娱山_Yushang

黄金节后来一波不错的反弹，是对节前勇敢抄底和拿住不动的人的奖赏。这个奖赏我没有拿到😅。目前可以涨涨，但还是在等最后一波的下跌，希望能买到4700~4800的黄金。#黄金 #XAUT

Opinion @opinionlabsxyz要来了，TGE在即 积分多的要麻了 群里已经有人29U一分收op积分了！ $OPN 将于2 月 6 日 11:00 上线 币安钱包Booster 活动！ 活动总奖励：500万枚 $OPN （占总供应量 0.5%） 参与条件：币安无私钥钱包用户，只要 Alpha 积分够就能参加，参与会消耗 5 个 Alpha 积分 奖励发放：第一阶段 300万枚 $OPN 会在 TGE 当天直接发放 @BinanceWallet @binancezh

No complexity. No accident. 10/10 was caused by irresponsible marketing campaigns by certain companies. On October 10, tens of billions of dollars were liquidated. As CEO of OKX, we observed clearly that the crypto market’s microstructure fundamentally changed after that day. Many industry participants believe the damage was more severe than the FTX collapse. Since then, there has been extensive discussion about why it happened and how to prevent a recurrence. The root causes are not difficult to identify. ⸻ What actually happened 1.Binance launched a temporary user-acquisition campaign offering 12% APY on USDe, while allowing USDe to be used as collateral with the same treatment as USDT and USDC, and without effective limits. 2.USDe is a tokenized hedge fund product. Ethena raises capital via a so-called “stablecoin,” deploys it into index arbitrage and algorithmic trading strategies, and tokenizes the resulting fund. The token can then be deposited on exchanges to earn yield. 3.USDe is fundamentally different from products such as BlackRock BUIDL and Franklin Templeton BENJI, which are tokenized money market funds with low-risk profiles. USDe, by contrast, embeds hedge-fund-level risk. This difference is structural, not cosmetic. 4.Binance users were encouraged to convert USDT and USDC into USDe to earn attractive yields, without sufficient emphasis on the underlying risks. From a user’s perspective, trading with USDe appeared no different from trading with traditional stablecoins—while the actual risk profile was materially higher. 5.Risk escalated further as users: •converted USDT/USDC into USDe, •used USDe as collateral to borrow USDT, •converted the borrowed USDT back into USDe, •and repeated the cycle. This leverage loop produced artificial APYs of 24%, 36%, and even 70%+, widely perceived as “low risk” simply because they were offered by a major platform. Systemic risk accumulated rapidly across the global crypto market. 6.At that point, even a small market shock was sufficient to trigger a collapse. When volatility hit, USDe depegged quickly. Cascading liquidations followed, and weaknesses in risk management around assets such as WETH and BNSOL further amplified the crash. Some tokens briefly traded near zero. The damage to global users and companies—including OKX customers—was severe, and recovery will take time. ⸻ Why this matters I am discussing the root cause, not assigning blame or launching an attack on Binance. Speaking openly about systemic risks is sometimes uncomfortable, but it is necessary if the industry is to mature responsibly. I expect there may be significant misinformation and coordinated FUD directed at OKX in the near future. Even so, speaking honestly about systemic risk is the right thing to do—and we will continue to do so. As the largest global platform, Binance has outsized influence—and corresponding responsibility—as an industry leader. Long-term trust in crypto cannot be built on short-term yield games, excessive leverage, or marketing practices that obscure risk. The industry needs leaders who prioritize market stability, transparency, and responsible innovation—not a winner-take-all mentality where criticism is treated as hostility. Crypto is still early. What we choose to normalize today will determine whether this industry earns lasting trust—or repeats the same mistakes again.