Mohammed Seif
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Mohammed Seif
@Mohammedseif30
الصمت في حرم الجمال جمالٌ







Under Emirati Pressure, the Arab League Fails to Condemn Drone Attacks on Sudan After Abu Dhabi Objects to Naming Ethiopia The Arab League Council, meeting at the level of permanent representatives, failed on Sunday, May 10, 2026, to approve a draft resolution condemning drone attacks that targeted Khartoum Airport and civilian facilities across Sudan. The failure followed an objection by the UAE representative to any condemnation of Ethiopia. He accused Sudan of trying to use the regional body to advance allegations he claimed were false. According to accounts of the session, most of the debate centered on exchanges between the Sudanese and Emirati representatives. The chair of the meeting, Bahrain’s representative, eventually postponed the session until Monday for further consultations. Sudan and Algeria objected to the delay, while other interventions ranged from attempts to pass a weakened version of the draft with no reference to Ethiopia, to proposals to postpone the discussion altogether. The deadlock is striking. The draft resolution concerned attacks on a civilian airport and other facilities inside an Arab League member state, incidents that directly affect Sudan’s sovereignty, security, and critical infrastructure. Yet the Council was unable to adopt a clear position because of the UAE’s objection to naming Ethiopia. Sudan has asserted that the attacks were linked to the use of Ethiopian territory as a platform or transit route for hostile operations against it. These claims have not remained confined to Sudanese political statements. They have been addressed in international reporting, including by Reuters and Middle East Eye, which have examined Bahir Dar Airport and alleged logistical and military support routes connected to the Rapid Support Militia. In a notable intervention, Egypt’s representative warned that the Arab League’s failure to pass a resolution condemning the attacks could trigger negative reactions among Arab public opinion regarding the organization’s role. His warning comes amid growing criticism of the League’s inability to take firm positions on matters involving the sovereignty and national security of its member states. The UAE’s objection cannot be separated from the wider context of the war in Sudan. The drone attacks on Khartoum Airport and civilian facilities came after Sudan directly accused Ethiopia of allowing its territory to be used in hostile operations, alongside repeated Sudanese accusations that the UAE supports the Rapid Support Militia. Following the attacks, the Sudanese government held a press conference in which the Sudanese Armed Forces spokesperson, Brigadier General Asim Awad Abdelwahab, presented what he described as technical and documentary evidence linking the attacks to Ethiopia and the UAE. During the conference, the Sudanese Armed Forces displayed images and flight paths that it said showed drones launched from Bahir Dar Airport in Ethiopia and targeting sites in Khartoum, Kordofan, Blue Nile, and White Nile, including Khartoum Airport. The military spokesperson also said that data from one drone shot down on March 17 had been analyzed, and that the Sudanese Armed Forces contacted the manufacturer, which, according to him, confirmed that the drone carrying the serial number S88 belonged to the UAE. In February 2026, Reuters published an investigation reporting that Ethiopia was hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the Rapid Support Militia. According to the report, eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian official, said the UAE funded the construction of the camp and provided military trainers and logistical support. An internal Ethiopian security document cited in the report indicated that 4,300 fighters were being trained there in January 2026. Reuters described the findings as the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in the war. That context makes the UAE’s objection to condemning Ethiopia inside the Arab League especially sensitive. Abu Dhabi was not only objecting to the naming of a neighboring country, but to the condemnation of a route that, according to international reporting, had already been linked to Emirati support and Ethiopian facilitation for the Rapid Support Militia. Middle East Eye also reported in April 2026 that satellite imagery collected since December had revealed a base in Assosa, in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, allegedly linked to Emirati supply lines and used to facilitate support for the Rapid Support Militia. The report adds to the background that makes the UAE’s objection more significant. It suggests that the issue is not simply whether Ethiopia should be named, but whether the Arab League is willing to confront alleged cross-border support networks sustaining the militia’s war effort. Seen in this light, the UAE’s objection appears less like a defense of Ethiopia alone and more like an effort to shield itself and a support route Abu Dhabi is accused of helping build. International reports examining Ethiopia’s role have not treated it in isolation from the UAE. They have pointed to training camps and logistical routes inside Ethiopian territory that, according to those reports, were funded or supported by the UAE for the benefit of the Rapid Support Militia. The Council’s failure to pass the resolution reveals a deeper crisis inside the Arab League. When the organization cannot condemn attacks on a civilian airport and vital facilities in a member state because of political pressure and objections from a country already accused of involvement in the war, the issue is no longer just the wording of a draft resolution. It becomes a question about the Arab League’s ability, and willingness, to defend the sovereignty of its own members. #Sudan #RSFisTerroristOrganization #UAEKillsSudanesePeople #UAESponsorsTerrorism





