Sarah Burkhard

Iran’s first of its 10 point plan in English: A binding guarantee that the U.S. and allies will not strike Iran again But in Iran’s Farsi version, a key phrase is tacked onto its first point namely the acceptance of Iran’s uranium enrichment. So, Iran’s English version of its 10 point plan makes no mention of nuclear, but its Farsi version, likely approved by the leadership, reiterates the same unacceptable enrichment condition. On the other hand, US first four points 1. Dismantle all major nuclear facilities 2. End all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil 3. Transfer enriched uranium stockpiles out of Iran 4. Accept intrusive international inspections everywhere These will be tough negotiations, made even harder by Iran’s other non-starter demands. The ceasefire may only be a brief interlude between military conflicts.

For those following the South Korean government release on North Korean nuclear weapons, here is some background, namely key results from my 2023 study on the size and nature of North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile and WGU and plutonium inventories as of the end of 2022 Under this estimate, the amounts of separated plutonium and weapon-grade uranium, or fissile material, produced as of the end of 2022, follow: 1. Weapon-Grade Uranium: 1770 kg median with 1425 to 2185 kg as the 5th and 95th percentile 2. Separated Plutonium: 63 kg median with 56 to 70 kg as the 5th and 95th percentile The attached table summarizes three principal estimates aimed at spanning the range of nuclear weapons North Korea could have produced through 2022. They are (1) a traditional estimate assuming that the arsenal is composed of relatively simple fission weapons, ones made only with plutonium and others made only with weapon-grade uranium; (2) one with every nuclear weapon composed of both plutonium and WGU, a “composite” nuclear weapon; and (3) an estimate with a set of single-stage thermonuclear weapons, in addition to simple fission weapons.   Table 1. The arsenal types and estimate ranges of North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal, as of the end of 2022.

NEW Case Study: A Chinese national residing in the U.S., Shenghua Wen, pleaded guilty in 2024 to conspiring with North Korea to export restricted items without a license. At the direction of the North Korean government, Wen acted from his private U.S. residences in Texas and California, buying military goods domestically and providing false end-user and shipping information to send the items to Hong Kong, and then to North Korea. Read the full case study by @jessicaakiim12 and @SarahBurkhard here: isis-online.org/isis-reports/c…

From G7 Foreign Ministers: We reaffirm that the Islamic Republic of Iran can never have nuclear weapons, and urge Iran to refrain from reconstituting its unjustified enrichment activities. We call for the resumption of negotiations, resulting in a comprehensive, verifiable and durable agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear program. In order to have a sustainable and credible resolution, we call on Iran to urgently resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required by its safeguards obligations and to provide the IAEA with verifiable information about all nuclear material in Iran, including by providing access to IAEA inspectors. We condemn calls in Iran for the arrest and execution of IAEA Director General Grossi. We underscore the centrality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is essential that Iran remains party to and fully implements its obligations under the Treaty. Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers on Iran and the Middle East MEDIA NOTE OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON JULY 1, 2025

DG Grossi said today on CBS Face the Nation that Iran could restart about 300 centrifuges or less in a matter of months. Iran just lost upwards of 20,000 centrifuges and can’t make more. Is this 300 or less the number of centrifuges Grossi thinks Iran may still have outside of Natanz and Fordow? If true, the situation is better than I would have thought. DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: “The capacities they have are there. They can have, you know, in a matter of months, I would say, a few cascades of centrifuges spinning and producing enriched uranium, or less than that.”

Israel is also degrading Iran’s ability to make the nuclear weapon itself, lengthening the amount of time Iran would need to finish a nuclear weapon. This graphic is a crude attempt to show where Iran’s capabilities have so far been degraded or complicated by Israel. Later, we will produce a report.

From our physicist in Ukraine: Last night was a new absolute record Shaheds  launched by russia: 472 On the night of June 1 (starting at 7:30 p.m. on May 31), Russia attacked with 479 air attack weapons: - 472 Shahed-type strike UAVs and various types of drone simulators from the following directions: Millerovo, Shatalovo, Kursk, Orel, Bryansk, Primorsko-Akhtarsk – Russian Federation; - 3 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from the Kursk and Voronezh regions – Russian Federation; - 4 air- and ground-based cruise missiles X-101, Iskander-K.

