GrapheneOS

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GrapheneOS

GrapheneOS

@GrapheneOS

Open source privacy and security focused mobile OS with Android app compatibility. Forum, Discord and Matrix: https://t.co/C0RaJbZosj

Katılım Mart 2019
0 Takip Edilen117.7K Takipçiler
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support. motorolanews.com/motorola-three…
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@Techjunkie_Aman @gnukeith @MrBDelany It only makes a substantial difference for specific kinds of web apps with JavaScript not heavily bounded by the performance of the DOM and other APIs. Vanadium has it disabled by default with a per-site opt-in. Standard V8 Optimizer toggle in Chromium isn't a full JIT toggle.
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Techjunkie Aman
Techjunkie Aman@Techjunkie_Aman·
Most Brave Browser users never open this: brave://flags That’s where the real power is. Here are the best hidden Brave flags you should enable 🧵
Techjunkie Aman tweet media
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@iammethankyou Nothing's devices are primarily designed by their ODM partner based on a reference design. They don't have as much control over the details as a larger OEM handling that in-house and outsourcing manufacturing. There aren't a lot of OEMs actually designing their own phones.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@iammethankyou Our partnership with Motorola Mobility (Lenovo) isn't exclusive. They chose to reach out to us and work with us. It's not our choice which OEMs are willing to work with us and work on devices meeting all of our hardware requirements. They're the ones interested in doing it.
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아임미 🇰🇷🇺🇸
아임미 🇰🇷🇺🇸@iammethankyou·
그래핀폰 기대했는데 짱깨랑 손잡았네. 에휴. 보안을 추구한다는 인간들이 왜 짱깨랑 손잡지? 지금은 생산 안하지만 기술력이 있는 한국의 엘지도 있고 팬텍도 있고 지금 당장 생산하는 회사가 필요하면 일본의 소니도 있고 나띵폰? 그런 것도 있고 중국 말고 있는데 왜 꼭 레노보냐고.
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS

We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support. motorolanews.com/motorola-three…

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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@aigarsdz @FrameworkPuter @IWNFYTFUB @Fairphone If a component on the motherboard including the SoC fails for one reason or another, then it's the same situation as a completely non-modular device with no replacement parts. You should compare which official replacement parts are available for a Pixel 10 and a Fairphone 6.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@aigarsdz @FrameworkPuter @IWNFYTFUB @Fairphone Fairphone doesn't sell replacements for the motherboard or any of the components on it. The replacement parts are for the display, battery, USB port, speakers, cameras, SIM tray, etc. It's not actually much more modular than a Pixel or iPhone in terms of the replacement parts.
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Framework
Framework@FrameworkPuter·
What a load of 💩
Big Brain Business@BigBrainBizness

John Ternus, Apple's SVP of Hardware Engineering, explains why Apple deliberately made the iPhone harder to repair, and why the math says it was worth it: In a conversation with MKBHD, John frames the design challenge by asking you to imagine two extremes: "Sometimes for me I find it helpful to kind of think about the book ends. Like if you imagine a product that never fails, right? That just doesn't fail. And on the other end, a product that maybe isn't very reliable but is super easy to repair." His position is clear: "Product that never fails is obviously better for the customer. It's better for the environment." When pushed on whether infinite repairability and infinite durability have to be mutually exclusive, John acknowledges they aren't always, but explains why the tension is real, using the iPhone battery as an example. Batteries wear out. If you want to extend the life of the product, they need to be replaced. But in the early days of iPhone, one of the most common failures wasn't the battery, it was water: "Where you drop it in the pool or you, you know, spill your drink on it and the unit fails. And so, we've been making strides over all those years to get better and better and better in terms of minimizing those failures." That work led Apple to an IP68 rating, the point where customers fish their phones out of lakes after two weeks and find them still working. But there was a cost to achieving that level of durability: "To get the product there, you've got to design a lot of seals, adhesives, other things to make it perform that way, which makes it a little harder to do that battery repair." That's the deliberate tradeoff. Apple chose tighter seals and stronger adhesives, knowing it would make battery replacement more difficult, because the reliability gains were worth it. John argues the math backs this decision: "It's objectively better for the customer to have that reliability and it's ultimately better for the planet because the failure rates since we got to that point have just dropped. It's plummeted, right? The number of repairs that need to happen and every time you're doing a repair, you're bringing in new materials to replace whatever broke." His conclusion reframes the entire repairability debate: "You can actually do the math and figure out there's a threshold at which if I can make it this durable, then it's better to have it a little bit harder to repair because it's going to net out."

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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@aigarsdz @FrameworkPuter @IWNFYTFUB @Fairphone Fairphones don't have competitive waterproofing which is a major factor in why they can make it so much easier to open up the device and replace the battery. Waterproofing helps a lot with saving people's devices from ending up as e-waste so it's directly tied to sustainability.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@aigarsdz @FrameworkPuter @IWNFYTFUB @Fairphone Fairphones aren't really upgradable. The battery is easier to replace. iPhones and Pixels have replaceable batteries with official kits available. The difference is that Fairphone makes it easier, but iPhones and Pixels have been improving it while retaining the waterproofing.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@aigarsdz @FrameworkPuter @IWNFYTFUB @Fairphone /e/ has baselessly claimed GrapheneOS mainly benefits criminals and also pushed the fabrication that most people are using it are criminals. These are Fairphone's close business partners and Fairphone has actively supported these attacks on GrapheneOS rather than being passive.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@aigarsdz @FrameworkPuter @IWNFYTFUB @Fairphone /e/ has heavily pushed the false narrative that protecting users from privacy and security vulnerabilities with hardening primarily benefits criminals. They've said this many times and have repeatedly tried to paint GrapheneOS as being for criminals. x.com/GrapheneOS/sta…
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS

Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies. Translation to English: > There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone. Transcription in French: > Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.

