Big Ten information and news

Big Ten 2024-25 payouts, per The Athletic: + Ohio State, $91.55 million + Penn State, $88.9 million + Indiana, $81 million + Next 13 members, $76-79 million + Oregon, $48 million + Washington, $46 million

If the NCAA and its members deregulated all meaningful rules and oversight to the conferences, would it still be worth remaining as an NCAA member? At that point what is the point of termination? They can still run the post-season events.

A New Model For College Athletics: Maximizing Conference Autonomy Without Full NCAA Termination *this model is not a completed version, but a starting point of a very important topic that has to be discussed. I outline the structure of a new model for college athletics. E-FCAM-LR - the stress-tested, Enhanced Federated Conference Autonomy Model. Don't worry about the title. That's just part of my work as to why it has that label. This model incorporates the April 29, 2026, insights on Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) and the explicit “somewhere in the middle” structure for conferences: full NCAA membership retained, maximum central deregulation, and conference-level governance in defined spheres. It's the realistic, low-risk path (especially if federal antitrust relief or collective bargaining remain stalled). Stress-Test Summary: Why This Model Now Passes Every Major Test Choh & Kirk doctrinal shift is real and powerful: The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because plaintiffs failed to plead a relevant antitrust market. They tried to define it narrowly as “Ivy League educational/athletic services,” but their own complaint admitted competition from non-Ivy schools (Power conferences, etc.). The court leaned heavily on Alston (2021): individual conferences may adopt rules different from NCAA-wide rules without triggering the same level of scrutiny when those rules can be justified under the rule of reason as promoting competitive balance, eligibility standards, roster stability, or market structure, rather than naked wage fixing. It gives Big school and conference lawyers strong cover for conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster rules, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons. Conferences adopt their own rules. Conferences file “Conference Autonomy Compacts.” The NCAA recognizes these as valid under the Constitution (no further national approval needed for deregulated areas). Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal, written legal vehicle that allows individual conferences to exercise and document their self-governance authority. A Conference Autonomy Compact is a filed agreement between a conference and the NCAA that: Identifies the specific NCAA rules (or categories of rules) that have been deregulated or are otherwise reserved to conferences. Lists the exact conference-specific rules the conference is adopting in those areas. Certifies that the conference’s rules comply with any remaining national minimum floors (e.g., core principles in Constitution Articles 1–2). Creates an internal enforcement mechanism (conference discipline, standardized contract templates, dispute-resolution processes) that the NCAA recognizes as valid. Legal Structure and Protection (Directly from the NCAA Manual + Court Precedent) 1. NCAA Constitutional Authority (2025-26 Manual) Constitution Article 2.B (Organization) explicitly states: “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Once the Division I Cabinet and sport oversight committees deregulate a rule area (the process already underway in 2026 for Bylaws 11, 13, and 17), that authority is automatically reserved to conferences. The Compact simply documents and activates it - no new constitutional amendment needed. Article 9 (Legislative Authority) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) allow conferences to adopt their own operating rules once the national rule is removed or made optional. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk) NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. What a Typical Conference Autonomy Compact Contains A real-world Compact (filed with the NCAA’s Office of the President and the Division I Board) would typically include: Scope section: Lists the deregulated bylaws (e.g., portions of Bylaw 13 recruiting, Bylaw 17 playing seasons, revenue-share mechanics). Conference-specific rules: – Uncapped revenue-share templates (NIL/IP/performance contracts with explicit waivers and “lost NIL licensing value” damage theories). – Legal tampering windows and retention bonuses. – Transfer disincentives, roster limits, and notification windows. – Eligibility add-ons framed as competitive-balance measures. – Standardized buyout formulas. Compliance certification: Confirms adherence to national floors (5-year eligibility, structured transfers, medical care, women’s/Olympic sports protections). Enforcement provisions: Conference discipline process, arbitration, and appeal rights (NCAA appeal limited to federal-funding/EO risks only). Duration and amendment: Usually 4–6 years with opt-out/renewal clauses. How They Are Created and Activated (2026 Timeline) Cabinet/sport oversight committees deregulate the rule (already scheduled for 2026). Conference legal teams draft the Compact -style template (waivers, alternative damage theories, competitive-balance framing). Conference presidents/commissioners approve and file it with the NCAA. NCAA acknowledges receipt and lists the conference’s rules as “valid conference governance” - no further national vote required. The Compact becomes effective for the next academic year. Role in E-FCAM-LR Conference Autonomy Compacts are the operational heart of the model. They deliver exactly what Big Ten and SEC leaders described on April 29, 2026: “central deregulation with the ability for leagues to govern in certain spheres” - while keeping the NCAA tournament, championships, and umbrella intact. They provide:Legal clarity and enforceability inside NCAA membership. Antitrust safe harbor via Alston/Choh. Title IX protection for uncapped revenue share (treated as commercial NIL compensation, not athletic aid). A ready-made structure for the Premier FBS Division (top 28–52 programs). No full separation. No new federal legislation required. Just the NCAA doing what its own Constitution already says it should do. This is why the Power conferences have been quietly building toward this architecture. The Compacts are the clean, low-risk, immediately available tool that turns the 2025-26 Manual and Choh decision into a fully functional new governance reality. Again, to make it clear, Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal legal document that activates a conference’s self-governance authority once the NCAA has deregulated a rule area. They are not a new invention - they are the natural extension of the 2025-26 NCAA Constitution Article 2’s explicit reservation of authority to conferences. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk)NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. Practical impact:Conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster limits, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons can be defended as preserving competitive balance within the conference - exactly the framing Choh endorses. Antitrust risk drops dramatically compared with NCAA-wide rules (which have repeatedly lost in Alston, House, etc.). Combined with Big Ten-style contract drafting (waivers, NIL/IP framing, performance-based reimbursement, alternative damage theories), this creates a resilient legal architecture. When rules are framed around pro-competitive justifications (competitive balance, roster stability, eligibility standards, market structure) rather than naked wage-fixing or price-fixing, they face lighter scrutiny and are more likely to survive. The NCAA’s governing documents explicitly permit — and in many cases require - this delegation: Constitution Article 2 (Organization): “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Divisions have independent authority to organize their own governing bodies, standards, and enforcement. Article 9 (Legislative Authority and Process) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) empower the Cabinet, sport oversight committees, and Board to deregulate via normal legislative channels. No constitutional amendment is required. Institutional control (Articles 1.E, 6, 8) remains with campus presidents/chancellors - conferences simply exercise the authority the NCAA has already reserved to them.

