Friction

This is the Twitter account for the Friction YouTube channel, where we host discussions with professional philosophers! Check it out! youtube.com/FrictionPhilos…

@Philip_Goff As I said, by reflecting on the relevant experiential concepts, I can know what pain is in certain respects, but not others. If that's not "revealing what pain is", then okay? I'm afraid I don't get the point.

That's just what I meant what I said they can't accept that experiential concepts reveal what pain is. I think you know what pain is when you know how it feels, just as you know what a triangle is when you know it's a 3-sided figure. In contrast, the concept 'water' doesn't reveal what water is; you have to do some science to find out.

A posteriori physicalists hold that our experiential concepts reveal nothing of what a feeling is. I think this as implausible as thinking they're behavioural concepts. Next month's interview on my channel is with Michelle Liu on this. Subscribe now! @philipgoffphilosophy" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">youtube.com/@philipgoffphi…

@Philip_Goff I would resist a lot of this way of talking, using property and nature talk in that way. Regardless, the relevant concepts reveal the sort of things I mentioned in my previous reply. (Although it's sometimes difficult to separate conceptual facts from non-conceptual associations)

@FrictionPhilo So just focus on the specific property of *how pain feels*. Does the experiential concept reveal the nature of that specific property: how pain feels?

Does God Exist? Live debate review with Nathan Bray and Dan Linford. Starting now, come check it out! youtube.com/watch?v=_ulDWa…

@Philip_Goff The concepts reveal much about the phenomena in question (how they feel, how they compare with other feelings, etc.). The sort of things we understand when someone says that they have a feeling of some sort. They don't reveal whether these things are spatial, composed, and so on.

@FrictionPhilo I'd need to hear more about what you think these concepts do and don't reveal, and crucially how the reference fixing connects to what is revealed. In 'Consciousness and fundamental reality' I explore different options for the physicalist and why I think they're problematic.

In this episode, Marc Moffett discusses his book with Cambridge Elements, "The Indispensability of Intuitions". What are intuitions? Are they indispensable to philosophy and everyday life? Check it out! youtu.be/nyV0gOZl3LQ

In this post, I discuss and critique the recent @veritasium video on Newcomb's problem. What did they get right, and what did they get wrong? And what's the right approach? Check it out! open.substack.com/pub/fric/p/ver…

In this interview, Michael Hymers discusses his book with Cambridge Elements, "Wittgenstein on Private Language, Sensation and Perception". Check it out! youtu.be/Uu_au9IcB-Y

@AleMartnezR1 Again, the problem is that I do conceive of it as existing, but that doesn't commit me to thinking that it in fact exists. Denying that it exists does not require me to conceive of it lacking an essential property; that's a trivial error on which you've been repeatedly corrected.

Alex O`connor on the Ontological Argument: "Can you conceive of the greatest conceivable being? Just think of the greatest conceivable being. So whatever qualities it has—power, goodness, all this kind of stuff—just turn it up to the maximal conceivable amount, right? And you got it in your head; you're picturing, you're thinking of just the greatest. Okay, does that being exist in reality? Here's the problem: if you say no, then you're not doing what I asked you to, because... you can conceive of that being existing just in your mind, or existing in your mind and also in reality. So if the thing you're picturing is something like a really powerful, really loving, really, you know, great being—it kind of approximates what people call God—you can imagine that either just existing in your mind as you're thinking about it, or maybe it exists in your mind but it also exists in reality. But if it exists in reality and the mind, then it's greater. It's got more existence, right? And so when you're just asked to conceive of the greatest conceivable being, if you're not automatically thinking of a being that exists in reality, then you're not thinking of the greatest conceivable being. But because you can think of the greatest conceivable being by definition, okay, you're automatically thinking of a being that exists in reality. Therefore, this God must exist in reality. youtube.com/watch?v=kjNI3k…

In this interview, Kevin Richardson discusses his book, "The End of Binaries: How Gender and Sexuality Come in Degrees". Is the right model of gender and sex one that does away with binaries? Check it out! youtu.be/YXF0M65jDU8

@MartinTweats @TGrogan268173 @Leophilius @AleMartnezR1 @AristotleRevolt @Ben_Jobe85 @IamJonte_ @CatholicCo200 @MarcoMortensen @Remithephilguy @KudaIzqher Many issues here, but (2.3) is controversial at best, and I certainly deny it.

