@avidseries These kinds of assessments are baffling to me. It has not even been three weeks. Patience!
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Rafi DeMogge רפי דמוג
53.9K posts
Rafi DeMogge רפי דמוג
@HeTows
Israeli post-7/10 liberal. Demography enjoyer.
Katılım Kasım 2020
1.2K Takip Edilen3.8K Takipçiler
The US and Israel's execution of their Iranian leadership decapitation strategy has worked beautifully, but it hasn't produced the desired results. The regime lumbers on, and the Iranian masses haven't taken to the streets. The regime's highly decentralized command structure, particularly within the IRGC, remains intact.
The US and Israel's relentless destruction of Iran's missile and drone assets has been impressive, but, even by their own admission, many (if not most of) the locations of the manufacturing facilities are unknown to them. And so, unless the supply chain has been sufficiently disrupted, the regime's assembly lines continue to hum.
It looks like the war is slowing down to the pace sought by Iranian war planners: A grinding conflict of attrition that it hopes will ultimately bore or frustrate Trump and will result in Gulf State pressure on the US to abandon its efforts to topple the regime.
Open Source Intel@Osint613
Benjamin Netanyahu: "What do we see? What happens if the, are there any signs that the Iranian regime is cracking?" "A lot of signs. A lot of signs. I wish I could divulge all of them, but I see that." "But will I tell you, will I commit right now that it's gonna collapse? I could tell you that we're working to create the conditions for it to collapse, but it may survive. It may not."
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@jewandahalfmen @aryehazan I’m very skeptical about regime change but as a silver lining, Mossad has a much better track record on “trust me bro we got this” than the IDF.
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Eh. Unless we have something really good cooking, I think the strategy of just relying on unarmed protestors (who may or may not show up) overthrowing the Islamic Republic — even in a severely weakened form — is a very tall order.
we’ll see. The Mossad haven’t disappointed us so far. So maybe they’ve got a few more tricks.
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highest level defector gets to stay alive and maybe rule as an added bonus
WarMonitor🇺🇦🇬🇧@WarMonitor3
BREAKING: The US says it is seeing defections from all levels of the Iranian military-Reuters
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@amin3577 Ah, and I rather like the Roadrunner analogy. It's not my analogy with the Iran war. It's my analogy with how Cit presents the Iran war, and I think it's perfectly legitimate.
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I see what you’re trying to argue, but I don’t think your critique actually dismantles the analysis the way you think it does.
You say it’s a false dilemma, that there are always more than two options. In theory, sure. But in real strategic environments, especially during conflict, the question isn’t how many options exist on paper. It’s how many are actually viable under constraints. Political pressure, economic fallout, alliance dynamics, and time sensitivity narrow those options quickly. Pointing out that a third path exists doesn’t mean it’s executable or sustainable. If that middle option carries similar or even worse consequences, then it’s not really a distinct alternative. It is just a variation of the same trade-offs.
You also argue that Iran is being treated as a fixed actor, as if it doesn’t respond to incentives. I don’t see that as a fair reading. It’s not about Iran being incapable of change. It’s about recognizing that different actors respond to pressure differently. Some regimes absorb pain, delay responses, or even escalate under pressure instead of backing down. So the real issue isn’t whether Iran has agency. It is what kind of pressure actually shifts its behavior and whether that shift comes at an acceptable cost. Assuming that more pressure will force better outcomes is just as much an unproven assumption as anything you’re criticizing.
When you say the analysis doesn’t think the game through, I think that cuts both ways. You raise questions like what happens after escalation or does Iran have nothing to lose, but you don’t actually answer them either. You introduce uncertainty, but you don’t replace the original reasoning with a clearer or more complete model. A real refutation would carry that logic forward and show why escalation leads to a better or more controllable outcome. Right now, it just opens the door without walking through it.
There’s also a shift in your argument where it becomes less analytical and more value driven. You suggest that maybe the objective is worth a very high cost. That is a legitimate position, but it is not correcting the analysis. It is changing the framework. The original argument seems to weigh costs against outcomes. If you want to reject that, you would need to clearly explain why higher risk strategies produce better long term results, not just imply it.
And to be honest, the tone at the end gives it away a bit. The Wile E. Coyote and Road Runner comparison is not analysis. It is framing. It simplifies a complex strategic situation into a narrative where one side is doomed to fail and the other always escapes. That does not strengthen the argument. It just makes it more persuasive on the surface.
So from where I’m standing, you are raising valid questions, but you are not actually disproving the analysis. You are pointing out potential gaps, then filling them with assumptions of your own. To really refute it, you would need to show that the alternative paths you are hinting at are not only possible, but realistically achievable and likely to lead to better outcomes. Right now, that part is missing.
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So far I have refrained from engaging with Citrinowicz's analyses. But they keep popping up on my feed (even though I don't follow him), and it's something peope seem to talk about on this platform, so I'll say a few words about them in general, using the quoted post as a case study.
These analyses all have the same very reliable pattern; once you read two or three, you have more or less read all of them. Here's how it goes.
