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637 posts

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@Geobellam

Katılım Haziran 2025
12 Takip Edilen6 Takipçiler
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen This isn't really an argument. I would argue that it's incredibly philosophically lazy and anti-intellectual to posit the existence of incomprehensible, absurd entities as liberally as Platonists do. They inflate our ontology in ridiculous ways for real no explanatory gap.
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen I don't believe that there is any such fact that: A) is true or highly probably true B) necessitates universals Especially regarding consciousness and the continuum which we do not fully understand.
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Jacques 羅漢
Jacques 羅漢@aprioricity·
@Geobellam @die_rizzen what if the reality of forms relates to other elements of our ontology in important ways (for instance consciousness and the continuum)? if we just stop at how things immediately seem as primitive we'll never make these connections
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen And the Platonist MUST do this at some point btw unless they want a circular answer or an infinite regress.
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen 2) You criticise the Ostrich for relying on brute facts but the Platonist - and literally everyone else - relies on them. The Platonist answer to "in virtue of what does x instantiate P?" is just to say that it's brute. It's the same Ostrich strategy just hidden one step later.
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen The central idea here is that you can't keep looking for explanations. The buck stops somewhere. And thus the "explanatory gain" that the Platonist offers is really just illusory, because it generates further demands for explanations that it itself cannot answer.
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen ... an explanation. It's simply a brute fact. The Platonist faces the same problem. We might ask: "in virtue of what does x and y instantiate the universal?" - in which the Platonist must say "because x and y resemble each other" (circular) or simply say it's primitive.
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen The position is called austere nominalism or as Armstrong called it - "ostrich nominalism". It doesn't surmount to simply ignoring a problem or burying one's head in the sand tho. I prefer to think of ppl like him as "mirage realists" anyway - they see a problem that isn't there.
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G@Geobellam·
@aprioricity @die_rizzen Attribute agreement is a brute fact that - metaphysically speaking - cannot be analysed. Any attempt to explain it in terms of universals (or even classes or tropes) just leads into circularity or regress.
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G@Geobellam·
@die_rizzen To make this point explicit: we may paraphrase any truth that appears to quantify over universals such that it quantifies over concrete particulars. To answer your question: I would say that yes I am, only it may not appear that way.
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G@Geobellam·
@die_rizzen I am speaking in a general way about concrete particulars. The point is that these generalisations are not ontologically real. If I say that "x and y are red" I am not committing myself to a literal entity of REDNESS; I am only committing myself to two resembling particulars.
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G@Geobellam·
@die_rizzen You are confusing generality/universality in language with real ontological entities. The former does not entail the latter.
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Jake.
Jake.@YedIin·
If a biopic (or any movie) has to go through studio heads, focus groups, and family approval, then the final product truly has no artistic intrigue for me
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