Confuso

What is happening, in fact, is that Muhammad al-Halbousi has given one year from his side’s two-year share of the Kirkuk governorship to the Turkmen, and it is a very smart move. Here is why: Halbousi clearly has big ambitions, and giving up one year of the governorship is a small concession for potentially much larger gains. It would be the first time a Turkmen holds the post since the early years of the Iraqi state. The symbolic value is significant, especially in a province like Kirkuk, where the Turkmen sit between Kurds and Arabs and can tip the balance in an ethnically mixed arena. In the last election, the Kurdish parties together won five seats, the Arabs won five, and the Turkmen won two. That is exactly why the Turkmen matter as kingmakers. This will be seen as a major gesture toward them. Since it also requires PUK approval, some of the credit will go there as well, but it is more clearly a Halbousi move. Beyond local demographics, it will also be seen as a gesture toward Turkey, strengthening Halbousi’s regional ties at the KDP’s expense. It also shows the kind of game he is playing. He is being highly strategic in how he builds alliances and distributes concessions. By contrast, the two main Kurdish parties remain absorbed in low-quality petty games. Reporting like this from KDP media, although aimed at the PUK, actually weakens the broader Kurdish position in Kirkuk, where Kurdish influence depends on maintaining allies among other groups. The result is to undermine Kurdish standing across the disputed territories. Not everything is about Kurds alone. Without building ties with other ethnic and sectarian communities, they risk losing them for good.

Barzani liderliği ve KDP, Suriye’deki süreci büyük bir yenilgi ya da “Rojava’nın çöküşü” olarak okumuyor. Bu konuda Türkçe yürüyen tartışma, Erbil’in pozisyonundan oldukça uzak. Barzani liderliğinin yaklaşımı özetle şöyle: •Suriye’de varılan ateşkes ve anlaşma sayesinde Kürtlerin diplomatik masanın dışına itileceği bir savaş senaryosundan korunmasını önemli bir başarı olarak görüyor. •Rojava’yı da kapsayabilecek bölgesel askerî manevra riskinin şimdilik ertelenmiş olmasından memnuniyet duyuyor. •SDG’ye bağlı Kürt birliklerinin şehirlerin dışına çekilerek varlığını sürdürmesinin güvence altına alınmasını bir kazanım olarak değerlendiriyor. •Suriye ordusunun Kürt şehirlerine girmemesini olumlu karşılıyor. •Şam’la yeni bir diyalog sürecinin başlamasını olumlu bir gelişme olarak görüyor. •Türkiye’deki çözüm sürecinin Suriye sahası nedeniyle zorlandığını, ancak kalıcı bir zarar görmeden bu sürecin atlatıldığını düşünüyor. •Rojava krizinde izlenen diplomatik hattın, Beyaz Saray’ın Kürt politikasına olumlu yönde etki ettiğini değerlendiriyor. •Suriye’deki yeni anlaşmayı bir son değil, bir başlangıç olarak okuyor. Bunların dışında dile getirilen yorumlar hiçbir şekilde Erbil’in yaklaşımını yansıtmıyor.

As more details of the SDF-Damascus agreement become available, the contours of the deal can be summarised in five points: 1. Integration and the Hasakah division. The text states that in Hasakah, SDF forces will be integrated into a division that the Syrian government will create in the governorate, with SDF integrated into three brigades. That wording strongly suggests the Hasakah division will include additional brigades beyond the three allocated to SDF personnel, without specifying the total number. In the new Syrian military structure, some divisions appear to have four brigades (as in Daraa), while others have more (one Aleppo division, for example, is described as having six). More importantly, the language implies that division-level command will sit with the Syrian Ministry of Defense, while the SDF presence is capped at the brigade level. This matters because a division HQ is where real authority sits: even if brigades retain cohesion on paper, a division commander who answers to Damascus controls tasking, deployment, and operational priorities. The draft also does not state that the three SDF brigades will be confined to Kurdish-majority areas. In theory, the division commander could redeploy an SDF brigade to places like al-Shaddadi - still within Hasakah governorate, but in areas currently under stronger government control. In practice, the arrangement may be managed more cautiously, but the shift is still significant: before the recent SDF territorial losses, the SDF was pushing for three full divisions; the current text points instead to three brigades (plus a separate brigade arrangement in Kobani) within a Damascus-created division. 2. The agreement stipulates that the Syrian Army retreats to Shaddadi, further south of Hasakah city, but equally important, it conditions SDF withdrawal from Hasakah and Qamishli. It also states: "Prohibit the entry of military forces into cities and towns by all parties, especially in Kurdish areas." However, it permits 15 security vehicles to enter each of Hasakah and Qamishli, a rather symbolic step, as SDF officials have noted. The tension is obvious: other clauses point to much deeper state re-entry, including the handover of remaining oilfields in Rmelan and al-Suwaydiyah, Qamishli airport, and the two key crossings, Semalka with Iraq’s Kurdistan Region and Nusaybin with Turkey, alongside a broader takeover of civilian institutions across Hasakah governorate. If these sites are handed to Syrian ministries, a crucial operational question follows: who provides the armed protection on the ground, and under what chain of command? 3. Another significant provision requires licensing all local organisations, cultural associations, and media institutions in accordance with the laws of the relevant Syrian ministries. Combined with the government takeover of civilian institutions, this substantially reduces the autonomy SDF-held areas currently enjoy. If implemented as written, there will be no distinct legal framework beyond education in Kurdish. 4. Compared to the January 18 framework, this text is more detailed and arguably more workable in the short term. But it also points toward a more centralised outcome, with SDF-held areas absorbing state institutions and laws. Security integration is mentioned, but there is no clear quota or binding formula that guarantees the weight of SDF-affiliated personnel within the new security architecture. The Hasakah security chief, for example, is nominated by the Syrian government, and nothing in the text prevents Damascus from staffing Hasakah and Qamishli with personnel outside the SDF framework. The document also leaves ambiguity around what exactly is meant by “Kurdish areas,” especially given the phrasing “especially in Kurdish areas,” which implicitly acknowledges that not all SDF-held areas are "Kurdish areas". 5. Despite these limitations, the Hasakah governorship and deputy/assistant defence minister positions that SDF is set to receive are meaningful posts with legally assigned powers, not merely token appointments. However, the deputy/assistant minister is appointed by decree specifying their tasks and competences, so the importance of this post will ultimately depend on what responsibilities the SDF appointee is assigned.