Chuks

🇳🇬 EXPOSED - NIDCOM Boss Abike Dabiri-Erewa’s Vulgar Social Media Meltdowns Undermine Nigeria’s Global Image, Fuel Diaspora Profiling The Chairman of the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, Abike Dabiri-Erewa, is under growing criticism from Nigerians for repeated use of insulting and unprofessional language on social media, with concerns that the conduct is damaging Nigeria’s international reputation. Her posts in April 2026 have drawn particular attention. In one instance, she wrote “Obingo 😩 Obi diot 🤣🤣🤣,” widely seen as a jab at supporters of Peter Obi. In other exchanges, she referred to Nigerians as “professional hackers,” “warped minds,” and used terms such as “Didinrin,” “Dodoyo,” and “mugu.” This is not an isolated pattern. In June 2024, she described journalist Samuel Ogundipe as “useless,” “miserable,” and “pathetic,” reinforcing concerns raised by Nigerians about her approach to public communication. Nigerians say the role of the NIDCOM chairman requires disciplined and measured engagement, especially when representing citizens abroad. Public communication from that office carries international visibility and reflects directly on the country. Many Nigerians in the diaspora already face scrutiny in different countries, and there are concerns that statements from a senior official that appear hostile or dismissive could reinforce negative perceptions and weaken Nigeria’s image. The issue remains clear. Public officials at this level are expected to communicate with restraint and professionalism, and Nigerians say repeated departures from that standard continue to raise serious questions about the country’s global standing.

OPERATION HADIN KAI: AIR COMPONENT NEUTRALISES TERRORIST LOGISTICS HUB AND ENCLAVE IN PRECISION AIR STRIKE AT JILLI, GUBIO LGA OF BORNO STATE The Air Component of Joint Task Force (North East) Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK), in a carefully planned and intelligence-driven operation, has successfully conducted a precision air strike on a known terrorist enclave and logistics hub located near the abandoned village of Jilli in Gubio Local Government Area of Borno State. The successful strike, executed on 11 April 2026, followed sustained intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions over the Bindul–Jilli axis, an area long identified as a major terrorist movement corridor and convergence point for Islamic State West Africa Province terrorists and their collaborators. It will be recalled that in January 2026, troops moving from Gubio towards Damasak came under a major Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack along the road at Bindul, resulting in the tragic loss of eight soldiers, while several others were wounded in action. More recently, on 9 April, coordinated attacks were recorded in Ngamdu and Benisheik, supported by the same terrorist logistics network. Consequently, the Theatre intensified overhead surveillance and intelligence gathering across the area in response to persistent reports of terrorist movement and logistics activity. On 11 April 2026, multiple reports were received of ISWAP Gun Trucks(GT) and Motorcycles (MC) moving along the axis. Consequently, ISR coverage over the area was immediately intensified. During the surveillance mission, a contingent of motorcycles was observed moving in the direction of Jilli, followed shortly by the movement of several additional vehicles, all converging on the same location. These suspicious movements were subsequently corroborated by credible human intelligence sources, confirming that the converging elements were terrorists, their collaborators, and logistics handlers. In line with established operational procedures, a rigorous and professional targeting process was undertaken. Target fidelity was confirmed through multiple credible Human Intelligence sources, supported by persistent aerial surveillance. Upon final validation, the Air Component executed a series of precision strikes on the objective, while Surveillance platforms maintained continuous overwatch for real-time battle damage assessment. Post-strike assessment confirmed that the target area was struck with high accuracy, resulting in the destruction of the identified terrorist logistics enclave. Scores of terrorists were neutralised in the strike, with their vehicles and technicals destroyed, while surviving elements were observed fleeing in multiple directions. Intelligence further indicates that the neutralised elements were in the final stages of receiving logistics from couriers, for coordinated attacks on troop locations within the Gubio axis. This decisive action has therefore significantly disrupted imminent terrorist plans and degraded their operational capability within the Theatre. Instructively, on 12 April 2026, a terrorist logistics courier identified as “Turja Bulu”, was arrested at Ngamdu Town, and upon preliminary investigation confessed that he took part in the attack at 29 Bde location on 9 April 2026 at Benisheik and had been dispatched by ISWAP from Jilli where most of his fellow terrorists were hibernating to provide food items for another group of terrorists currently hibernating around the Magumeri-Gubio General Area.

Many Nigerians still view ISWAP via the lens of the pre-2015 insurgency, a bunch of ragtag militia. That perception is outdated. The growing tactical exchanges between ISWAP and ISGS is enabling the cross-border flow of foreign fighters, including Caucasians, adding new dimension to the conflict. In recent times, there has been a noticeable influx of these fighters into ISWAP’s core heartland in the predominantly Kanuri-speaking areas of northeastern Nigeria, bringing with them advanced tactics, combat experience, and operational expertise. It is this foreign expertise that is reshaping the battlefield dynamics in the northeast and the Lake Chad region. With international links providing training, funding, and operational support, these guys now have access to tactical gear, night vision goggles, and even armed drones. We are confronting a well equipped, highly coordinated, and tactically savvy group, with fighters in numbers that rivals or exceeds that of several West African national militaries. One capability they consistently struggle to counter is the Nigerian Air Force. Sustained aerial bombardment and precision strikes degrade their operational stability and impose significant psychological pressure. It remains a domain they have limited control and no effective defense. Unfortunately, this advantage cannot yet be fully exploited due to gaps in tactical air assets. The delivery of two M-346FA squadrons and one AH-1Z Viper attack helicopter Squadron will significantly enhance the NAF operational depth. When they arrive, the window ISWAP has used to exploit limited air coverage will come to an end,

When I was Muslim, I never talked in the bathroom and toilet because I was told Jinns (spirits) live there. Those were crazy times! 😂