Kerry Boyd Anderson

Why pressure and force don't always work — this article now feels prescient warontherocks.com/2026/02/for-ir…

The war with Iran has highlighted that desalination plants are vulnerable critical infrastructure. 5 experts address the issue in our latest In Brief (for War on the Rocks members) warontherocks.com/2026/03/holdin…

Thanks for the great conversation on Iraq @KBAresearch!

What is going on with US temporary suspensions of sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil? I talked with @Mai_Nikoladze about it. (For War on the Rocks members) warontherocks.com/episode/warcas…

No matter how this war ends, the level of Arab Gulf mistrust/public anger at Iran regime is a new reality for Tehran to reckon with. Arabic social media tells a very different story than English posts. There is no going back to pre-Feb. 28.

I talked with @VictoriaT_ about the many ways in which the war in Iran is spilling over into Iraq. Really important to the region's future. (available for War on the Rocks members) warontherocks.com/episode/warcas…

Check out this conversation on France's nuclear policy with @AstridChevreuil and @nktpnd! (For War on the Rocks members) warontherocks.com/episode/thinki…

Interesting foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/26/asi…

The Houthis attacked Israel today with a ballistic missile, joining the war alongside Iran. Why, why now, and so what? -There has been speculation since day 1 of the war that the Houthis would eventually join. Why did they wait? One theory was that they were waiting "in reserve" to join at a time that would maximize impact. -The other theory was that the Houthis were cautious: much more than in 2024, strikes in 2025 on Yemen by the US and Israel did cause a fair degree of damage. The US and Israel showed a much greater intelligence penetration, hitting mobile missile launchers, weapons stockpiles, weapons production sites, and even killing military and civilian leaders (whereas in 2024, strikes were more limited and less effective). The Houthis presumably knew that if they joined the war, the US and Israel would hit back, hard, and that this time it would hurt even more. That is likely to happen now. -Why only hit Israel with missiles? The Houthis cannot make a material difference in the war like this: their missiles and drones are unable to cause significant damage in Israel as most are intercepted (though there is a valid counter-argument here that they can help run down Israel's interceptor capability). -The Houthis have clearly shown that their main source of leverage is to shut down maritime shipping in the Red Sea (parallel here too: for Iran, the war has clearly shown that its most damaging leverage is closing Hormuz). Will the Houthis move in this direction now? If - as I expect - Israel and the US retaliate soon, we should expect the Houthis to start threatening Red Sea shipping. The impact on the global economy - coupled with Iran's closure of Hormuz - then rapidly becomes amplified. And it far outlasts the end of the war, whenever that is, because of the disruption on supply chains. -There was also an assumption that the Houthis were more likely to join the war if the fall of the Islamic Republic was imminent. That is not the case: its fall is not imminent. On the one hand, that can help explain why they had not joined until now. If the Houthis' involvement remains limited (ie, no major attacks in the Red Sea), it may be a factor. -On the other hand, the Houthis could be joining to help increase Iran's leverage in negotiations with the US. -The Houthis are also mindful of managing relations with Saudi Arabia. Limited strikes on Israel (as opposed to closing the Bab al-Mandab at the southern tip of the Red Sea) allows the Houthis to avoid re-stoking the fire with their Saudi neighbor (this is not to say that the Houthis won't target the Red Sea in the future; but that is a possible consideration). -Finally, the usual point: the Houthis are not Iran's proxy, in the sense of being its puppet. Iran does not "order" the Houthis into action. Today's attack, and whatever the Houthis do next, reflects their own interest, and is the product of their own decision-making - of course in close coordination with Iran.

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Really interesting nytimes.com/2026/03/28/wor… via @NYTimes

@DEsfandiary Is he talking about radiological weapons? Confusing, anyway

What??

I really enjoyed talking with Yun Sun about how the war in Iran is — and is not — affecting China's energy security. warontherocks.com/episode/the-in…

I had a really interesting conversation w/ @mkoplow about Israel's operations in Lebanon and what Israel is trying to achieve there and around the region. (for War on the Rocks members) warontherocks.com/episode/warcas…

Super interesting discussion on Iran's drone capabilities! (for War on the Rocks members) warontherocks.com/episode/the-in…

A declining trend in drone launches can feel reassuring at first glance. It can also mask shifts in strategy that are harder to see. (Members Only) Listen here: ow.ly/VJNh30sUAZY

Check out this fascinating conversation with @KofmanMichael and Rob Lee about the war in Ukraine, including potential lessons (or not) for the Gulf Arab states facing attacks from Iran. warontherocks.com/episode/therus…

Great thread on these crucial islands from @hahellyer

A new look from the ground in Ukraine shows a war defined by constant adaptation, from seasonal shifts at the front to the growing challenge of defending against drones and ballistic missiles. (Members Only) Listen here: ow.ly/Vj2r50YzckC

I'm always interested in hearing @aa51_ansari's views, and it's extra great to hear him on one of my fave podcasts!