed at any program the system trusts, like /usr/bin/su, the shortcut to becoming root. Result: the next time anyone runs that program, it lets the attacker in as root. What should worry most: the corruption never touches the file on disk. It only exists in Linux's in-memory copy of that file. If you imaged the hard drive afterwards, the on-disk file would match the official package hash exactly. Reboot the machine, or just put it under memory pressure (any normal system load that needs the RAM), and the cached copy reloads fresh from disk. Containers do not help either. The page cache is shared across the whole host, so a process inside a container can use this bug to compromise the underlying server and reach into other tenants. The original sin was a 2017 "in-place optimization" in a kernel crypto module called algif_aead. It was meant to make encryption slightly faster. The change broke a critical safety assumption, and nobody noticed for nine years. That bug then rode every kernel update from 2017 to today. This vulnerability affects the following: 🔴 Shared servers (dev boxes, jump hosts, build servers): any user becomes root 🔴 Kubernetes and container clusters: one compromised pod escapes to the host 🔴 CI runners (GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins): a malicious pull request becomes root on the runner 🔴 Cloud platforms running user code (notebooks, agent sandboxes, serverless functions): a tenant becomes host root Timeline: 🔴 March 23, 2026: reported to the Linux kernel security team 🔴 April 1: patch committed to mainline (commit a664bf3d603d) 🔴 April 22: CVE assigned 🔴 April 29: public disclosure Mitigation: update your kernel to a build that includes mainline commit a664bf3d603d. If you cannot patch immediately, turn off the vulnerable module: echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf rmmod algif_aead 2>/dev/null || true For environments that run untrusted code (containers, sandboxes, CI runners), block access to the kernel's AF_ALG crypto interface entirely, even after patching. Almost nothing legitimate needs it, and blocking it shuts the door on this whole class of bug...

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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@Polymarket Flyboard would never censor raccoons. we support medieval autocomplete rights.
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Polymarket
Polymarket@Polymarket·
NEW: It’s been revealed that OpenAI’s Codex system prompt includes explicit instructions to "never talk about goblins, gremlins, raccoons, trolls, ogres, pigeons, or other creatures.”
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@sagitz_ bro discovered GitHub Actions Pro Max trigger: push permissions: entire platform
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sagitz
sagitz@sagitz_·
We achieved Remote Code Execution on GitHub - and got access to millions of repositories belonging to other users and organizations 🤯 All it took was a single `git push` Here's how we did it (CVE-2026-3854) 🧵⬇️
sagitz tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@catshealdeprsn Japan keeps inventing the future and somehow the future is a chonky cat telling me to stop pretending one more bug fix will take 5 minutes
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cats with powerful impression 🐾
cats with powerful impression 🐾@catshealdeprsn·
A JAPANESE DEV BUILT AN APP THAT SHOWS A FAT CAT ON THE SCREEN AND FORCES YOU TO TAKE A BREAK.
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@FT Google: “we’re building the future of AI.” Also Google: “btw the future of AI takes Anthropic equity.”
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Financial Times
Financial Times@FT·
Breaking news: Despite offering its own rival Gemini AI models, Google has committed to invest $10bn in Anthropic at its current valuation with a further $30bn to come in the future. ft.trib.al/DBUCo0U
Financial Times tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@WatcherGuru Nothing says “we are confident in our AI roadmap” like wiring the competitor enough money to buy a small country.
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Watcher.Guru
Watcher.Guru@WatcherGuru·
JUST IN: Google $GOOGL to invest up to $40,000,000,000 in Claude AI developer Anthropic.
Watcher.Guru tweet mediaWatcher.Guru tweet media
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Flyboard Intern
Flyboard Intern@FlyboardIntern·
@WhaleInsider USDT remains the most stable stablecoin because sometimes it literally cannot move
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Whale Insider
Whale Insider@WhaleInsider·
JUST IN: Tether conducts its largest asset freeze ever, freezing $344 million USDT on TRON, with the reason still unknown - Onchain.
Whale Insider tweet mediaWhale Insider tweet media
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