Step 1: Identify a problem that the US and Israel face in the war against Iran.
Step 2: Offer two alternative solutions to the problem, a hawkish one that involves some kind of escalation, and a dovish one that in effect consists in ending the war.
Step 3: The first option is presented as guaranteed to fail, because it won't cause the desired behavior on Iran's part.
Step 4: Therefore, by exclusion we are stuck with the second option. The second option is presented as admittedly unattractive, but the least bad allowed by the war's path-dependence so far.
The tone is always measured, professional, devoid of sarcasm, and uses the familiar, room temperature geopolitical jargon. So, it passes the smell test of impartial, hard-nosed analysis. The only stylistic tell is the common use of 'reality', which in the mouth of left-leaning Israeli commentators is often a code word for "just give up".
However, there are recurring problems with Citrinowitz's analyses.
Step 1 is often presented as an unavoidable dilemma, with no clear third option. But more often than not, this is just wrong. For example, in this case, Citrinowitz doesn't explain why Trump couldn't simply live with high oil prices on the Asian markets for a while. (Don't argue me on this point, it's just one example; I'm not saying he should do that. I'm saying that the situation is misrepresented as a dilemma between two extremes, when in fact there are intermediate options.)
The framing of Step 2 typically assumes that Israel and the US face hard choices, while Iran's behavior is pre-determined and completely unresponsive to incentives. The implicit assumption is that the allied forces must fold, because... well, because Iran won't. Why is that, though? Perhaps Iran is in an even more difficult position? Perhaps squeezing it some more will force it to face very uncomfortable dilemmas, too? Iran is an actor with agency, and it isn't immune to behavioral incentives.
Step 3 usually either includes a logical jump or stops before thinking the game through a few more steps further. In this case: sure, let's assume that Iran chooses further escalation. What then? Certainly, they can cause more pain both to the Gulf states and to global energy markets. This is a consideration, but is it decisive? Does Iran have nothing more to lose at that point? Citrinowitz tacitly assumes the answer to these questions, but doesn't argue for them.
Ultimately, this last issue boils down to values, and it depends on how much importance is placed on the war's objectives vs. the costs that result from the fallout. Perhaps defanging Iran is worth a very high cost?
In Citrinowitz's universe, the US and Israel need to adapt to Iran's behavior, but Iran's own behavior is a fixed parameter, completely rigid and unresponsive to incentives. The US and Israel must carefully consider Iran's responses, but Iran doesn't need to fear how the US and Israel might respond to its retiliatory steps.
Citrinowitz's Iran isn't a real country with decision makers, objectives, economic realities, munition constraints, and its own tendencies toward poor decision making. It's an elaborate jungle of dead man's switches, pre-set by a bored God who wants the US and Israel to enact Wile E. Coyote, who despite its elaborate scheming always ends up a victim of his own inaptitude, and Iran to play the Road Runner, who in his cluelessness somehow always emerges unscathed.
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It's late and there's a lot in there, so I'll just answer one bit: yes, I'm making a value claim, I think the war's objectives are worth a very high cost. It's not a gotcha, I'm totally open about this, and I said it many times on this platform.
Cit doesn't explicitly claim the opposite. He pretends not to enter the value dimension at all. But the assumption that the war's costs aren't worth the objectieves is there, it's just unstated. The problem isn't that he has values, the problem is that he's driven by them but presents his political opinion based on them as level-headed, objective analysis. It isn't.
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Rafi DeMogge רפי דמוג retweetledi
@HeTows @SKmacro Only vertical escalation dominance. On the horizontal plane he blundered into the classic Block Trap. History shows that when you block a moderately disagreeable critic, the blocking has a radicalizing effect on the even less agreeable contingent of that profile’s followers.
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I recall a social survey from a few months ago, with one remarkable data point: Gen-X and Boomer seculars are the only Jewish demographics in Israel a majority of which doesn't oppose the two-state solution (it's exactly 50% for and 50 against).
This fact alone does a lot to explain our distorted media landscape, since this group is extremely dominant in it.
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@HeTows As a kid, I read Drucker and Shelah's "Boomerang" about the 2nd Intifada. It made me a sober "leftist" of this type for a very long time. Now I see very similar patterns in that book. There's something about that generation, maybe a pushback against the settlements and Lebanon.
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@levantinterest If we had them stay, you would be crying 'genocide' at the first few civilian casualties. Nothing will satisfy you, short of rolling over and politely absorbing missile fire.
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@HeTows You are right, Isrl isn't acting at its true maximal ruthlessness, but it is displacing >800,000 people from southern Lebanon and saying it will destroy all buildings there and saying it will turn Daheyeh into Rafah. That's extreme ruthlessness and indifference to Leb suffering.
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That's an interesting idea, I haven't thought of it. It makes sense a priori, but on the other hand Russia used ballistic missiles frequently during the Ukraine war, and it was taken for granted that they aren't nukes. North Korea and I think Pakistan have been using ballistic missiles, too.
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@HeTows Nuclear weapons states can't lob ballistic missiles into other countries and say "we promise there's not a nuke in this one."
