
KwasiAfrican
1.7K posts

KwasiAfrican
@KwasiAfrican
Development Practitioner | Nkrumaist



Why Elon Musk is RIGHT to fight South Africa’s racist rules blocking Starlink? Imagine this: Long ago, South Africa had very unfair laws called apartheid. They treated Black people badly and kept them from good jobs and money. When those bad laws ended, the country made new rules (called B-BBEE) to help Black people get a fair share of business. The idea was good – like a big helping hand. But now? For companies like Starlink to sell fast internet, they MUST give away 30% of their business to Black partners. Just because of skin color. Elon Musk was born in South Africa. He left as a teen to chase big dreams. Today, his company SpaceX wants to bring Starlink – super fast satellite internet – to South Africa. But the rules say no unless they give up part of the company. Elon said it right: “Starlink is not allowed because I’m not Black.” SpaceX promised to spend about $30 million (that’s 500 million rand!) to give FREE high-speed internet to 5,000 rural schools. That helps over 2.4 MILLION kids every year learn better, get jobs later, and have a brighter future. Real help for the people who need it most! Starlink already works in about 24 other African countries. Villages there now have internet for school, doctors, and business. South Africa’s villages are missing out because of these racist rules. Elon isn’t asking for special favors. He just wants fair play so Starlink can connect everyone fast. Internet = education, jobs, hope. Why hold back millions of kids over rules that pick by race and color?











In case you missed Newsfile today, here is the lowdown: 1. In July 2025, a company called Engineers & Planners (E&P), owned by one of Ghana's top politicians & businessmen, announced that it had raised $100m from the Ecowas Bank (EBID) to buy the Black Volta goldmine. 2. Black Volta Mine is super interesting because it opens up a new gold mining frontier in Ghana's Upper West, away from the traditional gold hubs in the middle belt. By some estimates, the mine may produce 2m ounces of gold over its lifetime, which at current prices would fetch over $7bn. (Asset valuation is, of course, based on net, not gross, cashflow.) 3. The only problem is that the investors who have owned the rights to the mine since 2020, Ibaera, weren't part of the announced deal. They had broken off their relationship with E&P in December 2024 many months before the EBID announcement. It seemed as if E&P was trying to strong-arm them to hand over the mine. 4. That's what got me interested: governance and the investment climate are undermined if businesses with political connections try to strong-arm others and take over their assets. 5. After massive public controversy, Ghana's Energy Minister intervened, and E&P resumed negotiations with Ibaera. Meanwhile, an arbitration in London initiated by E&P in October 2024 was also ongoing. 6. The negotiations centred around E&P paying ~$100m to clear off loans the investors had made to their 100% owned Ghana entity, Azumah Ghana, that holds the mining license for Black Volta issued in 2014 (I will ignore the smaller Upwest mine in my analysis). The loans reflect spending on exploration to confirm where the gold is concentrated on the many square kilometres of land in the license area. 7. Since Ibaera invested for profit, there was also an understanding in the initial 2023 agreement signed with E&P that E&P would raise over $200m (updated from $160m based on a bankability study) to build the mine and thus earn the full shares of the company, allowing the investors to exit at multiples of the money originally invested. Now that trust was broken, the negotiations centred on E&P paying another $100m to acquire all the shares instead of co-developing the mine with the investors. 8. Between 11th July and 5th September, during which negotiations and the arbitration proceedings have proceeded in parallel, the issues couldn't be resolved. In short, the investors wanted their money to walk away. But for whatever reason, E&P hasn't paid. 9. On 5th September, E&P withdrew its own case from arbitration. Then, on 8th September, it announced a takeover of 100% of the shares of Azumah Ghana, the Black Volta license holder, which itself is 100% owned by Ibaera through IGIC and Azumah Australia. Naturally, the move confused observers. 10. What actually happened is that the Secretary to Azumah Ghana, one Hector Nyinaku, had been listed as the "beneficial owner" of the Azumah Ghana shares. This person was the Admin Manager of Azumah during the time of the previous owners. When ownership changed to Ibaera in 2020, he remained listed as the "beneficial owner" even though he doesn't own a single share and isn't the ultimate controller of the company or owner of its economic assets in anyway. I consider his role an "implied trusteeship." 11. In short, the "takeover" announced on 8th September was simply shares moving from Azumah's Secretary, Mr. Nyinaku, to E&P, without Ibaera's consent. 12. Naturally, Ibaera was livid, hence the threat to increase their claim at arbitration to $1 billion and expose Ghana if the state assists E&P to keep the shares. 13. So, what's the latest? Negotiations have accelerated. It is clear that E&P has taken a risky gambit. It has boxed Ibaera into a corner to force its hand. But by so doing, it has also made the arbitration tribunal far more likely to rule against it. The high-stakes gamble would only work if it gets Ibaera to agree on a quicker, perhaps cheaper, settlement, thus terminating the arbitration (which continues despite E&P's withdrawal of its claims because of Ibaera's counterclaims). Thereby increasing the chances of convincing financiers to release the funds for them to pay off Ibaera. 14. So far, the only serious financiers we have spotted hanging around the deal are the Ecowas Bank (EBID) and CBG Ghana, both public banks. 15. There are risks in how E&P has approached this affair, knowing full well that it would need to approach the market for over $200m to build the mine after takeover. 16. There is a vocal group of online warriors pushing the narrative that Ghana doesn't need any investors and therefore that the country's, and by inference E&P's, investment reputation doesn't matter. This is quite ridiculous. There are many mineral deposits lying around in Ghana that can't be developed due to lack of capital. There are 11 sites with manganese occurrences, for instance, and about the same number with credible iron occurrences. There are many gold occurrences in the North that remain untapped as well. Why haven't the "local champions" these keyboard warriors say they are fighting for developed these sites? Simple: because capital is scarce. Building capacity for indigenous ownership of mines in Ghana actually require safeguarding the investment climate, which is the work some of us have been doing for years despite widespread misunderstanding and motive questioning. 17. The cost of confirming enough reserves or "mineral concentration" before proceeding to build a viable, modern, mine is massive. That is why prizes like Black Volta, where so much money has been spent over the years and a lot of work done to position the mine for investment, are so valuable. And are being so ferociously fought over. 18. We hope that, going forward, E&P will balance ambition with prudence as it seeks to close this chapter. The people of Wa - Lawra deserve the jobs and local investment that could come from the mine if properly managed.






In 1900 white population of world was 36%, today it is 8%.