A New Model For College Athletics: Maximizing Conference Autonomy Without Full NCAA Termination *this model is not a completed version, but a starting point of a very important topic that has to be discussed. I outline the structure of a new model for college athletics. E-FCAM-LR - the stress-tested, Enhanced Federated Conference Autonomy Model. Don't worry about the title. That's just part of my work as to why it has that label. This model incorporates the April 29, 2026, insights on Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) and the explicit “somewhere in the middle” structure for conferences: full NCAA membership retained, maximum central deregulation, and conference-level governance in defined spheres. It's the realistic, low-risk path (especially if federal antitrust relief or collective bargaining remain stalled). Stress-Test Summary: Why This Model Now Passes Every Major Test Choh & Kirk doctrinal shift is real and powerful: The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because plaintiffs failed to plead a relevant antitrust market. They tried to define it narrowly as “Ivy League educational/athletic services,” but their own complaint admitted competition from non-Ivy schools (Power conferences, etc.). The court leaned heavily on Alston (2021): individual conferences may adopt rules different from NCAA-wide rules without triggering the same level of scrutiny when those rules can be justified under the rule of reason as promoting competitive balance, eligibility standards, roster stability, or market structure, rather than naked wage fixing. It gives Big school and conference lawyers strong cover for conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster rules, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons. Conferences adopt their own rules. Conferences file “Conference Autonomy Compacts.” The NCAA recognizes these as valid under the Constitution (no further national approval needed for deregulated areas). Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal, written legal vehicle that allows individual conferences to exercise and document their self-governance authority. A Conference Autonomy Compact is a filed agreement between a conference and the NCAA that: Identifies the specific NCAA rules (or categories of rules) that have been deregulated or are otherwise reserved to conferences. Lists the exact conference-specific rules the conference is adopting in those areas. Certifies that the conference’s rules comply with any remaining national minimum floors (e.g., core principles in Constitution Articles 1–2). Creates an internal enforcement mechanism (conference discipline, standardized contract templates, dispute-resolution processes) that the NCAA recognizes as valid. Legal Structure and Protection (Directly from the NCAA Manual + Court Precedent) 1. NCAA Constitutional Authority (2025-26 Manual) Constitution Article 2.B (Organization) explicitly states: “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Once the Division I Cabinet and sport oversight committees deregulate a rule area (the process already underway in 2026 for Bylaws 11, 13, and 17), that authority is automatically reserved to conferences. The Compact simply documents and activates it - no new constitutional amendment needed. Article 9 (Legislative Authority) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) allow conferences to adopt their own operating rules once the national rule is removed or made optional. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk) NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. What a Typical Conference Autonomy Compact Contains A real-world Compact (filed with the NCAA’s Office of the President and the Division I Board) would typically include: Scope section: Lists the deregulated bylaws (e.g., portions of Bylaw 13 recruiting, Bylaw 17 playing seasons, revenue-share mechanics). Conference-specific rules: – Uncapped revenue-share templates (NIL/IP/performance contracts with explicit waivers and “lost NIL licensing value” damage theories). – Legal tampering windows and retention bonuses. – Transfer disincentives, roster limits, and notification windows. – Eligibility add-ons framed as competitive-balance measures. – Standardized buyout formulas. Compliance certification: Confirms adherence to national floors (5-year eligibility, structured transfers, medical care, women’s/Olympic sports protections). Enforcement provisions: Conference discipline process, arbitration, and appeal rights (NCAA appeal limited to federal-funding/EO risks only). Duration and amendment: Usually 4–6 years with opt-out/renewal clauses. How They Are Created and Activated (2026 Timeline) Cabinet/sport oversight committees deregulate the rule (already scheduled for 2026). Conference legal teams draft the Compact -style template (waivers, alternative damage theories, competitive-balance framing). Conference presidents/commissioners approve and file it with the NCAA. NCAA acknowledges receipt and lists the conference’s rules as “valid conference governance” - no further national vote required. The Compact becomes effective for the next academic year. Role in E-FCAM-LR Conference Autonomy Compacts are the operational heart of the model. They deliver exactly what Big Ten and SEC leaders described on April 29, 2026: “central deregulation with the ability for leagues to govern in certain spheres” - while keeping the NCAA tournament, championships, and umbrella intact. They provide:Legal clarity and enforceability inside NCAA membership. Antitrust safe harbor via Alston/Choh. Title IX protection for uncapped revenue share (treated as commercial NIL compensation, not athletic aid). A ready-made structure for the Premier FBS Division (top 28–52 programs). No full separation. No new federal legislation required. Just the NCAA doing what its own Constitution already says it should do. This is why the Power conferences have been quietly building toward this architecture. The Compacts are the clean, low-risk, immediately available tool that turns the 2025-26 Manual and Choh decision into a fully functional new governance reality. Again, to make it clear, Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal legal document that activates a conference’s self-governance authority once the NCAA has deregulated a rule area. They are not a new invention - they are the natural extension of the 2025-26 NCAA Constitution Article 2’s explicit reservation of authority to conferences. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk)NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. Practical impact:Conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster limits, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons can be defended as preserving competitive balance within the conference - exactly the framing Choh endorses. Antitrust risk drops dramatically compared with NCAA-wide rules (which have repeatedly lost in Alston, House, etc.). Combined with Big Ten-style contract drafting (waivers, NIL/IP framing, performance-based reimbursement, alternative damage theories), this creates a resilient legal architecture. When rules are framed around pro-competitive justifications (competitive balance, roster stability, eligibility standards, market structure) rather than naked wage-fixing or price-fixing, they face lighter scrutiny and are more likely to survive. The NCAA’s governing documents explicitly permit — and in many cases require - this delegation: Constitution Article 2 (Organization): “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Divisions have independent authority to organize their own governing bodies, standards, and enforcement. Article 9 (Legislative Authority and Process) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) empower the Cabinet, sport oversight committees, and Board to deregulate via normal legislative channels. No constitutional amendment is required. Institutional control (Articles 1.E, 6, 8) remains with campus presidents/chancellors - conferences simply exercise the authority the NCAA has already reserved to them.