PART1: From Al Ain and Ghayathi to Nyala: Defected Commander Details UAE-Backed Training, Mercenary Routes, and Drone Programs for the Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed) In a conference held by the forces of Brigadier General Al-Nour Al-Qubba after their defection from the Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed) and their return to the national side, field commander Ali Al-Tayeb Mohammed Musa gave direct testimony about what he described as the external support received by the militia, placing the United Arab Emirates at the center of a network of training, military support, and movement. Al-Tayeb opened his remarks by introducing himself as the field commander of Brigadier General Al-Nour Al-Qubba’s forces. He thanked the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the leadership of the armed forces for receiving them and opening what he described as “the embrace of the homeland” to the forces that had defected from the militia. He said the militia had been receiving clear and noticeable foreign support from the beginning of the war until today, stating that drones and other forms of support were coming from the UAE. He added that they had personally witnessed this support, stressing that his account was based on direct experience during his time inside the militia before the defection. According to Al-Tayeb, the UAE’s role was not limited to drones. He said it also included direct training inside UAE territory. He stated that he personally attended a training course in the UAE, where the trainers were Emiratis, naming Al Ain and Ghayathi as locations where training took place. The reference to Ghayathi is significant because it also appears in investigative work by Conflict Insights Group. In its report Blood Money: How UAE Support and Foreign Mercenaries Enabled the Fall of El Fasher, the group said it tracked a device linked to a Colombian mercenary that arrived at Zayed International Airport in the UAE on June 11, 2025, and moved the same day to a military training facility in Ghayathi, Abu Dhabi, where it remained until June 24. The report also noted that a 2021 United Nations Panel of Experts report on Libya had previously described the same Ghayathi facility as a site where Sudanese mercenaries hired by the UAE company Black Shield were trained under the supervision of Emirati officers. Conflict Insights Group further said it found four other Spanish-language devices at the Ghayathi base between April and September 2025. According to the report, two of these devices later traveled to South Darfur, including one that went to Nyala airport and connected to networks named “ANTIAEREO” and “AirDefense,” while another moved across South Darfur to an area around 30 kilometers from Nyala where satellite imagery indicated what appeared to be a military camp. Al-Tayeb added that the same trip was not only for training. Wounded militia fighters were also traveling with them for treatment, alongside training and officer qualification programs for members of the Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed). He also said intermediary countries were involved in transporting drones until they reached Sudan. Al-Tayeb then described the routes used by the militia to move personnel and support. He said the airports and routes included N’Djamena Airport in Chad, Al Jufra Airport in Libya, another airport in Benghazi, and an airport in Somalia. He said he personally landed at these airports during his trip to the training course. According to his account, the journey began in Nyala, then went to Al Jufra in Libya, then to Benghazi, before eventually reaching the UAE. On the return journey, he said they landed in Somalia, then moved from there to Chad, before returning to Sudan. Al-Tayeb also addressed the presence of foreign mercenaries in Sudan’s war, saying the matter had already been acknowledged by the militia commander himself in a public appearance, when he spoke about bringing in Colombian mercenaries. Al-Tayeb added that, during the return journey, he personally traveled with more than thirty Colombians, who came with them from the UAE until they landed at Nyala Airport. This part of his testimony also aligns with broader findings by Conflict Insights Group, which said it had tracked more than 50 devices associated with Colombian mercenaries operating in Sudan in 2025. The group’s report described Nyala airport as a hub for Colombian mercenaries and Rapid Support Militia drone operations, and said it documented significant drone activity at the airport. Al-Tayeb connected the movement of mercenaries to a wider training system, saying that around ninety percent of the training centers used for militia personnel were located inside the UAE. He said the transfer of personnel to those centers was coordinated from Nyala Airport, through the airports he had mentioned, before reaching the training centers inside the UAE, where he said he personally trained in Al Ain and Ghayathi. According to his remarks, the training courses included modern drone operations, strategic operations, suicide drones, reconnaissance drones, security and intelligence courses, and various administrative courses. He said these programs had intensified in the recent period because of the major administrative vacuum that struck the militia after the outbreak of the April 15 war. According to him, the officers who had been handling the militia’s administrative work were originally seconded from the Sudanese Armed Forces. When 480 officers left on the first day of the war in response to the Commander-in-Chief’s call for Sudanese Armed Forces personnel inside the militia to return to the army, the militia was left with a wide administrative gap, pushing it to expand training and qualification programs. The value of this testimony lies in its level of detail. It names places, routes, types of training, airports, and the movement of fighters, wounded personnel, and foreign mercenaries. When placed next to the findings of Conflict Insights Group, especially its reference to Ghayathi and the movement of Spanish-language devices toward South Darfur and Nyala, the testimony becomes part of a wider evidentiary picture that deserves further investigation and international scrutiny. For Sudan, the question is no longer only whether external support exists, but how deeply this support has shaped the course of the war. The account presented by Ali Al-Tayeb points to a structure that helped the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed) sustain military operations, expand drone capabilities, and move fighters through regional corridors while Sudanese civilians continue to pay the price. #Sudan #RSFisTerroristOrganization #UAEKillsSudanesePeople #UAESponsorsTerrorism




الحكومة حلها ساهل حترجع بورتسودان في أقرب فرصة اما المواطن يكتوى بنار اثار القصة ديه.


