
Ken Jackson
598 posts














This is lopsided, hyperbolic and relies on Iranian and Arab sourced spin that portrays a still-unfinalized diplomatic track as “total surrender” by Trump and the US. It’s a classic horseshoe trap we see recurrently in Iran hawk commentary and IRGC propaganda: maximalist framing of US downsides and Islamic Republic upsides in diplomatic contexts. It also doesn’t hold up too well under scrutiny of 1, actual timeline, 2, incentives, and 3, reported terms. What matters upfront is that the $6B remains an Iranian ask, and that release of funds is stratified, gradual, and conditional in the ongoing talks. There is no credible report of an immediate payout or the quid pro quo terms involved in any financial line item. What matters for an objective assessment of the deal’s merits is the sums, timelines, sequencing and cross-implementation, freedom of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, and any reported leak origins. Briefly and parsimoniously, on the Strait of Hormuz issue, after US blockade was imposed on April 13 and the ceasefire was extended on the 21st, Project Freedom was launched on Monday, May 4 to escort stranded ships out of the Strait. Some 1,500 vessels and over 22,000 mariners have been stranded since the start of the war and have sporadically been targeted by drones and fast attack craft. The IRGC immediately refuted US claims that the vessels would be permitted to traverse the Strait unharmed through their Tasnim news agency, saying “maritime movements contrary to the announced principles of the IRGC Navy face serious risks, and violating vessels will be forcibly stopped.” Trump paused Project Freedom the next day, Tuesday evening, at Pakistan’s request citing progress in Iran negotiations. For the US extracting the hostage vessels and crew is valuable for global energy demand pressure, humanitarian reasons and notably vital for theater-shaping because 1,500 vessels strewn across the littoral dilute defensive capacity along the Gulf. This is a critical constraint along two concurrent axes: saturation risk and interceptor magazine depth. Protecting these vessels drains bandwidth from critical ports, terminals, refineries, and strategic sites like the more than four hundred desalination plants and vitally, UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant -- which water pressurized nuclear reactor was attacked last week with three drones after IRGC Iraqi proxy Awiyah al-Wa'ad al-Haq announced a Jihad against on March 10 and the IRGC directly threatened to strike it on March 23. A drone penetrated defenses and struck an electric power generator within the plant but outside its inner perimeter according to the UAE ministry of defense. That followed Al-Saadi’s arrest by less than 48 hours (see x.com/danlinnaeus/st…). That should clarify for policymakers the scope and magnitude of the stakes. What we now know is that a deal is “largely negotiated” and will include reopening the Strait of Hormuz. It involves multiple regional players including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and others via Pakistani mediation. For additional discussion, x.com/danlinnaeus/st…. In plain terms, this ceasefire is a terrorist ransom payment. But release and exchange timelines matter greatly. And whether they live to enjoy their blood money is another seriously open question. History of US actions would suggest otherwise.




It’s hard to overstate how deeply Netanyahu views this moment as a possible personal and political defeat. A U.S.–Iran agreement under Trump would be a major blow to him mainly diplomatically, but above all politically. For years, Netanyahu built his political identity around being “Mr. Iran,” the leader who insisted that only pressure, deterrence, and force could stop the Iranian regime. And now, after multiple rounds of operational successes but one resounding strategic failure, and after finally succeeding in drawing the United States into direct confrontation with Iran, he may be forced to accept an agreement that not only legitimizes the very regime he sought to weaken, but also exposes the collapse of his long-standing Iran doctrine. His approach was based on the belief that more pressure, more military power, and tighter coordination between Israel and the United States would eventually either force Iran into submission or destabilize the regime itself. Instead, the result has been a more radicalized, more resilient, and more dangerous Iran, one that even Washington now hesitates to confront militarily again. If this confrontation ends with an agreement, an even bigger strategic question emerges: what future American president would be willing to commit U.S. forces to another major Middle Eastern conflict after seeing the political and military costs of this one? Netanyahu had what may have been his greatest opportunity to prove his central strategic theory: that a close Israeli-American military partnership could fundamentally reshape Iran and perhaps even threaten the regime’s survival. By every indication, that assumption failed. Against this backdrop, reports of a tense conversation between Trump and Netanyahu become much easier to understand. They also help explain the extraordinary level of pressure now coming from Jerusalem, and the extent to which Netanyahu is trying to persuade, or pressure, the administration not to move toward a deal with Tehran. The bottom line is that a U.S.–Iran agreement would not only signal the failure of the military confrontation Netanyahu pushed for, but also the collapse of the broader strategic doctrine he has championed since entering Israeli politics, all on the eve of what could be the most critical election of his career. In that sense, the next Israel’s leadership need to learn the fundamental lessons of this war. More than ever, this conflict demonstrates the urgent need for Israel to develop a different long-term strategy for dealing with Iran and especially to understand the following: Israel’s confrontation with Iran will not bring normalization with the Arab world, nor will it resolve Israel’s most fundamental security challenges, first and foremost, the Palestinian issue. The belief that regime change in Iran would transform Israel’s position in the Middle East was always detached from reality. In fact, the consistent opposition of Gulf leaders and major Arab states to further escalation against Iran has demonstrated this repeatedly throughout the conflict. Israel will not be able to use the “Iran card” as a substitute for addressing the core political issues shaping the region. Anyone arguing that military confrontation with Iran alone can unlock normalization is mistaken and, more importantly, misleading others about the strategic reality of the Middle East. Because despite the undeniable tactical and operational achievements of the campaign, this failure may ultimately leave Israel facing a more dangerous strategic reality, one that has not fundamentally improved its position in the Middle East. #IranWar


Reporter: Do you believe that (the Iranian regime) is still committed to peace? Trump: Yeah. I do. We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the f*ck they’re doing. (So, “Death to Israel” is no longer a thing because of a social media post. That’s not how this works.) #4DChess

No one planned for or expected a long-term engagement in Iran, so it’s good to hear a deal is soon to be announced. But it’s also probably a punch in the gut for most Iranians knowing the IRGC still remains firmly in control. In the end, I’m not sure anyone trying to do the right thing really walks away winning here.
















