KaspaKaha

46 posts

KaspaKaha banner
KaspaKaha

KaspaKaha

@KaspaKaha

Kaspa Covenant + DeFi Explorer | Real-time insights on Toccata, covenants & on-chain activity. Building the future of scalable DeFi on the fastest BlockDAG.

Katılım Temmuz 2026
181 Takip Edilen240 Takipçiler
Sabitlenmiş Tweet
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
Kaspa L1 DeFi just leveled up 🔥 KRON is live - the first native launchpad & DEX built directly on Kaspa L1 with covenants. No rollups. No custodians. Pure L1. We’re already displaying its data… and the volume is already running ahead of ZealousSwap. This is what native programmability looks like. KaspaKaha.com @KronTechnology @ZealousSwap $KAS #Kaspa #KaspaDeFi
KaspaKaha tweet mediaKaspaKaha tweet mediaKaspaKaha tweet media
English
8
50
187
10.8K
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
Stablecoins on Kaspa are live — but only on L2 for now. Current bridged stables across Igra + Kasplex: • Total: $1.47M • USDC: $1.10M (peg -0.03%) • USDT: $370.7k (peg -0.53%) Most of it sits in lending markets. DEX pools are still tiny. Kaspa still has no native stablecoin issuer tracked. The real question: When do we get proper stables on L1? @Kaspa_HypeMan @KaspaKii @Kaspa_KEF KaspaKaha.com $KAS #Kaspa #KaspaDeFi
KaspaKaha tweet media
English
10
13
87
2.4K
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
Good - that’s the right call, and genuinely glad it’s happening. A named-firm audit against the real source closes the gap far better than a decompile ever could - which was exactly our caveat. No need to hand us anything; that’s their job, not ours. “Who’s behind KaspaKaha” - a MEV research team from the Kaspa community that just wants Kaspa to be better. Judge the work, not the handle. Worth separating though: a Hashlock/Sherlock audit answers “is it safe, can they rug.” Ours was a different axis - MEV and extractability - which a security audit doesn’t cover. And that point was never KRON-specific: logic open enough to audit is open enough to extract from. That’s the part still worth arguing.
English
1
1
11
297
v
v@v4n1m4·
@KaspaKaha Who's behind KaspaKaha? Shawn (@KronTechnology) already has quotes from @hashlock_ @sherlockdefi and other prominent firms to audit the entire source. The funding is partially organised already. Good write up but I don't see why you'd be given the golden source. Wait 4 audit.
English
3
0
7
346
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
“KRON is fishy - they never published the source.” We keep seeing this. So we did the next best thing: we decompiled the deployed covenant straight off Kaspa L1 and read it. Here’s what the on-chain bytecode actually shows. No admin key. No pause, no seize, no upgrade hatch - the only signature check in the whole system is ordinary per-owner token auth. Nobody can freeze or drain it. No hidden mint. Supply is minted once at genesis and the mint path is permanently closed after - we checked it against the actual genesis transaction. 399M to the curve + 21M dev = 420M, matching the advertised max. The dev allocation is exactly 5%, and it’s sitting where it should be on-chain. The “permanently locked” graduation liquidity is genuinely unremovable, and the pool math (constant-product, LP shares, fee routing) holds up - rounding consistently favors the pool, not an extractor. In short: from the bytecode, this does not look like a scam. One honest caveat, stated plainly: a decompile is what the deployed script does - it is not KRON’s source. We can’t byte-verify that the on-chain script was built from any particular source file. So take this as “the deployed covenant behaves correctly,” not a stamp of approval. So here’s our open offer to the KRON team (@KronTechnology): hand us the source and we’ll run a full, proper audit against it and confirm the build - under NDA if you’d prefer to keep it private. That’s how you close the gap for good - not our word on a decompile, but a reproducible audit of the real thing. The door’s open whenever you are. Now the part that’s bigger than KRON. The same thing that let us audit an unpublished covenant - full execution logic living on L1, in the open - is exactly what lets a searcher model it and extract from it. Read access and extraction access are the same access. That’s the whole point about MEV on Kaspa. It isn’t hiding in a dark forest. It’s in plain sight, by design, because the chain is transparent by design. You cannot have fully-inspectable on-chain logic and ordering that’s somehow invisible to searchers. Those are the same property viewed from two sides. Which is why “just make it private/resistant at the app layer” doesn’t work. If the logic is on L1, the ordering opportunity is on L1. The only place you can actually address it is the consensus/DAG layer - the ordering rules themselves - not the contract on top. That’s the real conversation. @michaelsuttonil @hashdag - this is your territory, not the app developers. KaspaKaha.com #KAS #Kaspa #KaspaDefi #MEV
