GrapheneOS

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GrapheneOS

GrapheneOS

@GrapheneOS

Open source privacy and security focused mobile OS with Android app compatibility. Forum, Discord and Matrix: https://t.co/C0RaJbZosj

Katılım Mart 2019
0 Takip Edilen109.6K Takipçiler
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support. motorolanews.com/motorola-three…
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@PiereChangstein Their attacks on GrapheneOS are getting increasingly desperate because we're winning. We're not going to leave.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
There's a group coordinating attacks on GrapheneOS on X via a Telegram group. They have a couple dozen accounts here. They've based their attacks around claiming modular builds and updates via packages somehow aren't open source. We debunked this here: x.com/GrapheneOS/sta…
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS

We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom. A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided. Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components. A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both. An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files. Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components. Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element. GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done. Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability. Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds. Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering. The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims. They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted. GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this. x.com/TheVancedGamer…

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Nikolai Grigoriev
Nikolai Grigoriev@nikolaiG22·
@techdroider Hey, @GrapheneOS , I assume this nonsence about Google saying what I can and cannot do with my device will be ignored by you, so we all keep using Obtanium, Aurora, F-Droid etc as we successfully and safely do for years?
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TechDroider
TechDroider@techdroider·
As expected, Google is making sideloading harder on Android… but it is NOT going anywhere Here's the new way in simple steps: • Turn ON Developer Mode in settings • Confirm no one is forcing you • Restart your phone and unlock again • Wait 24 hours, then verify with fingerprint / face / PIN • Now you can install apps (7 days or always) More steps, but you still have the choice
TechDroider tweet media
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@ssamat @Le_happy_can It's not clear what Google thinks they gain from making monthly and quarterly updates exclusive to the stock Pixel OS without pushing the code to AOSP. It makes Pixels increasingly non-viable as a platform for other operating systems and negatively impacts Google's OEM partners.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@ssamat @Le_happy_can GrapheneOS made substantial contributions to Android Open Source Project privacy and security but we're no longer able to do that due to changes by Google. It has also become increasingly difficult to support Pixels and we'll likely be fully using different devices in the future.
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Sameer Samat
Sameer Samat@ssamat·
Android has always been about choice. Today, we’re sharing how we’re evolving the ecosystem so you don’t have to choose between an open platform and a secure one. We’re introducing a new advanced flow for sideloading where power users can go through a one time flow to enable their devices to load software from unverified developers. We’ve designed this process to stop more vulnerable users from being coerced to do this during a guided scam (which are a major problem today for people) We also have new account types for students and hobbyists that address their feedback.
Android Developers@AndroidDev

📣 Sideloading is here to stay. Users will be able to install apps from unverified developers via a new advanced flow, which includes safeguards that stop scammers and maintain choice. Learn more about how Android developer verification is evolving → goo.gle/advance-flow

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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@P4mui @sorrow_io @COWCATGames @grap There's not going to be any change to installing apps on GrapheneOS from this. It's a Google Mobile Services device feature and GrapheneOS doesn't have any of that built into the OS.
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P4mui 
P4mui @P4mui·
Google a tranché concernant le sideloading sur Android à partir de fin 2026 : Au lieu d’interdire les apps de développeurs non-vérifiés (pour passer outre la solution était adb) : Google va vous donner le choix d’une manière bien particulière : la désactivation de cette « sécurité » (en bref activer un mode développeur), avec un délais de 24h avant de pouvoir vraiment la désactiver (c’est quelque chose à faire UNE fois, pas une fois par apps)
TechDroider@techdroider

24-hour security delay to install apps… are you serious, Google?

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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@underscor31 @mainlinedbutter @TeleviziaSTB @TheVancedGamer Reading what you've posted publicly isn't an invasion of privacy. We're taking sensible steps to protect ourselves from relentless attacks on our project and team. That includes archiving what we can find from people trying to harm us in case our legal team ends up needing it.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
We posted a thread on our Mastodon instance addressing the underhanded attacks being made on GrapheneOS by Volla due to our opposition to their Unified Attestation API: @GrapheneOS/116251325625494349" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/11… An account previously pretending to be a fan supporting Volla has been clearly exposed as run by them. Despite how this account has previously posted, it began repeatedly posting on behalf of Volla and referring to themselves as being part of it. They referenced Volla contacting us half a year ago wanting a partnership with us which didn't go anywhere as they're unable to meet our requirements. We've opposed Unified Attestation on very reasonable grounds which we've once again elaborated on in the linked thread after covering this. This account clearly run by Volla themselves has repeatedly posted outrageous conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS implying we're working for the US government. We included links to a history of posts predating our opposition to Unified Attestation where they engage in false marketing of Volla products and try to convince people to use those over other options with inaccurate claims. That includes them replying to threads where people discussed GrapheneOS. They were misleading people about GrapheneOS prior to us speaking of them. They're now attacking us in a super underhanded way because we oppose them seizing control over which devices and operating systems are allowed for European banking/government apps. Don't allow them to memory hole this. The account is very clearly run by Volla, has openly acknowledged it and proven it with insider knowledge. We also have a very good idea of exactly who is running the account due to the writing style. These companies using sockpuppet accounts and personal accounts to attack us doesn't lessen it.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@underscor31 @mainlinedbutter @TeleviziaSTB @TheVancedGamer Your group has a dozen accounts with few follows or followers beyond each other. You're making completely disingenuous claims about GrapheneOS in a highly unethical attempt to cause harm to it. We've thoroughly debunked your nonsensical fabrications at x.com/GrapheneOS/sta….
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS

We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom. A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided. Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components. A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both. An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files. Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components. Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element. GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done. Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability. Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds. Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering. The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims. They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted. GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this. x.com/TheVancedGamer…

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Leandro | codelindro
Leandro | codelindro@mainlinedbutter·
I have been looking into @GrapheneOS for long, even once considered pushing it at the workplace to ensure our mobile devices can be as safe as they can no matter their age, but hesitated after seeing what is going on in the Team, the Codebase and the Community. [1/x]
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
> Once again: Please stick to the facts. We're sticking to the facts. You're posting baseless conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS: x.com/GrapheneOS/sta… > We are not attacking the Graphene OS team. We are clarifying the intent behind UnifiedAttestation and have invited the Graphene OS team to participate. You are attacking GrapheneOS and the GrapheneOS team. > Vollaficationist is not an account belonging to Volla Systeme or any Volla Systeme employee. If it doesn't belong to a Volla employee, how do they know when Volla contacted GrapheneOS and other internal details from Volla? Why do they have a very unique writing style and posts with unique content matching one of Volla's employees on LinkedIn and elsewhere? > Today, some apps use Google Play Integrity. These are primarily banking, payment, and digital ID apps. In some countries, citizens rely on these apps because government-issued ID apps, for example, are a prerequisite for opening a bank account. We view this development critically. A tiny portion of Android apps use the Play Integrity API. 90% of banking and government apps do not enforce it. >99.999% of other categories of apps do not enforce it. This is something we can be fought and defeated. Creating another system with a similar design helps the Play Integrity API by legitimizing it and harming efforts to defeat it. > To be able to offer alternative Android operating systems to all users without limitations, UnifiedAttestation is an open-source, freely available alternative to Google Play Integrity. It's a centralized, anti-competitive system which will not permit freely using arbitrary hardware and software. It will only permit products from the companies involved in it. It's irrelevant whether the server side code is open source to whether it's anti-competitive. It cannot simply be hosted by anyone else since apps aren't going to trust arbitrary servers. Claiming it's open source is simply a red herring. It being freely available is worse than if it was paid. > We see a greater chance of convincing app developers and publishers who currently use Google Play Integrity to adopt an alternative rather than to abandon Google Play Integrity altogether. However, this persuasion will only succeed if app developers and publishers see a relevant market. Hence the consortium. Perhaps we will even succeed in making UnifiedAttestation an open standard. The Android hardware attestation API already exists. Unified Attestation is entirely built on top of it. There's no legitimate reason for it to exist beyond a power grab. > Once again, for clarification: UnifiedAttestation should not be a prerequisite for apps to be installed and used on alternative Android systems—not at all. It concerns a small subset of apps that currently prevents customers from using an alternative Android operating system. These apps can use the standard Android hardware attestation API to permit arbitrary operating systems. There's no need for a centralized service wrapping it and putting control over what's allowed in your hands. > Regarding your statement about Volla as a hardware manufacturer. That is a false statement. Volla Systems is an OEM with complex supply chains for its own hardware, in which our designers and engineers are involved, and with its own production capacities for the final production steps. This gives us full access to the source code generated in the supply chain, starting with the Android source tree of the SoC manufacturer. No, it's a correct statement. Your devices are designed and produced for you by an ODM. You do not have the full source code as you claim. You're misrepresenting your level of involvement in designing and producing the devices along with how much access you have. You certainly don't have access to all of the sources for the firmware, let alone the hardware. The source tree of the SoC manufacturer (MediaTek) provided to their partners is not even the full sources for userspace. Vollaficationist quite clearly belongs to someone at Volla who has made very similar posts from his personal accounts on LinkedIn and elsewhere. It's the same writing style and claims coming from the personal accounts elsewhere. How do you explain this account having internal information from Volla and using the same unique writing style and unique claims coming from someone who works for Volla from their personal accounts on other platforms? > Let’s make good products and develop the market for alternatives. You're working towards locking out alternatives including GrapheneOS. We aren't on the same side and trying to mislead people with your inaccurate marketing about both Unified Attestation, your products and many inaccurate claims about GrapheneOS further confirms it. You're posting the same stuff you were via the Vollaficationist account dressed up in a more formal way.
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS

