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Yesterday, during a Space hosted by .@SITREP_artorias, .@realazadeh I listened to .@MalcolmNance , describing how Iran could dominate U.S. armed forces in the Gulf. As someone who greatly respects him as an expert on these matters, I still found the analysis unconvincing from my layman's perspective. I forwarded the recording (below) to two far more knowledgeable people. One responded with a strategic-level critique (with a touch of humor), while the other dove into the tactical details. I'd welcome any comments here - and especially a response from Malcolm Nance himself. 1. Clausewitz, your narrative reads like a thriller novel, not a realistic assessment of Iran’s capabilities. The idea that the IRGC can seamlessly coordinate massed missile salvos, drone swarms, suicide boats, underwater vehicles, and mines simultaneously is pure fantasy. Recent events show Iran struggles even with modest synchronized operations - drones fail frequently, get intercepted easily, and ballistic missiles show inconsistent accuracy and reliability, far from the precise, perfectly timed strikes you describe. Quietly moving dozens of anti-ship missiles hundreds of kilometers for a synchronized national salvo ignores Iran’s chronic C2 problems, logistical bottlenecks, and constant U.S. ISR coverage of the terrain. Strategic surprise isn’t their strength. The U.S. isn’t fixated on the Strait of Hormuz as you assume. American strategy focuses on keeping Iran off balance, shaping the battlespace, and hitting Tehran’s weak points - often far from Hormuz. The U.S. enjoys overwhelming spectrum dominance, persistent ISR, and unmatched rapid-strike options. Your dramatic mountain-to-desert epic doesn’t match operational reality. Iran’s systems look impressive on paper, but large-scale, multi-domain coordination remains limited. The U.S. would dictate the tempo - not Tehran, and certainly not as you’ve imagined. 2. Malcolm, your assessment is outdated and fails to reflect 2026 operational realities in the ongoing conflict with Iran. The notion that the U.S. Navy is helpless against Iranian Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) due to carrier standoff distances is obsolete. The U.S. has deployed low-altitude, persistent platforms to counter these threats: - A-10 Thunderbolt II ("Warthog"): aircraft, operating from regional airbases, are actively hunting and destroying FIACs in the Strait of Hormuz. Armed with AGM-65 Mavericks, APKWS rockets, and the GAU-8/A Avenger cannon, they excel at loitering, visually acquiring, and engaging fast boats in cluttered littoral zones. Recent operations confirm A-10s "hunting and killing" Iranian fast-attack watercraft. - AH-64 Apache helicopters engage one-way attack drones and small naval targets with precision munitions alongside A-10s and allies. CENTCOM reports over 120 Iranian vessels destroyed-including swarm boats and mine layers-with operations ongoing to secure the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's shore-based anti-ship missiles remain a threat, but the claim of firing 50 simultaneously is unrealistic. U.S. and Israeli air dominance enables strikes on storage sites and launchers at the moment of attempted launch. Iran's capabilities are minimal and eroding daily through sustained attacks. While they may score a few ship hits-as in the 1980s or 2019 - these will not constitute victory. Within weeks, Iran's naval threat will be reduced to a minor obstacle, and safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz will be fully restored. This isn't the 1980s: Carrier standoff is strategic; deep-strike assets neutralize missile threats while A-10s and Apaches dominate the littoral. FIACs can't "zoom out and vanish"- they're hunted in real time. U.S./Israeli forces execute large-scale coordinated attacks deep into Iran, with 89–92% of Iranian missiles/drones failing to reach targets.

Tucker Carlson allowed a CCP mouthpiece who is employed by a high school in Beijing that promotes the Chinese Communist Party on its website to come on his podcast to spew CCP propaganda. @TCNetwork @TuckerCarlson never once pushed back. During the interview, @xueqinjiang said, “It is the nature of the Chinese government NOT to interfere in foreign affairs…China doesn't really have a geopolitical framework, a grand strategy. It really believes in global trade.” Tucker Carlson didn’t push back. In fact, you can see him nodding his head in agreement with Jiang Xueqin, who I exposed below as a CCP supporter. Tucker Carlson runs cover for Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and now China. He is an enemy of the state and needs to be treated like one. A total traitor to America. Reminder: Tucker’s son Buckley Carlson works in the White House for @JDVance. Do they condemn this CCP propaganda? We need to know.

