Elmi

For years, the UAE built influence by backing non-state actors, secessionist projects, and parallel authorities across the Red Sea, North Africa, and the Gulf of Aden. In Libya it backed Haftar. In Sudan it backed the RSF, complete with foreign mercenaries and drones. In Yemen it backed the Southern Transitional Council. In Somalia it backed Somaliland and assorted factions. In Ethiopia it encouraged reckless pressure on Eritrea and helped destabilize the Red Sea balance. This model depended on fragmentation. States were treated as obstacles and militias as assets. It worked only as long as larger powers tolerated it. That tolerance ended in a single week. Saudi Arabia pushed the UAE out of Yemen and the STC dissolved itself. Pakistan began moving aircraft and weapons into Sudan through Saudi coordination. Egypt pressured Haftar to block RSF supply routes through eastern Libya. Sudan’s Sovereignty Council struck RSF camps inside Ethiopian territory, with Addis Ababa notably silent. At the same time, the UAE and Ethiopia abruptly issued statements affirming Somali unity after years of enabling its breakdown. Saudi Arabia has concluded that Emirati adventurism now threatens core Saudi interests. Yemen’s fragmentation directly endangers Saudi security. Sudan’s collapse destabilizes the Red Sea. Libya’s partition sets a precedent the Arab world cannot afford. Somalia’s disintegration crosses another red line. Somaliland’s attempted recognition, especially via Israel, triggered alarm not only in Riyadh but also in Cairo, Ankara, Jakarta, and Beijing, where the implications extend as far as Taiwan. The UAE misread its position. It is not a power centre; it is a marketplace dependent on Saudi tolerance, Western goodwill, and a regional stability it did not create. Once its actions began producing systemic instability, it became expendable. What we are witnessing is a corrective realignment. Militias are being cut off, secession projects reversed, and state sovereignty reasserted. The corridor that ran from eastern Libya to Darfur, from Aden to Berbera, is being dismantled. We may even see a reversal of Israeli recognition of Somaliland. The question now is what happens next to Haftar, the RSF, Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party, Somaliland, other Somali factions, and the remnants of the STC and, most importantly, how the UAE recovers from this reversal. These events have exposed how vulnerable its position really is, and how carefully it will have to move from here on, both in action and in perception.