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GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@null_NEU @iAnonymous3000 It's a misconception that sandboxed Google Play requires using another profile. It's not at all the case. They're regular sandboxed apps with no special access including in the Owner user. Profiles are useful but the benefits aren't unique to sandboxed Google Play.
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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@null_NEU @iAnonymous3000 People can simply go through the initial setup which is simpler than the stock OS with a lot less nagging both during and after it followed by installing sandboxed Google Play in the Owner user. There's no need to make profiles or do anything special to use sandboxed Google Play.
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Sooraj
Sooraj@iAnonymous3000·
The “opensource Linux privacy phone” pitch needs a serious audit. Librem 5 and PinePhone are marketed as if running Linux on a phone automatically makes it trustworthy. That isn’t how mobile security works. What protects a phone is the security architecture. Modern Android and iOS are designed around a specific stack: verified boot with rollback protection, a hardware-backed keystore tied to a secure element, mandatory access control across all apps, per-app sandboxing, modern exploit mitigations, and a real long-term patch pipeline. Mainline Linux on a phone is NOT built around that stack. PINE64’s own PinePhone Pro page says mobile Linux still has “a way to go” and that users dependent on banking apps, travel apps, mainstream messengers, DRM media, or mobile games are not the audience. That is the vendor saying it. Kill switches are useful but oversold. A microphone switch cuts the mic. It doesn’t stop sensor side channels. Stanford’s Gyrophone work showed gyroscopes are sensitive enough to recover speech-related acoustic signal. Later research (AccelEve, AccEar) showed accelerometers can reconstruct audio from speaker vibrations without the mic permission ever being granted. PinePhone and PinePhone Pro switch lists cover modem, Wi-Fi/BT, mics, cameras, and headphone/UART. Neither has an IMU kill switch. Librem 5 does disable IMU, GNSS, ambient, and proximity sensors, but only in full lockdown when all three radio switches are off. That is not a daily-driver posture. OnePlus is a separate problem. The issue is trust minimization: OEM software, telemetry, jurisdiction, vendor response, and how much custom code sits between the user and upstream Android. CVE-2025-10184, disclosed by Rapid7 in September 2025, let any installed app silently read SMS and MMS on OxygenOS 12 through 15. That is enough to quietly intercept SMS-based MFA codes. Rapid7’s testing suggests the bug shipped with OxygenOS 12 in late 2021 and sat there for years. On top of that, the House Select Committee on the CCP asked Commerce in June 2025 to open an ICTS investigation into alleged OS-level connections from OnePlus devices to PRC operated servers. It is the kind of unresolved trust question a privacy buyer doesn’t need to take on when better options exist. What actually protects users: secure boot chains, rollback protection, hardware-backed keys, app sandboxing, memory corruption mitigations, fast patches, long support windows, and a mature vulnerability response pipeline. Pixel 8 and later ship Titan M2 as the root of trust. NIST’s CMVP validation entry confirms Titan M2 enforces Android Verified Boot and backs Android StrongBox Keymaster. The Pixel 8 series and later support ARM Memory Tagging Extension, which @GrapheneOS deploys in production for the kernel and most of the base OS. Google guarantees 7 years of OS and security updates on Pixel 8 and later. GrapheneOS preserves verified boot by flashing its own verified boot public key to the secure element on bootloader relock, which is the part most custom Android ROMs fail. iPhone is the other serious option. The Secure Enclave is isolated from the main processor and designed to protect sensitive data even if the application kernel is compromised. iOS sandboxes third-party apps, mounts the OS partition read-only via the Signed System Volume, runs BlastDoor to isolate iMessage parsing, and ships Lockdown Mode for high-risk users. Google Pixel + @GrapheneOS is the strongest practical privacy and security configuration available today.
Web3Privacy Now@web3privacy

Your phone - your rules. Explore what devices experts are using to become more sovereign humans. stacks.web3privacy.info/categories/Pho…

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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@null_NEU @iAnonymous3000 GrapheneOS is very easy to install and can be purchased preinstalled on a device. It doesn't require that people are technical to use it. Sandboxed Google Play doesn't require special knowledge or understanding to use. GrapheneOS isn't at all limited to technical users.
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null NEU
null NEU@null_NEU·
@iAnonymous3000 GrapheneOS on a Pixel is stronger and gives the user more control, but it assumes someone willing to install it, understand sandboxed Google Play, and accept the friction with banking apps that fight de-Googled environments. That fit works for technical users.
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GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@iAnonymous3000 Ubuntu doesn't use official longterm branches in most cases but rather makes their own with far fewer patches backported. RHEL and other enterprise distributions use ancient kernels with barely any patches backported. Official longterm branches only get 2 years of support again.
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GrapheneOS@GrapheneOS·
@iAnonymous3000 Mainline Linux means the upstream release candidate and point zero releases. Those are tagged by Linus. The stable and longterm branches are a separate thing. Most modern distributions including Android-based operating systems use the longterm branches with added patches.
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