English
5
24
85
2.3K
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
Right - you run the EL over the L1-ordered txs and derive the state yourself. That’s the whole point of a based rollup: execution is a deterministic function of L1 data, so anyone can reproduce canonical L2 state without trusting a third party. Which is exactly the “trust only your own data from genesis” rigor you recommended two posts up. The RPC is a convenience layer for people who’d rather not run it - useful, but not the source of truth, and not where ordering lives.
English
0
0
0
29
Pavel Emdin
Pavel Emdin@emdin·
@KaspaKaha Not sure I understand. L1 gives you the ordered raw EVM transactions; it does not give you the execution results. To get the events, someone has to run the EL over that ordered L1 data. Otherwise you just have bunch of payloads.
English
1
0
1
86
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
We rebuilt the entire Kaspa L2 searcher network from public chain data alone. Every arb wallet on Igra + Kasplex. Clustered into operators by shared executor contracts. No mempool feed. No inside access. Just consensus. 98 searchers. On Igra alone: • One operator runs 27 wallets • Another has cleared ~20K KAS across 5 wallets Solid lines = same operator, multiple wallets Dashed lines = competitors arbing the same routes This is what “MEV is real on Kaspa” actually looks like - an industrialized, competitive market you can reconstruct purely from on-chain data. Front-running is resisted. Arbitrage is the business. And it’s already crowded. kaspaKaha.com $KAS #Kaspa #KaspaDeFi #MEV
KaspaKaha tweet media
English
5
6
34
1.4K
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
Two different claims. That front-running is possible - that ordering is purchasable - needs no dataset: it follows from feerate set same block position, which is public and which you already granted. That’s the MEV question, and it’s settled on your own terms. Measured extraction volume is a separate empirical question, and the L1 data to run it is as public to you as to us. The mechanism doesn’t need our book - it’s derivable from the chain. Happy to compare methodology; the claim was never resting on private data.
English
0
0
0
24
Pavel Emdin
Pavel Emdin@emdin·
@KaspaKaha "We’ve shown the work" please share the dataset + code, we'll compare directly and publicly. The rest I've addressed above and won't rehash.
English
1
0
1
71
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
1/ Appreciate the public follow-up @emdin - and real credit for correcting the ordering point. That was the substance, glad it’s settled. We’re a team of MEV researchers; transparency is the job. So here’s everything, on the table 👇 2/ Where we agree - which is most of it: sandwiching on Igra is real, persistently attempted, and as attempted it’s been unprofitable. Higher carrier feerate wins the same-block slot. Your findings and ours line up. No fight there. 3/ But “0/12 net-negative → not profitable” has a gap, and it’s the crux. That measures the sandwiches that were attempted, at the sizes those attackers happened to pick. Sandwich P&L is convex in front-run size - one optimum; too small or too large both lose. 4/ So the same victim swap flips negative→positive at the right size. The result shows those attackers sized wrong and left EV on the table - not that an optimally-sized sandwich on those victims is unprofitable. “Not profitably attempted yet” ≠ “not profitable.” The claim needs the per-victim optimum, not the observed sample. 5/ Our number, since you asked - no deflection. 446K KAS total, never a sandwich figure: • Arbitrage ~99% · Liquidations ~1% · Sandwiches ~0 (we agree with you) By chain: Igra 365,149 KAS (78%), Kasplex 22%. 6/ Definitions, so it’s checkable: • Completed sandwich = same-Kaspa-block front+back-run, both land, value = backrun − frontrun − fees → ~0 net-positive (matches your 12). • Arb extracted value = realized WKAS on a completed cycle, net of carrier fee + gas. • Venues: Igra L2 + Kasplex L2. 7/ So both hold: front-running resisted-as-executed (agreed); arbitrage MEV live and ~99% of realized extraction (the data). On sandwich profitability, we read it as a sizing result, not a mechanism result - and we’ll show the optimization against your ZS dataset. That’s the engagement worth having. - a team of MEV experts. Data’s on the table.
Pavel Emdin@emdin

