Luke Gormen&Advisor

Jamieson Greer: "If America doesn’t develop and implement its own policies to protect its industry and its workers, we will end up being policy takers. So if we’re not policymakers, we end up being policytakers." I think this is among the most important points Greer makes in this New York Times interview, but it is not nearly as well-understood by policymakers around the world as it should be. What Greer is arguing is that in a hyperglobalized world in which some economies exert much greater control over their external accounts, while others exert much less, if the former also implement aggressive domestic industrial policies, they will be able to externalize the resulting imbalances through their trade and capital accounts. This has extremely important implications that mainstream economists almost alway miss. Not only are economies that exert much greater control over their external accounts able to determine their domestic imbalances, they are also able to determine the domestic imbalances of their more open trade partners through their control of both countries' external imbalances. In effect the former are able to make their domestic industrial policies also the industrial polices, in reverse, of the latter. For example, if a country that can control its external accounts decides that as a matter of domestic industrial policy it wants to shift out of producing services and/or commodities and into manufacturing, and so increase its share of global manufacturing, its more open trade partners will automatically reduce their share of global manufacturing as they shift either into services, like the EU, or into commodity production, like Brazil. There will of course be constituencies in the EU that say that producing services is better than producing manufactured goods, and constituencies in Brazil that say that producing commodities is better than producing manufactured goods, and in some cases they may even be right. But the point that they miss is that these shifts were not the result of local market conditions, nor of the decisions of their own policymakers. The shifts were imposed upon them by the policymakers of their more closed and more aggressive trade partners. The changes in their economies were designed, in other words, not to accommodate their own economic needs but rather to accommodate the economic needs of their trade partners. It should be obvious (but isn't to many economists) that this is not how free markets work. nytimes.com/2026/07/20/pod…

US military training to suffer without funding boost, Hegseth says reut.rs/4ffoRgg reut.rs/4ffoRgg

This is concerning. For the first time, a Chinese model Kimi K3 has taken #1 on the Frontend Code Arena and is scoring at or near the frontier on other benchmarks. Meanwhile America is tying itself in knots: politicians and bureaucrats are banning new data centers, piling on state regulations, and pushing for new federal agencies to pre-approve frontier models. This is how you lose the AI race. The rest of the world won’t play by our rules if we bog ourselves down. Permissionless innovation is how America won the internet and became the technological envy of the world. We can do it again with AI -- while addressing risks in a targeted way -- or we’ll watch our lead evaporate.

BREAKING: China's Kimi K3 ranks #1 on the Frontend Code Arena, surpassing Claude Fable 5.

New York just became the first state in the country to sign a moratorium on data centers. I want you to sit with that, because it tells you everything about the two paths in front of us. One path builds the infrastructure that runs the next fifty years of the American economy. The other talks itself into a moral panic, bans the future, and then acts surprised when the jobs and the money show up in somebody else’s state. I am here to defend the data centers, and I want to walk you through why, because most of the fear you are hearing is manufactured. ewerickson.substack.com/p/in-defense-o…