We posted a thread on our Mastodon instance addressing the underhanded attacks being made on GrapheneOS by Volla due to our opposition to their Unified Attestation API: @GrapheneOS/116251325625494349" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/11… An account previously pretending to be a fan supporting Volla has been clearly exposed as run by them. Despite how this account has previously posted, it began repeatedly posting on behalf of Volla and referring to themselves as being part of it. They referenced Volla contacting us half a year ago wanting a partnership with us which didn't go anywhere as they're unable to meet our requirements. We've opposed Unified Attestation on very reasonable grounds which we've once again elaborated on in the linked thread after covering this. This account clearly run by Volla themselves has repeatedly posted outrageous conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS implying we're working for the US government. We included links to a history of posts predating our opposition to Unified Attestation where they engage in false marketing of Volla products and try to convince people to use those over other options with inaccurate claims. That includes them replying to threads where people discussed GrapheneOS. They were misleading people about GrapheneOS prior to us speaking of them. They're now attacking us in a super underhanded way because we oppose them seizing control over which devices and operating systems are allowed for European banking/government apps. Don't allow them to memory hole this. The account is very clearly run by Volla, has openly acknowledged it and proven it with insider knowledge. We also have a very good idea of exactly who is running the account due to the writing style. These companies using sockpuppet accounts and personal accounts to attack us doesn't lessen it.

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Volla - The freedom Smartphone from Germany.
Once again: Please stick to the facts. We are not attacking the Graphene OS team. We are clarifying the intent behind UnifiedAttestation and have invited the Graphene OS team to participate. Vollaficationist is not an account belonging to Volla Systeme or any Volla Systeme employee. It makes no sense to repeat our arguments; instead, let us describe UnifiedAttestation from a different perspective: Today, some apps use Google Play Integrity. These are primarily banking, payment, and digital ID apps. In some countries, citizens rely on these apps because government-issued ID apps, for example, are a prerequisite for opening a bank account. We view this development critically. To be able to offer alternative Android operating systems to all users without limitations, UnifiedAttestation is an open-source, freely available alternative to Google Play Integrity. We see a greater chance of convincing app developers and publishers who currently use Google Play Integrity to adopt an alternative rather than to abandon Google Play Integrity altogether. However, this persuasion will only succeed if app developers and publishers see a relevant market. Hence the consortium. Perhaps we will even succeed in making UnifiedAttestation an open standard. Once again, for clarification: UnifiedAttestation should not be a prerequisite for apps to be installed and used on alternative Android systems—not at all. It concerns a small subset of apps that currently prevents customers from using an alternative Android operating system. Regarding your statement about Volla as a hardware manufacturer. That is a false statement. Volla Systems is an OEM with complex supply chains for its own hardware, in which our designers and engineers are involved, and with its own production capacities for the final production steps. This gives us full access to the source code generated in the supply chain, starting with the Android source tree of the SoC manufacturer. Let’s make good products and develop the market for alternatives.
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Jaoh
Jaoh@Jaoheah·
@GrapheneOS Will it support the 2027 version of the Razr Fold?
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Jaoh
Jaoh@Jaoheah·
@GrapheneOS Will the Motorola Razr Fold support Graphene? Or is it the next gen one? I heard something about Motorola having a Fold version that will support Graphene.
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Proton VPN
Proton VPN@ProtonVPN·
1/4 Google has known about a bug that breaks VPN apps for 7 months, leaving users exposed with no warning or error, just a VPN app that stopped working in the background. If you're using ANY VPN on Android, you can help us by getting Google's attention to fix it. Details 👇 🧵
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@therealfunar @ProtonVPN Our priority is fixing leaks rather than an issue causing an annoyance where a reboot might be required to get connectivity again since leak blocking is working properly for it. We have 1 full-time developer mainly working on resolving VPN issues right now. We can't assign more.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@therealfunar @ProtonVPN We already have fixes for 5 holes in Android's VPN leak protection. We're working on identifying all remaining issues and resolving those. The most severe issues are fixed but there are remaining bugs in the Android VPN APIs we need to resolve. It's a lot of work and not easy.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@therealfunar @ProtonVPN Our priority is fixing the leaks rather than an issue causing an annoyance where a reboot might be required to get connectivity again which is successfully blocked by the VPN leak protection. Google has far more resources. It's inherently slow for us to get a dozen bugs fixed.
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