Brother Michael

3.8K posts

Brother Michael banner
Brother Michael

Brother Michael

@MichaelEssandoh

#Cloud #Kubernetes #DotNet #LLMs

Accra, Ghana Katılım Mayıs 2010
1.1K Takip Edilen817 Takipçiler
Brother Michael retweetledi
Asanwa.sol
Asanwa.sol@Chizitere_xyz·
People have learned a few psychological buzzwords on social media,like "gaslighting," "narcissist," "boundaries," and "toxic", and now they use them to run away from normal human conflict. Sometimes your partner isn't a "toxic narcissist violating your boundaries"; sometimes they are just annoyed, having a bad day, and you are actually the one who was wrong. We have weaponized therapy language to ensure we never have to apologize or compromise.
Kaze 🇳🇬@8Kyle

unpopular relationships opinions that would get you in this position???

English
183
5.3K
25.1K
963.7K
Brother Michael
Brother Michael@MichaelEssandoh·
Seeing all these dumsor apps has motivated me to complete a related side project. Let’s see just how much I can stretch @claudeai 😏
English
0
0
1
56
Brother Michael retweetledi
n
n@topboyasante·
We built a crowdsourced outage tracker for Ghana. Power and now water too. See what your neighbours are reporting in real time, no waiting on ECG or GWCL. 1,500+ reports across 80 zones in a day.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ check it out on odumsor.com
n tweet median tweet median tweet media
English
16
230
414
50.9K
Brother Michael
Brother Michael@MichaelEssandoh·
The human responsible for 90% of the horrible legacy code and technical debt is now back with LLMs. God help us all 😔
English
0
0
0
50
Brother Michael retweetledi
Виталя пишет код
Виталя пишет код@gambala_codes·
Стандартная позиция человека, который решает проблемы других:
Виталя пишет код tweet media
Русский
275
29.6K
238.3K
3M
Brother Michael retweetledi
Kai Lentit (e/xcel)
Kai Lentit (e/xcel)@KaiLentit·
I am monitoring the situation. (2026 FULL)
English
29
44
440
25.4K
K.
K.@kwesi_dadson·
I need a reliable shipping agent that can just ship things from China for me. How hard is that?
English
21
1
22
4.3K
Brother Michael retweetledi
Kyle Daigle
Kyle Daigle@kdaigle·
Yup, platform activity is surging. There were 1 billion commits in 2025. Now, it's 275 million per week, on pace for 14 billion this year if growth remains linear (spoiler: it won't.) GitHub Actions has grown from 500M minutes/week in 2023 to 1B minutes/week in 2025, and now 2.1B minutes so far this week. So we're pushing incredibly hard on more CPUs, scaling services, and strengthening GitHub’s core features. And as a fine purveyor of hand-crafted shit code for many years, I'm not gonna weigh in on that. 🤣
ThePrimeagen@ThePrimeagen

I would like to make my apologies for defending M$, but I must from time to time. I have to put respect on github for handling the amount of shit code that has been added over the last 3 months. literally 10s of billions of lines of code that will never see the light of a CPU

English
144
471
6.2K
2M
Brother Michael retweetledi
Gemini_DNA♊️🇬🇭
Gemini_DNA♊️🇬🇭@gemini_dna·
For those of you who have forgotten this document, please walk with me 🙏🦁🇬🇭
Gemini_DNA♊️🇬🇭 tweet media
Sam 'Dzata' George 🦁🇬🇭@samgeorgegh