Hey @KaspaKaha, TL;DR this is wrong info, as I already mentioned in my DM to you several days ago. Results of our research which we'll publish soon: ~6% of frontrunning attempts win the carrier race and land (11 confirmed sandwiches over ~25 days), and 0% of those extract anything from victims. Which is... quite good. For the public, this is my DM message, I copy it here since it contains no private data and important for the context: "We independently confirmed your narrow technical point: our doc conflates probabilistic inclusion with fee-prioritized ordering once transactions are selected. We’ll correct that, thanks for noticing. We also completed a chain-wide measurement covering last months, all 37 ZS pools, 10k swaps joined to their Kaspa carriers, and approximately 14.5 million Kaspa blocks. We found 12 genuine same-Kaspa-block sandwiches across five attackers. All 12 were net-negative for the attacker. Our data confirms that while sandwiching is real and persistently attempted on Igra, and that higher carrier feerate wins the same-block position in the cases we observed, it does not currently support your claim re “live and continuous at scale” as profitable extraction. Over the full measured window, only 12 landed chain-wide, and none was profitable. It also fully supports our previous claim re single-digit per-attempt success rates -- empirical number is ~4.5%. We're going to publish these results next week. Your public app displays 404,362 KAS of extracted MEV without a visible methodology or breakdown. To reconcile the findings, could you share: - how much of the 404,362 KAS is attributed specifically to Igra; - the split between arbitrage, liquidations and sandwiches; - the observation period and covered venues; - your definition of a completed sandwich and extracted value; - one representative Igra example that we can independently reproduce. We’re not asking for your detector or full dataset as we need enough evidence to understand whether your Igra claim measures profitable extraction, attempted execution, or mechanism-level exposure. If your Igra signal reproduces against our chain-wide dataset, a broader engagement makes sense."

