Jose Manuel Amor
6.4K posts
@JMAafi
Partner, Afi. Research. Views generally my own. 🇺🇦🇪🇺
Jeez - these numbers for Europe are absolutely bonkers China's trade data for the first 2 months of the year. Exports to the EU up 27.8% Exports to Germany up 31.3% Exports to Netherlands up 17.9% Exports to France up 31.9% Exports to Italy up 36.4%
📊El EU‑ETS arranca 2026 en un entorno de mayor volatilidad geo, climática y especulativa. Desde @Afi_Research analizamos: caída de correlación TTF‑EUA, exigencias en aviación y marítimo, factores fundamentales (clima/ generación energética) y posicionamiento táctico futuro.
Two questions about Japan. 1/ Why has 🇯🇵been able to accumulate so much debt (275% of GDP in 2023) up until now without triggering a fiscal crisis? 2/ Will 🇯🇵 be able to continue harvesting these excess returns? 1/ Why has 🇯🇵 been able to accumulate so much debt (275% of GDP in 2023) up until now without triggering a fiscal crisis? The Japanese public sector was funding itself at below-market floating rates by having the BOJ issue reserves (91% of GDP in 2023) and then investing in risky assets (181% of GDP), including foreign assets. Between 2013 and 2023, the public sector earned an extra 6.25 % of GDP per annum (in excess of its below-market funding costs) by taking on interest rate risk, currency risk and equity risk. As a result, between 1997 and 2023, the net debt, liabilities minus assets, of the entire public sector has only grown from 24.7% to 94.3% of GDP, a 70% of GDP increase, despite the fact that the cumulative primary fiscal deficit of the general government exceeded 133% of GDP during the same periods and despite growth being close to zero. 2/ Will 🇯🇵 be able to continue harvesting these excess returns? No. Probably not. In a counterfactual exercise without QE and YCC (no funding by issuing reserves; the public sector funds itself at true no-YCC market rates), we find that the extra 6.25% of GDP is reduced to 2.75% of GDP. If we then force the government to hedge the currency risk (like the financial sector), then there is no excess return left. The no-QE/no-YCC counterfactual assumes that market bond yields would have been 200 bps higher. Since the BOJ's tentative switch to policy normalization in 2022, the 10-year JGB yield has already increased by more than 200 bps. The long end has increased even more. This suggests these excess returns harvested by the public sector will disappear going forward, unless the BOJ reverts back to massive QE and/or YCC. Bottomline: Low-rate policies and financial repression are easy to start, but hard to exit. Japan has been running an interesting experiment for the rest of the world, especially advanced economies, and Europe in particular. I hope we all learn from it. Joint work with YiLi Chien and Hal Cole. dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4…
José Manuel Amor, socio director de @Afi_es: "El mercado no es que ignore los riesgos políticos, pero los trata de forma excepcional. El error del mercado es valorar todo de forma cortoplacista porque lee mal la prima de riesgos política"
👇 Algunos de los vectores clave que están configurando el escenario geopolítico actual. El orden global se reescribe: las normas se diluyen, se cruzan umbrales antes impensables y la ambigüedad pesa tanto como la fuerza. No hay nuevo equilibrio, sino su fabricación.