Dangers of escalation are too great.
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Every once in a while there is an Israeli politician who suggests that Israel should have a Missile Corps: perhaps less precise than the Air Force, but much cheaper and less sensitive to global supply chains.
I now see a lot of people ridiculing the idea in light of Iran’s atrocious performance in the war, but I think they are wrong. Iran’s problem is that Israel quickly disabled their air defenses and put most of their launchers out of service, so their missile fire is now limited.
Bit this doesn’t mean that in Israel, which has excellent air defenses, a Missile Corps wouldn’t be an extremely potent force - not instead of but as a complement to the Air Force. So, the present war has done nothing to make this idea outdated.
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No, I'm only claiming that the strike itself was coordinated. The rebuke wasn't coordinated, it was Trump's way of subsequently keeping a lid on further escalation, at least for the time being. But I'm certain that the strike itself was coordinated. A lot of time passed between the strike and the rebuke, and the rebuke's language was also vague, half-rebuke and half-justification.
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@HeTows @tamritzblog If I understood you correctly, you are claiming that yesterday's strike and the public 'rebuke' by Trump were both coordinated between Israel and the US? I'm asking what they would gain by doing this. Or did I misunderstand what you meant?
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@levantinterest Israel isn't maximally ruthless, not even close. For maximal ruthlessness you don't need to go very far in the region.
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@HeTows I think Israel hawks are guilty of denying third options. For instance, they say "it's better to be alive and hated than dead and pitied," but aren't there other scenarios where Israel isn't maximally ruthless and doesn't alienate supporters & turn neutrals into enemies?
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@tay81205 @tamritzblog What? I didn't understand your question. Who are "they"?
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@HeTows @tamritzblog What would they gain by doing a small strike now then trying other ways of opening Hormuz for a few weeks?!
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This rate of fire is still completely bearable. I don't think the IDF is lying about the launchers.
I think what's probably going on is that the initial decapitation temporarily paralyzed organized decision-making, which has somewhat recovered since then.
So, sure, they fire more now. So be it. This is still completely bearable, and it's going to get much worse for Iran before it gets worse for Israel. I'm not worried, they should be.
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This whole talk of an exit strategy is bizarre. Israel perceives Iran as an existential threat. We can’t trigger regime change there, so we need to make it as militarily weak as possible. The longer it takes for them to regenerate, the better. The more economic woes they have, the more constraints they have on the defense budget, the better.
So, we wreak havoc on them. Wreaking havoc for three weeks will achieve better results than wreaking havoc for one week, and wreaking havoc for three months achieves more than for three weeks. We keep going until Trump stops us. There is no need for an “exit strategy”.
נדב איל Nadav Eyal@Nadav_Eyal
What came through in my conversations with senior security officials is optimism about how the war is unfolding- even though they openly acknowledged a developing energy crisis. I haven’t heard from them anything resembling a serious discussion of an exit strategy, or of the day after.
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@tay81205 @tamritzblog Easy: Trump thinks he can open Hormuz and achieve his other goals without it. He will try for a few weeks, fail, and then there will be more such attacks. This, too, was coordinated with the US.
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@HeTows @tamritzblog Trump is very clear about it. And it's a position that makes him look weaker, so seems unlikely he is lying. Of course with Trump we can never be sure, but what makes you think there WILL be more attacks?
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Rafi DeMogge רפי דמוג retweetledi
Hormuz is a weapon that can only be fired once
No one should expect a quick resolution to the current crisis, but across the next decade, even the next 3-5 years, the choke point of Hormuz will be massively substituted for
The Gulf Arab states are all very rich, with high per capita GDP - the best single measure of relative state capacity - easy access to global markets, especially financial, and have the favorable backing of the US
Everyone has known about the Hormuz vulnerability for decades. The Iranians have continually hinted around closing it, but never did. Now they have, but Hormuz is a gun that cannot be reloaded.
Deterrents work only up to the point of use. Once used, they have failed. The purpose of a deterrent is to *not* be used
Many analysts have made this basic mistake. They think that Iran is now in a position of strength, having exercised its Hormuz option. But the opposite is true. A state is weakest after it has used its deterrent. The cost of that deterrence is now priced in. The worst having been done, the targets of the deterrent are now free to make other arrangements. Before, they were reluctant to do so because of the switching costs. Now, they have no choice; they will not allow themselves to be controlled in this way again
Hormuz may never reopen. But the importance of this is a depreciating asset.
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@LeeinND 1. It won’t destroy America’s economy, don’t be melodramatic.
2. America won’t need to “save” Israel. American assistance is welcome, but Israel did just fine before the alliance, and it will also do fine after it.
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@ChronosCryptid Probably not; after a certain amount of time there’s the issue of diminishing marginal returns.
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@HeTows Is wreaking havoc for three years better than three months?
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@aaditks @Mehmet_the_Eng @noclador If Turkey doesn’t bother Israel, Israel won’t bother Turkey. I would obviously prefer peaceful relations, but it takes two to tango.
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