Official Spokesperson of the Sudanese Armed Forces Presents Evidence of United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia Involvement in Drone Attacks… Downing of a UAE-Owned Drone Reveals Its Flight Path and Targets Including Khartoum Sudan has announced what it describes as documented evidence pointing to external involvement in recent drone attacks targeting multiple regions across the country, raising serious concerns about sovereignty and regional escalation. In a press conference, the official spokesperson of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Brigadier General Asim Awad Abdelwahab Mohamed, stated that authorities are presenting a package of verified evidence to the Sudanese public, as well as to regional and international audiences. According to the spokesperson, the findings indicate the involvement of both the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia in what was described as aggression against Sudan, constituting a serious violation of national sovereignty and international law. The spokesperson explained that, based on conclusive data gathered by official institutions, three drones launched from Bahir Dar Airport in Ethiopia carried out hostile sorties beginning on March 1, 2026. The operations reportedly targeted several areas, including White Nile State, Blue Nile State, and both North and South Kordofan. On March 17, Sudanese air defenses intercepted and shot down one of the drones north of El-Obeid. Following the incident, technical teams analyzed the drone’s data and contacted the manufacturer. According to the spokesperson, the analysis confirmed that the drone, identified by serial number S88, is owned by the United Arab Emirates and was operated from Ethiopian territory, specifically Bahir Dar Airport. Flight data indicated the drone’s takeoff point and its route into Sudanese airspace, where it engaged targets in Al-Kurmuk and other locations in Blue Nile State, as well as in North and South Kordofan. The briefing also detailed a renewed incident beginning on May 1, when another drone launched from the same location reportedly entered Sudanese airspace. It was tracked until reaching the Jebel Aulia area, where it targeted Khartoum International Airport and other sites before being intercepted. The spokesperson emphasized that Sudan views these actions as direct aggression and affirmed that the armed forces remain fully prepared to respond to any threat in a manner that safeguards the country’s sovereignty, security, and national dignity. These claims emerge amid a growing body of international reporting pointing to a broader regional dimension of the conflict. A Reuters investigation has highlighted activity in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region near the Sudanese border, where a military training facility was reportedly used to prepare fighters affiliated with the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed). The report indicated that the facility was supported logistically and financially by the United Arab Emirates, including the provision of equipment and training, although both Ethiopia and the UAE have denied these allegations. Satellite imagery examined in the investigation also showed expansions at nearby infrastructure, including Asosa airport, raising concerns about its potential use in operational support, including drone-related activity. Parallel findings from the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab reinforce concerns about activity within Ethiopian territory. The lab’s analysis, based on satellite imagery and open-source intelligence, documented patterns consistent with the use of an Ethiopian military base in Asosa to support operations linked to the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed). While the report primarily focuses on the Ethiopian dimension, it aligns with wider investigative efforts pointing to external networks facilitating logistics, training, and the expansion of drone capabilities within the conflict. In a separate statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sudan addressed the diplomatic and legal dimensions of these developments, outlining Sudan’s position at the international level and reinforcing its characterization of the incidents as violations of international law. #Sudan #RSFisTerroristOrganization #UAEKillsSudanesePeople #UAESponsorsTerrorism