English
2
3
15
1.3K
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
@JinnoPolar Tbh Igra isn’t MEV resistance. Front running is possible.
English
0
0
0
29
Jinno
Jinno@JinnoPolar·
@KaspaKaha Hi, are you saying that "MEV resistance" at the consensus layer can only prevent the so-called toxic MEV (sandwich attacks, where a miner maliciously inserts transactions before and after a user's transaction), but it cannot prevent structural MEV?
English
1
0
0
45
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
We’ve been watching something quietly grow on Kaspa… MEV - Maximal Extractable Value. All time extracted across Igra + Kasplex: 446,514 KAS Almost entirely arbitrage. Igra currently leads with 78%. Front running and sandwich opportunities also exist. We’re tracking every opportunity - independent of any bot. A full MEV series is coming. kaspaKaha.com @michaelsuttonil @hashdag @Igra_Labs @emdin @kasplex $KAS #Kaspa #KaspaDeFi #MEV
KaspaKaha tweet media
English
4
9
43
4.6K
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
The limiting principle is the one you already granted: Igra isn’t FIFO. Same-block position is set by carrier feerate, not arrival - your words. So position IS purchasable: bid a higher feerate, land ahead. That’s the ordering action a loser couldn’t match, and a controllable advantage an ordinary FIFO/CEX participant never has. That’s the exact line between MEV and “just trading” - and it doesn’t over-include, because FIFO trading has no such lever. Your 5% is the inclusion axis - landing in a specific victim’s block. That’s the probabilistic half we agreed on at the start; you separated it yourself: inclusion probabilistic, ordering deterministic. The purchasable advantage lives on the ordering axis. So, from the data: Igra isn’t FIFO, ordering position is fee-purchasable, front-running and sandwiching are both possible (capital/latency-bounded today, not impossible), and “MEV-resistant by design” isn’t accurate - resistance takes L1 consensus mechanisms that aren’t live yet. We’ve shown the work; readers can weigh it.
English
1
0
0
35
Pavel Emdin
Pavel Emdin@emdin·
"On-chain arb is ordering-contingent by construction" Yes, and on Igra no ordering advantage is purchasable or controllable. Trader win by being first to see the opp and fastest to broadcast. It is speed/latency/strategy, available equally to everyone with the same public RPC. What ordering action does the winning arb tx take that a loser could not? "decided by ordering" Would mean whoever controls ordering wins reliably. 95% failure rate is not control. "one tx captures each opportunity, therefore MEV" There is no limiting principle here? By this def, every market maker who wins a fill and trader, who captures a move first, is "extracting ordering-contingent MEV," so all trading revenue is MEV. That's not the definition.
English
1
0
0
74
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
Igra’s a based rollup - every L2 tx is embedded in and ordered by Kaspa L1, and the L2 is a deterministic function of that L1 data. The source of truth is L1, which we index from our own node. Your RPC is a convenience layer for reading L2 state; it isn’t where the ordering - or the ground truth - lives. Deriving from L1 is the rigorous path, not the shortcut.
English
1
0
0
76
Pavel Emdin
Pavel Emdin@emdin·
@KaspaKaha Light node is in the backlog. But honestly, as a researcher you want a full node anyway, trust only your own data from genesis. The 40h sync is one-time, and serious hardware runs ~40 EUR/mo. For reliable rollup research there's no substitute for your own node.
English
1
0
1
102
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
We’ve always said Maximal EV - and that’s the crux: MEV is value extractable via transaction ordering. It doesn’t need an ordering authority to capture it; the searcher extracts it. That’s the “maximal.” On-chain arb is ordering-contingent by construction: each spread closes winner-take-all per block - one tx captures it, the rest revert. “Available to any actor” is true for the attempt, not for the capture. Ordering-extracted value = MEV. And you made the deeper point yourself: you pointed to DAGKnight to clean up the residual. Exactly - MEV-resistance is something you build at the L1 consensus layer, not something a based rollup inherits for free. Until those mechanisms ship, inheriting L1 ordering ≠ resisting MEV, and ordering-contingent extraction is live. What Igra genuinely resists is ordering-authority MEV - the sandwich/censorship kind where someone sells position. Real, and to your credit. Searcher-arb MEV is a different animal, and it’s alive. Benign vs adversarial we’ll happily separate for users - both are MEV, they just differ in who they hurt.
English
1
0
0
39
Pavel Emdin
Pavel Emdin@emdin·
Just to make sure we're on the same page. 1. Our measured claim: on Igra an attacker cannot reliably buy the winning slot in the victim's block by fee. Co-inclusion succeeds ~5% and can't be driven higher by paying more (no ordering authority to sell position), vs 100% deterministic on Ethereum via Flashbots and similar. That's tx-level and reproducible. (btw even these 5% will be most likely eliminated by the DAGKnight.) 2. The 365,149 KAS you attribute to "MEV" conflates two different things: a) opportunity-based arbitrage, essentially closing a price spread, available to any actor, tightening prices, which you yourselves call benign and b) adversarial, ordering-extracted MEV. Those aren't the same claim. Arbitrage is MEV only if an ordering authority captures the value, and which is impossible on Igra. 3. We'd genuinely appreciate the labeled data -- which tx, netting which fees, and captured by which ordering authority. If none is captured, it's arbitrage trading, avail for all, not MEV and in which case please separate the two for users. "MEV loss" and "benign price-tightening arb any actor can do" are very different animals.
English
1
0
1
100
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
Appreciated 🙏 - we do run our own Kaspa L1 node. Igra’s the catch: it’s a 40h+ sync on serious hardware to self-host, so we’re on your public RPC for the L2. Honestly that’s the thing worth solving - a lighter Igra node would do more for reliable rollup research than any rate-limit bump.
English
1
1
1
174
Pavel Emdin
Pavel Emdin@emdin·
@KaspaKaha Btw guys suggest you run you're own node and RPC if not already, our public one is rate limited and not ideal for reliable research.
English
1
1
1
375
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
1/ Both - but that dichotomy collapses on-chain, and that’s the interesting part. The spread originates as ordinary cross-venue arb. But “anyone could close it at any time” is a CeFi intuition. On-chain, exactly one tx closes each spread per block - and which one is decided by the carrier race + feerate ladder you documented. Losers revert. 2/ So the capture is ordering-dependent by construction, even when the opportunity is a plain spread. That’s exactly what separates on-chain arb from off-chain arb. And the term itself - Flash Boys 2.0, Daian et al. - was defined around precisely this: DEX arbitrage won by transaction ordering. Arb isn’t the exception to MEV. It’s the original case. 3/ The honest nuance we’ll grant: it’s benign MEV - it tightens prices, it doesn’t tax users the way a sandwich does. Different ethics, same mechanism. Happy to tag each cycle in the 365K as standing-spread vs victim-contingent - but both are won by ordering, not by “anyone, anytime.”
English
1
0
0
72
Pavel Emdin
Pavel Emdin@emdin·
@KaspaKaha Glad we agree re front-running. Now re classification & data for 365K KAS arbitrage as MEV -- is that ordering-dependent extraction or cross-venue spreads that anyone could close at any time? Cause only the former is adversarial MEV; the latter is ordinary arbitrage.
English
1
0
6
260
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
“MEV resistance” is about ordering - and on Igra the sequencer is Kaspa L1, so it inherits exactly that. But arbitrage and liquidations don’t care who sequences; they need a price gap and a lending market. Kaspa L1 covenant DeFi is already arriving - the moment it does, that MEV is there too. It follows the DeFi, not the ordering model.
English
0
0
2
206
Classic
Classic@Classicxbt·
@KaspaKaha Kaspa is mev resistant. Igra and Kasplex are different networks. Stop misleading people.
English
1
0
10
335
KaspaKaha
KaspaKaha@KaspaKaha·
“MEV resistance” is about ordering - and on Igra the sequencer is Kaspa L1, so it inherits exactly that. But arbitrage and liquidations don’t care who sequences; they need a price gap and a lending market. Kaspa L1 covenant DeFi is already arriving - the moment it does, that MEV is there too. It follows the DeFi, not the ordering model.
English
0
0
0
157
Bombie𐤊💰
Bombie𐤊💰@Bombiecrypto·
@KaspaKaha Kaspa L1 blockchain is MEV resistant You should be specific on your post!
English
1
0
3
251