Dear X, In 2017, when many were afraid to speak for the NDC after the massive 2016 election defeat, a few of us stood up and filled the gap. I was on TV and radio, sometimes 3 times a day. I was on the floor of Parliament as part of a paltry 106 against the NPP's 169. I made sure my voice was heard! Today, I see the slicing and reposting of old videos to set an agenda. I smile and say, "I have paid my dues." You may think you are cooking, but with each video you post, you show the stripes on my shoulder as I fought to bring my party - the NDC - to power. I stood for something I believed in - the return of JM. When former Ministers refused to speak and defend, I did, and I have ABSOLUTELY no regrets. So, dig deeper, you will find 10,000s of videos of me toiling either on the screens or in Parliament. Today, JM is back in power with an even bigger victory than we lost in 2016. We have almost 190 MPs in Parliament. I paid my due, and I hold my head high. Now ask yourself, what have you stood for or achieved? If you think my hustle is simple, like we say on the streets, do make we see! The fact that I have chosen peace does not mean that I am asleep. You think you are agenda-ing, you are simply writing my political memoirs, and I am reading with delight at the testimony of the work we did and achieved. This one is a #TuffSeed. Go and ask your predecessors and be told! Nothing you say about me today is new and has not been told to me before. And oh, let me add the emojis. 🦁🇬🇭 #EyesFixedOnThePrize #LionBorn #HyeWonHye #ThatWhichFireCannotBurn

English
11
214
641
52.2K
Brother Michael retweetledi
Feross
Feross@feross·
📢 ZERO SIGN UP, FREE FOREVER, MALWARE PROTECTION. npm i -g sfw sfw npm install sfw pnpm install sfw yarn install sfw cargo fetch sfw uv pip install socket.dev/blog/introduci…
Feross@feross

🚨 CRITICAL: Active supply chain attack on axios -- one of npm's most depended-on packages. The latest axios@1.14.1 now pulls in plain-crypto-js@4.2.1, a package that did not exist before today. This is a live compromise. This is textbook supply chain installer malware. axios has 100M+ weekly downloads. Every npm install pulling the latest version is potentially compromised right now. Socket AI analysis confirms this is malware. plain-crypto-js is an obfuscated dropper/loader that: • Deobfuscates embedded payloads and operational strings at runtime • Dynamically loads fs, os, and execSync to evade static analysis • Executes decoded shell commands • Stages and copies payload files into OS temp and Windows ProgramData directories • Deletes and renames artifacts post-execution to destroy forensic evidence If you use axios, pin your version immediately and audit your lockfiles. Do not upgrade.

English
24
41
316
46.1K
Brother Michael retweetledi
Joe Desimone
Joe Desimone@dez_·
Cobbled together a supply chain monitoring system last week: Cursor+Composer-2-fast harness on live package diffs (pypi+npm). Simple! Received a slack alert within minutes of Axios compromise. Reported to the devs after triple checking, because at first I could not believe it!
Joe Desimone tweet mediaJoe Desimone tweet media
English
12
52
376
34K
Brother Michael retweetledi
International Cyber Digest
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest·
‼️ Meet the guy almost everyone loves for alerting the axios devs about the supply chain attack. He built a supply chain monitoring system last week, and was alerted within minutes of the axios compromise. The world should be thanking Elastic Security's finest: Joe @dez_
International Cyber Digest tweet mediaInternational Cyber Digest tweet media
International Cyber Digest@IntCyberDigest

‼️ Meet the guy almost everyone hates for releasing a PoC for a MongoDB unauthenticated memory leak exploit dubbed Mongobleed the day after Christmas. This is allegedly the vulnerability used to breach Ubisoft, which led to the R6 chaos.