A New Model For College Athletics: Maximizing Conference Autonomy Without Full NCAA Termination *this model is not a completed version, but a starting point of a very important topic that has to be discussed. I outline the structure of a new model for college athletics. E-FCAM-LR - the stress-tested, Enhanced Federated Conference Autonomy Model. Don't worry about the title. That's just part of my work as to why it has that label. This model incorporates the April 29, 2026, insights on Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) and the explicit “somewhere in the middle” structure for conferences: full NCAA membership retained, maximum central deregulation, and conference-level governance in defined spheres. It's the realistic, low-risk path (especially if federal antitrust relief or collective bargaining remain stalled). Stress-Test Summary: Why This Model Now Passes Every Major Test Choh & Kirk doctrinal shift is real and powerful: The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because plaintiffs failed to plead a relevant antitrust market. They tried to define it narrowly as “Ivy League educational/athletic services,” but their own complaint admitted competition from non-Ivy schools (Power conferences, etc.). The court leaned heavily on Alston (2021): individual conferences may adopt rules different from NCAA-wide rules without triggering the same level of scrutiny when those rules can be justified under the rule of reason as promoting competitive balance, eligibility standards, roster stability, or market structure, rather than naked wage fixing. It gives Big school and conference lawyers strong cover for conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster rules, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons. Conferences adopt their own rules. Conferences file “Conference Autonomy Compacts.” The NCAA recognizes these as valid under the Constitution (no further national approval needed for deregulated areas). Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal, written legal vehicle that allows individual conferences to exercise and document their self-governance authority. A Conference Autonomy Compact is a filed agreement between a conference and the NCAA that: Identifies the specific NCAA rules (or categories of rules) that have been deregulated or are otherwise reserved to conferences. Lists the exact conference-specific rules the conference is adopting in those areas. Certifies that the conference’s rules comply with any remaining national minimum floors (e.g., core principles in Constitution Articles 1–2). Creates an internal enforcement mechanism (conference discipline, standardized contract templates, dispute-resolution processes) that the NCAA recognizes as valid. Legal Structure and Protection (Directly from the NCAA Manual + Court Precedent) 1. NCAA Constitutional Authority (2025-26 Manual) Constitution Article 2.B (Organization) explicitly states: “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Once the Division I Cabinet and sport oversight committees deregulate a rule area (the process already underway in 2026 for Bylaws 11, 13, and 17), that authority is automatically reserved to conferences. The Compact simply documents and activates it - no new constitutional amendment needed. Article 9 (Legislative Authority) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) allow conferences to adopt their own operating rules once the national rule is removed or made optional. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk) NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. What a Typical Conference Autonomy Compact Contains A real-world Compact (filed with the NCAA’s Office of the President and the Division I Board) would typically include: Scope section: Lists the deregulated bylaws (e.g., portions of Bylaw 13 recruiting, Bylaw 17 playing seasons, revenue-share mechanics). Conference-specific rules: – Uncapped revenue-share templates (NIL/IP/performance contracts with explicit waivers and “lost NIL licensing value” damage theories). – Legal tampering windows and retention bonuses. – Transfer disincentives, roster limits, and notification windows. – Eligibility add-ons framed as competitive-balance measures. – Standardized buyout formulas. Compliance certification: Confirms adherence to national floors (5-year eligibility, structured transfers, medical care, women’s/Olympic sports protections). Enforcement provisions: Conference discipline process, arbitration, and appeal rights (NCAA appeal limited to federal-funding/EO risks only). Duration and amendment: Usually 4–6 years with opt-out/renewal clauses. How They Are Created and Activated (2026 Timeline) Cabinet/sport oversight committees deregulate the rule (already scheduled for 2026). Conference legal teams draft the Compact -style template (waivers, alternative damage theories, competitive-balance framing). Conference presidents/commissioners approve and file it with the NCAA. NCAA acknowledges receipt and lists the conference’s rules as “valid conference governance” - no further national vote required. The Compact becomes effective for the next academic year. Role in E-FCAM-LR Conference Autonomy Compacts are the operational heart of the model. They deliver exactly what Big Ten and SEC leaders described on April 29, 2026: “central deregulation with the ability for leagues to govern in certain spheres” - while keeping the NCAA tournament, championships, and umbrella intact. They provide:Legal clarity and enforceability inside NCAA membership. Antitrust safe harbor via Alston/Choh. Title IX protection for uncapped revenue share (treated as commercial NIL compensation, not athletic aid). A ready-made structure for the Premier FBS Division (top 28–52 programs). No full separation. No new federal legislation required. Just the NCAA doing what its own Constitution already says it should do. This is why the Power conferences have been quietly building toward this architecture. The Compacts are the clean, low-risk, immediately available tool that turns the 2025-26 Manual and Choh decision into a fully functional new governance reality. Again, to make it clear, Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal legal document that activates a conference’s self-governance authority once the NCAA has deregulated a rule area. They are not a new invention - they are the natural extension of the 2025-26 NCAA Constitution Article 2’s explicit reservation of authority to conferences. