RVP Commenter

2.4K posts

RVP Commenter

RVP Commenter

@RVPCommenter

Sports Bobcat. Variety progrum enthusiast

Katılım Mayıs 2021
1.1K Takip Edilen1.3K Takipçiler
Ruthless Podcast
Ruthless Podcast@RuthlessPodcast·
Is the slow creep of socialism the reason that Canada can’t win at Hockey anymore? Donald Trump’s case for American exceptionalism and smaller government on today’s show with @HolmesJosh, @ComfortablySmug and @JohnAshbrook - link in replies.
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Ruthless Podcast
Ruthless Podcast@RuthlessPodcast·
🚨TOMORROW🚨 Trump lays out a case for smaller government with a clarity we haven’t heard in years. Watch as @HolmesJosh, @ComfortablySmug and @JohnAshbrook discuss how messaging around limited government and fraud can resonate in the midterms. PLUS @mkratsios47, the WH Director of Science and Tech, joins Smug and @MichaelDuncan, and a naked burglary becomes a political discussion. New pod at 5am - link in replies.
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RVP Commenter
RVP Commenter@RVPCommenter·
The key missing component added after Eagle Claw was *transportation*. The 160th. Not sure how that part wasn’t included.
GIF
Jennifer Griffin@JenGriffinFNC

Incredible coda to this rescue operation for the 2 F15E airmen: The very same Special Operations units were formed after the failed Operation Eagle Claw ordered by President Jimmy Carter to rescue the 53 American hostages held at the US Embassy in Tehran are the very same units who performed heroically during this 48 hour rescue operation. On April 24-25 1980 – 46 years ago – a rescue mission for the US hostages was aborted amidst sandstorms and mechanical failures affecting the military helicopters involved. The aircraft had gathered at a remote site dubbed “Desert One.” The conditions on the ground in part reminiscent of the two MC130 aircraft getting stuck in the wet sand on Saturday at the make shift landing strip in Iran. A US helicopter collided with a C130 transport plane leaving 8 American servicemen dead. The disaster led to the creation of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the creation of SEAL Team 6 (Naval Special Warfare or DEVGRU) a few months later in 1980. Each played a central role in the rescue of the two F15E airmen. SEAL Team 6 was formed in November 1980 in the wake of the disastrous Operation Eagle Claw. The Joint Special Operations Command or JSOC which is based at Fort Bragg was also formed in 1980, a direct consequence of the failed rescue mission. 46 years later members of these very units carried out a daring rescue in the exact same country where their units were essentially born out of a failed rescue operation that marred a presidency and led to the creation of SEAL Team 6 and JSOC.

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RVP Commenter
RVP Commenter@RVPCommenter·
@BecketAdams @LeighWolf When people like Ben think winning wars is a crime, they stop empowering warriors to do their job. Hard to fathom why they don’t want the USA to win, though
RVP Commenter tweet mediaRVP Commenter tweet media
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T. Becket Adams
T. Becket Adams@BecketAdams·
@RVPCommenter @LeighWolf I was JUST saying this to my wife. One damper on all these recent insane military feats (I.e. Maduro, Fordow, this extraction, etc.) is that they lead inevitably to the question: if these are within our abilities, then what excuses are there for Afghanistan 2021 and Libya 2012?
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RVP Commenter
RVP Commenter@RVPCommenter·
@HolmesJosh @ComfortablySmug @MichaelDuncan @JohnAshbrook Europe wants to be reliant on Russia and Iran for energy (and China for everything else). Then, has the balls to tell us to pay more to NATO, UN, etc
James E. Thorne@DrJStrategy

Food for thought. Trump, Hormuz and the End of the Free Ride For half a century, Western strategists have known that the Strait of Hormuz is the acute point where energy, sea power and political will intersect. That knowledge is not in dispute. What is new in this war with Iran is that the United States, under Donald Trump, has chosen not to rush to “solve” the problem. In Hegelian terms, he is refusing an easy synthesis in order to force the underlying contradiction to the surface. The old thesis was simple: the US guarantees open sea lanes in the Gulf, and everyone else structures their economies and politics around that free insurance. Europe and the UK embraced ambitious green policies, ran down hard‑power capabilities and lectured Washington on multilateral virtue, secure in the assumption that American carriers would always appear off Hormuz. The political class behaved as if the American security guarantee were a law of nature, not a contingent choice. Their conduct today is closer to Chamberlain than Churchill: temporising, issuing statements, hoping the storm will pass without a fundamental reordering of their responsibilities. Trump’s antithesis is to withhold the automatic guarantee at the moment of maximum stress. Militarily, the US can break Iran’s residual ability to contest the Strait; that is not the binding constraint. The point is to delay that act. By allowing a closure or semi‑closure to bite, Trump ensures that the immediate pain is concentrated in exactly the jurisdictions that have most conspicuously free‑ridden on US power: the EU and the UK. Their industries, consumers and energy‑transition assumptions are exposed. In that context, his reported blunt message to European and British leaders, you need the oil out of the Strait more than we do; why don’t you go and take it? Is not a throwaway line. It is the verbalisation of the antithesis. It openly reverses the traditional presumption that America will carry the burden while its allies emote from the sidelines. In this dialectic, the prize is not simply the reopening of a chokepoint. The prize is a reordered system in which the United States effectively arbitrages and controls the global flow of oil. A world in which US‑aligned production in the Americas plus a discretionary capability to secure,or not secure, Hormuz places Washington at the centre of the hydrocarbon chessboard. For that strategic end, a rapid restoration of the old status quo would be counterproductive. A quick, surgical “fix” of Hormuz would short‑circuit the dialectic. If Trump rapidly crushed Iran’s remaining coastal capabilities, swept the mines and escorted tankers back through the Strait, Europe and the UK would heave a sigh of relief and return to business as usual: underfunded militaries, maximalist green posturing and performative disdain for US power, all underwritten by that same power. The contradiction between their dependence and their posture would remain latent. By declining to supply the synthesis on demand, and by explicitly telling London and Brussels to “go and take it” themselves, Trump forces a reckoning. European and British leaders must confront the fact that their energy systems, their industrial bases and their geopolitical sermons all rest on an American hard‑power foundation they neither finance nor politically respect. The longer the contradiction is allowed to unfold, the stronger the eventual synthesis can be: a new order in which access to secure flows, Hormuz, Venezuela and beyond, is explicitly conditional on real contributions, not assumed as a right. In that sense, the delay in “taking” the Strait, and the challenge issued to US allies to do it themselves, is not indecision. It is the negative moment Hegel insisted was necessary for history to move. Only by withholding the old guarantee, and by saying so out loud to those who depended on it, can Trump hope to end the free ride.

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🐺@LeighWolf·
@fareedi_kamran “Don’t appear on a show with a host who said 2,977 Americans deserved to die on 9/11” is actually a really good argument for democrats to make to their candidates.
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