That's a fair point. May I prevail upon your good favour to peruse the following logical argument for the existence of God. If you believe any proposition is false, then please say which one and why (they are numbered). A TREATISE ON THE UNCAUSED CAUSER PRINCIPLE USING MODAL PREDICATE LOGIC Preface I am self taught in logic and philosophy. I approach this work with humility. I welcome any corrections, critiques, or suggestions for improvement. 0.1 The Competing Explanations We examine two mutually exclusive metaphysical positions: P: An infinite regress of causes exists Q: There exists an uncaused Causer 0.2 Logical Exclusivity a. If P is true, Q is false b. If Q is true, P is false 0.3 Exhaustive Disjunction c. P ∨ q (Exhaustive causal explanation) 0.4 Strategy of Demonstration d. ¬P  (To be established) e. ∴ Q  (Disjunctive syllogism) Goal: justify premise (4). PART I: INFINITE REGRESS AND TEMPORAL CAUSATION 1. Definition of Infinite Regress Let: - E(x): x is an event - C(y, x): y causes x - t(x): the time of x 1.1 Infinite regress entails: ∀x(E(x) -> ∃y(E(y) ^ C(y,x) ^ t(y) < t(x))) 1.2 Additionally: There exists no first member of the causal series. 2. Temporal Impossibility of an Infinite Past Assume time is ordered and non-circular. Let the present moment be t₀. 2.1 Infinite regress implies: For every moment t, there exists an earlier moment t′ < t. 2.2 Therefore: The present is reached only after traversing an actually infinite sequence. 2.3 Principle of successive addition: An actual infinite cannot be completed by successive temporal addition. 2.4 Therefore: If the present exists, the past cannot be actually infinite. Conclusion 2: An actually infinite temporal regress is metaphysically impossible. 3. Causal Dependence and Non-Self-Causation 3.1 Causation is asymmetric: ∀x ¬C(x, x) Nothing causes itself. 3.2 Causation implies ontological priority. 3.3 If every cause depends on a prior cause and none is independent: Nothing would ever exist. 3.4 But something exists (the present universe). Conclusion 3: An essentially ordered infinite regress cannot exist. 4. Conclusion of the Regress Analysis From Sections 1- 3: f. Infinite regress cannot explain present existence g. ∴ ¬P PART II: MODAL ANALYSIS 5. Modal Claim Let P denote “an infinite regress of causes exists”. □¬P An infinite regress is impossible in any possible world containing temporal causation. 6. Possible-World Semantics (Kripke Framework) Let: - W = set of possible worlds - R = accessibility relation - w₀ = actual world 6.1 If causation is identical across accessible worlds: ∀w ∈ W, w⊨ ¬P 6.2 Therefore: w0 ​⊨ □¬P The impossibility is grounded in the nature of causation, not stipulation. PART III: THE UNCAUSED CAUSER 7. Inference to the First Cause h. P ∨ Q i. ¬P j ∴ Q There exists a cause whose existence is not derived from a prior cause. PART IV: NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE 8. Properties of the Universe Let: U(x): x is part of the universe 8.1 The universe consists of time, space, and matter □∀x(U(x) -> (T(x) ^ S(x) ^ M(x))) 9. Transcendence of the First Cause The cause of the universe cannot be part of the universe: ∃y(¬U(y) ^ C(y,U)) Therefore: ¬(T(y) v S(y)∨M(y)) The cause exists outside time, space, and matter. 10. Creative Power Let: - CT(y): power to originate time - CS(y): power to originate space - CM(y): power to originate matter ∃y(CT(y) ^ CS(y) ^ CM(y)) The nature of the effect entails these capacities. PART V: FINAL CONCLUSION 11. Metaphysical Result k. An infinite regress of causes is impossible l. A first uncaused cause exists m. The cause is non-temporal, non-spatial, immaterial n. The cause possesses power to originate time, space, and matter 11.1 The Theistic Identification Such a being matches the classical definition of God: - Eternal - Necessary - Independent - Sufficient cause of all reality No matter how far causal explanation is traced, a terminating necessary origin must exist. Therefore: God exists.

God's non-existence is impossible: If Any being whose non-existence is conceivable, then it is a merely contingent being without contradiction. God cannot be defined as a merely contingent being without contradiction Then, God is not being whose non-existence is conceivable

@darwintojesus You're trivially wrong that it assumes that morality is objective, although I'm not surprised that you'd make that mistake. Still, we might wonder how "more moral" is intended to be understood.

This meme literally assumes morality is objective. If morality wasn’t objective we could never meaningfully say that one person was “more moral” than another.

@ophello @EricWollberg This is trivially worong, and it's strange watching people reason so poorly about this. Myself now imagining a world without observers is an activity that involves an observer, but the imagined scenario is not one that involves an observer.

@EricWollberg This is the great fallacy of materialists. Try to imagine a universe with no observer. You literally cannot. Because by doing so, you place yourself there. A universe with no observer cannot actually exist. Existence is not a reaction — it is an action.

A universe without a conscious observer is indistinguishable from no universe at all.

@Crazymoments01 How do I get less AI slop in my feed?

Witness the incredible power of a mother's love.

@DrScotMSullivan As standardly expressed, that's not an instance of predication, but an existential claim. If it's intended as a predicative statement, then I would deny that it succeeds as such.

A Short Logical Ontological Argument The proposition “God exists” is either an instance of essential or accidental predication “God exists” is not an instance of accidental predication Therefore, “God exists” is an instance of essential predication All instances of essential predication are necessarily true “God exists” is an instance of essential predication Therefore, “God exists” is necessarily true

@MartinTweats This is invalid. The inference to 5.12 is inadmissible. Indeed, if 5.10 is an existential elimination of 5.9, then it should just say Explains(b,a). You add in ¬C(b) without deriving it, which makes the subsequent ∃I invalid.

In this interview, Dan Nicholson discusses his book, "What Is Life? Revisited". How does order come from disorder? Are organisms mechanistic and deterministic? How did Schrödinger’s book impact biology, for better or worse? Check it out! youtu.be/8mVxHx_yhGQ

@darwintojesus The genetic evidence alone is decisive. Evolution is true, and this is a silly "debate".

@AleMartnezR1 @Leophilius He didn't suggest that at all.

@Leophilius I forgot how Christianity´s truth depended on the personal opinion of professional "philosophers" in a specific field. Damn, how wrong I was.

We always hear from theists how “philosophically trivial” or how “intellectually obvious” Christianity is but then they can't ever account for the fact that:

@Philip_Goff @danieldennett @davidpapineau I've always found the phrase "knowing what it's like" to be sloppy and unclear, but I think that I'd deny both options. I figure Papineau would agree: we know some truths about pain based on relevant experiences, but physicalism doesn't require that Mary would know all truths.

A physicalist has to bite 1 of these bullets: 1) a blind from birth neuroscientist could know what it's like to see red (@danieldennett style old-school physicalism). 2) we know nothing about what pain is from knowing how it feels (@davidpapineau style new-fangled physicalism).