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk)NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. Practical impact:Conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster limits, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons can be defended as preserving competitive balance within the conference - exactly the framing Choh endorses. Antitrust risk drops dramatically compared with NCAA-wide rules (which have repeatedly lost in Alston, House, etc.). Combined with Big Ten-style contract drafting (waivers, NIL/IP framing, performance-based reimbursement, alternative damage theories), this creates a resilient legal architecture. When rules are framed around pro-competitive justifications (competitive balance, roster stability, eligibility standards, market structure) rather than naked wage-fixing or price-fixing, they face lighter scrutiny and are more likely to survive. The NCAA’s governing documents explicitly permit — and in many cases require - this delegation: Constitution Article 2 (Organization): “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Divisions have independent authority to organize their own governing bodies, standards, and enforcement. Article 9 (Legislative Authority and Process) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) empower the Cabinet, sport oversight committees, and Board to deregulate via normal legislative channels. No constitutional amendment is required. Institutional control (Articles 1.E, 6, 8) remains with campus presidents/chancellors - conferences simply exercise the authority the NCAA has already reserved to them.

A New Model For College Athletics: Maximizing Conference Autonomy Without Full NCAA Termination *this model is not a completed version, but a starting point of a very important topic that has to be discussed. I outline the structure of a new model for college athletics. E-FCAM-LR - the stress-tested, Enhanced Federated Conference Autonomy Model. Don't worry about the title. That's just part of my work as to why it has that label. This model incorporates the April 29, 2026, insights on Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) and the explicit “somewhere in the middle” structure for conferences: full NCAA membership retained, maximum central deregulation, and conference-level governance in defined spheres. It's the realistic, low-risk path (especially if federal antitrust relief or collective bargaining remain stalled). Stress-Test Summary: Why This Model Now Passes Every Major Test Choh & Kirk doctrinal shift is real and powerful: The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because plaintiffs failed to plead a relevant antitrust market. They tried to define it narrowly as “Ivy League educational/athletic services,” but their own complaint admitted competition from non-Ivy schools (Power conferences, etc.). The court leaned heavily on Alston (2021): individual conferences may adopt rules different from NCAA-wide rules without triggering the same level of scrutiny when those rules can be justified under the rule of reason as promoting competitive balance, eligibility standards, roster stability, or market structure, rather than naked wage fixing. It gives Big school and conference lawyers strong cover for conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster rules, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons. Conferences adopt their own rules. Conferences file “Conference Autonomy Compacts.” The NCAA recognizes these as valid under the Constitution (no further national approval needed for deregulated areas). Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal, written legal vehicle that allows individual conferences to exercise and document their self-governance authority. A Conference Autonomy Compact is a filed agreement between a conference and the NCAA that: Identifies the specific NCAA rules (or categories of rules) that have been deregulated or are otherwise reserved to conferences. Lists the exact conference-specific rules the conference is adopting in those areas. Certifies that the conference’s rules comply with any remaining national minimum floors (e.g., core principles in Constitution Articles 1–2). Creates an internal enforcement mechanism (conference discipline, standardized contract templates, dispute-resolution processes) that the NCAA recognizes as valid. Legal Structure and Protection (Directly from the NCAA Manual + Court Precedent) 1. NCAA Constitutional Authority (2025-26 Manual) Constitution Article 2.B (Organization) explicitly states: “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Once the Division I Cabinet and sport oversight committees deregulate a rule area (the process already underway in 2026 for Bylaws 11, 13, and 17), that authority is automatically reserved to conferences. The Compact simply documents and activates it - no new constitutional amendment needed. Article 9 (Legislative Authority) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) allow conferences to adopt their own operating rules once the national rule is removed or made optional. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk) NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. What a Typical Conference Autonomy Compact Contains A real-world Compact (filed with the NCAA’s Office of the President and the Division I Board) would typically include: Scope section: Lists the deregulated bylaws (e.g., portions of Bylaw 13 recruiting, Bylaw 17 playing seasons, revenue-share mechanics). Conference-specific rules: – Uncapped revenue-share templates (NIL/IP/performance contracts with explicit waivers and “lost NIL licensing value” damage theories). – Legal tampering windows and retention bonuses. – Transfer disincentives, roster limits, and notification windows. – Eligibility add-ons framed as competitive-balance measures. – Standardized buyout formulas. Compliance certification: Confirms adherence to national floors (5-year eligibility, structured transfers, medical care, women’s/Olympic sports protections). Enforcement provisions: Conference discipline process, arbitration, and appeal rights (NCAA appeal limited to federal-funding/EO risks only). Duration and amendment: Usually 4–6 years with opt-out/renewal clauses. How They Are Created and Activated (2026 Timeline) Cabinet/sport oversight committees deregulate the rule (already scheduled for 2026). Conference legal teams draft the Compact -style template (waivers, alternative damage theories, competitive-balance framing). Conference presidents/commissioners approve and file it with the NCAA. NCAA acknowledges receipt and lists the conference’s rules as “valid conference governance” - no further national vote required. The Compact becomes effective for the next academic year. Role in E-FCAM-LR Conference Autonomy Compacts are the operational heart of the model. They deliver exactly what Big Ten and SEC leaders described on April 29, 2026: “central deregulation with the ability for leagues to govern in certain spheres” - while keeping the NCAA tournament, championships, and umbrella intact. They provide:Legal clarity and enforceability inside NCAA membership. Antitrust safe harbor via Alston/Choh. Title IX protection for uncapped revenue share (treated as commercial NIL compensation, not athletic aid). A ready-made structure for the Premier FBS Division (top 28–52 programs). No full separation. No new federal legislation required. Just the NCAA doing what its own Constitution already says it should do. This is why the Power conferences have been quietly building toward this architecture. The Compacts are the clean, low-risk, immediately available tool that turns the 2025-26 Manual and Choh decision into a fully functional new governance reality. Again, to make it clear, Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal legal document that activates a conference’s self-governance authority once the NCAA has deregulated a rule area. They are not a new invention - they are the natural extension of the 2025-26 NCAA Constitution Article 2’s explicit reservation of authority to conferences. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk)NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. Practical impact:Conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster limits, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons can be defended as preserving competitive balance within the conference - exactly the framing Choh endorses. Antitrust risk drops dramatically compared with NCAA-wide rules (which have repeatedly lost in Alston, House, etc.). Combined with Big Ten-style contract drafting (waivers, NIL/IP framing, performance-based reimbursement, alternative damage theories), this creates a resilient legal architecture. When rules are framed around pro-competitive justifications (competitive balance, roster stability, eligibility standards, market structure) rather than naked wage-fixing or price-fixing, they face lighter scrutiny and are more likely to survive. The NCAA’s governing documents explicitly permit — and in many cases require - this delegation: Constitution Article 2 (Organization): “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Divisions have independent authority to organize their own governing bodies, standards, and enforcement. Article 9 (Legislative Authority and Process) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) empower the Cabinet, sport oversight committees, and Board to deregulate via normal legislative channels. No constitutional amendment is required. Institutional control (Articles 1.E, 6, 8) remains with campus presidents/chancellors - conferences simply exercise the authority the NCAA has already reserved to them.

A New Model For College Athletics: Maximizing Conference Autonomy Without Full NCAA Termination *this model is not a completed version, but a starting point of a very important topic that has to be discussed. I outline the structure of a new model for college athletics. E-FCAM-LR - the stress-tested, Enhanced Federated Conference Autonomy Model. Don't worry about the title. That's just part of my work as to why it has that label. This model incorporates the April 29, 2026, insights on Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) and the explicit “somewhere in the middle” structure for conferences: full NCAA membership retained, maximum central deregulation, and conference-level governance in defined spheres. It's the realistic, low-risk path (especially if federal antitrust relief or collective bargaining remain stalled). Stress-Test Summary: Why This Model Now Passes Every Major Test Choh & Kirk doctrinal shift is real and powerful: The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because plaintiffs failed to plead a relevant antitrust market. They tried to define it narrowly as “Ivy League educational/athletic services,” but their own complaint admitted competition from non-Ivy schools (Power conferences, etc.). The court leaned heavily on Alston (2021): individual conferences may adopt rules different from NCAA-wide rules without triggering the same level of scrutiny when those rules can be justified under the rule of reason as promoting competitive balance, eligibility standards, roster stability, or market structure, rather than naked wage fixing. It gives Big school and conference lawyers strong cover for conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster rules, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons. Conferences adopt their own rules. Conferences file “Conference Autonomy Compacts.” The NCAA recognizes these as valid under the Constitution (no further national approval needed for deregulated areas). Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal, written legal vehicle that allows individual conferences to exercise and document their self-governance authority. A Conference Autonomy Compact is a filed agreement between a conference and the NCAA that: Identifies the specific NCAA rules (or categories of rules) that have been deregulated or are otherwise reserved to conferences. Lists the exact conference-specific rules the conference is adopting in those areas. Certifies that the conference’s rules comply with any remaining national minimum floors (e.g., core principles in Constitution Articles 1–2). Creates an internal enforcement mechanism (conference discipline, standardized contract templates, dispute-resolution processes) that the NCAA recognizes as valid. Legal Structure and Protection (Directly from the NCAA Manual + Court Precedent) 1. NCAA Constitutional Authority (2025-26 Manual) Constitution Article 2.B (Organization) explicitly states: “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Once the Division I Cabinet and sport oversight committees deregulate a rule area (the process already underway in 2026 for Bylaws 11, 13, and 17), that authority is automatically reserved to conferences. The Compact simply documents and activates it - no new constitutional amendment needed. Article 9 (Legislative Authority) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) allow conferences to adopt their own operating rules once the national rule is removed or made optional. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk) NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. What a Typical Conference Autonomy Compact Contains A real-world Compact (filed with the NCAA’s Office of the President and the Division I Board) would typically include: Scope section: Lists the deregulated bylaws (e.g., portions of Bylaw 13 recruiting, Bylaw 17 playing seasons, revenue-share mechanics). Conference-specific rules: – Uncapped revenue-share templates (NIL/IP/performance contracts with explicit waivers and “lost NIL licensing value” damage theories). – Legal tampering windows and retention bonuses. – Transfer disincentives, roster limits, and notification windows. – Eligibility add-ons framed as competitive-balance measures. – Standardized buyout formulas. Compliance certification: Confirms adherence to national floors (5-year eligibility, structured transfers, medical care, women’s/Olympic sports protections). Enforcement provisions: Conference discipline process, arbitration, and appeal rights (NCAA appeal limited to federal-funding/EO risks only). Duration and amendment: Usually 4–6 years with opt-out/renewal clauses. How They Are Created and Activated (2026 Timeline) Cabinet/sport oversight committees deregulate the rule (already scheduled for 2026). Conference legal teams draft the Compact -style template (waivers, alternative damage theories, competitive-balance framing). Conference presidents/commissioners approve and file it with the NCAA. NCAA acknowledges receipt and lists the conference’s rules as “valid conference governance” - no further national vote required. The Compact becomes effective for the next academic year. Role in E-FCAM-LR Conference Autonomy Compacts are the operational heart of the model. They deliver exactly what Big Ten and SEC leaders described on April 29, 2026: “central deregulation with the ability for leagues to govern in certain spheres” - while keeping the NCAA tournament, championships, and umbrella intact. They provide:Legal clarity and enforceability inside NCAA membership. Antitrust safe harbor via Alston/Choh. Title IX protection for uncapped revenue share (treated as commercial NIL compensation, not athletic aid). A ready-made structure for the Premier FBS Division (top 28–52 programs). No full separation. No new federal legislation required. Just the NCAA doing what its own Constitution already says it should do. This is why the Power conferences have been quietly building toward this architecture. The Compacts are the clean, low-risk, immediately available tool that turns the 2025-26 Manual and Choh decision into a fully functional new governance reality. Again, to make it clear, Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal legal document that activates a conference’s self-governance authority once the NCAA has deregulated a rule area. They are not a new invention - they are the natural extension of the 2025-26 NCAA Constitution Article 2’s explicit reservation of authority to conferences. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk)NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. Practical impact:Conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster limits, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons can be defended as preserving competitive balance within the conference - exactly the framing Choh endorses. Antitrust risk drops dramatically compared with NCAA-wide rules (which have repeatedly lost in Alston, House, etc.). Combined with Big Ten-style contract drafting (waivers, NIL/IP framing, performance-based reimbursement, alternative damage theories), this creates a resilient legal architecture. When rules are framed around pro-competitive justifications (competitive balance, roster stability, eligibility standards, market structure) rather than naked wage-fixing or price-fixing, they face lighter scrutiny and are more likely to survive. The NCAA’s governing documents explicitly permit — and in many cases require - this delegation: Constitution Article 2 (Organization): “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Divisions have independent authority to organize their own governing bodies, standards, and enforcement. Article 9 (Legislative Authority and Process) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) empower the Cabinet, sport oversight committees, and Board to deregulate via normal legislative channels. No constitutional amendment is required. Institutional control (Articles 1.E, 6, 8) remains with campus presidents/chancellors - conferences simply exercise the authority the NCAA has already reserved to them.

A New Model For College Athletics: Maximizing Conference Autonomy Without Full NCAA Termination *this model is not a completed version, but a starting point of a very important topic that has to be discussed. I outline the structure of a new model for college athletics. E-FCAM-LR - the stress-tested, Enhanced Federated Conference Autonomy Model. Don't worry about the title. That's just part of my work as to why it has that label. This model incorporates the April 29, 2026, insights on Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) and the explicit “somewhere in the middle” structure for conferences: full NCAA membership retained, maximum central deregulation, and conference-level governance in defined spheres. It's the realistic, low-risk path (especially if federal antitrust relief or collective bargaining remain stalled). Stress-Test Summary: Why This Model Now Passes Every Major Test Choh & Kirk doctrinal shift is real and powerful: The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because plaintiffs failed to plead a relevant antitrust market. They tried to define it narrowly as “Ivy League educational/athletic services,” but their own complaint admitted competition from non-Ivy schools (Power conferences, etc.). The court leaned heavily on Alston (2021): individual conferences may adopt rules different from NCAA-wide rules without triggering the same level of scrutiny when those rules can be justified under the rule of reason as promoting competitive balance, eligibility standards, roster stability, or market structure, rather than naked wage fixing. It gives Big school and conference lawyers strong cover for conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster rules, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons. Conferences adopt their own rules. Conferences file “Conference Autonomy Compacts.” The NCAA recognizes these as valid under the Constitution (no further national approval needed for deregulated areas). Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal, written legal vehicle that allows individual conferences to exercise and document their self-governance authority. A Conference Autonomy Compact is a filed agreement between a conference and the NCAA that: Identifies the specific NCAA rules (or categories of rules) that have been deregulated or are otherwise reserved to conferences. Lists the exact conference-specific rules the conference is adopting in those areas. Certifies that the conference’s rules comply with any remaining national minimum floors (e.g., core principles in Constitution Articles 1–2). Creates an internal enforcement mechanism (conference discipline, standardized contract templates, dispute-resolution processes) that the NCAA recognizes as valid. Legal Structure and Protection (Directly from the NCAA Manual + Court Precedent) 1. NCAA Constitutional Authority (2025-26 Manual) Constitution Article 2.B (Organization) explicitly states: “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Once the Division I Cabinet and sport oversight committees deregulate a rule area (the process already underway in 2026 for Bylaws 11, 13, and 17), that authority is automatically reserved to conferences. The Compact simply documents and activates it - no new constitutional amendment needed. Article 9 (Legislative Authority) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) allow conferences to adopt their own operating rules once the national rule is removed or made optional. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk) NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. What a Typical Conference Autonomy Compact Contains A real-world Compact (filed with the NCAA’s Office of the President and the Division I Board) would typically include: Scope section: Lists the deregulated bylaws (e.g., portions of Bylaw 13 recruiting, Bylaw 17 playing seasons, revenue-share mechanics). Conference-specific rules: – Uncapped revenue-share templates (NIL/IP/performance contracts with explicit waivers and “lost NIL licensing value” damage theories). – Legal tampering windows and retention bonuses. – Transfer disincentives, roster limits, and notification windows. – Eligibility add-ons framed as competitive-balance measures. – Standardized buyout formulas. Compliance certification: Confirms adherence to national floors (5-year eligibility, structured transfers, medical care, women’s/Olympic sports protections). Enforcement provisions: Conference discipline process, arbitration, and appeal rights (NCAA appeal limited to federal-funding/EO risks only). Duration and amendment: Usually 4–6 years with opt-out/renewal clauses. How They Are Created and Activated (2026 Timeline) Cabinet/sport oversight committees deregulate the rule (already scheduled for 2026). Conference legal teams draft the Compact -style template (waivers, alternative damage theories, competitive-balance framing). Conference presidents/commissioners approve and file it with the NCAA. NCAA acknowledges receipt and lists the conference’s rules as “valid conference governance” - no further national vote required. The Compact becomes effective for the next academic year. Role in E-FCAM-LR Conference Autonomy Compacts are the operational heart of the model. They deliver exactly what Big Ten and SEC leaders described on April 29, 2026: “central deregulation with the ability for leagues to govern in certain spheres” - while keeping the NCAA tournament, championships, and umbrella intact. They provide:Legal clarity and enforceability inside NCAA membership. Antitrust safe harbor via Alston/Choh. Title IX protection for uncapped revenue share (treated as commercial NIL compensation, not athletic aid). A ready-made structure for the Premier FBS Division (top 28–52 programs). No full separation. No new federal legislation required. Just the NCAA doing what its own Constitution already says it should do. This is why the Power conferences have been quietly building toward this architecture. The Compacts are the clean, low-risk, immediately available tool that turns the 2025-26 Manual and Choh decision into a fully functional new governance reality. Again, to make it clear, Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal legal document that activates a conference’s self-governance authority once the NCAA has deregulated a rule area. They are not a new invention - they are the natural extension of the 2025-26 NCAA Constitution Article 2’s explicit reservation of authority to conferences. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk)NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. Practical impact:Conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster limits, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons can be defended as preserving competitive balance within the conference - exactly the framing Choh endorses. Antitrust risk drops dramatically compared with NCAA-wide rules (which have repeatedly lost in Alston, House, etc.). Combined with Big Ten-style contract drafting (waivers, NIL/IP framing, performance-based reimbursement, alternative damage theories), this creates a resilient legal architecture. When rules are framed around pro-competitive justifications (competitive balance, roster stability, eligibility standards, market structure) rather than naked wage-fixing or price-fixing, they face lighter scrutiny and are more likely to survive. The NCAA’s governing documents explicitly permit — and in many cases require - this delegation: Constitution Article 2 (Organization): “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Divisions have independent authority to organize their own governing bodies, standards, and enforcement. Article 9 (Legislative Authority and Process) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) empower the Cabinet, sport oversight committees, and Board to deregulate via normal legislative channels. No constitutional amendment is required. Institutional control (Articles 1.E, 6, 8) remains with campus presidents/chancellors - conferences simply exercise the authority the NCAA has already reserved to them.

A New Model For College Athletics: Maximizing Conference Autonomy Without Full NCAA Termination *this model is not a completed version, but a starting point of a very important topic that has to be discussed. I outline the structure of a new model for college athletics. E-FCAM-LR - the stress-tested, Enhanced Federated Conference Autonomy Model. Don't worry about the title. That's just part of my work as to why it has that label. This model incorporates the April 29, 2026, insights on Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2026) and the explicit “somewhere in the middle” structure for conferences: full NCAA membership retained, maximum central deregulation, and conference-level governance in defined spheres. It's the realistic, low-risk path (especially if federal antitrust relief or collective bargaining remain stalled). Stress-Test Summary: Why This Model Now Passes Every Major Test Choh & Kirk doctrinal shift is real and powerful: The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal because plaintiffs failed to plead a relevant antitrust market. They tried to define it narrowly as “Ivy League educational/athletic services,” but their own complaint admitted competition from non-Ivy schools (Power conferences, etc.). The court leaned heavily on Alston (2021): individual conferences may adopt rules different from NCAA-wide rules without triggering the same level of scrutiny when those rules can be justified under the rule of reason as promoting competitive balance, eligibility standards, roster stability, or market structure, rather than naked wage fixing. It gives Big school and conference lawyers strong cover for conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster rules, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons. Conferences adopt their own rules. Conferences file “Conference Autonomy Compacts.” The NCAA recognizes these as valid under the Constitution (no further national approval needed for deregulated areas). Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal, written legal vehicle that allows individual conferences to exercise and document their self-governance authority. A Conference Autonomy Compact is a filed agreement between a conference and the NCAA that: Identifies the specific NCAA rules (or categories of rules) that have been deregulated or are otherwise reserved to conferences. Lists the exact conference-specific rules the conference is adopting in those areas. Certifies that the conference’s rules comply with any remaining national minimum floors (e.g., core principles in Constitution Articles 1–2). Creates an internal enforcement mechanism (conference discipline, standardized contract templates, dispute-resolution processes) that the NCAA recognizes as valid. Legal Structure and Protection (Directly from the NCAA Manual + Court Precedent) 1. NCAA Constitutional Authority (2025-26 Manual) Constitution Article 2.B (Organization) explicitly states: “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Once the Division I Cabinet and sport oversight committees deregulate a rule area (the process already underway in 2026 for Bylaws 11, 13, and 17), that authority is automatically reserved to conferences. The Compact simply documents and activates it - no new constitutional amendment needed. Article 9 (Legislative Authority) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) allow conferences to adopt their own operating rules once the national rule is removed or made optional. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk) NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. What a Typical Conference Autonomy Compact Contains A real-world Compact (filed with the NCAA’s Office of the President and the Division I Board) would typically include: Scope section: Lists the deregulated bylaws (e.g., portions of Bylaw 13 recruiting, Bylaw 17 playing seasons, revenue-share mechanics). Conference-specific rules: – Uncapped revenue-share templates (NIL/IP/performance contracts with explicit waivers and “lost NIL licensing value” damage theories). – Legal tampering windows and retention bonuses. – Transfer disincentives, roster limits, and notification windows. – Eligibility add-ons framed as competitive-balance measures. – Standardized buyout formulas. Compliance certification: Confirms adherence to national floors (5-year eligibility, structured transfers, medical care, women’s/Olympic sports protections). Enforcement provisions: Conference discipline process, arbitration, and appeal rights (NCAA appeal limited to federal-funding/EO risks only). Duration and amendment: Usually 4–6 years with opt-out/renewal clauses. How They Are Created and Activated (2026 Timeline) Cabinet/sport oversight committees deregulate the rule (already scheduled for 2026). Conference legal teams draft the Compact -style template (waivers, alternative damage theories, competitive-balance framing). Conference presidents/commissioners approve and file it with the NCAA. NCAA acknowledges receipt and lists the conference’s rules as “valid conference governance” - no further national vote required. The Compact becomes effective for the next academic year. Role in E-FCAM-LR Conference Autonomy Compacts are the operational heart of the model. They deliver exactly what Big Ten and SEC leaders described on April 29, 2026: “central deregulation with the ability for leagues to govern in certain spheres” - while keeping the NCAA tournament, championships, and umbrella intact. They provide:Legal clarity and enforceability inside NCAA membership. Antitrust safe harbor via Alston/Choh. Title IX protection for uncapped revenue share (treated as commercial NIL compensation, not athletic aid). A ready-made structure for the Premier FBS Division (top 28–52 programs). No full separation. No new federal legislation required. Just the NCAA doing what its own Constitution already says it should do. This is why the Power conferences have been quietly building toward this architecture. The Compacts are the clean, low-risk, immediately available tool that turns the 2025-26 Manual and Choh decision into a fully functional new governance reality. Again, to make it clear, Conference Autonomy Compacts are the formal legal document that activates a conference’s self-governance authority once the NCAA has deregulated a rule area. They are not a new invention - they are the natural extension of the 2025-26 NCAA Constitution Article 2’s explicit reservation of authority to conferences. 2. Antitrust Protection (Alston + Choh & Kirk)NCAA v. Alston (2021): The Supreme Court made clear that individual conferences may adopt rules different from (or stricter than) NCAA-wide rules. Only multi-conference/NCAA agreements face the highest level of scrutiny. Choh & Kirk v. Brown University (2d Cir., Apr. 2, 2026): The court reinforced that conference-specific rules on competitive balance, eligibility, roster stability, transfer rules, revenue-share mechanics, and tampering windows receive more favorable rule-of-reason analysis when framed around pro-competitive justifications (market structure, roster integrity, competitive parity) rather than naked wage-fixing. Because a Compact is a single-conference (or single-subdivision) agreement, it benefits from this lighter scrutiny and the national-market reality the Second Circuit recognized. The Compact itself becomes the documentary evidence that the rules are conference-driven, not a centralized NCAA cartel - further insulating them from antitrust attack. Practical impact:Conference-specific revenue-share templates, transfer disincentives, roster limits, tampering windows, and eligibility add-ons can be defended as preserving competitive balance within the conference - exactly the framing Choh endorses. Antitrust risk drops dramatically compared with NCAA-wide rules (which have repeatedly lost in Alston, House, etc.). Combined with Big Ten-style contract drafting (waivers, NIL/IP framing, performance-based reimbursement, alternative damage theories), this creates a resilient legal architecture. When rules are framed around pro-competitive justifications (competitive balance, roster stability, eligibility standards, market structure) rather than naked wage-fixing or price-fixing, they face lighter scrutiny and are more likely to survive. The NCAA’s governing documents explicitly permit — and in many cases require - this delegation: Constitution Article 2 (Organization): “The membership of the NCAA encompasses public and private institutions and conferences of widely varying mission, size, resources and opportunities. Accordingly, Association-wide governance must reflect these differences through the delegation of authorities and responsibilities to the divisions, conferences and individual member institutions except where necessary to promote and maintain the Association’s core principles.” “Authorities not specifically assigned to the Association are reserved to divisions, subdivisions, conferences, or institutions.” Divisions have independent authority to organize their own governing bodies, standards, and enforcement. Article 9 (Legislative Authority and Process) and Bylaw 21 (Governance Structure) empower the Cabinet, sport oversight committees, and Board to deregulate via normal legislative channels. No constitutional amendment is required. Institutional control (Articles 1.E, 6, 8) remains with campus presidents/chancellors - conferences simply exercise the authority the NCAA has already reserved to them.

No. 1 Seed 🌊😼 The Lake Show will play next in the second round on Sunday, May 10 at Northwestern Medicine Field at Martin Stadium.