My team, myself & @camhigby were just violently assaulted on Skid Row, my camera crew were punched in the neck and face, we were pepper sprayed, but thankfully just escaped. Some members of our team had to run 10 blocks to get out. We were in the heart of Skid Row confronting the petitioners who @Savsays and my team caught on tape illegally offering drugs for ballot signatures. Please share this video to understand what we’re up against.

JUST IN: The country that learned to shoot down Iranian drones over Kyiv is now teaching the Gulf to shoot them down over refineries. Nobody asked Trump. The Gulf asked Ukraine. President Zelensky confirmed at the UK Parliament on March 18 that 201 Ukrainian military specialists are already deployed across UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, with teams en route to Kuwait and 34 more ready to go. These are active-duty government military personnel, not private contractors. They are sharing combat-proven expertise from three years of intercepting Iranian Shahed drones over Ukrainian cities, power grids, and civilian infrastructure. The Gulf states requested the assistance. Saudi Arabia explicitly approached Ukraine. The arrangement is reciprocal: Ukraine provides the expertise that no other country possesses at this depth of operational experience, and the Gulf provides what Ukraine needs most, funding, technology, and air defence systems. Zelensky specifically highlighted Patriot missiles as part of the exchange. The country that cannot get enough Patriots from the West is earning them from the Gulf by teaching drone interception. Trump did not request this deployment. No reporting in any outlet, from Reuters to Al Jazeera to the Kyiv Post, indicates American coordination or approval. The recent Trump-Zelensky tensions over aid disputes and public friction are well documented. This is not a Washington-orchestrated move. It is a bilateral arrangement between Ukraine and Gulf capitals that bypasses Washington entirely. Zelensky built a parallel channel to the Gulf that gives Ukraine what America has been reluctant to provide while giving the Gulf what America’s $23.5 billion arms surge does not include: the people who know how to fight Shaheds because they have been fighting them every night for three years. The expertise is specific and irreplaceable. Ukraine has intercepted thousands of Shahed-136 and Shahed-238 drones since 2022. It has developed detection protocols, jamming techniques, acoustic tracking, small-arms interception methods, and integrated air defence coordination that no training manual teaches. The Gulf states purchased Patriot batteries, THAAD radars, and anti-drone systems through the $23.5 billion arms package. The hardware is American. The operational knowledge of how to use it against the exact Iranian drone variants now striking Gulf refineries is Ukrainian. Israel views this positively. Anything that strengthens Gulf air defences against Iranian drones reduces the threat environment for every country in the region, including Israel. Ukrainian-Gulf cooperation reinforces the anti-Iran alignment that the Abraham Accords established. Israel and Ukraine share a common adversary’s weapons system: Iran builds the Shaheds, Russia deploys them against Ukraine, and the IRGC deploys them against the Gulf. The expertise flows in one direction. The threat originates from the same factory. The Putin dimension is real but secondary. Iran supplies Russia with Shahed drones for use against Ukraine. Ukraine now teaches Gulf states to destroy those same drones when Iran uses them directly. The feedback loop is elegant: every Ukrainian lesson learned from shooting down Russian-deployed Shaheds over Odesa is now applied to IRGC-deployed Shaheds over Ras Laffan. Putin’s Iranian drone supplier is being countered by the country Putin is fighting, on a battlefield 4,000 kilometres from the front line. The irony is structural. The aggravation is intentional. Two hundred and one experts. Government military, not contractors. Gulf-requested, not Trump-directed. Shahed-specific, not generic. And the country with the most relevant expertise on Earth got there before the $23.5 billion in hardware arrived. open.substack.com/pub/shanakaans…

Really smart piece about Virginia gerrymandering in @realDailyWire by @bdomenech. Where in the world are the Republicans in this? Spoiler: There's someone with a LOT of money who could do something about it dailywire.com/news/yes-virgi…