Kaushal Kumar Singh

@inner_concerns Started with pre-requisite knowledge required to understand it. So my first book is "An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography".

@TheCyyber That's exciting. Where are you starting?

Starting my journey into zero-knowledge… with zero knowledge. #PostQuantum #Blockchain #Crypto

QRL ( $QRL ) A live Layer 1 focused on post-quantum security since genesis using hash-based cryptography. Referenced by Google Quantum AI researchers: quantumai.google/static/site-as… Referenced in a Lockheed Martin patent: patents.google.com/patent/US20240… Feels massively overlooked right now. 👀

project you bullieve in? 👀

As the quantum threat to current cryptography becomes harder to ignore, exchanges may want to start evaluating projects already built for that future. Quantum Resistant Ledger ( $QRL ) is a live Layer 1 using hash-based signatures since 2018 - not a planned upgrade. Referenced in Google Quantum AI research: quantumai.google/static/site-as… And in a Lockheed Martin patent: patents.google.com/patent/US20240… @upbitglobal - worth a closer look. #PostQuantum #Blockchain #Crypto

Quantum Resistant Ledger ( $QRL ) @QRLedger They promised a quantum-resistant blockchain since genesis. They delivered it. Referenced by Google Quantum AI quantumai.google/static/site-as… Cited in a Lockheed Martin patent patents.google.com/patent/US20240… Fully transparent & verifiable - though supply verification on @CoinMarketCap is still pending despite all details submitted.

Which project? What they promised: ■■■□□ What they delivered: ■■■■■

@r8raq Standardized PQ cryptography gives us signatures and KEMs, but migration isn’t just about primitives. We still lack NIST-level, well-reviewed solutions for aggregation, efficient ZK, and composability-key gaps for real-world systems.

@TheCyyber Are hash-based, and lattice ones above enough for all applied scenarios? Kaushal!

Post-quantum cryptography is progressing, but we're not "done." We have: • Dilithium, Falcon, XMSS, SPHINCS+ (signatures) • Kyber (KEMs) But we still lack: • Efficient ZK • Threshold & multi-sig (mature) • BLS-like aggregation The hard part is just beginning. #PostQuantum #Crypto #Blockchain

Based on my current understanding of ZK, I don't think STARK-proving CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA-87) verification is efficient for small batches if we keep the NIST-standardized hash functions unchanged. The same likely applies to SPHINCS+ / SLH-DSA: it may be provable, but not cheap enough to act like practical signature aggregation & the prover memory requirements can also be substantial.

@TheCyyber Efficient zk? Never heard of hash-based proofs?

Thank you for explaining zero-knowledge proofs in such an accessible way. I've just ordered the book. I'm interested in exploring the topic more deeply from a technical perspective-could you recommend additional resources that cover the mathematics and cryptography required to implement advanced ZK protocols?

Everyone's chasing the next $1 billion coin… but ignoring the one problem that could break them all: quantum risk. Quantum Resistant Ledger ( $QRL ) solved this in 2018 - live mainnet, not a roadmap. Referenced by Google Quantum AI: quantumai.google/static/site-as… And in a Lockheed Martin patent: patents.google.com/patent/US20240… Most people haven't noticed yet. That's how early it still is. @Bybit_Official @benbybit - are you watching? #PostQuantum #Crypto #Blockchain

Quantum Resistant Ledger ( $QRL ) has been live since 2018, already implementing post-quantum security using hash-based signatures (XMSS), not waiting for a future upgrade. Referenced by: • Google Quantum AI research quantumai.google/static/site-as… • Lockheed Martin patent patents.google.com/patent/US20240… Real, production-ready PQC infrastructure exists today - it's just being overlooked.

quantum computing breaking current encryption is a known problem most crypto projects are just pretending it won't happen @quipnetwork is literally building the defense layer right now post quantum security on btc eth sol without touching the underlying chains plus a shared compute marketplace so you don't need a $20m machine to access quantum hardware airdrop still live, nodes running on normal machines most people haven't noticed yet and that's the point

Quantum risk is approaching, and hardware wallets need to be ready. Future devices should be designed to easily support post-quantum schemes like ML-DSA-87 and SPHINCS+ - without extreme optimization tradeoffs. Building PQ-ready hardware today will define crypto security tomorrow. @Ledger - hope this is already part of the roadmap. 🔐⚛️ #PostQuantum #Crypto #Blockchain

@WySiWyG2076 @QSecurity4all Honestly, what surprised me most is how fast post-quantum crypto matured on paper but how slow it's been to actually get adopted. With NIST standardizing PQC, it's not really a theoretical problem anymore. Now it's more about whether real-world systems catch up in time.

@TheCyyber @QSecurity4all @TheCyyber a decade in the quantum-crypto trenches shapes perspective. What’s the most surprising development you’ve seen in the last decade?

When should the crypto ecosystem start taking quantum threats seriously? Honestly, I think the answer is already now — just not in a panic mode. 🧵👇

By the time quantum becomes an obvious threat, it'll already be too late to start from scratch. That's the part most people underestimate. #PostQuantum #Crypto #Blockchain

Personally, I don’t think quantum is a "tomorrow problem". But it’s also not a "ignore until it hits" problem. It’s one of those things where early preparation is the only realistic option.

Standards are already coming out of NIST. And some projects didn’t wait for the problem to become urgent. Quantum Resistant Ledger ( $QRL ) is one example - built around XMSS from day one.

So "taking it seriously" doesn’t mean hype or fear. It means: • Designing for crypto agility • Thinking about migration paths early • Reducing unnecessary key exposure Basic engineering discipline.

There’s also the part people ignore: Public keys exposed today don’t disappear. They can be stored now and attacked later. Especially for chains where keys are already revealed.

Once large-scale quantum machines exist, algorithms like Shor’s algorithm won’t give you a warning period. Attackers need a short window. Defenders need years of coordination. That mismatch is the real risk.

Even today, most users still reuse addresses, don’t rotate keys, and delay upgrades. Expecting a smooth post-quantum migration across the entire ecosystem is… optimistic.