Jalel Harchaoui جلال حرشاوي@JMJalel_H
𝑻𝒓𝒊𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊 𝑺𝒍𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒔 𝑩𝒂𝒄𝒌 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒐 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝑾𝒂𝒓
One cannot overstate the difference between the situation in Tripoli as of Monday evening and as of Tuesday evening.
On Monday, Prime Minister Dabaiba and his allies looked like geniuses. They had just executed challenger Abdelghani al-Kikli, and, although there were clashes, the violence fell short of all-out war. Their operation, precise and compelling, was sellable as a harsh but useful step vis-à-vis many foreign states and the Libyan populace. Had Dabaiba’s side stopped there, calm might have followed in a sustainable fashion.
By Tuesday evening, however, the same Dabaiba coalition had launched a direct attack against Radaa’s interests—despite the fact that Radaa was better organized and more popular in the large suburb of Suq al-Jumaa. The assault did not achieve the swift victory Dabaiba needed. In response, hundreds of military vehicles from Zawiyah have mobilized to back Radaa, as have forces under General Usama al-Juwaili from Zintan. More Misrata brigades may continue to join on Dabaiba’s side. In all cases, more factions are seeking to insinuate themselves into downtown Tripoli itself. This situation is thus more dangerous than those in 2011, 2014, or 2019.
In 2014, fighting was confined mainly to southern Tripoli near the International Airport. In 2011, Qadhafi fled early; he did not wage war in the city center. In 2019, Haftar’s armed coalition never penetrated downtown Tripoli. Today, however, many civilians are rightfully outraged as central Tripoli comes under direct threat.
Haftar’s coalition will inevitably try and get near Tripoli and support its existing partners, such as Juwaili of Zintan and the Buzeriba family in Zawiyah—ties that will now be activated logistically and financially.
Dabaiba’s move against Radaa, and his failure to secure a quick victory, may well prove a #fatal mistake. Perhaps he can still prevail, but doing so now would almost certainly require a protracted war among multiple factions converging on the capital. Also possible is the prospect of Dabaiba losing everything.
In any event, the old arrangement—where militias that distrusted each other maintained an uneasy cohabitation—is likely over. The events of the past two days, especially Tuesday’s nonconclusive offensive against Radaa, have shattered that longstanding modus vivendi. It does not mean Dabaiba’s camp has already lost, but the only chance to avoid a drawn-out conflict was a quick victory last night. With that window gone, all signs point to a more prolonged, destructive, and existential battle with a nationwide dimension.
I wouldn’t be surprised if the attitude of some key foreign states like Turkey were to change somewhat.