English
13
116
1.5K
145.2K
Brother Michael retweetledi
vx-underground
vx-underground@vxunderground·
There is a project on GitHub called Axios. Axios is extremely popular. It is used by millions upon millions of applications. Axios is a programming library that helps your JavaScript code make HTTP/S requests (communicate with websites). In simple terms, if you're a programmer doing something with JavaScript, and want to do stuff that communicates with a website in literally any capacity, people heavily recommend using Axios due to its simplicity. Using Axios you don't have to reinvent the wheel and do a bunch of work. All you need to do is import Axios into your code and you're off to the races. Someone (currently unknown) compromised Axios (currently unknown how) to deliver malware to people. When someone updates or installs Axios, Axios itself contains malware. What the malware does is (currently) unknown, but it is being reversed engineered by probably every malware analyst on the planet at this moment. In a few hours more details will emerge. Information is being exchanged in real time on social media and private communication platforms as I write this. Due to the size and popularity of Axios, it is unknown how many are impacted, it could be millions, it could be thousands, or if we're lucky, only hundreds of people or organizations will be impacted. If this is absolute worst case scenario, millions of organizations across the planet have been infected with malware which (currently) we do not understand. However, the likelihood of this is low. It appears Axios being compromised was detected quickly, potentially within minutes (or hours) of it being compromised to deliver malware. Additionally, the likelihood of every single Axios user updating Axios as soon as it was compromised to deliver malware is astronomically low. It is basically zero. The impact from Axios being compromised is devastating, the fallout from this will be a massive headache. This is unironically a malware nuclear missile and will likely be studied in the future.
English
107
837
7.8K
586.5K
Brother Michael retweetledi
vx-underground
vx-underground@vxunderground·
The LiteLLM supply chain attack is big shenanigans. I have to explain the whole thingie though so you can get the full context of the shenanigans. TeamPCP (the people who probably did it) is unironically swinging a big ass fuck off baseball bat, they're swinging for the moon. tl;dr see picture of cat as summary I also want to preface this with I DID NOT PERFORM THIS ANALYSIS. I almost never do open-source solutions malware stuff and this is also more in the line of work with DFIR (Digital Forensics and Incident Response). This summary comes from various peers and colleagues of mine who have been discussing TeamPCP the past couple of days. DFIR nerds I sourced: - @ramimacisabird - @InsiderPhD Non DFIR nerds I sourced: - @IceSolst - @IntCyberDigest Yeah, so pretty much this group of nerds named TeamPCP bamboozled an open-source security product called Trivy. TeamPCP sent a pull request on GitHub but did it with "pull_request_target". Normally a pull request isn't a big deal. Nerds do it all the time. "pull_request_target" though is designed to copy secrets, tokens, etc. pull_request_target is a legit thing. People do it all the time. It should only be performed by people you trust. TeamPCP impersonated a legitimate GitHub contributor. Trivy was caught slippin'. When TeamPCP did pull_request_target they stole access tokens to a place called Aqua Security. Aqua Security was like, "lol gosh dang it" and did what you were supposed to do. They rotated access tokens and passwords and stuff. However, Aqua made an oopsie and forgot to rotate the stuff for one of their automation bots. Once TeamPCP had access they injected malicious code which steal environment variables, SSH keys, cloud credentials, cryptotokens, etc into three things. - Trivy - Trivy GitHub actions - Trivy Docker stuff As is tradition, once TeamPCP put malware into Trivy stuff, anyone who did anything with Trivy was given malware. TeamPCP got a metric poop ton of stolen data and began using it to move to NPM projects. The projects they infected next was infected with a malware people named "CanisterWorm". In extreme summary, CanisterWorm placed stuff in package.json from the infected NPM project. Every new infected NPM project would download malware to the machine that (unsurprisingly) stole your data. TeamPCP seems to have been inspired by the North Korean government, or ALPHV ransomware group, because instead of stealing data to their server they store it on the blockchain ... making it virtually impossible to takedown. LiteLLM takes place somewhere between Trivy and CanisterWorm. As of this writing the exact way TeamPCP got access to LiteLLM is unknown, however it's heavily speculated it is from Trivy. TeamPCP also stated very bluntly they got access from Trivy but ... they could also be lying. This may come as a surprise, but sometimes criminals lie to cover their tracks. LiteLLM infection though was a few more degrees amplified than the previous stuff. LiteLLM infection also attempts lateral movement by automating Kubernetes stuff. LiteLLM infection also steals a ton more data than previous stuff. Here is the big ass list of stuff it steals: - SSH keys - AWS credentials and configurations - GCP credentials and configurations - Azure environment variables - Kubernetes credentials and configurations - Environment configurations - Shell History - Git credentials and configurations - Docker credentials and configurations - Database instances - IaC / CI/DI - SSL private keys - Solana keys - Crypto wallets - VPN credentials and configurations - Hashicorp vault (?) - NPM configurations - SMTP credentials TeamPCP is unironically putting in big moves. What makes them unusual is how profoundly aggressive they are. It isn't uncommon for Threat Actors to attempt things like this, but TeamPCP is doing something more akin to "smash and grab" rather than "stay silent and watch".
vx-underground tweet media
English
33
163
1.2K
60.5K