We are not publishing commercial satellite images of the explosion at a port at Bandar Abbas, but today’s images show two warehouses totally destroyed with numerous containers destroyed by blast and fire. And the fire is still smoldering. What a disaster!

Based on the new IAEA quarterly report, Iran’s breakout timelines to make WGU are now shorter than in August. It can now make enough WGU, taken as 25 kg per weapon, for almost ten nuclear weapons in one month, 13 in two months, 14 in three months, 15 in four months, and 16 in five months.

1/ Check out today’s WSJ editorial, quoting @DAVIDHALBRIGHT1 and @SarahBurkhard wsj.com/opinion/iran-n…

🚨Available Now: The Peddling Peril Index for 2023/2024 –the fourth edition of our in-house ranking of strategic trade control systems– is out! Get your copy on Amazon here: a.co/d/7HS1SrF 1/

Some closeups of pre- and post-attack images at Cape Fiolent, Crimea and a site in Yeysk.

Electronics shipped from Netherlands to Russia via .. the Maldives 🏝️ houthoff.com/insights/news-…

What are the diplomatic actions to be taken by the Biden administration and other members of the G7 as a result of Iran’s massive attack against Israel? They should be guided by the simple principle that the US and its allies have taken their gloves off. No brainers, in no particular order, include: 1. SnapBack of sanctions and embargoes by E3 under JCPOA 2. All list IRGC as a terrorist organization. 3. No more sanction-related payments of any type to Iran. 4. Increased sanctions and enforcement 5. Real support for the IAEA in its struggle with Iran to declare its nuclear materials and activities completely 6. Congress rapidly pass supplemental aid for Israel and Ukraine 7. Seriously stepped up efforts to disrupt Iran’s supply chain for missiles and drones 8. Increased disruption and attacks against Iranian proxies in Yemen and Iraq 9. Increased US military presence in region, with multilateral exercises and clear statements that another attack or any movement to build nuclear weapons will face a military response Given Iran’s actions, this list strikes me as a minimal. Others can think of more items to add

A parts dealer in Gabon reportedly supplied Russia with sanctioned aircraft parts worth almost 1.5 billion dollars. As Russia gets more creative in its sanctions evasions efforts, many countries that lack export controls are vulnerable to exploitation. 1/ aero.de/news-47196/Wie…

Yesterday, OFAC sanctioned entities in Iran, Turkey, Oman, & Germany for purchasing carbon fiber, epoxy resin, antennas, etc. for Iran's missile program. Some procurements went to entities directly tied to Iran's enrichment program, TESA & Kalaye Electric home.treasury.gov/news/press-rle…

This case is a great example of the immense importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which makes it mandatory for all UN members to have adequate controls to prevent the trafficking of WMD and related materials by non-state actors. 1/ justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/u…

The new leaked documents about #Alabuga and Iran need to be checked for their authenticity, but so far they seem genuine. We will be checking this out further. However, the reported average cost per #Shahed 136 seems high for what JSC Alabuga will pay to make Shahed 136 drones. One must keep in mind JSC Alabuga has been creating a Shahed 136 manufacturing plant with considerable capital expenses, expected to last for considerably longer than the 2.5 years of the initial Russian Ministry of Defense order of 6000 drones. Some of these capital expenses went to Iran to pay for technology, training, and manufacturing-related goods. So averaging over the 6000 drones in the first order is overestimating the unit cost for the life of the plant. JSC Alabuga in fact projected a per drone cost of 5 million rubles (about $70,000 to $80,000). The initial order of 600 whole, but disassembled, Shahed 136 drones, all delivered by June 30, 2023, may have had a considerably higher cost per drone. That is to be expected, given that Iran was free to charge what it could get away with, and there were expensive projected delivery costs (about $50,000 per drone). Anyway, we look forward to analyzing the new information and will be reexamining all these numbers.

If fully operational, this reactor’s plutonium would allow NK to significantly increase its nuclear arsenal of smaller, more powerful, missile deliverable nuclear warheads. “Second North Korean nuclear reactor appears to be operational, IAEA says” Reuters reuters.com/business/energ…

The link to the recording is here: twitter.com/i/spaces/1djGX…